Georgians want their government to support Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, David Sichinava, Anano Kipiani, Kristina Vacharadze, Nino Mzhavanadze, and Makhare Atchaidze, CRRC Georgia staff members. The views presented within the article reflect the views of the authors' alone, and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has shocked the world. The war also shook Georgia, with new polling from CRRC Georgia revealing the extent of the political fallout so far.

The implications of the war for Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy and politics are wide-ranging. The official Georgian response to the war was incongruous: while the Prime Minister, Irakli Gharibashvili, flatly stated Georgia would not join the West in sanctioning Russia, the President, Salome Zourabishvili, went on a media and diplomatic blitz in Europe voicing strong support for Ukraine. 

In contrast to the government’s response to the war, the public’s response was clear. Georgians have been rallying in support of Ukraine in city, town, and village.

In light of the war in Ukraine and the surrounding upheaval in Georgia, CRRC Georgia conducted a survey between 7–10 March which included 1,092 respondents. The results lead to a range of conclusions around who Georgians blame for the war (Russia), what Georgians want the government to do (support Ukraine), and the domestic political fallout of the government’s response (Georgian Dream has lost significant support).

Georgians blame Russia for the war

The vast majority of the Georgian public places responsibility for the war on Russia (43%) or Vladimer Putin (37%). Other responses were named by 3% or less of the public, aside from uncertain responses (9%).

The public was also asked about Russia’s motivation for the war. The data indicates that most people believe that Russia started the war to conquer territory (34%) or Ukraine specifically (25%), to revive the Soviet Union (20%), and to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO (17%). Other responses were named by less than 10% of people.

The public wants the Georgian Government to support Ukraine

The survey asked respondents whether they think the Government of Georgia should support the Government of Ukraine more, at its current level, a bit less than at present, or not at all. A large majority of the public reported that they should support Ukraine more (61%) or at current levels (32%). Only 2% said less than at current levels and 1% not at all.

Aside from the above, respondents were asked whether a number of different actions would be acceptable or unacceptable for the Government to take in response to the crisis. 

The vast majority of Georgians support supplying humanitarian aid to Ukraine (97%), accepting Ukrainian refugees (96%), and providing financial assistance to Ukraine (91%).

Two-thirds of people (66%) support allowing Georgian volunteers to travel to Ukraine, something the government has attempted to block.

Around half (52%) would support the Georgian government arming Ukraine.

The public wants Georgia to participate in sanctions

The public wants sanctions against Russia to be stronger, and a majority want Georgia to join them. This stands in stark contrast to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s rejection of sanctions.

The survey asked whether the public thought the countries which have imposed sanctions on Russia should strengthen them, keep them at current levels, lighten them, or not sanction Russia at all. 

The results show that a large majority think that sanctions should either be strengthened (71%) or remain at current levels (10%). Only 4% think the sanctions should be lightened, and 3% think they should be removed entirely.

When asked whether the Government of Georgia should join in the sanctions, a majority agreed with this view (66%). Views were split on whether Georgia should participate in all sanctions (39%) or some of the sanctions (27%). Only 19% reported that Georgia should not participate in the sanctions at all. A further 14% were uncertain on this issue.

Georgia and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Future

In light of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, a move quickly followed by Georgia and Moldova. 

Public opinion strongly supports Georgia and Ukraine’s application to candidate status. At the same time, there has been little movement in terms of overall support for Georgia’s membership in the EU and NATO (which was already high) since the start of the war.

Respondents to the survey were asked how strongly they supported or did not support Ukraine and Georgia becoming candidates in the European Union. The data indicates strong support from the Georgian public for both countries becoming candidates in the European Union.

Respondents on the survey were asked how strongly they support Georgia’s integration with the European Union, NATO, and the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. 

Data from the 2020 Caucasus Barometer survey using the same question wording and answer options found that 73% of Georgians supported EU membership and 71% supported NATO membership. Today, 75% support EU membership and 70% support NATO membership, statistically indistinguishable shares from the 2020 data.

The president and prime minister’s performance on the war

The Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili, has received significant criticism for his response to the war. While large swaths of the world imposed sanctions on Russia, Gharibashvili firmly stated that Georgia would not participate in the sanctions. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, even tweeted a thank you to the Georgian public for its support, while slighting the Georgian government for its lack thereof. 

In contrast to the Prime Minister, the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabishvili, has received broad praise for her performance in relation to the conflict. Zourabishvili expressed clear support for Ukraine in the conflict and travelled throughout Europe on a media and diplomatic tour in support of Ukraine.

Given the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the public is significantly more approving of the president’s performance in relation to the war than of the prime minister’s work.

While 64% of the public approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 41% approved of Gharibashvili’s performance, a 23 percentage point gap. In contrast, 15% of the public disapproved of Zourabishvili’s performance while 39% disapproved of Gharibashvili’s performance. This leads to a net approval for Zourabishvili of +49% and a net approval rating of +2% for Gharibashvili.

When looking at data broken down by party preferences, the data indicates that Salome Zourabishvili’s performance level being higher than Gharibashvili’s stems from a greater degree of support from the opposition: while 61% of opposition supporters approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 32% supported Gharibashvili’s performance. In contrast, Gharibashvili and Zourabishvili had quite similar levels of approval from supporters of Georgian Dream.

The political fallout

With Gharibashvili’s unpopular response to the war, it is unsurprising that Georgian Dream’s base of political support has shrunken.

To identify respondents’ political preferences, the survey asked respondents a) who they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. If the respondent was uncertain, they were asked who they sympathised with compared to other parties. 

The data showed a 10 percentage point decline in support for Georgian Dream. At present, 22% of respondents would support Georgian Dream in elections held tomorrow. This compares to 32% of respondents on a January 2022 survey. 

That is to say, Georgian Dream has, at least temporarily, lost around a third of its voters.

However, it is unclear whether this loss is permanent. The data does not show a gain in support for the opposition relative to January. Rather, the public became increasingly uncertain over who they would support. 

On the January 2022 CRRC Omnibus survey, 27% of respondents reported they were uncertain about who they would support in parliamentary elections, while in the March Ukraine survey, 38% of respondents reported the same, a twelve percentage point increase. 

The data also shows a slight decline in support for the opposition, with 25% supporting an opposition party in January of 2022, compared with 20% in March. 

The remaining respondents refused to answer which party they would support, the share of which shifted within the margin of error between the two surveys (20% in March and 17% in January).

While the official response to Russia’s war has been lackadaisical, the public unambiguously support Ukraine and support doing almost anything to help the country in its fight against Russia. The Georgian public’s views of the country’s Euro-Atlantic future has changed little. However, the public’s view of the government has changed, with Georgian Dream, at least temporarily, losing around a third of its supporters. 

The data this article is based on is available here.

Young Georgians do not want a military solution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia, and David Sichinava, Research Director at CRRC Georgia. All views, place names, and terminology used in this article are the words of the authors alone, and may not necessarily reflect the views of OC Media’s editorial board, CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised fears in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that military aggression might be expected from Georgia. As Russia mobilised its military along Ukraine’s borders, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia declared military readiness to avoid ‘possible provocation from Georgian authorities’, while the de facto authorities in South Ossetia ordered an examination of its troops. 

Despite sponsored videos attempting to provoke this type of response in Georgia, as well as Western commentators questioning whether Georgia might attempt a military response, Georgian authorities have not hinted at the prospect of any military incursion in the two regions amidst the war in Ukraine. Government affiliated media have also not made any argument for doing so. 

Moreover, Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories rejects the pursuit of a military solution altogether and aims to achieve the ‘full de-occupation’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through peaceful means.

Recently released data from the CRRC Georgia and Caucasian House Survey on Youth Civic and Political Engagement and Participation in Peacebuilding shows that young people in Georgia support this policy approach. 

The survey was administered in the summer of 2021 and interviewed 1,116 Georgians between the ages of 18–29. 

The survey asked whether the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be resolved by the use of force or through negotiations. 

The overwhelming majority (95%) of young Georgians said that they supported negotiations rather than the use of force. Only 2% said that the conflicts should be resolved by force, while 3% had no opinion.

The majority of young people in Georgia were in favour of reconciliation and forgetting about past hostilities. Almost two-thirds (62%) agreed that it was necessary to forget the past and think about the future together to have peace with Abkhazians and Ossetians. About the same share (64%) said that ordinary people currently living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were as much victims of the conflicts as Georgians. 

At the same time, a majority of young Georgians disagreed (60%) with the idea that ‘it is important for us to be the first to apologise to Abkhazians and Ossetians for war crimes committed by the Georgian side’. A fifth (19%) neither agreed nor disagreed, while 11% agreed with the idea. A further 10% were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Aside from supporting the peaceful resolution of the conflict, a majority of young Georgians (66%) reported they were willing to participate in reconciliation efforts. Ethnic Georgians (69%) were more willing to participate in efforts aimed at reconciliation compared to ethnic minorities (42%). So were those who were working (72%) compared to respondents (62%) who were not. 

Young Georgians who said they knew someone currently living in South Ossetia were more likely to be willing to participate in reconciliation efforts (77%) compared to those who had no acquaintances there (68%). Importantly, having acquaintances in Abkhazia was not associated with willingness to participate in reconciliation efforts.

Young Georgians who claimed that they were well-informed about the conflicts were more likely to express a willingness to participate in reconciliation (82%), than those with lower levels of awareness (57%).

Those who agreed that Georgians should forget about the past and think about the future with Abkhazians and Ossetians were also more predisposed towards participation in reconciliation efforts (75%) compared to those who were against forgetting (56%). Still, the majority in both groups were willing to take part in peacebuilding activities.

The results of the CRRC Georgia/Caucasian House study reflect the generally peaceful attitudes of Georgians towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

An earlier study conducted in April 2020 for Conciliation Resources showed that a majority (71%) of Georgians regardless of age believed that the Georgian government was in a position to step up and improve relations between Georgian and Abkhazian societies. 

A large majority of the public supported direct dialogue with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia (70%). The next most commonly supported step was the identification of common interests and the development of joint solutions to problems (48%). 

In the light of Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, fears arose around whether Georgia might pursue a military escalation towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nonetheless, neither evidence on the ground, nor public opinion in Georgia show an appetite for such a pursuit. 

The Georgian public, including young people, is overwhelmingly against forced re-incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia, and most support the improvement of relations with the societies there. 

While the data presented here was collected prior to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, and public opinion can shift drastically amidst changing political situations, this data is a good reminder that an overwhelming majority of Georgians, including its youth, look for peace, not war.

Note: The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

The analysis was carried out using multinomial regression. The regression modelling the willingness to participate in the reconciliation efforts included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–23, 24-29), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), experience of job loss due to pandemic (lost job or not), current perceived economic rung (lower, medium, higher), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), party affiliation (Governing party, opposition, no party, don’t know/refuse to answer), and durable goods index. Non-demographic variables tested as part of the analysis included interest in current interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (interested, neutral, not interested), interest in Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s politics (interested, neutral, not interested), having acquaintances in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia (having, not having), acquaintance with Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s conflicts (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards the need of forgetting the past and thinking about the future together for peace (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia being as much victims of conflicts as Georgians (agree, neutral, disagree). 

A different kind of social distance

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity. 

While the pandemic made ‘social distance’ about physically staying apart from one another, long before that, social distance in the social sciences measured inter-group acceptance, tolerance, and/or prejudice. The same approach is used in post-conflict settings to measure the extent of alienation between conflict divided societies, with studies suggesting that social boundaries grow between people across conflict lines when there is a lack of interaction. 

CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey has examined two dimensions of social distance over the years: 

• Approval of women of one’s ethnicity marrying into another ethnicity, measuring willingness to have an immediate and close relationship with a person;
• Approval of people of one’s ethnicity doing business with another ethnicity, measuring willingness to have a less immediate and intimate, but still close relationship with another ethnicity. 

Data from the Caucasus Barometer survey has regularly shown that Georgians are more accepting of doing business with other ethnicities, rather than of marrying them. The data from 2019 suggests a similar trend. 

The data also indicates that Georgians feel similarly distant to those living on the other side of the conflict line (i.e. to Abkhazians and Ossetians) as to ethnic minorities living in Georgia (Armenians and Azerbaijanis). 

Time series data shows that Georgian disapproval of doing business with or women marrying Abkhazians or Ossetians has not changed much over the last decade. Disapproval of such social interactions even decreased slightly. As in 2019, the differences in approval of doing business with or women marrying Abkhazians or Ossetians have been more or less in line with the approval of such interactions with Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in Georgia over the years. 

Further analysis suggests that different factors are associated with the acceptance of business and familial relations with different ethnicities. 

Trust in others is associated with the acceptance of inter-ethnic business relations. People who are generally trusting are more likely to be accepting of business relations with all groups noted here compared to those who believe that one cannot be too careful in dealing with people. 

Age is associated with acceptance of business relations with some ethnicities, with younger age groups being slightly more accepting compared to older age groups. 

Gender and ethnicity are associated with acceptance of business relations with some ethnicities. Women and ethnic Georgians appear to be less accepting in this regard. 

Interestingly, while several factors are related to acceptance of business relations with Abkhazians, Ossetians, and Azerbaijanis living in Georgia, only generalized trust is associated with acceptance of doing business with Armenians living in Georgia. 

Religious affiliation, household income, and employment situation are associated only with acceptance of doing business with Azerbaijanis (not presented on the chart below).

Other demographic variables, such as settlement type, educational attainment, several economic well-being measures, the importance of religion in daily life, and interest in permanent emigration did not show any association with approval of doing business with any of the ethnicities noted here. 

The factors associated with approval of inter-ethnic marriage differ from those associated with approval of doing business with other ethnic groups. 

The importance of religion in daily life is associated with acceptance of women marrying all of the ethnic groups considered here. Those that do not find religion important in daily life are notably more accepting of inter-ethnic marriage. 

Higher education is also associated with higher levels of acceptance in all cases.

Generalised trust is associated with acceptance of marrying Abkhazians and Ossetians only, with trusting people again being more accepting compared to those who generally have low trust in people. 

Age is associated with acceptance of marriage of some ethnicities, with younger age groups again being slightly more accepting compared to older groups. 

Willingness to emigrate permanently is associated with acceptance of women marrying Armenians living in Georgia. Ethnicity, religious affiliation, and frequency of attendance at religious services are associated only with acceptance of women marrying Azerbaijanis living in Georgia (not presented on the chart).

Settlement type, employment status, and other economic well-being measures are not associated with approval of marrying any of the above mentioned ethnicities, controlling for other factors. 

The social distance between the population of Georgia proper and Abkhazians and Ossetians, has changed little over the last decade, at least on the Georgian side of the line. Yet, the data from the last decade shows that the population felt as distant from Abkhazians and Ossetians as they do with Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in Georgia. This demonstrates a challenge for reconciliation with societies on the other side of conflict lines as well as the integration of ethnic minorities into society. While general trust is consistently associated with the approval of inter-ethnic business relations among these groups, the importance of religion in daily life and educational attainment seem to be more important factors in the acceptance of inter-ethnic marriage.  

Note: The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The analysis of whether people approve or disapprove of doing business or marrying people of another ethnicity was carried out using logistic regression. In all cases, regression models included the following demographic variables: sex (male, female), age group (18–35, 35–55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian, another ethnicity), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, higher than secondary education), employment situation (working, not working); economic well-being measures: household total income (medium or high, low or none), how often family does not have money enough for food (often, less often, never); religion related measures: religious affiliation (Orthodox Church, other), frequency of attendance of religious services (frequently, sometimes, rarely, never), the importance of religion in daily life (important, not important); as well as interest in permanent emigration (interested, not interested), generalized trust (you cannot be too careful, neutral, most people can be trusted). These variables were tested independently in separate regression analyses that controlled for the demographic variables.

 For ease of reading, OC Media's style does not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply a position on their status.

How do Georgians assess the parties involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh war?

This article first appeared at the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of OC Media and CRRC Georgia. This article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.  

While polling suggests that 26% of Georgia’s population had not heard of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh last autumn, for those who had, opinions were difficult to gage. So how did Georgians view the roles of the belligerents, outside actors, and indeed their own country?

In December 2020, shortly after the end of military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, 74% of Georgians reported they had heard of the conflict that had raged there only a month prior. Among those that were aware of the conflict, the data indicate that assessing the parties directly or indirectly involved in the conflict was quite difficult. 

While Georgia’s role is assessed most positively, the roles Russia and Armenia played in the conflict seem to be viewed most negatively. In this regard, the data might reflect Georgian society’s views of its own unresolved conflicts.

Besides the belligerents to the conflict, a number of states and multilateral organisations were involved in the conflict and its resolution, including Turkey, Russia, France, the US, and the EU, among others. 

During the war, both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces were reported to have violated international humanitarian laws and the laws of war, resulting in civilian casualties and abuses of prisoners of war. 

Turkey was an open and strong supporter of Azerbaijan, while Russia, France, and the United States were involved in the ceasefire negotiations. Russia has since deployed peacekeepers in the post-conflict area to oversee the ceasefire. A joint Russian-Turkish ceasefire monitoring centre based in Azerbaijan, outside of the zone of conflict, has also been opened.  

Although Georgia remained officially neutral throughout the war and offered to facilitate dialogue, there was a great deal of disinformation regarding Georgia’s position in both Armenian and Azerbaijani media. Meanwhile, the EU expressed concern over the fighting and allocated millions in emergency aid for civilians affected by conflict, but did not play a significant diplomatic role.

While this is the backdrop in which Georgians were asked their views of the different parties involved in the conflict, it does not mean that respondents were aware of it when surveyed. Indeed, a large share of those that were aware of the conflict found it difficult to positively or negatively assess the roles of each group asked about, with between 41% and 69% unable to assess each of the actors they were asked about either positively or negatively. 

People were particularly uncertain about how to evaluate France, the US, and the EU.

Those aware of the conflict were most positive about Georgia (44%). A regression model suggests that the assessment of Georgia’s role in the conflict does not vary significantly across different groups in society. 

The next most positively assessed party was the Azerbaijani authorities (33%). While there were no significant differences across different demographic groups here either, those who distrust the media were least likely to positively assess Azerbaijan’s role. Those neutral in their trust of the media were 15 points more likely (57%), and those who trust the media were 24 points more likely (66%) to report a positive view of Azerbaijan’s role.

A quarter of those aware of the conflict assessed the role of the EU positively, and around a fifth assessed the role of Turkey, the US, and France positively.

The roles of Russia and the Armenian authorities were assessed most negatively, followed by Turkey and the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities. 

While no differences were found in the assessment of the Armenian authorities across different groups in society, the assessment of Russia was associated with respondents’ ethnicity. Ethnic Georgians were 25 percentage points less likely to assess Russia’s role positively compared to ethnic minorities, including both ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Although the reasons behind people’s views of the parties to the conflict require further research, more positive assessments of Azerbaijan might be linked to the territorial integrity issues that Georgia itself faces. 

Back in 2013, when asked about a possible solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, slightly less than half of Georgians who reported they had heard about the conflict either could not answer the questions about the future status of the territory or refused to answer the questions. Of those who did answer, more were in favor of having it as a formal part of Azerbaijan rather than of Armenia.

The data shows that although the assessment of parties involved in the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh varies, an important share of the public is unable to make any assessment. 

For those who could make assessments, Georgia’s role was seen most positively, while Russia’s role was seen negatively. Azerbaijani authorities were assessed around three times more positively than the authorities of Armenia. 

The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

The analysis of whether the roles of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia were assessed positively or negatively was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–35, 35–55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or other ethnicity: Armenian, Azerbaijani, or other), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), frequency of internet use (every day, less often, never), trust in media (distrust, neither trust nor distrust, trust).

War in Nagorno-Karabakh went unnoticed for a quarter of Georgians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands. Yet despite there being a brutal war near its borders, many in Georgia were unaware of the conflict.

Data from the Caucasus Barometer survey indicate that awareness of the conflict’s existence increased shortly after the war in 2020 compared to 2013, but only slightly. In 2013, when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was ‘frozen’, 66% of Georgians reported they had heard of it. Around a third of the population was not aware of it. In December of 2020, shortly after the 44-day long war, 74% of Georgians reported they had heard of it.  A whole quarter (26%) of the population, meanwhile, was not aware of military operations between the country’s two direct neighbours. 

A regression model suggests that some groups in Georgian society were more likely to be aware of the conflict than others. Considering Georgia has a large population of ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, among others, it does not come as a surprise that ethnic minorities are 18 percentage points more likely than ethnic Georgians to be aware of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, all else being equal.

Controlling for other factors, men were 13 percentage points more likely to have heard about the war compared to women. 

Older people were more likely to be aware of the conflict than younger people. People aged 18-35 were 10 percentage points less likely to have heard of the conflict compared to those aged 35-54, and 13 percentage points less likely compared to older people (55+). 

Access to information is presumably also associated with awareness. Those living in Tbilisi, where access to information is better, were significantly more likely to be aware of the conflict compared to people in other cities and settlements, while no notable differences are found between those living in other cities and rural areas. Similarly, people with higher education were more likely to be aware of the conflict than those with secondary or lower education. Regular internet users were six percentage points more likely to have heard of the conflict, all else equal, compared to irregular users. 

Employment status, being displaced due to previous conflicts in the region, and general trust in the media were also analysed, but do not show statistically significant differences. 

Despite a war raging near its borders, a quarter of the Georgian public was unaware of it. An indirect link of awareness with access to information appears to be present in the data and a number of other variables were also significant predictors of awareness, but the reasons behind their significance require further research.

The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The analysis of which groups were aware or not aware of the war was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–35, 35–55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or other ethnicity), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), frequency of internet use (every day, less often, never), trust in media (distrust, neither trust nor distrust, trust).

Georgians increasingly open to compromise with Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Note: This article was written by David Sichinava, CRRC Georgia's Research Director, and co-published with OC Media. It is based on an article published in the Caucasus Analytical Digest. The views presented in the article represent the views of the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

Territorial integrity has been consistently ranked among the top issues in Georgian public opinion polls. But data from the 2019 Caucasus Barometer survey shows that many in Georgia are open to compromise.

The issue of territorial integrity remains a top concern for many Georgians, albeit with declining salience. In 2009, a CRRC/NDI public opinion poll showed that 49% perceived territorial integrity as the top national issue. Only 29% named it in a similar survey conducted in 2019.

Despite its salience, relatively little is known about what the Georgian public think about conflict resolution or the country’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or what type of relations Georgia should have with them.

The 2013 and 2019 CRRC Caucasus Barometer surveys show that Georgians strongly prefer models that maintain the country’s territorial integrity. In 2019, about 87% of the populace preferred Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be directly incorporated into Georgia, a proportion that was fairly close to the 2013 number (82%).

Yet, the public also became more open to other potential solutions. In 2013, a quarter of the public supported Georgia and Abkhazia forming a confederation, while in 2019, almost half of Georgians reported the same.

In 2019, 43% of Georgians supported having a confederation that would include South Ossetia as an equal entity to Georgia. 

Poll results from 2013 show that 57% of Georgians would accept Abkhazia enjoying a high degree of autonomy within Georgia, while the proportion increased to 67% in 2019.

Who is more open to compromise?

But which groups are most open to making concessions? To investigate this, a regression model predicting the degree of openness was constructed. 

Openness was measured on a four-point index. The highest value of the index was assigned to respondents who said they would accept the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those who would be willing to accept confederacy were assigned three, respondents accepting only regional autonomy a two, and those supporting their incorporation directly into Georgia were scored as one.

Analysis showed that residents of Tbilisi were more open to compromise. The probability of a Tbilisian to score four on the index was twice as high (14%) as for a rural resident (7%). They were also more likely to score three on the index than others. 

While the Caucasus Barometer did not ask respondents whether they were displaced by the conflict, distance from the areas of conflict can be used as a proxy. 

Respondents who lived in the immediate vicinity of Abkhazia were relatively more likely to have the highest score (18%) than those who lived 40 kilometres or more from Abkhazia (13%). 

Similarly, they were more likely to score three in the scale than those residing farther away.

The pattern was the opposite in the case of South Ossetia. Those residing in proximity to the region were more likely to oppose concessions to South Ossetia, with a mere 8% chance of scoring four on the compromise scale.

It would appear that Georgians are increasingly willing to consider alternative resolutions to these territorial disputes. 

The Caucasus Barometer survey shows that Tbilisi residents are more open for a potential compromise. Those who were most likely to experience the conflicts directly have diverging opinions. 

While the Georgian public seems to be more open to change than in the past, this does not guarantee that the peace process will find a way forward in the immediate future. Indeed, considering the opinions of national elites and those across the boundary lines, the chances of a breakthrough are rather bleak.

Internal Displacements’ Impact on Attitudes towards Gender Relations

As a result of the conflicts in the 1990s and in 2008 in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, nearly 6 percent of Georgia’s population is internally displaced. Previous studies have suggested that internal displacement from conflict can alter attitudes towards gender relations, and specifically perceptions of women’s household authority, tolerance of domestic violence, and attitudes towards women earning money.

This may be related to the psychological impacts of conflict and displacement on everyday household gender dynamics. Some have theorized that displaced women’s roles in the household often shift to that of breadwinner, and in response men push back by becoming more of a dominant presence in the home.At the same time, women reject their new leadership role by becoming more accepting of the idea of male authority.

A matching analysis, which compares individuals with similar social and demographic backgrounds except for whether or not the respondent had been displaced by conflict, using a 2018 nationwide survey CRRC conducted for UN Women shows that the previously noted differences in attitudes are present among Georgia’s conflict displaced population.

In the survey, male respondents in general were more likely to believe that men should have the final word in the household. However, both male and female respondents displaced by conflict were more likely to believe that men should have the final word in the household than individuals not displaced by conflict that had otherwise similar backgrounds.

As it relates to domestic violence, non-displaced women were least tolerant of domestic violence as a means to keep the family together, while female displaced respondents and non-displaced male respondents were more tolerant. Moreover, male respondents displaced by conflict were more tolerant in their attitudes towards domestic violence for the sake of family preservation than all other respondents.

In relation to women earning money, female respondents were more likely to believe that a woman earning more than her husband would cause problems regardless of whether they were displaced by the conflict. However, male respondents not displaced by conflict were less likely to believe that women earning more would cause relationship problems than men displaced by conflict.

Men and women displaced by conflict are more tolerant of domestic violence over the non-displaced in Georgia. Males displaced by conflict are more likely to believe men should have the final word in the home over non-displaced individuals, and non-displaced men are less likely to believe that if women earn more than their husbands, it will cause relationship problems. These findings support past research suggesting that the process of internal displacement can lead to adverse gender norms.

Note: The above analysis is based on the use of matching together with a regression analysis, where the dependent variable is the respondent's attitudes towards gender relations. The independent variables are displacement status and sex.  The individuals in the sample were matched on the following characteristics: parental education level, age, ethnicity, settlement type, and sex. Replication code for the above analysis can be found here.

The views presented in the above blog post do not represent the views of UN Women, SDC, or any affiliated entity.

Georgian public increasingly unaware of what the European Union Monitoring Mission does

[Note: This article originally appeared at OC-Media. The article was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Policy Analyst at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia or Europe Foundation.]

As much as 81% of the population of Georgia doesn’t know what the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) does, according to the 2017 Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia survey funded by Europe Foundation and implemented by CRRC-Georgia. This lack of knowledge has increased over time, as has the prevalence of incorrect information about the EUMM’s mission. This represents a missed opportunity for the EU’s communications in Georgia.

On the survey, respondents were asked, “What does the European Union Monitoring Mission do in Georgia?” A large plurality of the population (41%) reported they did not know what the EUMM does. The second most common response (25%) was “supports the implementation of democratic and market oriented reforms,” an incorrect answer. The third most common response (19%) was “supports the stabilization of the situation in the areas affected by the August 2008 war,” the EUMM’s actual mission.

The share of the public aware of what the EUMM does has declined over time. While in 2009, 39% of the population knew what the EUMM did, 19% did in 2017. This decline may stem from the relatively high salience of the Monitoring Mission in the years immediately following the 2008 August War with Russia, although no data exists which would confirm this.

Besides the decline in knowledge of what the EUMM does, inaccurate information about the organization has become more prevalent. While only 24% of the public gave an inaccurate answer to the question in 2009, 38% did in 2017. Notably, there was a large increase in don’t know responses in 2015 and a sizable decline in 2017. Rather than an increase in correct responses in 2017, however, the data suggests that a lack of knowledge was replaced by incorrect information.



The lack of knowledge about the EUMM is most pronounced in ethnic minority settlements, with only 2% of individuals in minority communities correctly responding to the question. The lack of knowledge in minority settlements should come as no surprise given that surveys in these communities regularly have high rates of don’t know responses.

In contrast, those living in rural settlements with a predominantly ethnic Georgian population provide the correct response most often. The fact that the rural population is more informed than urban populations may stem from the EUMM’s rural presence. While the organization has offices in four urban settlements – Tbilisi, Mtskheta, Zugdidi, and Gori – they regularly patrol the rural areas surrounding the administrative boundary lines with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Although the public is increasingly unaware of what the EUMM does, about 2/3 of people who provided incorrect answers to the question about the EUMM’s mission would like to have more information about the EU. About a quarter even want information specifically about the EU’s role in resolving Georgia’s territorial conflicts.

The lack of knowledge of what the European Union Monitoring Mission does in Georgia may represent a missed opportunity for the EU. While no data is available about the attitudes of people who have had contact with the EUMM, previous research in Georgia has suggested that individuals contacted by NGOs report greater trust in them. The EUMM, given its public service mission, may receive a comparable boost from contact with the public. Hence, the EU should consider increasing its outreach and communications related to the EUMM.

The public on the conflicts in the South Caucasus

On July 18, 2015 thousands of Georgians gathered in Tbilisi protesting Russia’s “creeping occupation” as South Ossetia based Russian troops continue to draw the border along the Administrative Border Line between Georgia and the occupied territory of  South Ossetia. The unresolved territorial conflicts over South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are major sources of instability in the South Caucasus. These conflicts are often referred to as ticking bombs, and despite numerous common challenges, the region is claimed to be “more divided than united” mainly because of these conflicts and because of the competing interests of regional powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran. All three South Caucasian states have different political relations with these states and towards the West.

In 2013, CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey asked the populations of the countries of the South Caucasus about their opinions on the territorial disputes in their own and in neighbouring countries – namely, the conflicts over Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. This blog post looks at the findings.

Assuming that the population of each country was informed about the conflict in their own country, the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan were asked if they had heard about the conflict in Abkhazia, while the population in Georgia was asked if they had heard about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Only those who reported having heard about these conflicts were asked follow-up questions. The data shows that a larger share of the Georgian population has heard about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (62%) compared to the shares of the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan that have heard about the conflict in Abkhazia (49% and 43% respectively).

In respect to each conflict, questions about potential solutions were asked. Speaking about Armenians’ attitudes towards possible solutions of the conflict in Abkhazia, Armenians most commonly think Abkhazia should be an independent country (46%). The next most commonly held view was that Abkhazia should be a part of Russia (26%). Only 7% of Armenians would favor Abkhazia as a part of Georgia.

Note: The question was asked to the 49% of Armenians who reported having heard about the conflict in Abkhazia.

In contrast, the Azerbaijani public most commonly would favor having Abkhazia as a formal part of Georgia (77%) and 12% would support the idea of having Abkhazia as an independent country. Less than 1% would favor having it as a formal part of Russia.

Note: The question was asked to the 43% of Azerbaijanis who reported having heard about the conflict in Abkhazia.

The Georgian population is overwhelmingly in favor of having Abkhazia as a formal part of Georgia without autonomy (73%), and 33% believe it should have a high degree of autonomy within Georgia. Only 3% favors Abkhazia as an independent country.

The opinions over the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh differ across the countries as well. Given that Armenia and Azerbaijan are the two sides involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is unsurprising that the populations of these countries express radically different opinions about the possible future of this conflict. Armenians most commonly would favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia (73%). More than half (54%) would also favor having it as an independent country, but would find it absolutely unacceptable for Nagorno-Karabakh to be a part of Azerbaijan.

The absolute majority (95%) of Azerbaijanis would favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Azerbaijan. Notably less – only about a third of the population – would favor the scenario of having Nagorno-Karabakh with a high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan. Unlike Armenians, Azerbaijanis do not at all favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country.

As for the Georgian public’s attitudes towards possible solutions of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, slightly less than half of Georgians who reported they have heard about this conflict either could not answer the questions about the future status of this territory, or refused to answer the questions. As for the rest, more people would favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Azerbaijan (26%) than of Armenia (9%).

Note: The question was asked to the 62% of Georgians who reported to have known about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This blog post looked at how public opinion on territorial conflicts in the region varies across the South Caucasian states. Overall, Georgian and Azerbaijani public opinion on the preferences about the future of Abkhazia is more similar than the public opinion in Armenia. As the opinions over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani public attitudes are sharper than the attitudes of Armenians, while Georgians largely avoid reporting their opinions, or do not have any. Yet, notably more Georgians which do have opinions about the possible solution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh are in favor of having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Azerbaijan than of having it as a formal part of Armenia. Considering the geopolitical realities, these findings are not surprising. Georgia and Azerbaijan are in a quite similar situation, as both have lost territories, while Armenia de-facto controls Nagorno-Karabakh with Russia’s support. As Svante Cornell et al. (2005) argue in their work on South Caucasian conflicts, the conflict in Abkhazia has the same symbolic importance for Georgia as the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has for Azerbaijan, as both countries were defeated in these conflicts against a numerically much smaller enemy relying on external support, while Armenia feels less urgency to find a solution and is interested in preserving the military status quo.

To learn more about public opinion on the conflicts in the South Caucasus, take a look at CRRC’s earlier blog posts, When is a war not a war?, Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for difficult reconciliation (Armenia) and Engagement without recognition? and check out our Online Data Analysis platform.

In the South Caucasus, the Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend

The three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) are geographically, historically and politically bound closely together. Nevertheless, these countries often find themselves in disagreement when faced with broader geopolitical questions regarding alliances, threats and visions about the future of the region. These countries are often divided on a variety of issues, such as whether or not to join the Eurasian Union, to sign the EU association agreements, or how to vote on the legality of the independence referendum in Crimea. While the South Caucasus is certainly a region in a geographic sense, there is little evidence of a regional identity that could point towards a future of increased cooperation or cohesion. Instead, a case of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ prevails, splitting the region into supporters and adversaries of the countries across their borders, which has consequences for both trade and foreign policy.

The majority of Armenian respondents to the 2013 Caucasus Barometer (CB) questionnaire named Russia as Armenia’s biggest ally (83%), while just under half of Georgian respondents named Russia as an enemy (44%), and 7% in Azerbaijan noted Russia as the main enemy of their country. A split can be seen in the case of Turkey, as most Azerbaijanis view Turkey as an ally (91%) and just over a quarter of Armenians view Turkey as an enemy of their country (28%).

The tension that characterizes cross-border perceptions in the region makes the borders themselves highly securitized spaces. Far from a free flow of people or goods, cross-border trade and travel is restricted between Georgia and Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Turkey following a series of wars over disputed territories.

Nevertheless, perceptions of borders can ebb and flow throughout history. Administrative boundaries can become state borders, as in the case of the South Caucasus in the early 1990s, and state borders can become as open as administrative ones, such as in the European Union. Similarly, perceptions of neighbors can vary across different issue areas. While opinions and alliances in the South Caucasus are largely polarized, the will (if not the actual ability) to trade and interact on a commercial level yields a slightly less tense picture. Countries with a strong negative perception of other countries can be extremely reluctant to engage economically with that country. However, when positions are less polarized, the approval to do business is much stronger.

The 2013 CB asked whether people approved of doing business with a range of different ethnicities. The percentage of Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians who approved of doing business with the titular groups of the countries they highlighted as their main enemies is shown below.

In 2013, Azerbaijanis overwhelming felt that Armenia was the main enemy of Azerbaijan, and only 1% said they approve of doing business with Armenians. However, although 66% of Armenians said the main enemy of Armenia was Azerbaijan, a significantly higher amount said they approve of doing business with Azerbaijanis (22%). For Georgians—who have the least polarized views—although 44% said Russia was the main enemy of Georgia, the majority said they approve of doing business with Russians (80%). Economic dependence and economic hardship certainly have a role to play in this pattern, with all three countries naming economic concerns (along with territorial claims) as core problems facing their populations.

However, even though Georgian export dependence on Russia is relatively low at 7%, cross-border trade would almost certainly increase if trade were to become more feasible. While it is not clear from this data whether openness to trade is driving reductions in hostility or vice versa, it is an important reminder that the practical need to coexist has the potential to ease relations between hostile countries. In a region such as the South Caucasus where perceptions of others across borders are so polarized, seeking common ground such as the need for economic development could be a potential arena for cooperation. To explore more aspects of cross-border relations, visit the CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

When is a war not a war?

When is a war not a war? While it may seem commonsensical that a country cannot simultaneously be at war and at peace, the prevalence of several ‘frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space defies simple categorization. If we take the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia or South Ossetia as an example, a quick internet search shows that there was a five-day war in 2008 that ended on the 12th of August with a preliminary ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, according to CRRC’s most recent Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey in 2013, almost no Georgians think that the conflict in Abkhazia had been resolved. Alternatively, Armenians and Azerbaijanis tend to support the idea that resolution has been achieved in Abkhazia (with 27% and 13%, respectively selecting this option), while differing significantly on their opinions about the status of their own territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh (with 38% of the Azerbaijani population placing this as their highest national concern, compared to only 3% of Armenians). This raises the possibility that conflict is as much about perceptions as it is about actual military confrontation, and that national, regional and international conflict narratives can diverge significantly.

This disparity in narratives underlines a definitional problem in the political sciences when it comes to conflict resolution, war and peace. The Correlates of War project uses the annual number of casualties to track the duration of wars and conflicts on both an inter- and intrastate level. According to this project, a war is deemed over once the annual death toll drops below 1,000. The problem is that while open armed conflict might cease, a conflict can be far from resolved.

Thus, the conclusion that Georgia’s own territorial disputes can be condensed into five days underestimates the enduring negative impact of the status quo on all sides. Trade and travel are prohibited for inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. De-isolation tops Abkhaz policy priorities, while the government in Tbilisi faces the ongoing challenge of settling and providing for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In addition to the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia conflicts, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is also called ‘frozen’, although experts like Thomas de Waal have suggested that the term ‘simmering’ might be a more appropriate designation. CRRC data is also instructive in this regard. When asked about the top two issues facing their respective countries, 38% of Azerbaijanis named unresolved territorial disputes as the number one problem in Azerbaijan, while 3% of Armenians and 10% of Georgians said the same. The figures in Azerbaijan and Georgia strongly suggest that these issues are not ‘frozen’ (or resolved) in the minds of the local population, although economic concerns also dominate throughout the region.

This blog has shown that national perceptions of conflict can contradict both regional and international narratives. This suggests that our current measures of war and peace are missing an important dimension. The CB provides a starting point for exploring the subject of war narratives. You can find comments about past perceptions of conflict resolution for the Azerbaijani-Armenian case here and for the Georgian case here. You can also access a report on Russian public opinion towards the future of these disputes here. Annual survey data for the South Caucasus region is also available for analysis on the online CB platform.