How financially literate are people in Georgia?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Koba Turmanidze, CRRC-Georgia's President, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

CRRC Georgia data suggests that about half the Georgian public has a basic understanding of interest and inflation rates.

Saving, spending, borrowing, or investing money are everyday decisions people around the world have to make. Making the right decisions requires a certain degree of financial literacy, which some scholars boil down to understanding the basics of inflation and interest rates.

In a bid to gauge the levels of financial literacy in Georgia, CRRC Georgia used questions developed by professors Annamaria Lusardi and Professor Olivia Mitchell to assess an individual’s understanding of inflation, interest rates, and investment.

Lusardi asked around 16,000 participants in a 15-country study the three questions for a 2019 study, which showed that around one in three people can answer all questions correctly and about a half can understand both inflation and interest rates correctly.

As Caucasus Barometer surveys have shown, people’s lives in Georgia are significantly influenced by inflation and interest rates. While very few people save money in Georgia, people borrow intensively. Notably, since 2015  between one in five and two in five Georgians have named inflation as a top issue in the country. 

With this in mind, CRRC Georgia adapted and replicated two of the questions developed by Lusardi and Mitchel — particularly those about inflation and interest rates.

In a January 2022 Omnibus survey, Georgians were asked to imagine that they had an account with $100 in it, and that the account paid a 2% interest rate. They were then asked whether, after five years, there would be more than $102, exactly $102, or less than $102 in their bank accounts.

The second question measured people’s understanding of inflation: again, people were asked to imagine they had a sum of money in their bank account with an interest of 1%, while prices of goods would increase by 2% annually. The respondents were then asked whether they could buy their usual groceries with the same amount of money over time, or if they would pay more or less.

The majority of the public answered each question correctly. Nearly two-thirds (61%) understood interest rates correctly (8% incorrectly, 29% were uncertain, and the remainder refused to answer), and 64% understood inflation correctly (10% incorrectly, 25% were uncertain, and the remaining respondents refused to answer the question). Overall, 51% answered both questions correctly, 26% at least one correctly, and 24% both incorrectly or with uncertainty.

The most important factors associated with financial literacy are education levels and ethnicity. 

Individuals who are more educated are more likely to be financially literate: those with technical education 10 percentage points higher, and those with tertiary education 21 percentage points higher than individuals with secondary education or lower.

Ethnic Georgians are 28 percentage points more likely to answer financial literacy questions correctly than ethnic minorities. 

Notably, internally displaced persons are less likely to understand inflation rates correctly than non-IDPs, but understand interest rates at similar levels. 

Other factors, such as gender, age, having children in a household, employment status, and wealth, are not associated with financial literacy.

When compared with other countries, where similar questions were asked, the results from Georgia show significant similarities and differences. While about 50% can answer both inflation and interest rate questions correctly, just like in other countries, the Georgian data does not confirm gender and age differences documented elsewhere. In contrast, having lower educational attainment and being an ethnic minority is associated with less financial literacy in Georgia. 

The data used in this post is available here.

How Armenians and Georgians feel about the dissolution of the Soviet Union

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Giorgi BabunaSvili, Senior Policy Analyst, and Kristina Vacharadze, Programs Director at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Caucasus Barometer 2021 data shows that a majority of Armenians feel that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was bad for their country, while almost half of Georgians feel that the collapse had a positive impact on Georgia. 

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Armenia have shared differing yet similar paths. 

Both have experienced wars, revolutions, and economic upheaval, but political direction and public sentiment on major political issues has often diverged. 

Data from the Caucasus Barometer 2021 has shown that a key difference is how the public views the Soviet collapse. In Armenia, a clear majority feels that the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the country worse off, while in Georgia opinion is divided, with half of the public viewing the collapse as having been good for the country. 

The annual survey found that two thirds (67%) of Armenians think the dissolution was bad for the country, whereas around two in five (38%) in Georgia think the same. In contrast, almost half of Georgians think that this was a good thing for the country, while only about a fifth of Armenians agree with the statement.

Opinions were associated with some demographic characteristics.

A regression model found that, in both Georgia and Armenia, people with a higher education were more likely to think that the dissolution of the USSR had had a positive impact than people with only a secondary or secondary technical education. In both countries, younger people were more inclined to say that the dissolution of the USSR was a good thing than older people.

There were no statistically significant differences in attitudes associated with gender, settlement type, or employment. However, wealth was a significant predictor of attitudes in Armenia: wealthier people assess the dissolution of the USSR more positively. The same variable was not statistically significant in Georgia.

Ethnic minorities in Georgia tended to feel less positively about the dissolution of the USSR than ethnic Georgians. Association with ethnicity was not tested in Armenia due to the small share of ethnic minorities in the country. 

What reasons do people give for their views?

The survey also investigated the reasons for people’s opinions. In both Georgia and Armenia, the overwhelming majority of those who felt that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had had a positive impact gave their country gaining independence as the main reason. Of those who felt it had been bad for their country, people’s economic situation having worsened was the most common response. 

However, amongst those who felt that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had had a negative impact, different demographic groups prioritised different reasons. 

Older people in Georgia and Armenia were more likely to resent that travel within the former USSR had become more difficult. 

People with a secondary education or below perceive the lack of free healthcare and education as a greater loss than people with higher education do. 

In Armenia, the country’s economic situation having worsened was of greater concern to people without a higher education. 

Older people and people in rural areas saw damaged ties with friends and relatives as a larger problem than younger people and residents of the capital. People in rural areas in Armenia were also more likely to attribute their negative assessment to a decline in the availability of jobs. 

Overall, Georgians felt more positive than Armenians about the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on their country, but the reasons that people gave for their assessments were similar in both countries. 

Note: The analyses of different groups’ views in the above uses binary logistic regression, where the dependent variable is either a) thinking the dissolution of the USSR is a good or bad thing, or b) the reason why the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a bad thing. The independent variables included gender, age group, ethnicity, settlement type, level of education, wealth, and employment status.

Georgian politics leave many feeling alienated

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Recent CRRC Georgia data suggests that half of the public believes that public officials don’t care about their opinions and that they do not have a say in what the government does.

Amid fears of democratic backsliding and as Georgians grow more jaded with the politics of Georgia — be it from opposition or ruling party politicians — data from the Caucasus Barometer 2021 survey suggests that older people, women, and people coming from poorer households feel especially alienated from politics.

Education level and party preference seem to be associated with the degree of political estrangement someone feels. However, in contrast to commonly voiced views, younger people and ethnic minorities do not report particularly high levels of political estrangement.

The Caucasus Barometer asked six questions that made it possible to examine voters’ feelings and attitudes towards the political system and decision-making in the country.

More than two-thirds of the people (69%) do not feel well qualified to participate in politics, 53% consider politics to be too complicated to understand, and half of the public thinks they do not have a say in what the government does (59%) and that public officials do not care about their opinions (51%).

At the same time, a third of the electorate believes that they have a good understanding of the important political issues in the country, while 39% of the public believes that their vote will not make any difference.

Who is more likely to be politically alienated?

The six questions in the graph above were aggregated into an index of political estrangement. The index ranged between total political estrangement at 0 and the absence of political alienation at 12. The mean score on the index was 4.2, suggesting that the public tends to feel estranged from the political system in the country.

Regression analysis suggests that young people, men, people with higher formal education levels, supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party, and people from wealthier households are less likely to feel estranged from Georgian politics than older people, women, people with lower education levels, supporters of the opposition, unaffiliated voters, and people living in poorer households.

The analyses indicate that some otherwise vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, women, and poor people feel especially estranged from politics. In addition, political alienation seems to be correlated with education and political preference — particularly whether or not someone supports Georgian Dream.

At the same time, young people and ethnic minorities, who are often assumed to be politically apathetic and disengaged from politics in Georgia, do not seem to feel particularly alienated from political processes and institutions. Therefore, the reasons for their comparatively higher levels of disengagement from political activities must be sought in other areas rather than in the realm of feelings and attitudes towards politics.  

Note: The above data analysis is based on the OLS regression model which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), partisanship (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK), and index of political estrangement (0-12: 0-full political estrangement, 12- the absence of political estrangement).

The data used in this analysis is available here.

Do Georgians trust TV?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Kristina Vacharadze, Programs Manager, and Mariam Kobaladze, Senior Researcher at CRRC-Georgia,  The views presented in the article are of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

In an increasingly polarised media environment, Georgians have mixed feelings about how much TV and TV journalists can be trusted. 

Over the past decade, TV as a source of news has been on the decline in Georgia. With just 53% of those surveyed in 2021 using TV as their primary news source, as compared to 88% in 2009, it is clear that TV has lost its dominance. Nonetheless, it remains the main news source for  half of the adult population.

This fall in TV consumption has taken place against a background of an increasingly divided media environment. Media monitoring studies show that, in recent years, there have been clear trends of polarisation amongst television channels, with many strongly supporting either the ruling party or the opposition. 

This has been reflected in qualitative studies by CRRC-Georgia, in which many people have said that they have to watch news on several television channels to be able to draw reasonable conclusions on events that have happened and how they might interpret them. 

In such an environment, what does the Georgian public think of television and TV journalists? 

Can TV be trusted?

According to the Caucasus Barometer 2021, an annual household survey run by CRRC, 18% of the population does not trust any television channel for news about politics and current events and 14% does not watch television news at all. 

The most trusted television channels for news on politics and current events were found at opposite ends of the political sprectrum - the pro-government Imedi, trusted by a quarter (25%) of the population, and the pro-opposition Mtavari, trusted by 12%. Less than a tenth of the population trusted Rustavi 2 (8%), TV Pirveli (6%), and the Public Broadcaster (4%) more than any other station.

A regression analysis found that trust in TV and TV stations and viewing habits were associated with various demographic characteristics. 

Older people were more likely to watch and trust TV compared to other age groups. 

Ethnic minorities were more likely to distrust TV or not watch it compared to ethnic Georgians. This could be in part related to a lack of Armenian- and Azerbaijani-language programming on Georgian television. 

Working people were more likely to distrust and/or not watch TV news compared to people who did not work. 

People who supported a political party were more likely to watch and trust TV than people who did not support any party, or refused to report a party preference.

There were no patterns associated with settlement type, gender, or education level.

Note: The analysis uses a multinomial regression, where the dependent variable is whether people distrust TV, do not watch any TV channel for news about politics and current events, or trust a specific TV station. The independent variables are gender, age group, ethnicity, settlement type, level of education, and employment status.

What do the public think of TV journalists?

With a third of the population distrusting and/or not watching news on any television channel, what does the Georgian public think of the performance of TV journalists? 

About half of those surveyed (48%) believed that Georgian TV journalists inform the population about ongoing events in Georgia neither poorly nor well, while approximately a fifth of the population either positively or negatively assesses their work.

A multinomial regression showed that women were more likely to agree with the idea that TV journalists were serving their interests than men were. On the other hand, people living in urban areas assessed the performance of TV journalists more negatively than those living in rural settlements.

Party allegiance was also a significant predictor of people’s views: respondents who supported an opposition party were more positive towards the performance of journalists than supporters of the ruling party, Georgian Dream. 

Wealth (measured as the number of items a household owns from a list of 14) was also a significant predictor: poor people assessed the performance of journalists more positively than wealthier people.

Unsurprisingly, people who watched TV tended to feel more positively about TV journalists than people who do not watch TV.

A regression analysis did not show significant differences in attitudes between different age groups, ethnicities, people with different education levels, or with and without a job.

Note: The analysis uses a multinomial regression, where the dependent variable is whether people agree or disagree with the statement that TV journalists in Georgia are serving the interests of people like them. The independent variables are gender, age group, ethnicity, settlement type, level of education, wealth, watching TV and employment status.

The data shows a similar pattern with regard to views on whether TV journalists in Georgia serve the interests of the people. Slightly less than half of the population in Georgia (47%) neither agree nor disagree, while around a quarter (23%) believed that TV journalists do not serve the interests of the people, and a fifth (19%) believed that they did. Notably, people have become more pessimistic with regards to this question over the last decade, with a seven percentage point increase in disagreement with this sentiment between 2009 and 2021, and a 13 point decline in agreement with the statement during the same period. 

In the context of a very divided media landscape, it is notable that there is low public trust in television news and outlets. This trust appears to have fallen over the past decade, with fewer now believing that TV journalists in Georgia serve their interests. 

The data used in this post is available here.

Do Georgians worry about fake news online?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Salome Dolidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Caucasus Barometer 2021, an annual household survey run by CRRC, investigated a range of attitudes and behaviours related to social media in Georgia. 27% of those surveyed felt that social media had a negative effect on the country, 18% a positive effect, and 42% a neutral or mixed effect.

Of those that thought it had a negative effect, 40% reported that the main reason for the negative effect was misinformation. This answer was by far the most common response to the question.

Similarly, more than half (59%) of those who use the internet worry about false information on the Georgian internet. Regression analysis suggests that some groups are particularly worried about false information. People over the age of 35 were more likely to report that they worry about false information online.  People living in rural areas were less likely to worry about this issue.

Other social and demographic variables such as sex, education, ethnicity, employment status, wealth, and having children in the household were not associated with attitudes towards false information on Georgia’s internet.

More than half of the internet-using population said that lately, they had noticed misleading or false information online about the COVID-19 pandemic (67%), elections (64%), and Georgia’s domestic politics in general (59%), while 43% say the same regarding global politics.

When it comes to reasons for disseminating misleading or fake news, 43% of Georgians think that the reason is to confuse people and distract them from real problems. The next most common reasons were advancing a political agenda or position (15%) or getting more engagement with their content (14%).

While Georgians recognise that misinformation is an issue, few do much to check the information that they receive online. One in five does not check if the information they are reading online is accurate and reliable. 

Around half (53%) of the internet-using population believe what they are reading on the internet but verify it in some manner. Some report using approaches like looking for the writer’s name and/or a publisher (36%), or looking at a URL address (4%).  A further 12% ask someone they trust, and 1% post on social media looking for clarification. 

Another 14% report they believe just about everything online, with 8% saying that they believe what they read on the internet because it is published, and 6% thinking that everything on the internet is accurate. 

Few are highly sceptical about everything they read on the internet. In total, 8% ignore most things they see, because they feel most information is questionable. A further 4% question all the information they access because they are sceptical about everything on the internet. 

The analysis shows that most people in Georgia who use the internet worry about the spread of fake news on the internet and social media. However, a large proportion of people do not check whether the information they receive on the internet is reliable or not. 

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables:  Age (18-34, 35-54, 55+); Sex (male or female); Settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); Education level (tertiary or not); Ethnicity (Ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); Employment status (employed or not working); Child dependency ratio (share of household 18 or under); Wealth index (A simple additive index of ownership of a number of durable goods within a household).

How do Georgians feel about drug users?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dr. Tinatin Bandzeladze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Drugs have been slowly but surely finding their way into the everyday lives of Georgians for years now; in 2020 alone, CRRC Data suggested that drug users in Georgia, at a very minimum, spent $1.5 million on drugs through the dark web between February and August.

And yet, data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer suggests that drug users are still widely stigmatised in Georgia, creating a barrier to harm reduction and prevention programming and possibly standing in the way of reducing the harm of illicit drugs in Georgia through prevention-oriented policies.

Data from 2017, 2019, and 2021 Caucasus Barometer surveys suggest that the only group which people would least like to have as neighbours are criminals. Drug users take second place in the most recent wave of the survey, previously being tied in this position with homosexual people.  In 2021, 27% of the public reported they would least like to have a drug user as a neighbour. This share has not changed significantly, with movement remaining within the margin of error since 2017.  

Whether or not a respondent named a drug user varied with age, ethnicity, and settlement type.

Controlling for other factors, people over 55 are 15 percentage points more likely than people aged 18-34 to mention drug users as unwanted neighbours. 

Ethnic Azerbaijanis are 36 percentage points more likely than ethnic Georgians to name drug users as undesirable neighbours.

Settlement type is also associated with negative attitudes toward drug users. People in Tbilisi are 17 percentage points more likely than residents of other urban areas and 12 percentage points more likely than rural residents to rule out drug users from a list of potentially undesirable neighbours.

Employment, marital status, educational attainment, and religion are not associated with attitudes towards drug users in Georgia — at least not as measured by this variable.

The above data suggests that drug users are stigmatised in Georgia, with many implicitly preferring to have a criminal as a neighbour rather than a drug user. In turn, this suggests that the stigma drug users face may be a barrier to the effective implementation of harm reduction policies and programming in the country.

Note: The data used in the blog can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The analysis of which groups had different attitudes towards drug users was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male, female), age group (18-35, 35-55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian, ethnic Armenian and ethnic Azerbaijani), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), educational attainment (primary, secondary, technical or higher education), employment situation (working or not), marital status (married or single) and religion (Orthodox Church, other Christian groups, or Islam). The outcome variable was whether or not a respondent mentioned drug users.

Caucasus Barometer 2021: Changing attitudes amid the pandemic

Today, CRRC Georgia released the most recent wave of the Caucasus Barometer survey, which was conducted between December 2021 and January 2022. The results of the survey shed light on a wide range of changes in the public’s attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy, attitudes towards the media and information security, the COVID-19 pandemic,  and various socio-economic issues.

Dr. David Sichinava, CRRC Georgia’s Research Director, and Nino Mzhavanadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia, presented the findings of the new wave of Caucasus Barometer. 

A recording of the presentation is available below:

The 2021 Caucasus Barometer survey was the eleventh wave of the survey to be made publicly available. It included 1540 respondents, and had a response rate of 23%. The survey’s margin of error is 2.27%. The survey was conducted using computer assisted personal interviewing. 

The 2021 wave of Caucasus Barometer is available for download here and to explore here.

Despite gains in 2020, Georgia’s institutions remain poorly trusted

Note: This article was published on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint publication of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The newly released 2020 Georgia Caucasus Barometer shows that trust in most institutions rose significantly since the start of the pandemic, but some institutions gained more than others.

This shows that the rallying around the flag effect, previously demonstrated for people’s assessments of the performance of institutions in the spring of 2020, has also led to large increases in trust towards them.

In December 2020, when the survey was conducted, religious institutions and the army were the most trusted institutions in the country. By contrast, political parties had the least amount of trust, followed by a large number of institutions that 25%–30% of people reported trusting.

While these levels of trust are not particularly high for most institutions, on average they were still 10 percentage points higher than the previous year. No institution saw a decline in trust. 

For seven of the fourteen institutions asked about, there was a double-digit increase in the share of the population trusting them. The executive government experienced the strongest gain of 19 percentage points compared to 2019. 

The media, the healthcare system, religious institutions, local government, political parties, and parliament also all experienced large gains in trust. By comparison, NGOs and banks did not gain a significant amount of trust during the pandemic.

Even though there has been an almost universal rise in trust in Georgia’s institutions, the country is still behind where it was in terms of institutional trust compared to 2008, the first year for which comparable data is available.

Trust is up in political parties, the executive government, and the army compared to the 2008 baseline. It has not changed significantly for local government, the police, the courts, or religious institutions. It has declined for the president, banks, the media, NGOs, parliament, the education system, and even the healthcare system. 

While the pandemic, and the largely effective institutional responses to it, likely explains the rise in trust in institutions between 2019 and 2020, trust in most of them remains low. 

Indeed, despite the gains in trust in 2020, most institutions are still less trusted than they were in 2008.

The data used in this article is available here.

Gaps remain in mobile phone ownership in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

While mobile phone ownership is widespread in Georgia, gaps still remain among rural, elderly, and ethnic minority populations.

Owning a mobile (cell phone) is considered so important that more widespread ownership is considered a sustainable development goal (SDG 5.b) by the United Nations. 

Mobile phone ownership among households has increased significantly over the last decade. Caucasus Barometer data indicates that in 2008, two thirds of households owned a mobile phone. This has steadily increased, reaching 96% of households in 2019, the last year for which Caucasus Barometer data is available.

While the vast majority of households have a mobile phone in Georgia, not everyone is equally likely to personally own one. Caucasus Barometer in 2019 specifically asked whether the respondent owned a mobile phone, and only 86% of individuals reported that they did.

A regression analysis looking at respondents’ social, demographic, and economic characteristics suggests that ownership varies between settlement types, age groups, ethnicities, employment status, household wealth, and education level. Though, it does not vary based on sex, after taking into account other factors. 

Controlling for other factors, people in rural areas are nine percentage points less likely than people in Tbilisi to own a mobile phone. Armenians are ten percentage points and Azerbaijanis eight percentage points less likely to own a mobile phone. People aged 56 and older are ten percentage points less likely to own a mobile phone. People with jobs are ten percentage points more likely to own a mobile phone. 

The level of education also has an impact with an individual who only has secondary education being 13 percentage points less likely to own a mobile phone compared with someone with tertiary education. Individuals in households that are relatively wealthy are five percentage points more likely to own a mobile phone, compared with households that own none of the assets asked about (aside from mobile phones).

While the vast majority of households have at least one member which owns a mobile phone, individual ownership is less common. To work towards improvement on this sustainable development goal, mobile phone ownership needs to increase among ethnic minorities, people in rural areas, older people, the less educated, and those not working. 

Notably, while the indicator is listed as part of the gender sustainable development goals, after controlling for other factors, there is no significant difference between women and men in terms of mobile phone ownership.

The data presented in this article is available here. 

Conservative gender mores are changing in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Otto Saladze, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Gendered norms prevail in Georgian society, which often translates into deprecation of women for smoking, drinking alcohol, having pre-marital sex, and even living with a boyfriend. However, attitudes appear to be shifting.

CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey asked people what they thought about several such activities. The data showed that the public are least accepting of women smoking, with 80% reporting it is never acceptable at any age. Sexual relations (63%) and cohabitating with a man before marriage were also commonly thought to be never acceptable for women (60%). 

Although there are still widespread prejudices about what is acceptable for women, some attitudes are changing. While in 2010, a slight majority (56%) said they were against women living separately from their parents before marriage at any age, this number had decreased by 18 percentage points by 2019 to 38%. 

In 2019, half of the respondents reported that women aged 18–25 should be able to live separately before marriage, compared to only 31% in 2010.  

In 2010, 80% said it was unacceptable for women to have sex before marriage at any age. In 2019, this number decreased by 17 percentage points, with 63% now against it. 

In 2019, 24% said it was acceptable for women aged 18–25 to have sex outside of marriage, 16 percentage points more than a decade ago (8%).  

However, people’s attitudes do not appear to have changed over the last decade towards women smoking and drinking strong alcohol.

Note: The original question text was: ‘Sometimes people are considered too young to do or experience certain things. Could you please tell me, from what age do you think it is acceptable for a woman to…’ Respondents were then asked about multiple activities. To ensure clear data visualisation, the answer options: ‘Under 18’, ‘18-25’, ‘26+’ and ‘Don’t know/Refuse to answer’, are not shown on the chart.  

There were only slight differences in the opinions of women and men on these issues, and attitudes have changed at similar paces among both sexes.

While 52% of men said it was never acceptable for women to drink strong alcohol, 59% of women reported the same in 2019. The numbers were almost the opposite a decade ago, with 59% of men saying it was never acceptable in 2010 and 55% of women. 

Both sexes’ attitudes changed regarding pre-marital sex and co-habitation at a similar rate. The share of men thinking pre-marital sex was unacceptable for women at any age decreased from 81% to 62% between 2019 and 2010, and among women the decline is similar (80% to 64%). In 2019, 58% of men and 61% of women were against cohabitation prior to marriage at any age compared with 71% of men and 73% of women in 2010. 

A similar pattern holds among people of different ages, with changes being quite similar in most age groups. One exception is attitudes towards pre-marital sex. While in 2010, 76% of 18-35-year-olds said this was never acceptable for a woman, in 2019 only 52% of young people reported the same, a 24 percentage point decline.  By comparison, the decline in disapproval among 35-54-year-olds was 17% and by 11% among those 55+.

People still judge women for a wide range of different behaviors in society, but attitudes are changing. Over the last decade, it appears that people have become more accepting of women’s choices regarding pre-marital sex and cohabiting out of wedlock. 

Are Georgians and Armenians becoming more or less tolerant?

[Note: This article was published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. This article was written by Kristine Vacharadze, Programmes Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article represent the views of the author alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

Surveys carried out in Georgia and in Armenia in 2009 and 2019 asked respondents if they approved or disapproved of doing business with or marriages with people of 12 other ethnicities. So, are Georgians and Armenians becoming more or less tolerant?

Data from the Caucasus Barometer has consistently suggested that Georgians and Armenians are more tolerant of doing businesses with other ethnicities than they are of inter-ethnic marriages.

Data from the 2019 Caucasus Barometer showed that in both Georgia and in Armenia, a majority approved of all ethnicities asked about on the survey as business partners, except for Turks and Azerbaijanis in Armenia. 

For Georgians, business partnerships with Georgians, Ukrainians, Russians, Italians, Americans, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Jewish people, and Turks were seen as more acceptable than those with Kurds, Indians, Arabs, and Iranians. 

Armenians followed a similar pattern. However, the rates of approval of doing business with Azerbaijanis, Turks, Ukrainians, and Jewish people were much lower in regards to business relations. 

Attitudes towards doing business with people of other ethnicities are becoming more negative in both Georgia and Armenia. The biggest decreases in Georgia are towards doing business with Kurds and Turks, which decreased by 15 and 14 percentage points, respectively. There were 12 percentage point decreases in approval of doing business with Jewish people, Americans, and Armenians and of 10 percentage points for Italians. 

In Armenia, the approval rate of business partnerships with Turks, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, and Jewish people dropped by 16, 11, 9, and 8 percentage points respectively. The rest remained relatively similar. 

The marriage approval data follows a similar pattern in terms of favoured ethnicities as described above, but with much lower levels of approval. 

However, the trends are different in Georgia and Armenia. 

The data from 2019 suggest that more people look favourably at inter-ethnic marriages in Georgia compared with 2009. The biggest increase is towards Georgian women marrying Azerbaijanis, which increased by 11 percentage points. It was followed by Turks with a 10 percentage point increase and Kurds with a seven percentage point increase.  

In contrast, Armenians became less approving of Armenian women marrying men of other ethnicities. The biggest drop was toward marrying Jewish people, which decreased by 11 percentage points, and Russians, which fell by 10 percentage points. 

The trend is similar regarding all nationalities but the difference is relatively small.

The most recent wave of surveys showed that Georgians have become more tolerant of inter-ethnic marriages while becoming less approving of doing business with other ethnicities. 

However, there appears to be a more positive trend in approval of marriages with other ethnicities, while support for business partnerships has declined, albeit slightly. 

In contrast, Armenians appear to have become less tolerant of both types of relations, with the exception of business partnerships with Georgians.

The data presented in this article is available from CRRC Georgia’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Why are Georgians nostalgic about the USSR? Part 2

Georgians are equally split in their evaluations of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. While younger, more educated, and wealthier Georgians are more likely to think it was a good thing, those with negative attitudes towards democracy, and those that prefer Russia over the West have more negative feelings. Although respondents named multiple factors to explain their dissatisfaction, these categories can be broken into broader constructs such as economic disarray and the political turmoil occurring after the collapse. This post further explores factors associated with positive attitudes towards the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the 2019 wave of the Caucasus Barometer survey respondents were asked why they thought the collapse of the Union was a good or bad thing. About four-fifths of those who believe that the dissolution was a positive thing (41%) for Georgia did so, because the country earned its independence. Fewer respondents picked options related to ethnic identity such as better opportunities for sustaining language and culture (8%) or improved chances for a flourishing national culture (6%). Yet another broader category consisted of answer options related to civil liberties such as freedom of speech (7%), human rights (7%), freedom of doing business (3%), and access to consumer goods (1%).

Looking closer at the demographic characteristics of respondents, age and socio-economic status are good predictors of endorsement of the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a positive thing. Those with higher educational attainment are more likely to pick categories related to the country’s independence as an explanation for why the collapse was a positive event. Relative to those in Tbilisi, rural Georgians are less likely to name categories related to civil liberties.





Importantly, attitudes towards democracy and foreign policy preferences are associated with respondents’ endorsement of collapse of the Soviet Union. Respondents who think that democracy is preferable over other political systems are about seven times more likely to pick the identity category as a reason why the collapse was a positive event, controlling for other factors. They also are more likely to name national independence and liberties than other respondents. Respondents saying that Georgia is a democracy are fifteen times more likely to select categories related to identity, twice as likely to name independence, and ten times more likely to choose liberties as an explanation for their positive assessment of the collapse.




Those with pro-western attitudes have the highest probability of assessing the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a positive event. Such respondents are seven times more likely to identify categories related to national identity as a main reason behind their endorsement, almost four times more likely to choose independence, and about twelve times more likely to name liberties than those who are not pro-western.

Positive attitudes towards the dissolution of the Soviet Union are associated with socio-economic status and age. Those with higher educational attainment, more wealth, and younger people are more likely to evaluate the collapse positively. Similar to factors associated with nostalgia, positive assessment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is highly correlated with feelings towards democracy and Western-leaning foreign policy preferences.

These blog posts have looked at factors associated with both positive and negative attitudes towards the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The data are consistent with the “winners and losers of transition” proposition as well as the political hypotheses explaining Soviet nostalgia. Those groups who would be expected to be losers of transition, such as less educated and poorer respondents are more nostalgic while respondents with higher socioeconomic status view the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a positive thing. As the political hypothesis of explaining nostalgia goes, Georgians with skeptical views on democracy are more likely to be nostalgic and vice versa. In short, both Georgian Ostalgie and anti-nostalgia reflect the long and winding road the country took through its post-Soviet transition.

Why are Georgians Nostalgic about the USSR? Part 1

Several surveys in recent years suggest that close to half of the Georgian public considers the dissolution of the USSR a bad thing. After nearly 30 years since gaining independence, why do so many Georgians look back with nostalgia towards the Soviet Union? Reasons for Soviet nostalgia in other contexts are usually associated with how people experienced transition from state socialism to capitalism. The economic hypothesis explaining nostalgia argues that a perception of being part either “a winner” or “a loser” of the transition is associated with nostalgic feelings towards the Soviet Union. Other hypotheses introduce politics into the equation. According to this explanation, those who reject democracy on ideological grounds are more likely to be nostalgic as are those who think that democratic institutions are too feeble in delivering state services. Are these explanations true for Georgian Ostalgie? This series of blog posts explores these and other potential explanations to Soviet nostalgia.

The 2019 Caucasus Barometer survey asked respondents whether the dissolution of the USSR was a good or a bad thing, as well as the reasons why. Respondents were considered nostalgic if they reported that the dissolution was a bad thing. However, it is worth keeping in mind the exact wording of the question when reading the analysis. Overall, 42% of the public think that the dissolution of the USSR was a bad thing, and a statistically indistinguishable share (41%) report it was good, leaving about 16% who were not sure.

When it comes to why it was a bad thing, by far, the most common reason is that respondents believe that people’s economic situation has worsened. And they’re not necessarily wrong.

Georgia had a particularly difficult economic transition during independence. Overall purchasing power is much higher today than before the transition, however, it only recovered to pre-transition levels in 2006 according to World Bank data.

At the same time, average purchasing power hides the high levels of economic inequality in Georgia. Inequality increased from an estimated GINI of 0.313 in 1988 to 41.3 in 1998. In 2018, it stood at 37.9 according to the World Bank data. Concomitantly social services were cut.

This likely explains why a majority of respondents that are nostalgic report that the economic situation has worsened to explain why they think the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a bad thing. The fact that some respondents directly cite a lower number of workplaces as a reason for believing that the dissolution was a negative thing, attests to this. The second most common reason is related to the conflicts that followed independence and the lost territories.


What sets nostalgic Georgians apart? A logistic regression model looking at attitudes towards democracy, Russia, political party preferences, and a number of demographic measures suggests a number of characteristics. Age is an important predictor, with older people being considerably more nostalgic.


Education also appears important, as individuals with more education are less likely to be nostalgic. Wealth has a less clear role, appearing only slightly relevant for overall attitudes, and more relevant when we look at those citing economic reasons for their attitude. This suggests that those who regret the dissolution of the USSR are those who suffered the most during the transition. This also suggests that as the economy improves and newer generations come of age, nostalgia towards the USSR may decline.

While age, education, and wealth are relevant, they are not the only factors. Attitudes towards democracy and towards Georgia’s orientation to Russia also seem to separate nostalgics from non-nostalgics. Those who believe that Georgia should forego NATO and EU membership in favor of closer ties to Russia as well as those who think that Georgia is not a democracy and that democracy is not necessarily the best form of government, are more likely to also believe that the dissolution of the USSR was a negative thing.


Similar patterns emerge when disaggregating the reasons for nostalgia, with wealth being more relevant for those who mentioned the worse economy as a reason for nostalgia. Interestingly, feeling close to a particular political party does not seem to be relevant for these attitudes, once other factors are held constant. One exception is when looking at identity-related responses for the attitudes. Respondents who feel close to pro-western opposition parties are less likely to believe that the dissolution of the USSR was a bad thing because ties with other nationalities became less common, travel to other former Soviet Republics became harder, or for people judging each other because of their identity. Ethnic minorities in Georgia are more likely to report these reasons than ethnic Georgians.

Nostalgia towards the USSR seems to be primarily related to an individual’s experience of the transition, and their current attitudes towards democracy and Russia. This connection might suggest that skepticism towards democracy and the West is related to individuals’ experiences of the transition. However, more direct analysis of attitudes towards democracy is needed to test this idea.
The next blog post looks at the characteristics of Georgians who view the dissolution of the USSR positively.

Note: The above analysis is based on a set of logistic regression analyses. Respondents were considered nostalgic if they believe that the dissolution of the USSR was a bad thing. Besides this, additional analyses grouped together the reasons respondents gave for their first answer to the question “Has dissolution of the Soviet Union been a good or a bad thing for Georgia?” The economic group consisted of respondents reporting worsening economic situation and a declining number of workplaces as a reason. The conflict group consisted of respondents reporting the war with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian civil war, and lost territories as reasons. The inequality group consisted of respondents who reported the privatization of social services, and the increasing gap in wealth between rich and poor as reasons. The identity group consisted of respondents who reported severed ties with friends and relatives, increases being judged due to identity, and more difficult travel to other former Soviet republics as reasons.

The independent variables are a positive attitude towards democracy, the belief that Georgia is a democracy, support for foregoing EU and NATO membership in favor of closer ties to Russia, distance of the respondent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ethnicity, party support, age, sex, type of settlement (capital, other urban, rural), employment status, wealth, and education. The data used in the blog is available here. Replication code of the above data analysis is available here.

Know English and how to use a computer?

A slightly jeering expression in Georgia when speaking about employment prospects suggests that to get a job, you need to know English and how to use computers. Data from Caucasus Barometer 2019 shows there’s a bit of truth in the jest.

Overall, 40% of people on the survey reported having a job. A logistic regression including basic demographic variables, like settlement type, age, gender, minority status and education, suggests that people between the ages of 35 and 54, men, and those with higher education have higher chances of being employed, controlling for other factors. Other demographic factors do not show statistically significant differences.



Aside from the above demographic characteristics, knowledge of English and of computers was also looked at to test the anecdote.  People who report knowing English at a basic level or higher are eight percentage points more likely to be employed, controlling for other factors. Knowing how to use a computer at even a basic level has an even larger effect for 19 percentage points, controlling for other factors. The social and demographic characteristics described above remain significant after controlling for knowledge of English.



Note: Two different logistic regression models were used to generate chart above: (a) self-reported employment in relation to the knowledge of English and (b) self-reported employment in relation to the knowledge of computer. The knowledge question were recoded. Options:  “Beginner”, “Intermediate”, and “Advanced” were coded as ”Beginner or higher”. “No basic knowledge” stayed the same. The regression model for both cases also included the following demographic co-variates: age; gender; ethnicity, education and settlement type. 

In general, these findings align with perceptions of what factors are most important for getting a good job in Georgia. People name education as one of the most important factors for getting a good job in Georgia.

Age, sex, knowledge of English and how to use a computer, and education, are associated with employment in Georgia. This confirms the anecdotal evidence. However knowledge of using a computer in comparison to the knowledge of English appears to be a more important factor for getting a job in Georgia.

To explore more the Caucasus Barometer 2019 survey findings for Georgia, visit CRRC’s Online Data Analysis portal. Replication code for the data analysis is available at CRRC’s GitHub repository here.