How do Georgians feel about drug users?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dr. Tinatin Bandzeladze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Drugs have been slowly but surely finding their way into the everyday lives of Georgians for years now; in 2020 alone, CRRC Data suggested that drug users in Georgia, at a very minimum, spent $1.5 million on drugs through the dark web between February and August.

And yet, data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer suggests that drug users are still widely stigmatised in Georgia, creating a barrier to harm reduction and prevention programming and possibly standing in the way of reducing the harm of illicit drugs in Georgia through prevention-oriented policies.

Data from 2017, 2019, and 2021 Caucasus Barometer surveys suggest that the only group which people would least like to have as neighbours are criminals. Drug users take second place in the most recent wave of the survey, previously being tied in this position with homosexual people.  In 2021, 27% of the public reported they would least like to have a drug user as a neighbour. This share has not changed significantly, with movement remaining within the margin of error since 2017.  

Whether or not a respondent named a drug user varied with age, ethnicity, and settlement type.

Controlling for other factors, people over 55 are 15 percentage points more likely than people aged 18-34 to mention drug users as unwanted neighbours. 

Ethnic Azerbaijanis are 36 percentage points more likely than ethnic Georgians to name drug users as undesirable neighbours.

Settlement type is also associated with negative attitudes toward drug users. People in Tbilisi are 17 percentage points more likely than residents of other urban areas and 12 percentage points more likely than rural residents to rule out drug users from a list of potentially undesirable neighbours.

Employment, marital status, educational attainment, and religion are not associated with attitudes towards drug users in Georgia — at least not as measured by this variable.

The above data suggests that drug users are stigmatised in Georgia, with many implicitly preferring to have a criminal as a neighbour rather than a drug user. In turn, this suggests that the stigma drug users face may be a barrier to the effective implementation of harm reduction policies and programming in the country.

Note: The data used in the blog can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The analysis of which groups had different attitudes towards drug users was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male, female), age group (18-35, 35-55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian, ethnic Armenian and ethnic Azerbaijani), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), educational attainment (primary, secondary, technical or higher education), employment situation (working or not), marital status (married or single) and religion (Orthodox Church, other Christian groups, or Islam). The outcome variable was whether or not a respondent mentioned drug users.

Knowing a queer person increases tolerance

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the Council of Europe, or any related entity.

Overall, according to the survey —  which CRRC Georgia conducted for the Council of Europe —  8% of the public reported knowing an LGBT person, and 87% reported they did not. A further 5% were uncertain, and 1% refused to answer.

The data shows young people are significantly more likely to know an LGBT person. So are people in Tbilisi, wealthier people, people who are employed, and those with a higher socio-economic status. Women are slightly more likely to report knowing an LGBT person than men. Ethnic minorities, those with different levels of education, IDPs, and people with children in their household are no more or less likely to report knowing an LGBT person than ethnic Georgians, non-IDPs, and those without children in their households.

To understand whether people who know an LGBT person are also more tolerant of LGBT people in general, a matching analysis was conducted. This method identifies statistically similar people who know and do not know an LGBT person and then compares their attitudes. The goal is to understand whether knowing an LGBT person might also be associated with tolerance for LGBT people more broadly.

The analysis shows that people who know LGBT people are significantly more tolerant. 

People who know an LGBT person are 26 percentage points more likely to approve of someone like them doing business with a homosexual person, compared with those who have otherwise statistically similar demographic characteristics. They are 10 percentage points more likely to think it is important to protect the rights of LGBT people. People who know an LGBT person are 46 percentage points less likely to say they would not want an LGBT person as a neighbour.

The effect of knowing someone who is not a heterosexual varies significantly with a number of social and demographic characteristics with regard to approval of doing business and approval of having an LGBT neighbour. However, it does not vary with regard to views on the importance of protecting the rights of LGBT people.

With regard to acceptance of doing business, the effect of knowing someone varies by age, settlement, wealth, socio-economic background, and whether or not a person lives in a household with children. 

The data shows that the effect of knowing an LGBT person is particularly large for people with children at 37 percentage points, compared to only 7 percentage points for people without children.

The data also indicates that there is no effect in rural areas, while there are substantively large effects in urban areas. 

The effect is also null for older people. By comparison, for people under the age of 54, the effect is rather larger at 39 percentage points for 35 to 54-year-olds and 31 percentage points for 18 to 34-year-olds.

The more education a person has, the greater the effect of knowing an LGBT person on their attitudes.

The data further shows that the effect is substantially larger for people from richer socio-economic backgrounds. To proxy people’s socio-economic backgrounds, the respondent’s parents’ education levels are considered, a common approach to understanding someone’s family background. 

The effect of knowing someone is substantial if both of the respondent’s parents had higher education. In contrast, people with one or no parents with higher education experience little effect from knowing an LGBT person.

Current wealth also shows a striking pattern with regard to the impact of knowing an LGBT person. People living in poorer households are significantly less likely to approve of someone like them doing business with a homosexual if they know an LGBT person. In contrast, people living in wealthy households are significantly more likely to approve of someone like them doing business with a homosexual if they know an LGBT person.

The size of the effect of knowing an LGBT person on willingness to live next to an LGBT person also varies with an individual’s sex, the settlement type they live in, their education level, whether or not they are an IDP, and their socio-economic status.

The effect is substantially larger for women than men (54 percentage points versus 28). The effect is larger in Tbilisi compared with other urban areas and rural areas. The effect is also larger for people with higher education and smaller for IDPs.

With regard to socio-economic status, the data shows that the effect is largest again for people with two parents that had higher education. People without parents that have higher education also experience a large effect. However, people with only one parent with higher education show no significant effect as a result of knowing someone who is LGBT on their willingness to live next to an LGBT person.

The data paint a similar picture of the effects on people in poorer and wealthier households of knowing an LGBT person on willingness to live next to an LGBT person. People in relatively well-off households are significantly more likely to be willing to live next to an LGBT person if they also know one. The reverse is true of people in poorer households.

In contrast to the willingness to do business with and to live next to an LGBT person, there were no significant variations in the size of the effect of knowing an LGBT person on different social and economic groups. 

The above data calls for further research. While on average there are statistically significant and substantially large effects of knowing an LGBT person on average, the effects vary significantly between groups. People living in wealthy households and from relatively better-off backgrounds appear to respond strongest to knowing an LGBT person. Other groups also experience substantial impacts from meeting LGBT people. However, these tend to be relatively small. Future research should aim to understand the causal mechanism by which these impacts could take place.

Do Georgians harbour Ethnonationalist sentiments?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The social and political integration of ethnic minorities remains a challenge for the long-term democratic development of Georgia. But could ethnonationalist sentiments be hindering such integration?

Considering that one in seven Georgian citizens is of non-Georgian ethnic descent, ethnonationalism has the potential to estrange significant sections of society, presenting barriers to social cohesion and stability. 

Although the failure to address this problem can be partially attributed to government and political institutions, the public’s attitudes and beliefs also likely serve as an impediment. 

Data from the 2020 Future of Georgia survey suggest that about a third of the electorate exhibit some form of ethnonationalist sentiment.

The survey found that around a third of the adult population (30%) think only ethnic Georgians should be allowed to be Georgian citizens, while around two-thirds disagree (61%). 

A regression analysis suggests that some groups are more prone to equate nationality with ethnicity than the others. 

Ethnic Georgians, people with lower levels of formal education, people without jobs, and those living outside of Tbilisi were found to be significantly more likely to report that only ethnic Georgians should be allowed to be Georgian citizens compared to ethnic minorities, people with tertiary education, employed people, and residents of Tbilisi. 

Other socio-demographic variables, including age, sex, and IDP status were not associated with the above statement.

Respondents were also asked whether they would vote for someone of another ethnic group, with 46% reporting they would. 

A regression model examining who would vote for someone of different ethnic descent suggests a similar pattern.

Ethnicity, formal education level, and settlement type appear to be associated with readiness to vote for someone of a different ethnicity than themselves. 

Ethnic minorities were 33 percentage points more likely to report that they would vote for someone of a different ethnicity than themselves. 

People with a higher education, residents of Tbilisi, and poorer individuals were also more willing to vote for someone who is a different ethnicity than people with lower levels of education and people living outside of the capital. 

Willingness to vote for someone of a different ethnicity was not associated with other socio-demographic variables, including age, sex, employment situation, or IDP status. 

In terms of the perceived impact of the increased political presence of ethnic minorities in parliament, ethnic Georgians and people with lower education levels seem to differ from ethnic minorities and people with tertiary education.

More specifically, ethnic minorities were found to be four times more likely than ethnic Georgians to report that an increasing number of ethnic minority MPs would have a positive impact on Georgia. 

Controlling for other factors, ethnic Georgians have a  14% chance of saying that having more ethnic minority MPs would have a positive impact on the country compared with a 32% chance of saying the impact would be negative.

People with tertiary education were more likely to see a positive impact of more ethnic minorities in the legislature and less likely to see a negative impact than people with less years of formal education.

Even though the majority of the adult population of Georgia do not seem to harbour explicitly ethnonationalist sentiments, a substantial section of the public do say that Georgian citizenship should be equated with Georgian ethnicity, that they would not vote for someone with a different ethnic background, and that increased presence of ethnic minorities in Parliament would negatively affect Georgia. 

Considering that approximately every seventh Georgian citizen is not an ethnic Georgian, these ethnonationalist and ethnocentric sentiments pose a serious challenge to the long-term democratisation and state-building prospects of the country.

Furthermore, some groups tend to exhibit ethnonationalist sentiments more than others. 

People with lower levels of formal education and people living outside of Tbilisi were less favourably inclined towards increased participation of ethnic minorities in politics compared to those with a higher education and residents of the capital.   

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic and multinomial regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-35, 35-55, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not) and ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority). 

The data used in this analysis is available here. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

 

Are Georgians and Armenians becoming more or less tolerant?

[Note: This article was published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. This article was written by Kristine Vacharadze, Programmes Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article represent the views of the author alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

Surveys carried out in Georgia and in Armenia in 2009 and 2019 asked respondents if they approved or disapproved of doing business with or marriages with people of 12 other ethnicities. So, are Georgians and Armenians becoming more or less tolerant?

Data from the Caucasus Barometer has consistently suggested that Georgians and Armenians are more tolerant of doing businesses with other ethnicities than they are of inter-ethnic marriages.

Data from the 2019 Caucasus Barometer showed that in both Georgia and in Armenia, a majority approved of all ethnicities asked about on the survey as business partners, except for Turks and Azerbaijanis in Armenia. 

For Georgians, business partnerships with Georgians, Ukrainians, Russians, Italians, Americans, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Jewish people, and Turks were seen as more acceptable than those with Kurds, Indians, Arabs, and Iranians. 

Armenians followed a similar pattern. However, the rates of approval of doing business with Azerbaijanis, Turks, Ukrainians, and Jewish people were much lower in regards to business relations. 

Attitudes towards doing business with people of other ethnicities are becoming more negative in both Georgia and Armenia. The biggest decreases in Georgia are towards doing business with Kurds and Turks, which decreased by 15 and 14 percentage points, respectively. There were 12 percentage point decreases in approval of doing business with Jewish people, Americans, and Armenians and of 10 percentage points for Italians. 

In Armenia, the approval rate of business partnerships with Turks, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, and Jewish people dropped by 16, 11, 9, and 8 percentage points respectively. The rest remained relatively similar. 

The marriage approval data follows a similar pattern in terms of favoured ethnicities as described above, but with much lower levels of approval. 

However, the trends are different in Georgia and Armenia. 

The data from 2019 suggest that more people look favourably at inter-ethnic marriages in Georgia compared with 2009. The biggest increase is towards Georgian women marrying Azerbaijanis, which increased by 11 percentage points. It was followed by Turks with a 10 percentage point increase and Kurds with a seven percentage point increase.  

In contrast, Armenians became less approving of Armenian women marrying men of other ethnicities. The biggest drop was toward marrying Jewish people, which decreased by 11 percentage points, and Russians, which fell by 10 percentage points. 

The trend is similar regarding all nationalities but the difference is relatively small.

The most recent wave of surveys showed that Georgians have become more tolerant of inter-ethnic marriages while becoming less approving of doing business with other ethnicities. 

However, there appears to be a more positive trend in approval of marriages with other ethnicities, while support for business partnerships has declined, albeit slightly. 

In contrast, Armenians appear to have become less tolerant of both types of relations, with the exception of business partnerships with Georgians.

The data presented in this article is available from CRRC Georgia’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Georgians have more negative attitudes towards the Chinese than other foreigners in Georgia

Georgia is often famed for its hospitality. While the country is more tolerant of other ethnicities, relative to Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has also experienced a rise in nationalist rhetoric and movements in recent years. A number of incidents have also taken place, with hate crime directed towards immigrants and religious and ethnic minorities. This blog post looks at attitudes towards different migrant groups based on a survey experiment in the Caucasus Barometer 2017 survey.

On CB 2017, respondents were randomly assigned to be asked one of five questions. The basic text read, “In your opinion, will the foreigners that come to live in Georgia contribute to the economic development of Georgia or not?” In the other four questions, respondents were asked about Russians, Americans and Europeans, Chinese, and Turkish people instead of foreigners. Since each group was randomly assigned, it is possible to look at whether attitudes to any of these groups differ from foreigners in general without base lining effects (i.e. the respondent reporting their attitudes towards one group based on a comparison with the previous groups they were asked about).

Only 11% of Georgians think that the Chinese people who come to live in Georgia will contribute to the country’s economic development and 40% think they will not. In contrast, 23% think “Foreigners” without their nationality specified will contribute and 26% that they won’t. People are also relatively more negative towards Turkish people, with 32% reporting a negative attitude.

The above results suggest a relatively lower level of tolerance for Chinese and Turkish migrants relative to people from Russia and “Americans and Europeans.” The importance of tolerance aside, this matters for Georgia’s economic development. Turkey and China are important trade partners for the country, with Turkey consistently being one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment in Georgia. Looking to the future, Georgia is likely to have more economic relations with China due to its strategic position along China’s New Silk Road project. A lack of tolerance towards these groups, if anything, will work against improving economic relations.

While the pattern is clear, the sources for the particularly negative attitudes towards Chinese people is less so. Have a hunch on the cause(s)? Join the conversation on our Facebook or Twitter pages. The data used in this post is available from CRRC’s Online Data Analysis portal.

Georgia’s imagined tolerance

[Note: This article was originally published in collaboration with OC-Media.]

Hate crime regularly makes the news in Georgia. The recent murder of Vitali Safarov, the harassment of Jehovah’s Witnesses, which has put the country in the European Court of Human Rights, and the 2013 riots on the International Day Against Homophobia all come to mind.

Yet, Georgians also pride themselves on examples of tolerance in the country’s history. This contradiction — pride in tolerance despite an apparent lack of it in many cases — is reflected in data CRRC-Georgia recently collected for the Council of Europe.

To understand attitudes towards different minority groups, the survey asked respondents whether they would approve of someone like them doing business with 24 different minority groups. Homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and people of ethnicities not traditionally associated with Europe or the Caucasus were generally less approved of than peoples from Europe and the Caucasus.

People with disabilities were the most approved of minority group.

The groups people approve of least were also the groups the public thinks are most likely to be the victims of hate crime and the targets of hate speech.

When asked how often specific groups are the victims of hate crime and the target of hate speech, homosexuals and Jehovah’s Witnesses topped the list.  When asked, who do you think is the target of hate speech most often in Georgia, LGBT people were named more often than any other group. The same is true of hate crime.

While these perceptions likely reflect the situation surrounding hate crime and hate speech to a reasonable degree, they are also likely mistaken to a certain extent.

For example, the vast majority of the public (91%) reports positive attitudes towards people with disabilities. In line with this pattern, only 2% of the public reported that people with disabilities are often the targets of hate speech and 2% the victims of hate crime.

Yet, as a person with a disability interviewed within the study stated, ‘Hate speech is part of our everyday life. Ingrained. Firmly established.’

It is not possible to generalise from a single interview, yet a gap between minority and majority perspectives on the challenges minorities face are not present only when it comes to people with disabilities.

The survey asked what the most significant issues a variety of groups faced were. While 41% of men reported that women faced no issues 28% of women did.  29% of ethnic Georgians reported that ethnic minorities faced no issues compared with 10% of ethnic Armenians and 12% of ethnic Azeris. 44% of Orthodox Christians reported that religious minorities faced no issues compared with 17% of Muslims and 20% of non-Orthodox Christians.

How the question was asked is important here. Respondents were provided with a list of potential responses and allowed to name other issues. However, that they face no issues was not part of that list, meaning that people actively reported the above groups face no significant issues rather than selecting one of the options from the list. If they face no issues was part of the list, a larger share of the public likely would have selected the option.

There are many plausible causes of the gap between minority and majority perceptions. A lack of contact between groups is one potential source. While this survey did not ask about contact with different minority groups, previous surveys show that those who are in touch with minorities often have more positive attitudes towards them (e.g. with LGBT people and with migrants).

A second potential cause is the portrayal of minorities in the media, which frequently contains hate speech.

No matter the precise reasons for intolerance in Georgia, these potential causes also suggest potential solutions.

First, increasing contact between minority and majority groups has the potential to decrease the animus people express towards minorities. Second, the media could remove hate speech from its discourse. Further, they could take the positive step of providing more detailed coverage of the problems minorities face in Georgia, thus directly informing the public.

Finally, highlighting the contradiction between Georgians’ pride in tolerance and the hate crime which takes place in Georgia all too often has the potential to encourage the public to question their own views.

Dustin Gilbreath is the Deputy Research Director of CRRC-Georgia. 

The views presented in this article do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in this article do not represent the views of the Council of Europe or any related entity.

The data used in this article are available here.

People in Georgia approve of doing business with Russians, despite interstate hostility

In the 2017 wave of CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey, 40% of the population of Georgia named Russia as the main enemy of the country.  Turkey and the United States garnered the second highest share of responses with 3% each.  Yet, no particular animosity towards ethnic Russians is observed in answers to a question about people’s (dis)approval of individuals of their ethnicity doing business with Russians. This blog post examines how answers differ by people’s opinions about whether or not Russia is the main enemy of Georgia. 

Seventy-seven percent of the population of Georgia report approving of people of their ethnicity doing business with a Russian, which is one of the highest approval rates of the 14 ethnic groups asked about in the survey.  It is important to note, though, that answers to this question are subject to ‘social desirability bias,’ which is the “tendency of some respondents to report an answer in a way they deem to be more socially acceptable than would be their ‘true’ answer.”

Only a slightly greater share of people who named Russia as the main enemy of Georgia report disapproving of their co-nationals doing business with a Russian, compared to those who did not name Russia as Georgia’s main enemy. These findings suggest a rather tolerant attitude towards ethnic Russians in Georgia, amidst a sizeable backdrop of opinions that identify Russia as the main enemy of Georgia. They also suggest that people in Georgia distinguish between attitudes towards “Russia” as a state and “Russians” as a people.  

Note: The question, “In your opinion, which country is currently the main enemy of Georgia?” was open-ended. For this chart, the countries other than “Russia” were combined into category “Not Russia.”

Given the antagonistic relationship between the political elites of Georgia and Russia, the evidence that interstate hostility does not necessarily equate to negative attitudes on a micro-level is important.

To explore the data used in this blog post further, visit our Online Data Analysis platform. 

What are young people’s values and how are these different from older generations’ values in Georgia?

[Note: This blog post summarizes the findings of an article written by CRRC-Georgia researcher Tamar Khoshtaria and published in The Journal of Beliefs and Values in August, 2017.]

As Georgian society is going through social and cultural changes, it is important to understand people’s beliefs and values. Comparing the values of young people to those of the older generations is also important. This blog post summarizes the findings of a study that examined the values of young people aged 18 to 25, and analysed how these values are different from the values of older people in Georgia, based on both quantitative (World Values Survey, 2014) and qualitative data (40 in-depth interviews conducted in 2016). The study looked at values, perceptions, attitudes and tolerance towards different minority groups in Georgia. It concludes that in many cases, the younger generation shares more modern views and values, while the older generations are more inclined to support traditional values and hold conservative points of view.

The study used Shalom H. Schwartz’s theory of basic values, which identifies ten basic values:

1. Self-direction: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring; 
2. Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life; 
3. Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself; 
4. Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards;
5. Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources;  
6. Security: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self; 
7. Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms;  
8. Tradition: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self; 
9. Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact; 
10. Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature. 

In his empirical work, Schwartz used short verbal portraits which describe a person as having a certain goal, aspiration or wish and point implicitly to one of the ten value types. After hearing a verbal portrait, respondents had to evaluate to what extent the person described was like or not like him or her. These verbal portraits were used during the 2014 World Values Survey (WVS) conducted in Georgia. During qualitative interviews (conducted independently from the WVS), respondents could provide detailed accounts of their attitudes. 

The quantitative and qualitative data show similar results. Quantitative data analysis suggests that Schwartz’s higher-ordered values ‘conservation’ (which includes the basic values of ‘security’, ‘conformity’, and ‘tradition’) and ‘self-transcendence’ (which includes the basic values of ‘benevolence’ and ‘universalism’) are very important for people of all age groups in Georgia. Over 70% in all age groups evaluated the persons described in the verbal portraits representing these five basic values as being ‘very much like them’ or ‘like them.’ When it comes to these basic values, the young generation, in general, does not differ much from the older generations.



On the other hand, there are some values which were assessed quite differently by people in different age groups. When looking at the basic values ‘self-direction’, ‘stimulation’, and ‘hedonism’ (representing the higher-ordered value of ‘openness to change’), there are differences by age group. Compared to older generations, a larger share of young people identified themselves with a person to whom it is important to think up new ideas, take risks, and have a good time.



Similarly, the basic values of ‘achievement’ and ‘power’ (representing the higher-order value of ‘self-enhancement’) have been assessed differently by young people and people of older generations. While being successful is important for 66% of young people, the share is lower among older people. In addition, while ‘being rich, and having a lot of money and expensive things’ was not reported as an important value in Georgia, the share of those valuing this kind of ‘power’ is slightly larger among young respondents than it is among the older ones.

The second part of the study focused on tolerance towards different minority groups, measured by a question about which groups of people respondents would not want as their neighbours. The least tolerated group in Georgia is homosexuals. People of all generations would not like to have them as their neighbours. Still, the answers of young people suggest more tolerance and openness to different minority groups.



Note: A show card was used for this question. Respondents could name as many answer options as they wanted. 

While some values (e.g. ‘security’, ‘conformity’, ‘tradition’, ‘benevolence’, and ‘universalism’) are almost equally important to young and old people in Georgia, the young generation identifies more with values like ‘self-direction’, ‘stimulation’, ‘hedonism’, and ‘achievement’. In addition, the young generation is slightly more tolerant towards different minority groups.

For detailed results, see the full article in the Journal of Beliefs and Values.

Are Georgians as tolerant as they claim to be?

[Note: This article was co-published with OC-Media and written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Policy Analyst at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC-Georgia or any related entity.]

On 15 November, the Ministry of Culture announced it would give ‘Georgian tolerance’ the status of intangible cultural heritage. Historically, Georgia may have exhibited relatively high levels of tolerance, with many pointing to the reign of King David the Builder in the 12th century. David is celebrated for presiding over the start of the country’s golden age, and many point to his encouragement of other ethnicities settling in Georgia as a good example of Georgian tolerance.

Yet, recent events in Georgia like the far-right March of Georgians, numerous incidents targeting Georgia’s Muslim community, and the 2013 riots during International Day Against Homophobia suggest Georgia has a ways to go when it comes to tolerance.

Survey data also consistently suggest modern day Georgia lacks tolerance towards minorities of all stripes, though is more tolerant than neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Caucasus Barometer data, Georgians generally disapprove of Georgian women marrying other ethnicities, a common proxy for tolerance in international surveys.

The graph below shows the net approval rating of women marrying other ethnicities between 2009 and 2015. Net approval ratings show whether attitudes are more positive or negative towards an individual or subject overall. The only positive net approval rating is for Russians and only in 2015. Every other net approval rating is less than zero suggesting more Georgians disapprove of women of their ethnicity marrying other ethnicities than approve.  This includes many ethnicities which the Ministry of Culture is presumably celebrating the country’s tolerance towards such as Armenians, Azeris, Abkhaz, Jewish people, and Ossetians.


The data also shows a clear religious bias. The chart below shows the average net approval of women in Georgia marrying ethnicities associated with Christianity and other religions. The graph shows that ethnicities traditionally associated with religions besides Christianity are less approved of by about 20 percentage points.


Note: Ethnicities associated with Christianity in the above graph include Russians, Armenians, Armenians living in Georgia, Ossetians, and Abkhaz. Ethnicities not associated with Christianity include Azeris, Azeris living in Georgia, Jewish people, Kurds, and Turks.

While Georgia lacks in tolerance, when compared with its neighbors in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia is welcoming. The graph below shows the net approvals for each ethnicity on the Caucasus Barometer between 2009 and 2013. The general pattern holds whether or not Armenians and Azerbaijanis attitudes towards each other are taken into account.



Note: Average net approvals were calculated using all ethnicities that were asked about in all three countries as well as the two South Caucasian neighbors of each country. Titular ethnicities were excluded from the calculation. Caucasus Barometer was not carried out in Azerbaijan in 2015.

While Georgia is more tolerant than its neighbors, it still has a long way to go, especially if it wants to match the famed tolerance of King David the Builder.

The data used in this article is available from CRRC-Georgia’s Online Data Analysis Tool.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance (Part 3)

As the first blog post in this series highlighted, approval by Georgians for doing business with members of other ethnic groups is, overall, declining. When it comes to Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities, Georgians are even less approving. These latter attitudes vary by settlement type, age, and level of education. As in the previous blog posts in this series, only the answers of ethnic Georgians are presented in this blog post.

Georgians living in the capital report the highest approval of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities. On average, there is a 14 percentage point difference between the population of the capital and rural settlements. The biggest gap is with Americans (19%): 54% of Georgians in Tbilisi approve of Georgian women marrying Americans, while only 35% of the rural population say the same. The gap is smallest with Russians: 55% in the capital and 45% in rural settlements approve of Georgian women marrying Russians.

Note: Only shares of those answering “Approve” are presented on the charts in this blog post. 

Differences between the answers of people of different ages are also noteworthy, though the gaps are smaller. Overall, younger people show greater approval of Georgian women marrying foreigners. The biggest gap is observed in respect to marrying Americans (14%): while 50% of young people 18 to 35 approve of Georgian women marrying Americans, only 36% of older people (56+) say the same.

Differences by education level are also informative. The higher a person’s level of education, the more s/he tends to approve of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities. On average, there is a ten percentage point gap between people with secondary or lower education and those with tertiary education. As with settlement types and age groups, the largest gap is observed in relation to Americans. Only 37% of people with secondary or lower education approve of Georgian women marrying Americans, while 51% of people with tertiary education report the same.

Approval by Georgians of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities varies by settlement type, education, and, to a lesser extent, by age. Interestingly, the gaps between the groups are consistently greatest when it comes to (dis)approval of Georgian women marrying Americans.

To take a deeper look at the data used in this blog post, try out our online data analysis tool.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance (Part 2)

In the previous blog post, we saw that Georgians report approval of doing business with representatives of other ethnic groups less than in the past. Based on CRRC’s 2015 Caucasus Barometer data, this blog post looks at how (dis)approval differs for Georgians of different ages, and living in different settlement types. 

People living in rural settlements report disapproval of business relations with representatives of the other ethnic groups asked about more often than residents of the capital and other urban settlements. On average, 56% of rural residents report approval of doing business with the 11 other ethnicities asked about over time, while the average for Tbilisi residents is 78%. 

Note: Only the answers of those answering “Approve” are shown on the charts in this blog post. 

The highest reported levels of approval of doing business with foreigners in rural settlements was with Russians and Ukrainians, both at 69%. By comparison, in the capital, 83% and 89% approved of doing business with Russians and Ukrainians, respectively. The largest differences between the attitudes of the population of rural settlements and the capital are when it comes to Jews and Kurds/Yezidis, with approximately 30 percentage point gaps. 

Differences in the attitudes by age are also noteworthy, though the gaps are not as large as in the case of settlement types. On average, there is a 10 percentage point difference between the youngest (18-35) and the oldest group (56+). Georgians who are 56 and older show less approval of doing business with non-Georgians asked about, with the largest difference in the case of Americans: 79% of 18 to 35 year olds approve of doing business with them, while only 61% of people older than 56 say the same. The gap is almost the same in the case of Ukrainians. 

Young Georgians and those living in the capital and other urban settlements approve of doing business with people of other ethnicities more than older Georgians and those living in rural settlements. In the next blog post in this series, we present findings on who approves of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities. 

Explore more about attitudes towards non-Georgians in Georgia here.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance (Part 1)

Overall, the population of Georgia reports supporting inter-ethnic business relations. Yet, CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB) longitudinal data show this support is declining. In 2015, Georgians were less likely to report approval of doing business with representatives of all ethnicities asked about than they were in 2009. Interestingly, only (dis)approval of doing business with Russians did not change. These trends are presented in this blog post.

While there is a general downward trend in approval of doing business with non-Georgians between 2009 and 2015, the largest drops were observed between 2009 and 2010 and then between 2013 and 2015. In 2015, the highest level of approval was for doing business with Russians (76%, discussed below separately) and Americans (72%). The lowest reported level of approval was for doing business with Kurds (55%). The relative positions of different ethnicities have been largely stable over time.

Note: Only the shares of ethnic Georgians answering “Approve” are shown on this chart. CB was not conducted in 2014.

CB survey results show that Georgians’ support for doing business with other Caucasians is also declining. In 2015, the highest reported level of approval of doing business with other Caucasian groups was with Abkhazians (69%), while the lowest was with Armenians (60%). Both of these levels of approval are much lower than in 2009. The biggest drops between 2009 and 2015 are in approval of doing business with Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which declined by 15 and 17 percentage points, respectively.

Note: Only the shares of ethnic Georgians answering “Approve” are shown in this chart. CB was not conducted in 2014. 

At the same time, clearly stated disapproval of doing business with all the above ethnicities is increasing. In other words, an active substitution of disapproval for approval is observed.

Of the ethnicities CB asked about, only (dis)approval of doing business with Russians has been steady between 2009 and 2015, exhibiting only minor fluctuations.

The decrease in approval and increase in disapproval of Georgians doing business with other ethnicities over the past six years is considerable. Except Russians, approval of doing business with even the most liked ethnicities CB asked about is declining. In addition, data measuring (dis)approval of doing business with Greeks, Italians, and Iranians, which only exists for some years, also shows a decline in approval over time. Importantly, the rates of approval for doing business with non-Georgians are already systematically higher than rates of approval for Georgian women marrying non-Georgians.

Explore more about attitudes towards non-Georgians in Georgia here.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance

From the events of May 17th, 2013 when Orthodox priests and their supporters attacked demonstrators at an International Day Against Homophobia rally, to more recently when “sausage-wielding nationalists” attacked a vegan café in Tbilisi, various forms of intolerance have put Georgia into headlines internationally in recent years.

The coming posts on Social Science in the Caucasus will use CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer data (CB) to explore indicators of ethnic (in)tolerance in Georgia. Specifically, we use two questions:

• Can you please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with an [ethnic group]?
• Would you approve or disapprove of women of your ethnicity marrying an [ethnic group]?

The blog posts in this series only report the answers of ethnic Georgians.

The data reveals a number of interesting trends and patterns. Today’s post looks at which ethnicities Georgians approve of doing business with and how (dis)approval has changed over time. Diving further into this issue, the second post looks at how (dis)approval of doing business with other ethnicities differs by age and settlement type. The third post mirrors the second, looking at (dis)approval of Georgian women marrying non-Georgians by age, settlement type, and education level.

Part 1 of this series is available here.
Part 2 of this series is available here.
Part 3 of this series is available here.

Georgian youth: EU aspirations, but lacking tolerance

Public opinion polls consistently show that the majority of Georgians want to be a part of the European Union. Young people in Georgia are especially pro-Western, often claiming to share the same values as their peers in the West, according to the survey Knowledge and attitudes toward the EU in Georgia funded by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and conducted by CRRC-Georgia. Yet, when it comes to acceptance of specific opinions and attitudes divergent from their own, Georgian youth are not always open and tolerant. This blog post compares young Georgians’ level of tolerance and liberal attitudes with that of the youth from other European countries using the results of a survey of young people (16 to 25 years old) conducted in the framework of the Memory, Youth, Political Legacy, and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE) project, carried out in 14 European countries. In each, two settlements were chosen for survey fieldwork. In Georgia, these were Kutaisi and Telavi, and the fieldwork was conducted in fall 2012 by CRRC-Georgia.

Georgian youth assess overall respect for human rights in the country far worse than youth in Croatia, Russia, the UK, and East and West Germany (the project was carried out in East and West Germany separately). Survey results demonstrate that a large majority (up to 70%) of youth in Kutaisi and Telavi think that there is little respect for individual human rights in the country. This can be explained in part by the fact that prior to the start of fieldwork in fall of 2012, videos of torture in Georgian prisons leaked to the media. This led to mass demonstrations, and eventually, spurred on a change of government through October, 2012 parliamentary elections.

Although young Georgians were critical of the extent to which human rights were respected in the country in general, they themselves reported a lack of interest in the rights of sexual and ethnic minorities. Young people’s interest in LGBT rights was particularly low – only 13% of the youth surveyed in Georgia reported that they were interested in LGBT rights, while 68% said they were not interested. Young people in Russian survey locations showed a similar disinterest in LGBT rights, while in all other countries reported interest in LGBT rights was higher, exceeding 20% in Croatia and the United Kingdom, and 40% in both East and West Germany. The lack of interest in Georgia could be interpreted as a lack of respect for the rights of these minorities.

Note: The 11-point scale used for this question was re-coded during the analysis, with original codes 0-3 being labeled as “Not interested”, 4-6 – as “Average interest” and 7-10 as “Interested”.

In Georgia, the above interpretation was partially confirmed by events which followed several months after fieldwork. On May 17, 2013, on the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHO), Georgian society, including the youth, demonstrated its intolerance towards sexual minorities. Thousands of angry people led by representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church violently attacked Georgian LGBT-rights activists gathered to commemorate the day. This violence “resulted in 17 people being injured – 12 of whom were hospitalized, including three policemen and a journalist.”

When it comes to the rights of other ethnic groups and foreign nationals – and most notably, migrants – Georgian youth seem to be more accepting than with sexual minorities. Nonetheless, the level of tolerance reported in Georgia is low compared to other countries. About 40% of young people in the Georgian survey locations “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement that “migrants should have the same rights to welfare (social assistance/support) as people from Georgia.” On the other hand, 38% “strongly disagree” or “disagree” with this statement. Compared with other countries, only Russian young people seem to be less tolerant, with 46% disagreeing with this statement. In surveyed European Union countries, young people are more open to other nations and a higher percentage agrees with the above statement. This data demonstrates that when it comes to immigrants, young people’s way of thinking in Georgia is more in line with young people living in Russia than those living in the EU.
 

Tolerance and openness to whatever is not considered “Georgian” is often absent among Georgian youth. Therefore, it seems too early to talk about deeply rooted liberal attitudes and tolerance of the youth in Georgia – these values, rather characteristic of EU countries, have not yet developed in Georgia, and many young people are not yet ready to accept different views or to respect and support the interests and rights of minorities in the country.

To learn more about the MYPLACE project, visit the project website. To view more results of other CRRC surveys, visit our Online Data Analysis tool.

Georgia in a turbulent world: 2014 in review

Calling 2014 turbulent for the world seems almost euphemistic. The world witnessed renewed Russian revanchism with the war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, the emergence of a highly successful militant Islamic organization, Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and the persistently tense situation in Israel erupted into another war between Israelis and Palestinians. Not only did the world see conflict, but it also witnessed the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa and electoral gains for the far right and left in Europe. Notably, Turkey continued on its path which has swung against secularism and democracy in recent years.

In contrast, Georgia, a country known for its prolonged territorial conflicts and volatile politics, was relatively calm in 2014. This, though, is not to say that the events which shook the world in 2014 did not reverberate through Georgia. Quite to the contrary, the Ukraine crisis resonated in Georgia and the conflict in Syria holds consequences for the country. Georgia’s domestic politics, while tame in comparison to the recent past, also had unexpected and difficult moments.

The crisis in Ukraine reminded the Georgian public of the threat posed by Russia, and for many it was also a reminder of what could have happened in 2008. As a CRRC blog post pointed out in September, Georgians’ perception of Russia as a threat increased during the crisis. Moreover, the crisis in Ukraine hastened the signing of Georgia’s long sought after Association Agreement with the European Union. While the Agreement was originally scheduled to be signed no later than August 2014, after the Ukraine Crisis, the European Union moved up its signing to no later than June 2014, ultimately culminating in the signing on June 27th.

One of the most unexpected outcomes of the Ukraine crisis is the proposed appointments of a number of former Georgian United National Movement officials to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. Former Minister of Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, Aleksandre Kvitashvili, and former deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Eka Zguladze, have taken up the same posts in the Ukrainian government. Notably, ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili turned down the Vice Premiership of Ukraine to keep his Georgian citizenship. While the proposed appointments have not been received with absolute unanimity from the governing Georgian Dream Coalition, Foreign Minister Tamar Beruchashvili has noted the importance of maintaining good relations with Ukraine.

The Ukraine crisis was not the only global event to reverberate in Georgia in 2014. The war in Syria and Iraq, which has resulted in massive loss of human life and mass displacement, also touched Georgia. After the start of the conflict, Georgia’s previously ultra-liberal visa regime made it relatively easy for Syrians to settle in the country. Notably, some ethnic Abkhaz Syrians fled to Abkhazia from the conflict. This year though, a number of young people from the Pankisi Gorge in northeastern Georgia have joined the war in Syria and Iraq, becoming not only members, but also high level commanders of the militant Islamic organization, Islamic State.

On a different note, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration took another step forward this year with agreement on a “Substantive Package” with NATO. This package was given to Georgia to increase interoperability with NATO countries, while also serving as a substitution for a Membership Action Plan which in the context of the Ukraine crisis and the unsettled conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, may have provoked Russia’s ire.

In what some commentators have viewed as a response to NATO’s substantive package, Abkhazia and Russia signed a treaty, including a mutual defense clause similar to Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty. Both Abkhazians and Georgians have heavily criticized the treaty. The Georgian government has described this treaty as a further step in Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia, and Abkhazians have criticized the treaty for giving up too much autonomy. While the first draft of the treaty was titled “Agreement on Alliance and Integration” it was later changed to “Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership” (emphasis added) as a result of Abkhaz protests. Significantly, the Kremlin-favored candidate Raul Khajimba was elected to the de-facto presidency of Abkhazia, following a June revolution in the breakaway republic.

Speaking of entirely domestic events, in 2014, intolerance again manifested itself in Georgia with a number of islamophobic and homophobic events. The most extreme example of islamophobia this year was when residents of Kobuleti decapitated a pig and nailed its head to the front door of a Muslim boarding school in protest of the schools opening. On May 17th, the physical violence of 2013 protests against the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia was avoided since the anti-homophobia rally was cancelled due to the fear of repeated violence. Instead, the Georgian Orthodox Church along with its supporters celebrated a “day of family values” on May 17th, a clear act of symbolic violence.

The political scene was also somewhat turbulent. The Georgian Dream Coalition experienced its first serious crack with the dismissal of Irakli Alasania from the Defense Minister post in November and the subsequent withdrawal of the Free Democrats from the coalition. Notably, the public’s appraisal of the Georgian Dream Coalition’s performance has decreased in 2014. While in November 2013 50% of the population rated their performance as good or very good, only 23% of the population reported the same in August 2014. The municipal elections in 2014, which demonstrated a high level of competition compared to many elections in the past, also held a number of surprises. Importantly, the newly emerged Patriotic Alliance garnered nearly 5% of the vote nationally and forced a second round in gamgebeli elections in Lanchkhuti.

Elections and coalition politics aside, an event in Georgia which remains unsettled to this day is the charging of Mikheil Saakashvili with a number of crimes he allegedly committed while in office. Saakashvili has denied any wrong doing and accused the current government of a political witch hunt. The government has claimed that they are attempting to demonstrate that everyone is equal before the law and that justice, which was precarious during UNM rule, has returned to Georgia.

While the world shook in 2014, Georgia mainly felt the weaker aftershocks of world events in 2014, and although Georgia experienced crises in miniature, it has navigated domestic issues with a relative grace. Still, the crises in Ukraine and Syria left their mark on Georgia, and will continue to impact Georgia in 2015.

Georgia: A Liberal or Socially Conservative Country?

How justified is it for Georgian women to bear a child or have sex outside of wedlock? Is the Georgian population tolerant towards homosexuals? What are views on issues such as these in the light of the western-oriented political course of the country? How do men and women compare in terms of liberal attitudes? To address these questions, this blog post presents the results from two waves of a nationwide public opinion survey entitled “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia” conducted by CRRC in 2009 and 2011. The data indicates that attitudes towards women having sex or bearing a child without being married have slightly changed in a more liberal way over the past two years, yet social conservatism remains deeply rooted in Georgia. Georgians remain generally unaccepting of homosexuality. Also, Georgian women seem to have more conservative attitudes towards particular issues than men.

Social values are quite static and two years is a very short period to speak about value changes. Yet the data still suggests some interesting trends indicating that certain values related to women having sex or bearing a child without marriage are slightly changing in a more liberal way, while other attitudes such as tolerance of homosexuality remain unchanged. CRRC data shows that 50%-64% of Georgians think that it is never justified for an unmarried woman to bear a child or have sex. Also, vast majority of Georgians think homosexuality is never justified.

As the chart shows, the number of Georgians who think that it is always or sometimes justified for a woman to give birth without being married has increased from 30% to 42%, while the number of people who think it is always or sometimes justified for a woman to have sex before marriage has increased from 15% to 28%. When the same question was asked about men in 2011, over half (57%) of the population said that it is always or sometimes justified for man to have sex before marriage. These results suggest that to some, men having sex before marriage is more justifiable in Georgia than woman doing the same. These slight changes within the past 2 years cannot be generalized to the entire range of social questions asked in the survey.  For example, 90% of Georgians think that homosexuality can never be justified and this result has remains unchanged since 2009. This is one indicator that social conservatism is still deeply rooted in Georgia.

Examining the data by gender shows that Georgian men and women equally condemn homosexuality and their attitudes related to woman bearing a child without marriage are also similar. However, there are some differences in values related to people having sex before marriage by gender. 

The data indicates that having sex before marriage is more justifiable for men than for women. 33% of Georgian men think that is always justified for a man to have sex before marriage, while this share decreases to 18% for women to do the same. However, it is also worth noting that 25% of Georgian men say that a man having sex before marriage can never be justified.

When asked about women having sex before marriage 57% of Georgian men think this is never justified and 70% of Georgian women say the same. Thus, Georgian women are even more conservative on this question. Moreover, over half (51%) of Georgian women agree that is always or sometimes (percentages added) justified for a man to have sex before marriage, while only 25% think that this can be justifiable for a woman as well.

The results suggest that even though there is a slight shift towards liberal values concerning women bearing a child or having sex without marriage, social conservatism still prevails. Tolerance of homosexuality remains extremely low over the past two years. Exploring the data by gender shows that while men and women share similar values and attitudes towards certain issues such as homosexuality and woman bearing a child without marriage, Georgian women have more conservative attitudes towards having sex before marriage than men.

The questions discussed in this blog post can be considered sensitive in Georgian society. Yet, these results are a good starting point for a healthy discussion on these issues. Feel free to share your thoughts with us and find out more on this topic via CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.