A Further Look at Material Deprivation

Continuing to explore standards of living in the South Caucasus, this blog looks at the between four sources of household income and material deprivation using data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer. Each of the four sources of income (salaries, pensions or government transfers, sales from agricultural goods, and remittances) are categorized by their importance to the household and then cross tabulated with material deprivation. The findings suggest that families reliant on salaries and remittances are better off, while families receiving pensions and government transfers, or those who sell agricultural products as their primary source of income have higher than average rates of material deprivation.

Salaries and pensions/government transfers are by far the most important sources of income, mentioned by around 50% of people in all three countries. Agriculture is mentioned as an income source by over 25% of respondents in Azerbaijan and Georgia, but is reported by only 17% of Armenians, where remittances are the third most common source of income. Twenty percent of Armenians and 17% of Georgians report income from remittances, but family transfers are relatively rare in Azerbaijan, with fewer than 7% reporting receiving remittances.

Chart 1

In the South Caucasus as a whole, people who list salaries as their household’s primary source of income have half the average material deprivation rate of 32%. By taking the ratio of the average rate of material deprivation (blue bar) and the material deprivation rate for salaries as the primary source of income (red bar), Chart 2 shows that households primarily relying on salaries for income have less than half (44%) the average material deprivation rate in Armenia. This figure is 52% of the average material deprivation rate in Georgia, and 63% of the average material deprivation rate in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, households in the South Caucasus that did not report salaries as an income source are 1.4 times as likely to be materially deprived.

Chart 2

Pensions and government transfers are the second most important source of income in the South Caucasus. Chart 3 shows that households where government transfers are the primary source of income have more than 1.5 times the average rate of material deprivation, while those where pensions and government transfers are the second source of income have three-fourths the average rate of material deprivation. This suggests that government transfers throughout the South Caucasus are not large enough to live without poverty, but can effectively supplement a main income. The trend is most extreme in Armenia where households relying on the government for their primary source of income are over two times as likely to be materially deprived, while households where government funds are a secondary source of income have three-fifths the average rate of material deprivation. In Azerbaijan, government transfers have a much weaker correlation with material deprivation. In fact, data from graphs 2 and 3 shows that households receiving government transfers as their primary source of income are twice as likely to be materially deprived as households dependent on salaries in Azerbaijan, three times as likely in Georgia, and five times as likely in Armenia.

Chart 3

As chart 4 shows, income from sales of agricultural products is correlated with higher material deprivation rates across the South Caucasus, supporting previous findings showing that material deprivation is concentrated in rural areas. Armenia has the lowest percentage of households reporting income from the sale of agricultural goods, and also the smallest changes in material deprivation based on income from agriculture. Georgian households dependent on agriculture for either their primary or secondary source of funding are around 1.4 times more likely to be materially deprived than the country average, while Azerbaijani households are almost 1.8 times as likely. In Armenia and Georgia, relying on pensions and government transfers is the strongest indicator of material deprivation, while in Azerbaijan it is dependence on sales from agricultural products.

Chart 4

Only 13% of respondents in the South Caucasus report receiving money from remittances, but chart 5 shows that households most reliant on remittances are less likely to be materially deprived. The trend is especially strong in Georgia, where households dependent on remittances as the primary source of income have 58% of the country’s average material deprivation rate.

Chart 5

Although overall trends are consistent across all three South Caucasus countries, the importance of each income source on standard of living varies rather widely. Material deprivation in Azerbaijan seems to reflect a large divide between urban and rural areas, with family transfers, salaries, and government transfers much less strongly correlated to changes in material deprivation than in Georgia or Armenia. In Georgia more people mention government transfers than salaries as an income source, and for those reliant on state transfers, the material deprivation rate is over 70%. Although Armenia has by far the lowest material deprivation rate, at under 19%, it has a huge disparity between households with salaries as their primary source of income and households dependent on government transfers.

Gender | How Does the South Caucasus Compare?

CRRC’s report “How Does the South Caucasus Compare?” aims to put attitudes towards gender in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the three countries of the South Caucasus region, into a global context. Comparing data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2010 with that of the CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB), the report shows that on several crucial questions of gender equality, there are significant cleavages between the South Caucasus neighbors.

To read how Caucasian gender attitudes compare, click here.

Class in the Caucasus | Article by Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock

Using data from the Caucasus Barometer, Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock argue that "in economic and socio-political terms there are as yet just two real classes among actual and potential employees in the South Caucasus – middle classes and lower classes – and that although these classes differ in their standards of living and political dispositions, these are unlikely to become bases for conflict between them."

Interested in more detail? Check the abstract online.

Ask CRRC!

When presenting our work, or talking about it informally, we are asked fairly similar questions: do you do your interviewing in all of the country? How do you select the respondents? How do you know they are not lying to you? Are people willing to say things critical of the government? How do you design a questionnaire?

These are extremely important questions, because they will influence whether you can take our survey results at face value. As mentioned in the last post, we have decided to give you more regular updates on what we do, and how we do it.

This, too, was another lesson we learned from our favorite role models, the Pew Research Centers. They have a specific section called "Ask the Expert", pictured below.

What, then, has always puzzled you about survey research? Let us know, either through the comments or by writing an e-mail. We will, eventually, make this information available in the local languages as well. Your input will help us identify the questions people have.

So, what questions do you have for us?

Religious Service Attendance: An ESS/CB Snapshot

By David McArdle

Earlier this week, The Economist pointed out some data from the 2008 European Social Survey (ESS) on attendance at religious services across Europe. Collating the answers on attendance from 28 countries in order to ascertain one aspect of religious observance, the results showed that the Czech Republic had the highest percentage of people who said they never attend services, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals.

Using the 2009 CB data, which has the same question on attendance, we included the countries of the south Caucasus to see how they fit vis-à-vis their European counterparts. Georgia is the country in the south Caucasus with the fewest people who say they never attend services (11 percent). Georgia, therefore, was fourth in the list behind Cyprus, Greece (both predominantly Greek Orthodox), and Poland (almost exclusively Roman Catholic).

Next came Armenia (21 percent) and then Azerbaijan (29 percent), with more moderate levels of religious service attendance. As shown on the graph below, Armenia’s figure was just below Turkey’s, while Azerbaijan’s was closer to Estonia’s.



While this is just one way to measure religious observance, it offers a glimpse of how people are practicing throughout Europe. The ESS has much data to discover, which can be done using its easy-to-use format, available here. Meanwhile, our own Caucasus Barometer also has similar questions, on rates of fasting (2009) and prayer (2007), for instance. For more information on these, get in touch with us, or explore the data on our interface here. Finally, to check out The Economist's article, go here.

Respondent Evaluation | A Great Tool for Looking into Survey Interviews

What are the patterns in how the respondents are rated by the interviewers? The relevance of this question is beyond doubt, as patterns in such ratings allow for an idea of the reliability of the data as well as for more general insights into the settings in which interviewers are gathering data. Relevant data has been gathered in the Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey for years, enabling us to analyze the impressions that interviewers have gained during their work in the South Caucasus.

One particularly interesting endeavour is to make comparisons between the perceptions of interviewers in the three countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. In all three cases, interviewers were asked to evaluate issues affecting the interview such as levels of distraction, frequency of the need for clarifications, or the extent to which respondents were reluctant to answer questions. Perceptions of the personal characteristics of respondents, such as sincerity, comfort and interest, are also recorded. Patterns of interviewer’s ratings can subsequently be identified by looking at several of the measured variables. These also allow us to filter out interviews in which respondents were uncomfortable, or seemed insincere.

One first interesting finding is that interviewers in Azerbaijan seem to face more obstacles in the interviewing process when compared with their counterparts in Armenia or Georgia. More concretely, respondents in Azerbaijan are more frequently in need of clarifications of questions and also show more often a lack of knowledge on a certain subject. Only in slightly above 20 percent of the cases were the interviewers in Azerbaijan ‘never’ (i.e. not throughout the entire interview) confronted with such situations. By contrast, in the neighbouring countries, such instances comprise over 30 percent (see Figures 1 and 2). A comparison between Armenia and Georgia shows that inhabitants of Georgia seem to have difficulties in slightly fewer instances, and in particular appear more knowledgeable to the interviewers. (Interestingly, there is some evidence that respondents in all countries seem to face more difficulties in answering questions without clarifications in 2009 as compared to 2007-08, but this is yet another topic.)

Given the above findings, it is then arguably strange that Azerbaijani and Armenian respondents were labelled as "more comfortable" compared with the Georgian respondents (see Figure 3). In other words, although Georgians are perceived by their interviewers to have less trouble during the interview (as reflected in need of clarifications and lack of knowledge), this does not coincide with a more comfortable behaviour even if one might have expected that. However, in all three instances, there is a comparably low number of nervous respondents (slightly less than 10 percent), which suggests that nervousness is not a particularly serious problem in any of the surveys.

Finally, of the many interviewer ratings the CB includes, another remarkable one is the evaluation of interest and involvement. The first striking aspect here is that in all three countries, most respondents do not appear to be interested or involved during the interview. Moreover, Georgians are least interested/involved in the interview process (less than 30 percent were assessed as interested), whereas Azerbaijanis are the most interested (approximately 45 percent; see Figure 4). Armenian subjects are, as in the above cases, perceived to be somewhere in the middle (40 percent). Thus, while interviewers in Azerbaijan seem to be more often confronted with a lack of knowledge and confusion about questions, interviewers in Georgia more often come across higher levels of perceived disinterest and lack of comfort on the part of the their respondents.

 

To be sure, these ratings are done at the end of the interview, and we know that we cannot ask complex questions at this point anymore. Typically we've been talking for 45 minutes and have exhausted the patience of the respondent. Nevertheless, these findings remind us that we need to keep our questionnaires short.

While we know that particular wordings may lead to slightly different interpretations in different languages, the interviewer ratings give us a glimpse into what is going on, and thus help us improve the quality further. Survey work is nearly never perfect. It's a process of continuous improvement. Plenty of opportunities for researchers to analyze the data more closely.

Attitudes toward the West | Caucasus Analytical Digest

Following an article on Georgians’ attitudes toward Russia, CRRC Fellows Therese Svensson and Julia Hon have written a new piece for CAD, entitled “Attitudes toward the West in the South Caucasus”. Their article looks at citizens’ views on three areas of relations — political, economic and cultural — between the South Caucasus and the West, in particular NATO, the US and the EU. The data were derived from the South Caucasus–wide 2007 and 2008 Data Initiatives (DI), as well as from the 2009 EU survey that was conducted in Georgia.

The article highlights several figures which show that citizens in the South Caucasus, and especially those in Georgia, are keen to cooperate with the West on economic and political levels. For example, on a ten-point scale — where '10' equals full cooperation and '1' is no cooperation — 80 percent of the Georgian respondents ranked their desire for economic cooperation with the U.S. in the top five categories, compared with 71 percent in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The percentages on potential NATO membership, by contrast, vary more widely in the three countries: while 42 percent in Georgia said they are fully in favor of membership, 21 percent said the same in Azerbaijan, and only 10 percent in Armenia.

But the most fascinating figures arise when the subject of cultural relationships comes up. Although citizens in the South Caucasus are open to friendship and doing business with citizens of the West, they seem less keen on Western cultural influences, which they view as potential threats to their own cultural identity and traditions. In all, 64 percent and 63 percent in Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively, either strongly or somewhat agreed with a statement that "Western influence is a threat to [national] culture". Twenty-four percent in Georgia said the same, while 34 percent chose "neutral" as their answer.

Perhaps understanding exactly which elements of Western culture are seen to be threatening, and in what way, would be a topic of additional interest.

For the full article, go here.

Greatest Threats Facing the World | Data from the 2009 CB & the Global Attitudes Survey

By Jesse Tatum and Vazha Burduli

From environmental catastrophe to violence, our world currently faces serious challenges with long-term consequences. In this context, what do people in the Caucasus consider to be the most acute problems?

Regarding the greatest threats to the world today, the spread of nuclear weapons and poverty are foremost on the minds of people in the South Caucasus, according to the 2009 CB.

The CB asked respondents to choose from a list of six dangers which one they believe poses the greatest threat to the world. In Georgia and Azerbaijan, the spread of nuclear weapons topped the list, with 44 percent and 36 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, in Armenia, poverty was chosen first, with 35 percent, just edging out the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. Curiously, more people in Azerbaijan seemed to worry about AIDS and infectious diseases -- something still to look into.

The 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which also asks people which threats currently pose the greatest risk to our world, found that pollution and environmental problems are increasingly taking over the top spots as the most pressing world dangers. (Note that CRRC's question was phrased slightly differently, and offered another option.)

Compared with the Global Attitude Survey's results, people in the South Caucasus are less concerned with pollution and environmental problems than in other parts of the world, especially Sweden, Canada and East Asia (China, S. Korea and Japan).

The amount of data available between the two surveys is extensive indeed. We hope you will check out Pew's report, and then compare other figures with our CB in order to see where South Caucasian's world views fit into the international context. In the future, we plan to post more comparisons of this sort.

Caucasus Barometer | A New Name for the CRRC's Data Initiative

The CRRC’s annual Data Initiative Survey will be renamed into the Caucasus Barometer starting from 2010. At CRRC, we think that the new name better reflects the essence of the survey and is more understandable for the general public and the journalists.

The Data Initiative was first launched in 2004. Since 2007, a representative sample of approximately 2,000 respondents is interviewed annually in each of the counties. They answer core questions about household composition, social and economic situation of households, employment status, assessments of social and political situation in the countries, as well as respondents’ perceptions about direction of life. In addition, we include questions about media, health, crime, and other topical issues.

The change of the name, however, will not cause any changes in the way the survey is carried out – it is still an annual survey conducted every fall in all countries of the South Caucasus, employing the same methodology and the same survey instrument. Its major goal is to get reliable longitudinal empirical data to understand various aspects of the processes of social transformation in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. We are committed to ensure the highest possible scientific quality through all the steps of survey implementation.

The data and the survey documentation are open to all interested researchers and represent a unique tool for further quantitative analysis. You can find more information about the Data Initiative/Caucasus Barometer on our website.

The Level of Trust in Government Institutions in Georgia: The Dynamics of the Past Three Years

During the last two decades, Georgia has created new government institutions designed to serve as the tools and safeguards of democracy. But do Georgians believe that these institutions live up to their mission statements? How much do Georgians trust government institutions, and which factors influence the public’s attitudes toward them?

A look at the data from the Data Initiative (DI) over the last three years (2007–2009) shows how the level of trust in government institutions may be related to the political crises and external threats to the country, as well as to the personalities representing these institutions.

For example, the public’s trust in President Saakashvili has experienced a significant increase, especially after the 2008 August war. Combining the “fully trust” and “somewhat trust” categories shows that the percentage of the respondents who trusted the President rose from 32 percent in 2007 to 51 percent in 2008 and remained nearly the same in 2009. Moreover, combining the “somewhat distrust” and “fully distrust” categories reveals that the number of those who distrusted him dropped from 37 percent in 2007 to 18 percent in 2009 (see Figure 1). Such changes could perhaps be linked, firstly, to the events that led to the November 2007 political crisis and, secondly, to the 2008 war and the rise of external threats to the country in the subsequent years. (The DI surveys were conducted in a period of around two weeks, between September and November of the respective years.)

Figure 1: Trust in the President.

Second, the level of trust in the Ombudsman was the highest when this institution was headed by a very popular personality, Sozar Subari (see, for example, Bahrampour, “Georgia’s Counterweight to Power,” Washington Post, July 24, 2009). The level of trust in the Ombudsman rose from 36 percent in 2007 to 58 percent in 2008, while the percentage of those who distrusted this institution fell to seven percent.

When Subari was replaced in September 2009, however, the public’s trust in the Ombudsman’s institution took a reverse turn, dropping by almost a third. While the level of distrust in this institution remained the same, the number of the respondents who trusted the Ombudsman dropped from 58 percent to 40 percent (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Trust in the Ombudsman.

Unlike the President and the Ombudsman, the levels of trust in the Parliament and the executive government (the Prime Minister and ministers) were lower, perhaps attributable to the lower degree to which most MPs and cabinet members are perceived to be politically independent figures. The level of trust in the Parliament, for example, rose significantly from 19 percent in 2007 to 34 percent in 2008 and remained the same in 2009. Meanwhile, the number of the respondents who distrusted the Parliament dropped from 44 percent in 2007 to 26 percent in 2009 (see Figure 3). The figures in each category of trust in the executive government were nearly the same as that of the Parliament.

Figure: 3: Trust in the Parliament.

Overall, these snapshots show that the public’s trust in government institutions was the lowest in 2007, which coincides with an acute political crisis in Georgia. However, after the 2008 war, the levels of trust grew and, with the exception of the Ombudsman’s institution, remained relatively high compared with the previous years.

You can access the DI dataset here to analyze the public’s trust in other institutions and make comparisons with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Social networks in rural and urban Georgia

It is often stated that life in a city is fundamentally different from that in rural areas. In the West, village life is said to be more intimate, and its inhabitants more caring about their peers, with strong ties between neighbors and family members. Can this also be said in the South Caucasus? After all, family relations and friendships are supposed to be strong in countries like Georgia. Do these ties reach into the cities, erasing the difference between strong social networks in rural areas and the more anonymous, independent urban setting?

The data from our 2008 Data Initiative (DI) gives us several clues as to how to answer this question. Georgian respondents in three settlements types - rural, urban (excluding the capital), and Tbilisi - were asked about their views on their social environment. The results showed that people with positive feelings about their social networks were, contrary to our expectations, most likely to be found in the capital, but least likely in other urban areas.

According to our data, inhabitants of rural settlements and Tbilisi are most likely to have enough people to trust. Villagers also have the lowest percentage of people lacking this kind of social support. Our question asked the respondents whether they had “many people to trust completely.” Respondents were most likely to agree with this statement in rural areas and Tbilisi (both 35 percent). Urban Georgia came out last, where only 21 percent felt they had trustworthy people around. By contrast, 24 percent in Tbilisi and about 23 percent in other urban areas said they cannot trust many people in their social environment. In rural Georgia only 13 percent of respondents said the same. The neutral answer reading “the statement more or less describes my feelings” was most often recorded in urban areas (53 percent), followed by rural Georgia (51 percent) and Tbilisi (41 percent).


When asked about people close to them, respondents in Tbilisi were more often satisfied with their situation than those living in other settlement types. Inhabitants of rural areas were least likely to express a lack of close friends. In response to the proposed statement “I have enough people I feel close to”, urban Georgia had again the least favorable response pattern. In cities like Batumi or Rustavi, only 41 percent of respondents stated that they have many close people around. Fifty percent in the capital and 45 percent in rural areas agreed with this statement. This time, Tbilisi also had the highest percentage of negative answers, with as much as 13 percent of the respondents thinking that they lack close friends. Only 9 percent of answers recorded in rural parts of the country, and only 10 percent in urban Georgia, reflected the same negative feelings. The neutral answer was most likely to be found in rural settings and urban areas (both 46 percent), followed by the capital (37 percent).

In response to the statement “there are plenty of people I can rely on when I have problems”, once again more people in the capital than in other parts of Georgia agreed, and urban Georgia featured the highest percentage of respondents who miss reliable people when they encounter problems. In urban Georgia only 30 percent of the respondents felt safe to turn to their friends when in trouble, and there were 18 percent who thought that they cannot rely on their social environment in this way. Both in the capital and in rural areas, the spread between positive and negative answers is much higher: in Tbilisi a full 48 percent agreed that they have plenty of reliable people around, compared with 14 percent who disagreed. In rural areas 42 percent gave a positive and only 13 percent a negative answer. The percentage of respondents who chose “describes more or less my feelings” as their answer was lower in the capital (37 percent) than in rural (45 percent) and urban Georgia (51 percent).


Now, which settlement has the highest quality of social networks? If we take a negative definition (i.e. we search the type of settlement with the smallest percentage of respondents expressing a lack of sound social ties), rural life seems to be the best choice, with the fewest amount of people choosing the negative answers. If, however, we compare positive answers (i.e. we search the type of settlement where the highest percentage of respondents were satisfied with their social networks), the capital is ahead of rural settlements. With both definitions, urban Georgia (excluding the capital) comes out last in the comparison. This hints to the fact that city life might have significant drawbacks, but that they have been compensated in Tbilisi by factors not present in other urban settlements. By the way, people in the capital also tend to have a more pronounced opinion about these matters, with fewer respondents choosing the neutral answer in response to the three statements.

What are the factors that help Tbilisi to counterbalance some of the negative aspects of city life? Why does it have so many people satisfied with their social networks, without the large numbers of unsatisfied respondents found in other cities in Georgia? Some of these factors might be found with the help of our survey data. If you feel like exploring this interesting subject, or would like to see similar data for Armenia or Azerbaijan, we invite you to visit http://www.crrccenters.org/sda, where you can find all of our 2008 DI survey data for free, accessible via an easy-to-use web interface. Comments and ideas are appreciated.

Insight to Georgian Households | CRRC Data on Economic Wellbeing in the Caucasus

How are Georgians doing financially, how much do they earn and what do they spend on? CRRC’s Data Initiative allows for an in-depth analysis of these and similar issues on the economic status of the population across the South Caucasus.

We again (see our recent piece on social developments here) published something in Investor.ge, the journal published by the American Chamber of Commerce -- and a great resource for tracking business and economic developments.

In this article, Arpine and Nana discuss how much Georgians earn, what they spend money on, how they borrow, and how they see their financial future. Read the article on economic well-being of Georgian households here.

Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions | Paper with CRRC Data

Robia Charles, a fellow at CRRC Georgia from January to June 2009, has written a paper to examine determinants of trust in religious institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - three countries with low levels of religiosity as measured by attendance, prayer and fasting, yet high levels of trust in religious institutions. The analysis employs individual-level survey data from the Caucasus Research Resource Centers’ (CRRC) 2007 Data Initiative and uses advanced statistical techniques to show that while religious practices do not determine trust in religious institutions, the importance of religion in one’s daily life is a strong indicator of trust in religious institutions in each country.

However, the results show some differences between the three countries with regard to two types of control variables-trust in secular institutions and socioeconomic factors. Georgia is the only country in which interpersonal trust is a significant indicator of trust in religious institutions. Residence in the capital is only significant in Azerbaijan. Armenia is the only country in which both education and age are significant.

To read the actual paper, which also tests two theories of trust in institutions, click here.

The South Ossetia Crisis: a War of Ideologies

Many scholars have commented on the influence of the Russia-Georgian war on foreign policy strategies in the Caucasus. In contrast, little attention has been given to its effect on public perception in the countries of the Caucasus.

It is therefore noteworthy that public opinion plays a key role in a recent article by Anar Valiyev, entitled “Victim of a ‘War of Ideologies’ - Azerbaijan after the Russia–Georgia War”. Because of the war, Valiyev argues, Azerbaijanis have become less supportive of Western-style “unmanaged” democracy, preferring instead a more controlled and Moscow-backed “sovereign democracy”.

Interestingly, he asserts that the Russia-Georgia war “significantly changed Azerbaijanis’ perceptions of the democratic West and negatively impacted their perceptions of the United States and the European Union. Georgia’s defeat and the subsequent political turmoil demonstrated the viability and stability of the sovereign democracy and made the Russian model of governance more attractive to the people of Azerbaijan.”

In order to illustrate this premise, Valiyev places a great emphasis on public opinion polls, including CRRC’s Data Initiative. He emphasises the value of these statistics, noting that they are almost the only method enabling to track the political development and the perceptions of the Azerbaijani society before and after the South Ossetia crisis.

For one, surveys held by CRRC show an interesting change in Azerbaijani public support for NATO membership. Whereas about 60 percent of the population supported NATO membership in 2006 and 2007, only 48 percent of the respondents supported the military block in November 2008. At the same time, the share of the population that was neutral on the question rose significantly. To Valiyev, this increasing undecidedness about joining NATO is a direct result of the West’s failure to effectively engage with Russia during the South Ossetia war.

Azerbaijani public support for EU membership was characterised by a somewhat similar development. The year 2008 saw a sharp increase in the percentage of people taking a neutral stance on potential EU membership for Azerbaijan (from 37 to 48 percent), while there was a decline in both the percentage of people supporting and the percentage of people not supporting EU membership. This shift indicates, Valiyev concludes, an increasing confusion among the Azeri public about the role of the EU in the Caucasus.

Other CRRC statistics used by Valiyev demonstrate how public trust in the Azeri armed forces dropped from 81 to 68 percent between 2007 and 2008, and how President Aliyev’s popularity rose to a record 82 percent after the war. Some additional survey material refers to popular support for enhancing economic relations with Western countries and Russia.

There is no conclusive answer as to whether the developments in public perception are a direct result of the Russia-Georgia war. However, Valiyev’s article makes for an engaging read, and highlights the value of survey data to expose the ideological dimension of conflict.

We recommend you to read the article at: http://heldref-publications.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,4,4;journal,1,23;linkingpublicationresults,1:119920,1
Alternatively, it can be found in Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization (Issue: Volume 17, Number 3 - Summer 2009).

Health issues in the South Caucasus

What are some of the most urgent health issues in the South Caucasus? And can any differences be seen between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia? These questions and many more can begin to be answered by data from the CRRC Data Initiative (DI).

As the above charts show, people’s perceptions of the most urgent health issue differ between the countries in the region. In Armenia, heart diseases are stated as the most urgent health issue followed by the quality of medical care and cancer. In Azerbaijan, the quality of medical care is stated as the most urgent, followed by heart diseases and diabetes. In Georgia, the number one most urgent health issue is the availability of affordable medicines, followed by the quality of the medical care, and, in third place, cancer. The quality of medical care, therefore, is in the top three issues in each of the three countries, and cancer is one of the most urgent issues in Armenia and Georgia.

The most striking difference between the countries is that Georgians consider the availability of affordable medicines to be the most urgent health problem (23.5 percent), but only 5.0 percent of the respondents in Azerbaijan agree with this being the most pressing health issue. The next interesting difference can be found in people’s perceptions of heart diseases. The respondents in Armenia and Azerbaijan believe this is one of the most urgent problem (19.1 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively), but only 7.5 percent of the respondents in Georgia agree with this. Moreover, a difference can be seen in people’s perceptions of diabetes and tuberculosis. Respondents in Armenia and Georgia do not state tuberculosis as one of the most pressing health issues (2.7 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively), but 9.6 percent of the respondents in Azerbaijan believe it to be of urgent concern. Finally, only 1.7 percent of the respondents in Georgia say diabetes is the most pressing health issue, while the same level of respondents in Armenia and Azerbaijan is 6.6 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively.

This is merely a data snapshot, and of course CRRC’s Data Initiative is not an instrument specifically designed to capture data on public health. Nevertheless, it yields valuable insights and even more information on health-related topics in the South Caucasus can be found by accessing the datasets on CRRC’s webpage. You can for example find out differences in perception of health issues between men and women, how satisfied people are with the medical healthcare, and information about smoking habits – as well as analyze in more detail the characteristics of different groups of respondents according to age, economic status and place of residence.

Go to http://www.crrccenters.org/index.php/en/5/999/ to check out the data for yourself.

Banking and Financial Services in the Caucasus | CRRC Data

Have banking and financial services penetrated most households in the South Caucasus? Due to the topicality of finance news, an investigation on the usage of banking and financial services in the Caucasus seems justified. As banks fall, get nationalized and panic is spreading, our DI data on the usage of banking/financial services can be useful to understand the 2007 baseline. For instance: How many households in the South Caucasus have saving accounts that could, theoretically, be frozen if the financial situation further deteriorates?

As one can see in the graph above, banking/financial services are not used by the majority of the DI’s respondents. 66% in Georgia have not used banking/financial services compared to 57% in Armenia and 53% in Azerbaijan. Not many households are at risk of having their savings eaten up since only 1% of households in the region have savings accounts. It is remarkable that loans have been taken by so many Armenians (18%), but note that these people may not be owing money right now. For a look at household exposure, check our older post.

Now, let’s have a look at the usage of banking cards, which ought not to be confused with savings accounts. Although that few households have used banking/financial services in the South Caucasus, the numbers on usage of banking card is relatively high in the region, with Armenia being the exception that confirms the rule. 5% in rural Armenia and 23% in the capital are bearers of banking cards. Comparing this with 30% in rural Azerbaijan and 58% in its capital, one can see that the penetration of banking cards in Armenian households is relatively small. However, the largest regional differences are to be found in Georgia. Only 9% of households in rural Georgia have banking cards compared to 55% in its capital.

We also have data on public trust towards banks. But here one important limitation of the data above is that it is from 2007, so that it may not be sufficiently up to date. However, the DI 2008 will soon be available online (and yes, if the data show large inconsistencies, there will be a blog post on it). For the data above, check the CRRC Data Initiative (DI) 2007.

Gallup: Azerbaijan is One of Least Religious Nations

According to a Gallup poll, Azerbaijan is considered to be one of the least religious countries in the world. Now, whereas this may be shocking news for those that perceive people in predominantly Muslim countries as devoted or even fanatical believers, those with experience of Azerbaijan probably would shrug their shoulders about this finding. But what exactly does least mean, and what causes the Azerbaijani lifestyle to be the most secular in the Moslem world?

How does religiosity in Azerbaijan look according to CRRC Data Initiative (DI)? According to our dataset, 97,2% of Azerbaijani identify themselves as Muslims, although this does not mean that religion is practiced on a daily basis by all of them. 14% of the Azerbaijani respondents pray every day, 30% admit that they do so “less often” and 25% of the Azeri’s say that they never bow in the direction of Mecca.

How about practice of religion in Azerbaijan from a regional perspective? Indicators determining importance of religion in people’s decision-making show that neighboring Armenians attach the same weight to religion as the Azerbaijani. Georgians, on the other hand, indicate that religion plays a much more important role in their daily lives in contrast to its two neighboring nations. For a more elaborate cross South Caucasian comparison on religious practices, check out this previous CRRC blog post.

Our dataset can not provide a conclusive answer to the second question on why the Azerbaijani lifestyle tends to be secular to its nature. One could point to the effects that Soviet rule might have had on expression of religiosity or that Azerbaijani, in general, perceives Western concepts of secularization and modernization as ideals. However, the depth of Azerbaijan’s secularity has also a pre-Soviet history to it. The country’s own version of Islam, one that has been heavily influenced by Sufi mystics over the centuries, has contributed to the un-dogmatic interpretation of religious decrees that is characteristic for secular nations, such as Azerbaijan.

These are just some possible explanations to the state of religiosity in Azerbaijan. If readers out there have other opinions, insights or critique on this issue, please comment!

Securing Personal Safety in the Caucasus | CRRC Data

Who secures personal safety in the South Caucasus? CRRC DI has an answer to this question and a surprising answer at that. We asked around 8000 households in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to evaluate how well criminal leaders, friends, relatives, media, neighbors, NGOs, Ombudsmen, police, private security agencies and Prosecutor’s office secure personal safety. For now let’s just focus on the three components: the Ombudsmen, police and the criminal leaders.

In Armenia, ironically, criminal leaders have top positions in the chart of groups/institutions that effectively secure personal safety of the population with 22% of the respondents evaluating them positively. Criminal leaders are not far from the police; moreover, while a similar percentage of respondents (22.1% vs. 22.9%) finds Ombudsmen and criminal leaders effective in securing personal safety, more respondents actually find Ombudsmen ineffective, by comparison with criminal leaders (52.3% vs. 47.1%).

How does the situation look in the neighboring countries? In Georgia, the percent of those who positively evaluate how criminal leaders secure personal safety (arguably relatively high) is around 13%; it would be interesting to compare these numbers with the data prior to Saakashvili reforms. (We actually have some data from 2004 in a different file, so let us know if you are interested in the comparison!) In Azerbaijan, only 7.2% assess criminal leaders effective in securing personal safety against 87.5% of those who find them ineffective.

Among the three South Caucasus countries Armenia shows the lowest level of trust in the police, while the highest level of trust being observed in Azerbaijan – almost 60%. Trust in the police in Georgia is not very high considering the fact that it is seen as one of the main successes of the post-revolution government. From our data we can see that the trust in police had decreased after the murder case of Sandro Girgvliani in 2006, but it is going up again.

CRRC DI allows exploring this topic further by looking at other components such as how relatives, friends or the Prosecutor’s office secure personal safety. More comparisons (age, settlement type, education, and so on) can be done thanks to the rich demographic bloc. Time comparison is also possible, since we have some data starting 2004. The datasets are available at CRRC website.

Comparing Civic Participation: Caucasus Data 2007

What's the level of engagement in the three countries of the South Caucasus? Are people involved? Are they staying abreast of what goes on? Again, our Data Initiative provides insight, since we asked people whether they had engaged in various activities over the last six months.

We seem to be seeing different patterns in the three countries. Print media, for example, is read a lot less in Azerbaijan than in the neighboring countries.

(in the last six months)

But of course, that could just be due to particular quirks: more television, or a bigger country in which relevant media does not make it out to the countryside. Just a blip? No, apparently not.

(also asked for the last six months)

Azerbaijanis indeed are less engaged in events. Few say that they discuss what is going on politically. One reason may be that they live in much more homogenous political space.

Generally, levels of civic engagement are low. This recalls, of course, Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work, which says that civic association forms the basis of both political (in the sense of good governance: public health, education, policing, and so on) and of economic success. Conversely, a people caught in amoral familism will find it hard to collaborate to improve their communities; and since the majority of real public goods can only be attained by collective action, this could be a serious constraint on improving livelihoods.

(yep, last six months)

On that level, we are extremely glad that we have captured this data. It will allow us to track changes over time.

But is the news all bad? Actually, no. Azerbaijan sees quite some volunteering. As rumor has it, the communal subotnik which brings communities together to clean up and improve the neighbourhood still is alive in some places (although volunteering may be encouraged top-down). See the data:

(still: in the last six months)

And in a similar vein, there are contributions to charity in Azerbaijan. In part, this may be because tithing (giving one tenth) to charity is mandated under Islam, and (as you may recall from our previous post) about 15% in Azerbaijan actually say that they pray every day. That almost adds up.

(remember for how many months...?)

What we are describing, ultimately, is a fascinating research agenda: filtering out who the socially active people in a community are, and what makes them different, and how they were mobilized, and how this could be replicated.

Our data set, for anyone who wants to take that stab, is online, and more data on similar questions will follow soon.

South Caucasus Data 2007 on Unemployment

Unemployment clearly is one of the pressing issues in the South Caucasus. But there is a lack of reliable data on people being without and looking for a job. This blog, based on CRRC’s Data Initiative 2007, provides a snapshot on these numbers.

According to CRRC’s dataset, about 25% of the adult population in Armenia and Georgia, and 20% of Azerbaijan’s citizens say they are unemployed. Further analyzing these numbers shows that 18% in Georgia, 14% in Armenia and 12% in Azerbaijan are actually interested in looking for a job.

[Note: excluded are “students", "housewives", "disabled" or "retired" - even if they are looking for a job.]

Yet the data shows sizeable differences across the countries, depending on whether you ask in rural areas, urban environments, or the capital. Let's look at what people say when asked whether they consider themselves to be employed. Note that housewives, pensioners, disabled and students are also considered "not employed".

Do you consider yourself to be employed? This employment may be part-time or full-time, you may be officially employed, informally employed, or self-employed, but it brings you monetary income.

If you analyze the data of by settlement type, it reveals that of those that describe themselves as not employed a relatively low number of people look for work in Baku (22%), compared with Tbilisi (29%) and Yerevan (32%). Besides, about the same share of people (again, of those describing themselves as not employed with monetary income) in the three countries look for a job in rural areas (nearly 30%).

However, the data impressively illustrates that the major interest -- among those that are not employed -- in a workplace can be found in urban areas, where about 40% of Armenians and Georgians, and almost 50% Azerbaijanis try to find work. This figure powerfully underlines the desolation of Caucasian cityscapes.

Of those that are not employed, what percentage is looking for a job?

Finally, the DI statistics show that the same number (once you factor in the margin of error) of people is unemployed and interested in a job, but not currently looking: 6% in Armenia, and 5% in Georgia and Azerbaijan. A slightly lower number of the unemployed is not looking for a job at all. Have those already given up?

Now the definitions of unemployment always are a little complicated (are pensioners looking for work considered unemployed?), but here is an article that can help. If you are interested to check the datasets yourself , please download it from CRRC’s homepage. For more information on the Data Initiative project, please click here.