Georgian Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change?

The results of the October parliamentary elections in Georgia have raised questions regarding the future trajectory of Georgian foreign policy. One of the priorities of Georgian foreign policy has been European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Will the new Georgian government initiate major changes and redirect Georgia’s foreign policy that has been supported by the National United Movement? Will Georgia promote closer cooperation with Russia? What do Georgians think about the direction of the country’s foreign relations in general? This blog specifically explores Georgians' attitudes toward the importance of strengthening ties with the EU, NATO, Russia, and the US using data from CRRC’s 2011 survey on Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia. As the CRRC data show, half of Georgia’s population is interested in the country’s foreign policy. Moreover, Georgians support closer cooperation with the EU, NATO, CIS, the US, and Russia.   

The EU survey reveals that 51% of Georgians show an interest in the country’s foreign policy. Similarly, half of the Georgian population is interested in Georgian domestic policy.

  

When split by age groups, about 31% of Georgians aged 18 to 35 show interest in Georgian foreign affairs. Up to 54% of the Georgian population between 36 and 55 years old tend to be interested in these matters. Finally, Georgians aged 56 or more seem to be most interested (56%) in Georgian foreign policy.

When asked about the importance of strengthening ties between Georgia and a number of political, economic, and intergovernmental organizations, 95% of Georgians believe that it is important to promote closer cooperation with the EU. The majority of Georgians (90%) also think that Georgia should strengthen ties with NATO, and although Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 2008, over half of the population (78%) thinks that Georgia should strengthen ties with the CIS.   

Georgian attitudes about political and economic cooperation between Georgia, the EU, the US, and Russia is also noteworthy. Over half of the adult population thinks Georgia should have closest political cooperation with the US (58%) and the EU (54%). In addition, 50% believe Georgia should have closest political cooperation with Russia.    

With respect to economic relations, a high percentage of the population thinks that the country should establish closest economic cooperation with the US (71%), the EU (66%), and Russia (47%). Many Georgians are also open to the prospect of having business relations with Russians. In this regard, 81% of the Georgians note that they would approve of people of their ethnicity doing business with Russians. 

In sum, data from the 2011 EU survey reveals that many Georgians show an interest in the country’s foreign policy, and consider the US, Russia, EU, NATO, and the CIS to be important to Georgia’s political and economic development. 

To learn more about the 2011 EU Survey, click here. 

ECFR report: Befuddling data

Public opinion found its way into a major report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), but through the back door. The chart below, from page 28 of the report, appears to compare support for integration with Russia/CIS versus EU integration in the six EU “neighborhood” states.


But the footnote reveals that this data is a pastiche from a number of national opinion surveys that asked questions about attitudes toward EU integration. This type of data presentation can lead us astray, for a few reasons:

1. Comparability: A footnote claims that the variously worded questions are nevertheless “roughly comparable.” However, the subjects of the questions range from actual political integration, to foreign policy alignment, to “strategic partnership.” Some are concrete (“If a referendum were held next Sunday…”), others abstract (“With which of the following does Armenia’s future most lie?”). The form of the questions also varies. Some explicitly offer a choice between Russia and EU, others probe attitudes about the EU alone, still others offer unknown options for partnership. More fundamentally, many respondents in the “neighborhood” countries may not believe that EU integration is actually a feasible option. Asking about preferences for integration in the CIS versus the EU is meaningful only if people feel this is a realistic choice.

2. Unknown Sources: There is no indication of the survey sources. Even if the data itself is of high quality, methodology certainly was different in each of the polls. Timing is a particular concern. Commendably, the authors of the report do note that the survey in Georgia was carried out in 2007, while the others were in 2008. But political events at various points during those years (the Russia-Georgia conflict, the economic crisis, gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine, among others) could influence responses.

3. Presentation: For some countries, the combined responses total nearly 100% (Belarus, Ukraine), others are far less (Georgia, at around 50%) or far more (Moldova, with 120%). Presumably this reflects the different types of questions asked, or possibly missing values. But the chart fails to tell us which responses account for these discrepancies.

This kind of data presentation is a little disconcerting. Although it is very encouraging to see public opinion data in a major report, one would wish for a slightly more cautious presentation. To be able to draw powerful conclusions, a more consistent approach to gathering the data would be required.

In the coming days, we’ll put up a follow-up post presenting CRRC’s data on attitudes toward cooperation with EU and Russia in the South Caucasus countries.