Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic politics than foreign affairs

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Kristine Jintchveleishvili, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic rather than international politics, and Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

Understanding political interest enables an understanding of how informed and engaged individuals are in civic life. Scholars have long argued that political interest is a key predictor of democratic participation — from voting to protesting. In the South Caucasus, where democratic institutions are far from consolidated, understanding who is engaged in politics and how offers insight into both opportunities and barriers to deeper democratic engagement.

When it comes to interest in international politics, 2024 Caucasus Barometer data shows that 45% of Armenians expressed interest compared to 30% in Georgia. By comparison, in Armenia, 63% of the public said they were interested in domestic politics compared to 54% in Georgia.

In Armenia, regression analysis shows that several factors are associated with interest in international politics. For one, women are less likely to be interested compared to men. Separately, older individuals (Aged 55 and older) are about twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to people aged 18–34. Education is another important factor — people with less than a tertiary education are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to those with higher levels of educational attainment.

For interest in domestic politics, regression analysis in Armenia shows that older individuals are significantly more interested than younger people. Those aged 55 and older are 27 percentage points more likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to the youngest age group (18–34). Education also plays a role, with individuals lacking tertiary education showing less interest. Wealth is also correlated with interest. People who live in relatively wealthy households are more likely to be interested in Armenia’s domestic politics compared to those who own less.

Settlement type, ethnicity, and employment status are not statistically significant predictors of interest in international or domestic politics in Armenia.

The pattern for interest in international politics is somewhat similar in Georgia. Women in Georgia are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to men, and older individuals are more interested compared to younger ones — people aged 55 and older are twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to those aged 18–34.

In turn, people living outside of Tbilisi, whether in urban or rural areas, are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to people living in the capital. Additionally, ethnic minorities show lower levels of interest compared to ethnic Georgians.

Finally, wealth is positively associated with interest in international politics — those with the highest wealth levels are more likely to be interested compared to those with less.

Regarding domestic politics in Georgia, regression results demonstrate that rural residents are less likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to people living in the capital. Older individuals and relatively well-off people show greater interest in domestic politics as well.

Education level and employment status were not associated with interest in either international or domestic political affairs in Georgia.

Despite the differences between the two countries, the trend is consistent across both Armenia and Georgia — more people are interested in domestic politics than international politics. The data also shows that Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the 2024 Caucasus Barometer  dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (tertiary or less than tertiary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Armenians and Georgians lack confidence in their ability to influence politics

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Melor Shengelia, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, both Armenians and Georgians tend to lack confidence in their influence on politics. However, Armenians in general are significantly less willing to participate in politics.

Both Armenian and Georgian politics have experienced dramatic protests over the last decade. Over the past three years, Georgia has experienced significant political unrest due to the ruling Georgian Dream party’s domestic crackdown and drift away from Euro-Atlantic integration. In Armenia, the political landscape has evolved since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, when mass protests brought current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan into power.

Though both countries have been host to mass public movements, data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer suggests that people’s perceptions of their political power differ between the two countries.

In Armenia, more people believed that politics and government were too complicated for the average person to understand. While this opinion was also common in Georgia, it was expressed significantly less often.

A statistical model demonstrates that people in Georgia living in urban areas outside of Tbilisi were more likely to agree than disagree with the statement, ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on’.

Younger people aged 18–34 were less likely to agree with this statement compared to people from older age groups.

The model also suggests that in Georgia, women were more likely to agree that politics were too complicated to understand compared to men.

Education was also a significant predictor of whether someone agreed or disagreed with the statement. People with a higher education were less likely to agree and more likely to disagree with this opinion compared to people with a lower education level.

Ethnic Georgians were also more prone to disagree with this statement compared to ethnic minorities.

In Armenia, however, demographic variables were not statistically significant predictors of feelings towards how complicated politics are.

Data related to whether people felt they had a say in what their government does similarly showed that people in both Armenia and Georgia were not confident in their ability to influence politics.

In Armenia, 64% of the public agreed that they did not have any say in the government’s actions. In Georgia, on the other hand, less, albeit half (52%) of the public, believed they lacked a say and influence in what their government does.

Regression analysis demonstrates that in both Armenia and Georgia, people who lived in rural areas were less likely to agree with the above statement compared to people from the capitals.

In Armenia, older people were more likely to agree with the statement compared to people aged 18–34. This variable was not a significant predictor in Georgia.

Additionally, while gender, education level, employment status, ethnicity, and ownership of durable goods (a common proxy for wealth) were included in the regression, none were statistically significant predictors in either country.

In both countries, people tended to lack confidence in their influence on politics while also feeling indifferent about their role in political life. While this trend was observed in both Armenia and Georgia, people in Armenia were significantly less willing to participate in politics and were less likely to perceive their role as important in political processes.

Note: The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the Caucasus Barometer 2024 dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (secondary or lower, secondary technical, higher than secondary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Does Georgia’s public want gender-balanced politics?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Elene Ergeshidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

CRRC Georgia surveyed the Georgian public on attitudes towards gender equality in politics and obstacles faced by women in politics in Georgia. 

Gender equality in politics is an important issue globally, and Georgian policy on the issue has been developing in recent years. Georgia introduced mandatory gender quotas for proportional party lists in 2020, extending this provision until 2032. The legislation stipulates that at least one out of four candidates submitted to the Central Election Commission, and provides financial support to parties that nominate more women. 

Despite these policy changes, much remains to be done to ensure gender equality in practice. In the 2020 parliamentary elections, only three political parties and one electoral bloc benefited from the financial incentive mechanism for nominating more female candidates than the mandatory gender quotas required. A study on mandatory gender quotas in Georgia found that in 2022, women still made up only 19% of Georgia’s parliament. 

Harassment directed at politicians is also a significant barrier. A CRRC study found that female politicians in Georgia more frequently faced online violence (abusive and harassing comments) related to their personal life than male candidates and politicians, in the two months before the 2020 parliamentary elections. 

Despite those challenges, data from the NDI and CRRC October 2023 survey suggest that the public’s attitudes are becoming more approving of gender equality in politics.

Two thirds of those surveyed believed that female and male politicians represented their interests equally. This marked a 10 percentage point increase compared to March 2023, and an 18 point increase compared with October 2014, when CRRC first asked the survey question. 

The survey also asked respondents what they believed were the largest obstacles preventing women in Georgia from engaging in politics. Respondents were allowed to name up to three issues. 

The most frequently named obstacles were family responsibilities (19%), a lack of self-confidence (13%), and women having no interest in politics (11%). One in ten (10%) reported the perception in the public that there was no place for women in politics was an obstacle, and 9% believed women were hindered by a lack of family support. 

However, these attitudes have also changed in the past decade. There was a nine percentage point drop in the share of those who named family responsibilities as an obstacle compared to 2014. The share reporting that women had a lack of interest in politics also decreased by seven percentage points. The percentage of respondents who named a lack of relevant experience and education halved, moving from 16% to 7% and 18% to 9%, respectively. 

However, there was also a seven percentage point increase in the share of respondents who stated that women face no barriers to engagement in politics since 2014. 

The above data shows substantial progress toward greater acceptance of gender equality in politics. 

Despite the belief that some issues, such as family responsibilities and a lack of self-confidence, remain barriers preventing women from entering politics, the decreasing percentage of respondents citing these as obstacles suggests a changing landscape in the country.  

Can political parties in Georgia survive abandonment by their leaders?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The study was financially supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of NED, CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A year before Georgia’s general elections, a CRRC survey found that less than half of surveyed Georgian partisans would remain loyal to their favoured party if its leader were to establish a new party, with supporters of the ruling party more likely to stick with their party than supporters of the opposition. 

In recent years, political experts and analysts have argued that parties in Georgia function more on the basis of their political leaders’ popularity, rather than as genuine political organisations. 

This would suggest that if political leaders left their party and established a new one, a substantial portion of their voters would go with them. 

To test this hypothesis, CRRC Georgia conducted a public opinion poll in October 2023, a year before Georgia’s next general elections. 

The data suggests that only four out of ten partisans would stay with their party if its leader left. However, supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party are more likely to stay with their party, while opposition supporters more likely to be unsure or follow their party’s leader.

Respondents were asked to identify the political party with which they identified most closely. 

Those respondents who named a political party (35% of respondents to the survey) were then asked to imagine a scenario in which a leader of their favoured party decided to cut ties with the party and establish a new party. Respondents were then asked to report how they would vote—would they still vote for their favoured party, or for the one that had been newly established?

Leader	Party
Bidzina Ivanishvili	Georgian Dream
Mikheil Saakashvili	United National Movement
Giorgi Gakharia	For Georgia
Zurab Girchi Japaridze	Girchi More Freedom
Mamuka Khazaradze	Lelo
Irma Inashvili	Alliance of Patriots
Shalva Natelashvili	Labour Party
Zurab Makharadze	Conservative Movement - Alt Info
Giorgi Vashadze	Strategy Aghmashenebeli
Giga Bokeria	European Georgia
Aleko Elisashvili	Citizens
Elene Khoshtaria	Droa
Iago Khvichia	Girchi
Anna Dolidze	For the People
Nino Burjanadze	Democratic Movement
Zviad Dzidziguri	Conservative Party
Fridon Injia	European Socialists
Levan Vasadze	ERI

Four out of ten partisans (39%) said they would still vote for their favoured party. Approximately every fifth partisan voter (18%) said they would change their partisan preference and would vote for the new party. A plurality of partisans (43%) said they did not know which party they would vote for or refused to answer.    

Further statistical analysis shows that some groups are more likely to stick with their favoured party even when its leader launches a new political venture. People with vocational education are less likely to stick with their favoured party than people who have a lower or higher level of formal education.

Party affiliation is also associated with whether or not voters are willing to stick with their current preferred party. Supporters of the ruling party are 27 percentage points more likely to say they would still vote for Georgian Dream if the party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, established a new party than opposition supporters when asked the same question regarding their parties’ leaders.

Regarding whether voters are willing to follow their party’s leaders, similar trends emerge. 

Opposition supporters were 16 percentage points more likely to report they would vote for a party newly founded by their party’s leaders than Georgian Dream supporters.

People with lower levels of formal education were more likely to follow their party’s leader than people with higher levels of formal education. 

Men were also more likely to follow a leader to a new party than women.

However, opposition supporters were also 17 percentage points more likely to be unsure of how they would vote if the leader of their favoured party established a new party compared with ruling party supporters.

People with higher education and vocational education are more likely to be unsure than people with lower levels of formal education. 

The above data supports the idea that Georgian political parties are at least partially driven by their leaders, with only four out of ten partisans reporting they would stick with their favoured party if its leader launched a new political venture. Moreover, one in eight ruling party supporters and one in three opposition supporters reported they would follow their leader to a new party. 

However, multiple other possible explanations for the data likely explain the differences between ruling party and opposition supporters. 

First, the line between the ruling party and the state is often blurred, meaning that Georgian Dream’s supporters might continue to support the party on the basis of it remaining in power. Second, at the time of the survey, Bidzina Ivanishvili had formally distanced himself from politics. As a result, some Georgian Dream supporters might have supported other leaders within the party and the party’s policies, rather than its founder. Finally, many of the opposition parties which the public reported supporting were founded by former members of the UNM who left or are otherwise dominated by a single personality. In turn, many of their voters are likely already voting for the party based on its leader.

Despite the above, ties appear to be stronger to the party itself for Georgian Dream supporters than for opposition supporters.  

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models, which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower, vocational, higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), employment status (not working, working in the private sector, working in the public sector), religious attendance (regularly, on special occasions, rarely or never), and party identification (Georgian Dream, Opposition). 

Is Georgia's Gen Z More Politically Engaged Than Young Millennials?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Zachary Fabos, an International Fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Public discourse in Georgia has in recent months raised the idea that Georgia’s young people, and particularly Gen Z, are politically interested and active, particularly following the March foreign agent protests. CRRC data suggests that a majority of 18-29-year-old Georgians are politically engaged, although the older age bracket are somewhat more interested.

In the conversation around Georgia’s foreign agent law protests, which took place in March, Gen Z — people born between the late 1990s and early 2000s — have featured heavily. Many of the protests’ most striking moments were attributed to those recently having reached voting age, as was some of their creativity and momentum.

The legislation in question found itself between contesting visions of Georgia’s political future, with protestors suggesting it would ruin Georgia’s hopes of Western integration, and Georgian Dream arguing that the law was necessary for transparency.

But prior to their engagement in the protests, what were Gen Z’s attitudes towards politics and how did they choose to participate? Data from CRRC-Georgia and Caucasian House’s 2021 Survey on Youth Civic and Political Engagement and Participation in Peacebuilding suggests that both Georgia’s Gen Z and millennials are interested in and engaged with the country’s politics, though Millennials are slightly more interested in politics.

For the purpose of this analysis, 18-25 year-olds are considered part of Gen Z, while the survey’s older participants, those aged 26-29, are referred to as millennials despite only covering the youngest of those born between the late 1980s and mid-late 1990s.

Data from the survey suggests a majority of both age groups are partially interested or interested in the country’s politics. However, more millennials were interested, with 41% reporting interest compared to 30% of Gen Z. By comparison, Gen Z was more likely to indicate partial interest, with 39% claiming to be somewhat interested and somewhat not and 27% of millennials stating the same.

 

When the data is broken down by social and demographic groups including gender, ethnicity, settlement type, and education level, a number of patterns emerge.

In terms of settlement type, young people in rural areas are six points more likely to be interested in politics than people in Tbilisi. People in urban areas other than Tbilisi are interested at a rate somewhere between the two.

When it comes to gender, women are seven points more likely to be interested in Georgian politics than men.

Finally, people with a higher education are twenty-six and thirty-seven points more likely to report they are interested in politics than people with secondary education or vocational education, respectively.

Note: Interest is coded as expressing at least partial interest.

 

Aside from general interest, the survey asked young people if they ever engaged in a range of political actions including membership in a political party, donating to a political party, participating in a political campaign, attending a meeting with a party member or candidate, taking part in a protest, or having voted in the 2020 parliamentary elections.

For the purpose of measuring engagement in politics among Gen Z and Millennials, the six activities were grouped together to create a political participation index, with six being all activities and zero being engagement in no activities. Overall, roughly half of respondents reported engaging in one activity, a third no activities, and the remainder two or more.

 

The survey data suggested that both generations engage in political activities at about the same rate, with a plurality having taken part in at least one action: 48% of Gen Z and 46% of millennials.

Breaking this down, education and ethnicity were the strongest predictors of how many political activities someone had taken part in.

Young people with a university education on average engaged in approximately one half of one activity more than those with other levels of education, controlling for other factors.

In contrast to perceptions in Georgia that ethnic minorities are politically unengaged, the data showed that ethnic minorities engaged in approximately one third more actions on average, controlling for other factors. While the data does not provide a clear explanation for this pattern, it may stem from the fact that this data focuses on young people, who may be more politically active than older people who are not ethnic Georgians. Alternatively, it could point towards an incorrect perception of ethnic minority political engagement more broadly.

Aside from one’s education level and ethnicity, the model demonstrated that other demographic factors were not associated with the types of civic engagement young people were engaged in.

 

Note: The chart above was generated from a regression model. The model includes ethnicity (ethnic Georgian, ethnic minority), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), education (tertiary, secondary technical school, secondary school or lower), gender (female, male) and age group (18-25, 26-29).

The results of the youth survey suggest that among young people, interest in politics is slightly higher among millennials than among Gen Z. Within those groups, participation in political activities is more associated with education and ethnicity than most other factors. However, the data does confirm that Gen Z was interested in politics and as likely as millennials to have engaged in political activity prior to the protests against the foreign agent law in March.

Note: The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis included gender (male, female), age group (18-25, 26-29), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), and ethnicity (ethnic Georgian, ethnic minority), as predictor variables. The data used in this article is available here.

Georgian politics leave many feeling alienated

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Recent CRRC Georgia data suggests that half of the public believes that public officials don’t care about their opinions and that they do not have a say in what the government does.

Amid fears of democratic backsliding and as Georgians grow more jaded with the politics of Georgia — be it from opposition or ruling party politicians — data from the Caucasus Barometer 2021 survey suggests that older people, women, and people coming from poorer households feel especially alienated from politics.

Education level and party preference seem to be associated with the degree of political estrangement someone feels. However, in contrast to commonly voiced views, younger people and ethnic minorities do not report particularly high levels of political estrangement.

The Caucasus Barometer asked six questions that made it possible to examine voters’ feelings and attitudes towards the political system and decision-making in the country.

More than two-thirds of the people (69%) do not feel well qualified to participate in politics, 53% consider politics to be too complicated to understand, and half of the public thinks they do not have a say in what the government does (59%) and that public officials do not care about their opinions (51%).

At the same time, a third of the electorate believes that they have a good understanding of the important political issues in the country, while 39% of the public believes that their vote will not make any difference.

Who is more likely to be politically alienated?

The six questions in the graph above were aggregated into an index of political estrangement. The index ranged between total political estrangement at 0 and the absence of political alienation at 12. The mean score on the index was 4.2, suggesting that the public tends to feel estranged from the political system in the country.

Regression analysis suggests that young people, men, people with higher formal education levels, supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party, and people from wealthier households are less likely to feel estranged from Georgian politics than older people, women, people with lower education levels, supporters of the opposition, unaffiliated voters, and people living in poorer households.

The analyses indicate that some otherwise vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, women, and poor people feel especially estranged from politics. In addition, political alienation seems to be correlated with education and political preference — particularly whether or not someone supports Georgian Dream.

At the same time, young people and ethnic minorities, who are often assumed to be politically apathetic and disengaged from politics in Georgia, do not seem to feel particularly alienated from political processes and institutions. Therefore, the reasons for their comparatively higher levels of disengagement from political activities must be sought in other areas rather than in the realm of feelings and attitudes towards politics.  

Note: The above data analysis is based on the OLS regression model which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), partisanship (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK), and index of political estrangement (0-12: 0-full political estrangement, 12- the absence of political estrangement).

The data used in this analysis is available here.

Georgians want their government to support Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, David Sichinava, Anano Kipiani, Kristina Vacharadze, Nino Mzhavanadze, and Makhare Atchaidze, CRRC Georgia staff members. The views presented within the article reflect the views of the authors' alone, and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has shocked the world. The war also shook Georgia, with new polling from CRRC Georgia revealing the extent of the political fallout so far.

The implications of the war for Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy and politics are wide-ranging. The official Georgian response to the war was incongruous: while the Prime Minister, Irakli Gharibashvili, flatly stated Georgia would not join the West in sanctioning Russia, the President, Salome Zourabishvili, went on a media and diplomatic blitz in Europe voicing strong support for Ukraine. 

In contrast to the government’s response to the war, the public’s response was clear. Georgians have been rallying in support of Ukraine in city, town, and village.

In light of the war in Ukraine and the surrounding upheaval in Georgia, CRRC Georgia conducted a survey between 7–10 March which included 1,092 respondents. The results lead to a range of conclusions around who Georgians blame for the war (Russia), what Georgians want the government to do (support Ukraine), and the domestic political fallout of the government’s response (Georgian Dream has lost significant support).

Georgians blame Russia for the war

The vast majority of the Georgian public places responsibility for the war on Russia (43%) or Vladimer Putin (37%). Other responses were named by 3% or less of the public, aside from uncertain responses (9%).

The public was also asked about Russia’s motivation for the war. The data indicates that most people believe that Russia started the war to conquer territory (34%) or Ukraine specifically (25%), to revive the Soviet Union (20%), and to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO (17%). Other responses were named by less than 10% of people.

The public wants the Georgian Government to support Ukraine

The survey asked respondents whether they think the Government of Georgia should support the Government of Ukraine more, at its current level, a bit less than at present, or not at all. A large majority of the public reported that they should support Ukraine more (61%) or at current levels (32%). Only 2% said less than at current levels and 1% not at all.

Aside from the above, respondents were asked whether a number of different actions would be acceptable or unacceptable for the Government to take in response to the crisis. 

The vast majority of Georgians support supplying humanitarian aid to Ukraine (97%), accepting Ukrainian refugees (96%), and providing financial assistance to Ukraine (91%).

Two-thirds of people (66%) support allowing Georgian volunteers to travel to Ukraine, something the government has attempted to block.

Around half (52%) would support the Georgian government arming Ukraine.

The public wants Georgia to participate in sanctions

The public wants sanctions against Russia to be stronger, and a majority want Georgia to join them. This stands in stark contrast to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s rejection of sanctions.

The survey asked whether the public thought the countries which have imposed sanctions on Russia should strengthen them, keep them at current levels, lighten them, or not sanction Russia at all. 

The results show that a large majority think that sanctions should either be strengthened (71%) or remain at current levels (10%). Only 4% think the sanctions should be lightened, and 3% think they should be removed entirely.

When asked whether the Government of Georgia should join in the sanctions, a majority agreed with this view (66%). Views were split on whether Georgia should participate in all sanctions (39%) or some of the sanctions (27%). Only 19% reported that Georgia should not participate in the sanctions at all. A further 14% were uncertain on this issue.

Georgia and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Future

In light of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, a move quickly followed by Georgia and Moldova. 

Public opinion strongly supports Georgia and Ukraine’s application to candidate status. At the same time, there has been little movement in terms of overall support for Georgia’s membership in the EU and NATO (which was already high) since the start of the war.

Respondents to the survey were asked how strongly they supported or did not support Ukraine and Georgia becoming candidates in the European Union. The data indicates strong support from the Georgian public for both countries becoming candidates in the European Union.

Respondents on the survey were asked how strongly they support Georgia’s integration with the European Union, NATO, and the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. 

Data from the 2020 Caucasus Barometer survey using the same question wording and answer options found that 73% of Georgians supported EU membership and 71% supported NATO membership. Today, 75% support EU membership and 70% support NATO membership, statistically indistinguishable shares from the 2020 data.

The president and prime minister’s performance on the war

The Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili, has received significant criticism for his response to the war. While large swaths of the world imposed sanctions on Russia, Gharibashvili firmly stated that Georgia would not participate in the sanctions. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, even tweeted a thank you to the Georgian public for its support, while slighting the Georgian government for its lack thereof. 

In contrast to the Prime Minister, the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabishvili, has received broad praise for her performance in relation to the conflict. Zourabishvili expressed clear support for Ukraine in the conflict and travelled throughout Europe on a media and diplomatic tour in support of Ukraine.

Given the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the public is significantly more approving of the president’s performance in relation to the war than of the prime minister’s work.

While 64% of the public approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 41% approved of Gharibashvili’s performance, a 23 percentage point gap. In contrast, 15% of the public disapproved of Zourabishvili’s performance while 39% disapproved of Gharibashvili’s performance. This leads to a net approval for Zourabishvili of +49% and a net approval rating of +2% for Gharibashvili.

When looking at data broken down by party preferences, the data indicates that Salome Zourabishvili’s performance level being higher than Gharibashvili’s stems from a greater degree of support from the opposition: while 61% of opposition supporters approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 32% supported Gharibashvili’s performance. In contrast, Gharibashvili and Zourabishvili had quite similar levels of approval from supporters of Georgian Dream.

The political fallout

With Gharibashvili’s unpopular response to the war, it is unsurprising that Georgian Dream’s base of political support has shrunken.

To identify respondents’ political preferences, the survey asked respondents a) who they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. If the respondent was uncertain, they were asked who they sympathised with compared to other parties. 

The data showed a 10 percentage point decline in support for Georgian Dream. At present, 22% of respondents would support Georgian Dream in elections held tomorrow. This compares to 32% of respondents on a January 2022 survey. 

That is to say, Georgian Dream has, at least temporarily, lost around a third of its voters.

However, it is unclear whether this loss is permanent. The data does not show a gain in support for the opposition relative to January. Rather, the public became increasingly uncertain over who they would support. 

On the January 2022 CRRC Omnibus survey, 27% of respondents reported they were uncertain about who they would support in parliamentary elections, while in the March Ukraine survey, 38% of respondents reported the same, a twelve percentage point increase. 

The data also shows a slight decline in support for the opposition, with 25% supporting an opposition party in January of 2022, compared with 20% in March. 

The remaining respondents refused to answer which party they would support, the share of which shifted within the margin of error between the two surveys (20% in March and 17% in January).

While the official response to Russia’s war has been lackadaisical, the public unambiguously support Ukraine and support doing almost anything to help the country in its fight against Russia. The Georgian public’s views of the country’s Euro-Atlantic future has changed little. However, the public’s view of the government has changed, with Georgian Dream, at least temporarily, losing around a third of its supporters. 

The data this article is based on is available here.