Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic politics than foreign affairs

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Kristine Jintchveleishvili, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic rather than international politics, and Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

Understanding political interest enables an understanding of how informed and engaged individuals are in civic life. Scholars have long argued that political interest is a key predictor of democratic participation — from voting to protesting. In the South Caucasus, where democratic institutions are far from consolidated, understanding who is engaged in politics and how offers insight into both opportunities and barriers to deeper democratic engagement.

When it comes to interest in international politics, 2024 Caucasus Barometer data shows that 45% of Armenians expressed interest compared to 30% in Georgia. By comparison, in Armenia, 63% of the public said they were interested in domestic politics compared to 54% in Georgia.

In Armenia, regression analysis shows that several factors are associated with interest in international politics. For one, women are less likely to be interested compared to men. Separately, older individuals (Aged 55 and older) are about twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to people aged 18–34. Education is another important factor — people with less than a tertiary education are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to those with higher levels of educational attainment.

For interest in domestic politics, regression analysis in Armenia shows that older individuals are significantly more interested than younger people. Those aged 55 and older are 27 percentage points more likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to the youngest age group (18–34). Education also plays a role, with individuals lacking tertiary education showing less interest. Wealth is also correlated with interest. People who live in relatively wealthy households are more likely to be interested in Armenia’s domestic politics compared to those who own less.

Settlement type, ethnicity, and employment status are not statistically significant predictors of interest in international or domestic politics in Armenia.

The pattern for interest in international politics is somewhat similar in Georgia. Women in Georgia are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to men, and older individuals are more interested compared to younger ones — people aged 55 and older are twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to those aged 18–34.

In turn, people living outside of Tbilisi, whether in urban or rural areas, are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to people living in the capital. Additionally, ethnic minorities show lower levels of interest compared to ethnic Georgians.

Finally, wealth is positively associated with interest in international politics — those with the highest wealth levels are more likely to be interested compared to those with less.

Regarding domestic politics in Georgia, regression results demonstrate that rural residents are less likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to people living in the capital. Older individuals and relatively well-off people show greater interest in domestic politics as well.

Education level and employment status were not associated with interest in either international or domestic political affairs in Georgia.

Despite the differences between the two countries, the trend is consistent across both Armenia and Georgia — more people are interested in domestic politics than international politics. The data also shows that Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the 2024 Caucasus Barometer  dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (tertiary or less than tertiary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Do Armenians and Georgians support protests?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tamar Uzunashvili, a Junior Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey, a majority of Georgians support protests. In comparison, while over half of the Armenian population is in favour of protests, support has been on the decline since 2019.

Protests in the South Caucasus have intensified recently, particularly in Georgia, where demonstrations have surged since the ruling Georgian Dream party first introduced the controversial Foreign Agent Law in 2023. Over the past year in Georgia, protests have occurred almost daily, particularly since the government’s November 2024 announcement that it was halting the country’s EU accession bid.  Similarly, Armenia has witnessed significant protests between 2017 and 2024, driven by political revolution and war.

Data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey shows that until 2021, public support for protest participation was consistently higher in Armenia than in Georgia. In 2021, attitudes were similar, but in 2024, more people in Georgia believed that people should participate in protests than those in Armenia.

In Georgia, support for protest participation declined between 2008 and 2011. In 2012, it surged by 22 points, with data collection taking place after prison abuse scandals — which showed the humiliation, torture, and inhumane treatment of prisoners — and parliamentary elections that year. In subsequent years, attitudes slowly rose and reached a stable point in 2017, after which there has been little change in attitudes.

In Armenia, support fluctuated between 2008 and 2012 and then stabilised between 2013 and 2019. Since then, however, support has decreased sharply, falling to 50% in 2024 from 71% in 2019.

A regression analysis of 2024 data demonstrates that attitudes vary among different social and demographic groups.

Gender and education were significant predictors of supporting protest in Armenia. Men were more likely than women to have a positive attitude towards participating in protests by 16 percentage points.

People with tertiary education were 22 percentage points more likely to support protest participation compared to those with secondary or lower education, and 10 percentage points more likely to support protests than individuals with secondary technical education.

People in Yerevan were more likely to support participation in a protest than people who live in rural or urban areas, where the probability of supporting protests was almost equal.

In Armenia, younger people (18–34) were more likely to support protests than older people (55+).

Wealth, partisanship, and employment did not predict attitudes in Armenia.

In Georgia, the data shows that people were more likely to support protests than oppose them across settlement types. At the same time, individuals who live in the capital were more likely to have positive attitudes toward protests than people in other urban or rural areas.

The data also varied across age groups, with young people (18–34) being substantially more likely to support protests than those who are 55 and older.

Those who support Georgian Dream were less likely to have a positive attitude toward protests than individuals who do not support any political party. People who support the opposition and those who refused to report which party they support had similar attitudes to individuals who did not support any party.

Employment was also a factor, with employed individuals more likely to support protest participation than those who were not employed.

Gender and wealth were not associated with attitudes towards protests in Georgia.

Support for protests is generally high in both Georgia and Armenia, though on the decline in Armenia. Across both countries, younger people are more inclined to support protests.

The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis includes gender (male and female), settlement type (capital, urban, and rural), age group (18–34, 35–54, and 55+), education (secondary and lower, secondary technical, and higher than secondary), a wealth index (0–13), employment (employed and unemployed) and partisanship (no party, Georgian Dream, opposition, and refused to answer) as predictor variables.

Increasing optimism for the future in Armenia and Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tinatin Gagoshidze, a Junior Researcher fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Since the Velvet Revolution, Armenians across a wide cross-section of society have become increasingly more optimistic about their country’s future. In comparison, Georgians have seen only a modest increase in optimism over the time period, with the uptick concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.

Both Armenia and Georgia have experienced significant political, economic, and social changes over the last decade. In Armenia, the changes have coincided with more Armenians believing that eventually everything will be fine, while in Georgia, there has been a largely steady though slightly upward trend, according to the Caucasus Barometer survey.

In 2017, nearly half of the Armenian population (46%) believed that the situation in their country would never improve. In contrast, more people in Georgia viewed their country’s future positively (68%).

In 2019, optimism in the Armenian population toward the future roughly doubled (80%), surpassing the share with an optimistic outlook in Georgia (69%).  This change took place following Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, which brought Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power.

Between 2019 and 2024, Georgians’ optimism about the future increased by six percentage points, coming to match the share of optimism in Armenia.

These changes in attitudes varied by social and demographic variables.

In Armenia, after the initial increase in optimism following the Velvet Revolution, those aged 35–54 gradually became less optimistic, while other age groups’ attitudes did not change significantly.

In Georgia, optimism rose among people 54 and under between 2019 and 2021, while it rose for older people between 2021 and 2024.

In Armenia, men became less optimistic about the future over time, while in Georgia, both men and women have gradually become more optimistic.

The data shows consistent trends over time in the Georgian population regarding people’s perceptions of their country’s future based on their level of education. However, Georgians with a higher education tend to have a more positive outlook on the country’s future compared to those with a secondary technical education or lower education levels.

In contrast, opinions among Armenians about their country’s future do not fluctuate substantially based on level of education.

Data from Georgia indicates that employed individuals are more optimistic about the country’s future than those who are not working. For example, in 2024, approximately 82% of employed people believed that everything would eventually be fine in Georgia, compared to 70% of people who were not working.

In Armenia, however, working people’s attitudes have declined slightly over time.

The data also shows that residents of rural areas in Georgia view the country’s future more negatively than those living in the capital. Attitudes became more positive between 2019 and 2024 for people in Tbilisi and rose substantially in other urban areas (by 19 percentage points) between 2021 and 2024.

In contrast, in Armenia, optimism is lowest in Yerevan, where attitudes became more negative between 2021 and 2024. Otherwise, attitudes have largely been stable across settlement types.

In 2024, levels of optimism for the future were quite similar in Armenia and Georgia, with optimism having increased substantially in Armenia, following the country’s Velvet Revolution and rising modestly in Georgia. In Armenia, increases in optimism were wide-spread across society, while in Georgia recent changes seem concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.

Armenians and Georgians lack confidence in their ability to influence politics

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Melor Shengelia, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, both Armenians and Georgians tend to lack confidence in their influence on politics. However, Armenians in general are significantly less willing to participate in politics.

Both Armenian and Georgian politics have experienced dramatic protests over the last decade. Over the past three years, Georgia has experienced significant political unrest due to the ruling Georgian Dream party’s domestic crackdown and drift away from Euro-Atlantic integration. In Armenia, the political landscape has evolved since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, when mass protests brought current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan into power.

Though both countries have been host to mass public movements, data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer suggests that people’s perceptions of their political power differ between the two countries.

In Armenia, more people believed that politics and government were too complicated for the average person to understand. While this opinion was also common in Georgia, it was expressed significantly less often.

A statistical model demonstrates that people in Georgia living in urban areas outside of Tbilisi were more likely to agree than disagree with the statement, ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on’.

Younger people aged 18–34 were less likely to agree with this statement compared to people from older age groups.

The model also suggests that in Georgia, women were more likely to agree that politics were too complicated to understand compared to men.

Education was also a significant predictor of whether someone agreed or disagreed with the statement. People with a higher education were less likely to agree and more likely to disagree with this opinion compared to people with a lower education level.

Ethnic Georgians were also more prone to disagree with this statement compared to ethnic minorities.

In Armenia, however, demographic variables were not statistically significant predictors of feelings towards how complicated politics are.

Data related to whether people felt they had a say in what their government does similarly showed that people in both Armenia and Georgia were not confident in their ability to influence politics.

In Armenia, 64% of the public agreed that they did not have any say in the government’s actions. In Georgia, on the other hand, less, albeit half (52%) of the public, believed they lacked a say and influence in what their government does.

Regression analysis demonstrates that in both Armenia and Georgia, people who lived in rural areas were less likely to agree with the above statement compared to people from the capitals.

In Armenia, older people were more likely to agree with the statement compared to people aged 18–34. This variable was not a significant predictor in Georgia.

Additionally, while gender, education level, employment status, ethnicity, and ownership of durable goods (a common proxy for wealth) were included in the regression, none were statistically significant predictors in either country.

In both countries, people tended to lack confidence in their influence on politics while also feeling indifferent about their role in political life. While this trend was observed in both Armenia and Georgia, people in Armenia were significantly less willing to participate in politics and were less likely to perceive their role as important in political processes.

Note: The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the Caucasus Barometer 2024 dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (secondary or lower, secondary technical, higher than secondary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Life Satisfaction And What People Teach Their Children

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dr. Tamar Khoshtaria, a Senior Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.


Data from the European Values Study (EVS) of 2017 suggests that values commonly taught to children in different countries appear to be linked to how satisfied communities are with their lives. CRRC Georgia has compared the results between Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and a handful of European countries.

Most people in the world seek satisfaction with their lives; however, whether one experiences it is a matter of numerous potential factors.

One plausible contributor to life satisfaction could be the values parents or society instil in young people.

Data from the European Values Survey suggest that countries where larger shares of the public are satisfied with their life are more likely to teach their children about tolerance, respect, and independence.

Hard work tends to be associated with lower levels of life satisfaction, a trait commonly reported in the South Caucasus and Russia.

The European Values Survey suggests that Northern European countries reported the highest level of happiness and life satisfaction: data from 2017 suggested that over 90% of respondents living in Iceland (95%), Norway (94%), and Sweden (94%) say they are ‘very’ or ‘quite happy’. In addition, of the 36 countries covered in the survey, Iceland (74%), Norway (72%), and Finland (72%) reported the highest levels of satisfaction with life.

In contrast, only about one-third of people in Armenia (33%), Azerbaijan (33%), and Russia (32%) reported they were satisfied with life. Georgia stands somewhere in between, with 45% of its respondents claiming to be satisfied.

After Ukraine (18%) and Bulgaria (17%), Georgia has the highest share of people who say they are dissatisfied with their lives (14%).

Note: Respondents assessed life satisfaction on a 10-point scale, where 1 meant dissatisfied and 10 meant satisfied. Responses 1, 2 and 3 are labelled as dissatisfied on the chart above. Responses 4, 5, 6, and 7 are labelled as average, and 8, 9 and 10 are labelled as satisfied. The above chart does not include all countries in the survey due to space limitations. The graph above presents the 10 most and least satisfied countries in the study.

 

When looking at countries that are most and least satisfied with their lives and comparing them to Georgia, we see that these countries tend to have different ideas on what qualities are the most desirable for their children to learn.

In the countries most satisfied with their lives — Iceland, Norway, and Finland — tolerance and respect for other people were named by over 80% of respondents. This share is significantly lower in Georgia (54%) as well as in the countries where people are least satisfied with their lives — Armenia (56%), Azerbaijan (61%), and Russia (52%).

In Iceland and Norway, though not in Finland, independence is named by over 80% of the public as a highly desirable quality for a child. The share of people naming this quality as most desirable is significantly lower in Azerbaijan (60%) and Georgia (49%) and even lower in Armenia (31%) and Russia (32%).

While over 70% of respondents name hard work as the most desirable quality which a child should have in the South Caucasus and Russia, the percentage is significantly lower in Iceland (45%), Norway (19%), and Finland (10%).

Some qualities were deemed desirable in all seven countries, such as having a sense of responsibility and being well-mannered.

 

Several patterns also stand out for specific countries. For example, 62% of people in Finland think determination and/or perseverance are desirable qualities, while religious belief is more desirable in Georgia (50%) than in all other countries.

Being able to save money and thrift was valued the most in Russia at 49%.  A number of other characteristics show relatively little in terms of distinctive patterns. 

 

The above data show that the most satisfied people in Europe live in Iceland, Norway, and Finland, while the least satisfied live in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Georgia stands somewhere in between.

People who are most satisfied with their lives are more likely to teach their children qualities such as tolerance and independence, while the least satisfied communities are more likely to emphasise the importance of hard work.

Responsibility and good manners are generally valued in all of these countries, while religious faith is more important in Georgia than in the other seven countries explored in this article.

The data used in this article is available here.

Shifting Tides: Changing Dynamics of Social Capital in Georgia and Armenia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by By Milord Shengelia, a Junior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

Both Georgia and Armenia are known for being close-knit, but levels of social ties and trust vary both between the countries and between demographics. And while levels of trust have increased in Armenia in the last decade, in Georgia, the opposite is true.

Past research has suggested that both Georgia and Armenia have high levels of bonding social capital — levels of trust within a family and community — but low levels of bridging social capital — the ability to make bonds with people outside one’s immediate circle.

However, recent data from the Caucasus Barometer shows that while in Armenia some measures of bonding social capital have risen significantly in the decade between 2011 and 2021, the same characteristics have remained largely stagnant in Georgia.

One measure of social capital is whether people feel that they have people that they can rely on when they have problems.

The share of the Georgian population who say that they have people they can rely on has varied slightly over the years, but remained between 34% and 40% between 2008 and 2021. The exception was a low of 29% in 2009, a year which is a relative outlier for Georgia.

In Armenia, however, respondents have increasingly felt that there are people that they can rely on, with this share doubling from 31% in 2011 to 60% in 2021.

 

The data show a similar pattern with regard to the statement, ‘There are many people I can trust completely’.

In 2008, 31% of the Georgian public reported that this described them, compared to 18% in Armenia. Since then, however, the situation has reversed, with 25% of the public in Georgia reporting this in 2021, compared with 48% in Armenia.

 

The relative levels of social capital which people report is associated with a number of demographic characteristics in Georgia and Armenia.

A regression model shows that in both Georgia and Armenia, people outside of the capital cities are more likely to say that in times of trouble, they have many individuals they can turn to than those living in Tbilisi and Yerevan. Similarly, wealthier people are more likely to believe they have people to rely on in both countries.

In Georgia, women are more likely to report they have plenty of people to turn to when faced with problems. In Armenia, gender is not associated with responses to this question.

In Georgia, ethnic Georgians were more likely to agree compared to ethnic minorities. Due to the small number of people of ethnic minority descent in Armenia, only a small number were present in the sample. Consequently, the same association was not tested in Armenia.

Employed people in Armenia, but not Georgia, are more likely to feel there are people they can rely on. Age and education are not associated with responses to this question in either country, controlling for other factors.

Regarding how much people feel they can trust others, in Georgia, this is associated with both where someone lives and their sex.

Men are more likely to say that there are many people they can trust completely compared to women, while people who live in Tbilisi are less likely to report people can be trusted, compared with people in other urban and rural areas. There were no differences associated with age, education, employment, or ethnicity on this question.

In Armenia, wealth is a significant predictor of trusting others. Wealthier respondents were more likely to indicate that there were many people they could trust completely. In Armenia, no other variable was associated with this statement.

 

Over the last decade, the dynamics of social capital in Armenia have undergone a transformation, while in Georgia they have remained stagnant. While Georgian people had more social capital in the past, today Armenians are more likely to have stronger bonding social capital.

Note: The results presented in the above chart came from regression model of the CB 2021 wave. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (secondary or lower, secondary technical, higher than secondary), employment (working, not working), wealth (ownership of 14 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

The views expressed in this article reflect the views of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

How Armenians and Georgians feel about the dissolution of the Soviet Union

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Giorgi BabunaSvili, Senior Policy Analyst, and Kristina Vacharadze, Programs Director at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Caucasus Barometer 2021 data shows that a majority of Armenians feel that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was bad for their country, while almost half of Georgians feel that the collapse had a positive impact on Georgia. 

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Armenia have shared differing yet similar paths. 

Both have experienced wars, revolutions, and economic upheaval, but political direction and public sentiment on major political issues has often diverged. 

Data from the Caucasus Barometer 2021 has shown that a key difference is how the public views the Soviet collapse. In Armenia, a clear majority feels that the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the country worse off, while in Georgia opinion is divided, with half of the public viewing the collapse as having been good for the country. 

The annual survey found that two thirds (67%) of Armenians think the dissolution was bad for the country, whereas around two in five (38%) in Georgia think the same. In contrast, almost half of Georgians think that this was a good thing for the country, while only about a fifth of Armenians agree with the statement.

Opinions were associated with some demographic characteristics.

A regression model found that, in both Georgia and Armenia, people with a higher education were more likely to think that the dissolution of the USSR had had a positive impact than people with only a secondary or secondary technical education. In both countries, younger people were more inclined to say that the dissolution of the USSR was a good thing than older people.

There were no statistically significant differences in attitudes associated with gender, settlement type, or employment. However, wealth was a significant predictor of attitudes in Armenia: wealthier people assess the dissolution of the USSR more positively. The same variable was not statistically significant in Georgia.

Ethnic minorities in Georgia tended to feel less positively about the dissolution of the USSR than ethnic Georgians. Association with ethnicity was not tested in Armenia due to the small share of ethnic minorities in the country. 

What reasons do people give for their views?

The survey also investigated the reasons for people’s opinions. In both Georgia and Armenia, the overwhelming majority of those who felt that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had had a positive impact gave their country gaining independence as the main reason. Of those who felt it had been bad for their country, people’s economic situation having worsened was the most common response. 

However, amongst those who felt that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had had a negative impact, different demographic groups prioritised different reasons. 

Older people in Georgia and Armenia were more likely to resent that travel within the former USSR had become more difficult. 

People with a secondary education or below perceive the lack of free healthcare and education as a greater loss than people with higher education do. 

In Armenia, the country’s economic situation having worsened was of greater concern to people without a higher education. 

Older people and people in rural areas saw damaged ties with friends and relatives as a larger problem than younger people and residents of the capital. People in rural areas in Armenia were also more likely to attribute their negative assessment to a decline in the availability of jobs. 

Overall, Georgians felt more positive than Armenians about the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on their country, but the reasons that people gave for their assessments were similar in both countries. 

Note: The analyses of different groups’ views in the above uses binary logistic regression, where the dependent variable is either a) thinking the dissolution of the USSR is a good or bad thing, or b) the reason why the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a bad thing. The independent variables included gender, age group, ethnicity, settlement type, level of education, wealth, and employment status.