Georgians largely hold Russia and Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

While over half of all Georgians believe that Russia or Russian President Vladimir Putin holds the most responsibility for the full-scale war in Ukraine, a large minority, 17%, felt they were uncertain who to blame, while another 13% considered Ukraine or its president Volodymyr Zelenskyi personally responsible.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shaped global politics since its start. Past polling has shown that the public in Georgia, a country with its own territorial conflicts with Russia, has broadly supported Ukraine. Data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer survey from Spring 2024 suggests that most people in Georgia hold Putin and Russia responsible for the war.

The data shows that most Georgians (57%) believe that Russia or Putin holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Just one in eight Georgians (13%) considered Ukraine or Zelenskyi personally responsible.

However, notably, 17% of Georgians were uncertain and reported that they did not know who holds the most responsibility for this war.

Further analysis showed that beliefs about responsibility for the war in Ukraine were associated with age, political preferences, and perceptions of the likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

For example, respondents aged 35 and older were less likely to blame Russia or Putin compared to younger respondents aged 18–34.

In turn, women were nine percentage points more likely to report uncertainty, selecting ‘don’t know’ when asked about responsibility for the war in Ukraine, while people living in rural areas were 16 percentage points more likely to be undecided on the issue.

Opposition party supporters were 23 percentage points more likely to blame Russia/Putin than those who supported the ruling Georgian Dream party. They were also 14 percentage points less likely to be undecided about responsibility for the war in Ukraine compared to ruling party supporters.

Respondents who did not provide a party preference on the survey were 15 percentage points less likely to place blame on Zelenskyi or Ukraine compared to Georgian Dream supporters.

Respondents who were uncertain about the risk of Georgia’s involvement in any conflict were significantly less likely to blame either Ukraine/Zelenskyi or Russia/Putin, and were more likely to be undecided.

Most Georgians, particularly the younger generation and opposition party supporters, hold Russia or Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine. Women and people living in rural areas were more likely to be undecided. Those who were uncertain about Georgia’s potential involvement in war also tended to be undecided about who is to blame for the war.

This analysis is based on a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable is ‘Who holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine?’ with three answer options: Russia/Putin, Ukraine/Zelenskyi, and Don’t know. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, education, ethnicity, employment, partisanship, and the perceived likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

Georgians are split on economic relations with Russia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Zachary Fabos, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia and Milorsh Shengelia, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Despite significant negative public sentiment towards Russia’s relations to Georgia, a 2023 CRRC survey found that there were mixed opinions on Georgia’s economic ties to Russia. 

In CRRC Georgia’s 2021 Caucasus Barometer Survey, 66% of Georgians surveyed identified Russia as the country’s main enemy. However, NDI and CRRC Georgia’s October 2023 survey data found that those surveyed had a variety of opinions on Georgia’s economic relations with Russia. 

Georgian support for deepening economic relations with Russia reached a peak of 53% in February 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A month later, in March 2022, support for the opposite — limiting economic relations — was at its highest at 39%. Since then, support for deepening relations has remained steady, while support for limiting relations has declined, with each position supported by a quarter of the surveyed public as of October 2023. At the same time, there has been an uptick in support for leaving relations as they stand, at 34%. 

Opinions on how to manage Georgia’s economic relations with Russia vary with settlement type, ethnicity, and gender. 

Tbilisi residents were 20 percentage points more likely to support the idea of limiting economic relations with Russia than those living in other urban settlements, and 28 points more likely than those in rural communities.

Ethnic minorities are 15 percentage points more likely to report the country should deepen economic relations with Russia, while men are 10 points more likely to support deepening economic relations with Russia than women. 

The share in favour of maintaining relations as they stand tends to be stable amongst social and demographic groups, with 35-39% of the different demographic groups holding this view, controlling for other factors. The two exceptions to this pattern are Tbilisi residents, who as noted previously tend to believe that relations should be limited, and ethnic minorities, who are more likely to believe relations should deepen.

Aside from demographic factors, partisanship predicts attitudes towards Georgia’s economic ties with Russia. 

The largest difference of opinions along party lines is between supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and the United National Movement (UNM). After controlling for other factors, supporters of the ruling party are twice (33%) as likely as UNM supporters (15%) to favour deeper economic relations with Russia. UNM supporters are also nearly four times as likely (52%) to think relations should be limited compared with Georgian Dream supporters (14%), controlling for other factors.

Georgian society is split on how the country’s economy should interact with Russia’s, and these differences of opinion vary substantially along social, demographic, and partisan lines. 

Note: The analysis in this article makes use of multinomial regression analysis. The analysis included gender (male, female), age group (18-34, 35-54, and 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary/ secondary technical/ lower, and tertiary), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian, ethnic minority), employment (not employed, employed), a wealth index (0-10), and political party support (No party/don’t know/Georgian Dream, UNM, other party, and refuse to answer), as predictor variables. 

This article was written by Milord Shengelia and Zachary Fabos, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

CRRC’s 9th Annual Conference: New Frontiers: The South Caucasus Amidst New Challenges

On June 22 and 23, the Caucasus Research Resource Centers in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia hosted the 9th annual methods conference. This year the conference focused on the  Russian-Ukrainian and how it has altered the geopolitical, economic, and demographic state of the South Caucasus. 

The first day of the conference featured four panels, on issues ranging from values, mobilization, and activism in the South Caucasus to migration to and from the region. 

The first day also featured a round table on  Archival Access and Openness in the Caucasus and Eurasia, with speakers from Berkeley, Cambridge, and Princeton, among other universities. 

The second day of the conference featured two panels, with the first looking at new economic geographies of the region, and the second focused on intercommunal relations in the South Caucasus. 

The conference concluded with a methods workshop, focused on Empowering Research Subjects with Photovoice in the South Caucasus.

The full conference video will be available from CRRC Georgia’s YouTube Channel in the near future, here.

The conference abstract book is available here. 

What Do The 'Tragic Consequences' Of Colour Revolutions Actually Look like?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia.The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

While Russia regularly warns against the supposed negative consequences of ‘colour revolutions’, data from the Varieties of Democracy project suggests that anti-regime protests leading to changes of government in former Soviet countries have led to lower corruption, cleaner elections, and more vibrant civil society.

Fearing unrest in their region, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and the Russian government often refer to the threat of ‘colour revolutions’ dislodging the existing government in neighbouring countries, maintaining that the West is working hard to engineer such a turn of events.

Most recently, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, claimed that the 7-9 March protests in Tbilisi were ‘of course being orchestrated from abroad’, and noted that they looked ‘very much like the Kyiv Maidan’.

The outcomes of such protests are clearly implied to be damaging, an idea occasionally explicitly stated: in 2014, Putin, commenting on a popular uprising in Russia, claimed that colour revolutions led to ‘tragic consequences’.

But what do these tragic consequences look like? Data shows that colour revolutions in Armenia (2018), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004, 2014) were associated with reduced corruption, decreased clientelistic relationships between politicians and voters, freer and more vibrant civil society, cleaner elections, and greater freedom.

However, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip revolution does not appear to have prompted such a clear post-revolutionary improvement on any of these measures.

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project relies on expert surveys to annually assess 450+ measures of democracy in almost all countries of the world.

One indicator measures how routinely public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material rewards. In all the selected countries except Kyrgyzstan, the post-revolutionary periods showed decreases in corruption in the public sector. The improvement was the most visible and substantial for Georgia.

Another

Another measure is of regime corruption, which aims at addressing the question: to what extent do political actors use a political office for private or political gain? On this measure, the picture is similar — revolutions in Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine were associated with a decline in the magnitude of regime corruption. Exceptions to the pattern were the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, which did not appear to lead to any changes in regime corruption in the countries.

Another indicator of healthy political life is the absence of clientelism. Clientelism refers to a relationship between political actors and voters in which voters’ political support is contingent on targeted rather than public distribution of resources such as jobs, money, and services. The chart below suggests that revolutions in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were associated with a decline in the extent to which politics was based on clientelistic relationships. 

 

A free and vibrant civil society is a necessary and important component of a well-functioning democracy. The data suggests revolutions led to improved scores, with a decrease in government repression of civil society organisations.

 

Moreover, the revolutions in Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine were clearly associated with greater civil society participation, which implies a larger involvement of people in CSOs. As for Kyrgyzstan, it took several years before the country registered improved scores for greater civil society participation.

 

Revolutions also often promise cleaner elections: that is, elections with less registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election-related violence. While Ukraine after 2014 and Kyrgyzstan after 2005 did not see such improvements, Georgia and Armenia did gain cleaner elections.

 

However, the electoral democracy index (a composite index aiming at assessing to what extent a political system satisfies the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens) measured substantial improvements in the post-revolution periods of all four selected four countries, suggesting that political leaders were more responsive to the needs of their population following a revolution.

 

As for freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, post-revolution improvements were seen in all four countries. However, it must be noted that in Georgia, the Rose Revolution did not result in immediate improvements. Georgia’s scores for freedom of expression and alternative sources of information significantly improved only after 2012, when the first peaceful transition of government took place in the country.

 

 

Finally, when it comes to civil liberties, the revolutions in the four countries led to better scores. Civil liberties are understood as the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of government constraints on private liberties and political liberties.

 

 

So what Putin describes as the ‘tragic consequences of colour revolutions’ appear, on closer examination, to be less corrupt state institutions, healthier and more democratic political processes, greater participation of civil society, and better-respected freedoms and liberties; perhaps not so tragic after all.

Who Do Georgians Blame For Russia's War in Ukraine?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a non-resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia.The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

In the face of conflicting narratives about the causes of the war in Ukraine, most Georgians see Russia and Putin as responsible for the conflict, but a substantial minority lay the blame with the West. Since Russia invaded Ukraine slightly over a year ago, a war of words has erupted over who is to blame for the war, with the general consensus being that Russia needlessly invaded Ukraine.

In contrast to this consensus, the Russian government has spread propaganda blaming Ukraine for the war, accusing the country’s Jewish president of being a Nazi and stating that the country needed to be ‘de-Nazified’.

Against this backdrop, and in light of Georgia’s history with Russia, what does the Georgian public think?

Data from CRRC-Georgia and the National Democratic Institute’s regular polling in Georgia suggests that most blame Russia as a whole, but an increasing proportion of the public blames Vladimir Putin specifically for the war. And while the majority of the public report that the war is Russia or Putin’s fault, one in six Georgians report that some Western actor is at fault for the war, while one in twelve blame Ukraine.

The share of Georgians blaming Russia and Putin for the war shifted in the year following the war, with the share blaming Russia declining from 67% in March of 2022, to 54% in December of 2022. There was a simultaneous rise in the share blaming Putin specifically, from 11% in March 2022 to 25% in December of that year.

A smaller but substantial proportion of the public considers the West to be responsible for the war in Ukraine. While relatively small shares blame NATO (2-3%) and the European Union (2-4%), a relatively high percentage blame the US. One in eleven (9%) blamed the United States in March, which rose to and stayed at 15% in July and December respectively.

Similarly, relatively few Georgians blame Ukraine for the war. This share stood at 5% in March 2022, rose to 11% in July 2022, and then moved to between these shares at 8% as of December 2022.

The remainder of the public is either uncertain about who to blame for the war (14-17%) or names some other factor (2%).

 

It is important to note that respondents could name up to three responses. Therefore, the shares do not necessarily sum to 100% on the chart above. In the first wave of the survey, Vladimir Putin was not specifically asked about, but respondents still named him. In subsequent waves of the survey, Vladimir Putin was added as a response option.

In the most recent wave of the survey, 59% of the public named only Russia or Vladimir Putin as responsible for the war. One in nine (11%) suggested that only Western actors were at fault for the war. A further 7% named at least one Western actor and one Russian actor. The remainder were mostly either uncertain on how to respond (15%) or refused to answer (1%). Other respondents blamed Ukraine as well as some combination of Russian and Western actors.

Who blames who?

The data suggest that men, people belonging to ethnic minorities, and Georgian Dream supporters are more likely to consider the West (including the US, EU, and NATO) at least somewhat responsible for the war, than are women, ethnic Georgians, and those that do not support Georgian Dream.Ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, those that claim they support no particular party, and people living in urban areas are more likely to blame Russia and/or Putin, compared to ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people in rural areas.

Ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, those that claim they support no particular party, and people living in urban areas are more likely to blame Russia and/or Putin, compared to ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people in rural areas.

Men and Georgian Dream supporters are more likely to believe that Ukraine is at fault for the war than women and opposition supporters. 

 

Women, people with vocational education, those outside Tbilisi, poorer people, and people who support Georgian Dream are more likely than men, people with secondary education, those in Tbilisi, wealthier people, and those who support the opposition to be uncertain about the causes of the war.

 

The data do not suggest that any particular group is more or less likely to name at least one Russian actor and one Western actor for the war.

While Russia’s fault in the war is questioned by relatively few in Georgia, the data do show that some groups are more likely than others to believe that Western actors or Ukraine itself is partially or fully at fault. A substantial share also remains uncertain.


Note: The social and demographic breakdowns shown in the article above were generated from a regression analysis. The analysis had someone’s belief about who was at fault for the war as the dependent variable, including naming Russia/Putin or not, naming any Western institution or not, naming both a Western and a Russian actor or not, and naming Ukraine or not. The independent variables included age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, or rural), education level (secondary, vocational, tertiary), wealth (an index of durable goods owned by the respondents’ household), ethnicity (ethnic minority or ethnic Georgian), employment (working, unemployed, or outside the labor force), and party support (Georgian Dream, United National Movement, other opposition, refuse to answer/don’t know/no party). This article only reports on statistically significant differences between groups.

How do Georgians feel about the influx of Russians?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

Recent CRRC data shows that a large majority of the Georgian public is concerned about the migration of Russians to Georgia.

Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, at least 1.2 million Russian citizens have entered Georgia, equivalent to roughly 30% of Georgia’s population. While the number of Russian citizens who have decided to stay in Georgia remains unclear, the impact of this mass migration is strongly felt in rising rents and concerns over the country’s security.

[Read more on OC Media: Suitcases and shattered dreams: fleeing Russians bring crisis to the Caucasus]

This has manifested in political conflict, with the opposition and the ruling Georgian Dream party arguing over the introduction of entry restrictions for Russian citizens.

A recent NDI and CRRC survey from December 2022 shows that this elite-level partisan difference mirrors a policy divide between everyday voters.

According to the findings, Georgians appear to be concerned about Russians entering their country: two-thirds (69%) think that the large number of Russian citizens entering Georgia since the war will likely have a negative impact on Georgia. 

On the other hand, every sixth Georgian (17%) thinks it will have a positive impact, while 8% say that they do not know, and 6% think the recent influx of Russian citizens will have no impact on the country.

After controlling for other socio-demographic variables, Georgian Dream supporters were slightly more optimistic about Russians coming to Georgia than supporters of the largest opposition group, the United National Movement. However, supporters of the ruling party were not different from supporters of other opposition parties or voters who do not support any party in particular on this issue.

Approximately a third of the public (29%) approve of how the government handled the influx of Russian emigrés, while a majority of the public (57%) disapprove — the remaining 13% do not know what to think about the government’s handling of the emigration.

Regression analysis suggests there is a sharp partisan divide between those who support and do not support the authorities’ approach, with Georgian Dream supporters being much more likely to approve of the government’s Russian migration policy, as shown in the graph below.

Slightly more than two-thirds of the public (69%) were also in favour of introducing a visa regime for Russian citizens — including the majority of Georgian Dream’s supporters.

The above data shows two things clearly: a large majority of the public is concerned about the migration of Russian citizens to Georgia, but supporters of the ruling party are more likely to be satisfied with the government’s approach to the Russian influx. 

Beyond partisan lines, however, the data also shows that the majority of Georgians are concerned and want the government to do something about Russian migration.

Who is pro-Russian in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

While this group is rarely examined, data from a March 2022 NDI/CRRC survey suggests that pro-Russian people in Georgia make up a fifth to a fourth of the public. 

The data suggests they tend to be more satisfied with the country’s direction, and assess the performance of the government more positively than people who do not sit in the pro-Russian camp.

What portion of the public can be considered pro-Russian?

Four different questions were used to identify Georgia’s pro-Russian public. People who responded in the following manner were considered pro-Russian for the purpose of this article:

• People who report favourable or very favourable views of the Russian Government.
• People who think that Russia’s influence on Georgia has increased in the last five years and that this is a good thing.
• People who think that Georgia should have its closest economic cooperation with Russia, and at the same time, believe that Georgia should not have close economic cooperation with the EU or US.
• People who think that Georgia should have its closest political cooperation with Russia.

People who responded in the above manner to at least one of the questions made up 23% of the electorate. 

Regression analysis was used to examine which social and demographic groups were more likely to sit in the pro-Russian camp. The data suggested that men and ethnic minorities were more likely to harbour pro-Russia attitudes than women and ethnic Georgians. 

Otherwise, no statistically significant differences were found in terms of age, education, settlement type, or party affiliation.

What does the pro-Russian camp think of where Georgia is headed?

With regard to the general direction of the country, pro-Russian Georgians tended to think the country was headed in the right direction more often than others. All else equal, people in the pro-Russian camp were 10 percentage points more likely to report that Georgia is developing in the right direction than people who were not in the pro-Russian camp.

Pro-Russians reported similar attitudes to the rest of the public regarding parliament’s performance as well as the work of President Salome Zurabishvili

However, pro-Russian Georgians were more likely to assess the Prime Minister’s work positively as well as that of the government. They were also substantially more likely — by 22 percentage points — to view the overall performance of the government positively.

The above data suggests that more analysis should be done about the roughly one-quarter to one-fifth of the public that holds pro-Russian views — views more often held by men and ethnic minorities.

Georgia’s pro-Russian camp were more satisfied with the performance of the executive branch of the government as well as the country’s general direction than people who are not pro-Russian.

Amid increasing concerns regarding recent steps by Georgia’s political leadership, the deteriorating media environment, and the country’s European path more generally, the pro-Russian segment of society being satisfied with the current direction of the country is telling, and a warning sign for those who advocate for Georgia’s democratisation and integration with Euro-Atlantic structures.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), partisanship (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK), and holding pro-Russia attitudes (pro-Russian, not pro-Russian). The data used in this analysis is available here.

Despite the war, Georgians differentiate Russia and Russians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Elene Ergeshidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, and Nino Mzhavanadze, an Independent Researcher. The views presented in the article are of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a large-scale migration of Russians to Georgia led to a debate in Georgian society. 

Many perceived the rising number of Russians entering Georgia as a security threat, and a majority wanted visa restrictions to be introduced for Russian citizens. Others empathised with Russians fleeing Putin’s Russia. 

In this context, there were widespread concerns about anti-Russian sentiment and the potential for hate crime and hate speech against Russians in Georgia. 

[Read on OC Media: Russian émigrés face chilly reception in Georgia]

Despite the concerns, data from CRRC and NDI’s polling from March 2022 shows that a majority of Georgians have a positive attitude towards Russian people and a negative attitude towards the Russian state. This maintains a pattern of public opinion that has been present in most surveys which CRRC Georgia has conducted which allow an exploration of the issue, including in multiple waves of the Caucasus Barometer survey and more recently a survey on foreign policy which CRRC conducted for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. 

On the March 2022 CRRC and NDI survey, a majority of Georgians (85%) reported an unfavourable attitude towards the Russian government. A majority (59%) also reported a positive attitude towards Russian people. 

Further analysis suggests that settlement type and ethnicity are correlated with holding unfavourable attitudes towards the Russian government. 

People in Tbilisi were six percentage points more likely to have unfavourable attitudes towards the Russian Government compared to people living in rural areas. Ethnic Georgians were seven percentage points more likely to express unfavourable attitudes towards the Government of Russia than ethnic minorities. 

Note: These charts were generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

Analysis shows that favourable attitudes towards Russian people also vary across demographic groups. 

Men were seven percentage points more likely to express favourable attitudes towards Russians compared to women. People over the age of 35 held more positive attitudes towards Russian people. Ethnic minorities living in Georgia were 28 percentage points more likely to report favourable attitudes than ethnic Georgians. Supporters of the ruling party were 14 and 9 percentage points more likely to hold favourable attitudes towards Russian people compared to opposition supporters and those who do not support any party, respectively. 

Note: These charts were generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

While there was widespread discussion about whether the Georgian public would become more hostile to Russian people following the war in Ukraine and large-scale Russian migration to Georgia, the data shows that people have maintained a distinction between Russia and Russians, with negative attitudes towards the former and positive attitudes towards the latter.