Georgians don’t want to be ruled by church, despite confidence in religious institutions

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Teimuraz Kobakhidze and Katharine Khamhaengwong, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or its affiliates.

Data from the ISSP 2018 religion survey shows that while Georgians have more confidence in churches and religious organisations than in schools, the business world, the legal system, and parliament, they also largely believe that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote. In total, very few believe that churches and religious institutions in Georgia should have more power.

The relationship between the state and the Georgian Orthodox Church is complicated and contested. While the Georgian government has provided the church with an annual budgetary allocation of millions of dollars, the government has also proposed and passed various measures the church has opposed, ranging from making Orthodoxy the state religion to protections for various minority groups.

Within the general populace, two thirds (67%) of Georgians have a great deal of confidence in churches and religious organisations, and 88% have at least some confidence in them. As other CRRC research has consistently shown, people’s own religious organisations and the army are the most trusted institutions in Georgia. This pattern appears within the ISSP survey as well, with churches and religious organisations being the most trusted institutions asked about on the survey. As the vast majority of Georgians are Orthodox Christians, the religious institution in question will typically be the Georgian Orthodox Church.

However, despite this confidence, 71% of Georgians agree that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote, compared to 15% who disagree, 9% who neither agree nor disagree, and 4% who were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Additionally, a plurality of Georgians, 42%, think churches and religious institutions have too much power in the country, while only 14% think they have too little power. Slightly over a third (36%) think religious organisations have the right amount, and 8% refused to answer or were uncertain over how to respond to the question.

Regression analyses looking at settlement type, sex, age group, education, having a partner or not, and frequency of religious service attendance shows that attitudes vary among different groups towards religious institutions’ role in society.

For confidence in churches and religious groups, sex, age group, and relationship status were not predictors of attitudes, while settlement type, education level, and religious service attendance were.

The groups most likely to express a great deal of confidence in churches and religious institutions were people in rural areas, weekly church attendees, and people with a secondary or lower education.

Education level similarly predicted responses to whether people believe religious leaders should try to influence voters — people with a higher education were less likely to agree that religious leaders should try to influence votes. Sex and relationship status were also correlated: women and those without partners were more likely to say that religious leaders should not influence voting.

Settlement type, age group, and frequency of religious service attendance did not predict attitudes.

Unlike the previous two questions, education level was not predictive of views on whether or not churches and religious organisations had too much or too little power in society. Settlement type, sex, and relationship status were likewise uncorrelated.

Age and frequency of religious service attendance, on the other hand, were predictive.

People who never or very rarely attended religious services were most likely to say that churches and religious institutions had too much power. Similarly, young people (18–34) were more likely to believe religious institutions have too much power. Notably, people who attended religious services monthly were actually more likely than those who attended weekly to think churches and religious institutions should have more power — 20% compared to 15%.

Despite their general favourability toward the church and religious institutions, Georgians do not think these institutions should have more power or that their leaders should try to influence voters.

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables: settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), age (18-34, 35-55, 55+), sex (male or female), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, or higher than secondary), employment status (employed or unemployed), relationship status (has a spouse or partner, does not have a spouse or partner), and frequency of attendance of religious services (never or less than once per year, at least once per year, at least once per month, at least once per week).

Study suggests large numbers in Georgia to celebrate Easter in church

Note: This article was co-published with OC Media. It was written by Koba Turmanidze, President of CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Research by CRRC Georgia suggests that a large number of Georgia’s Orthodox Christians intend to celebrate at Church.

As Easter celebrations approach in Georgia, a study by CRRC Georgia suggests that a large number of Georgia’s Orthodox Christians still intend to celebrate at Church. The survey of Facebook users found that around 40% of people who usually celebrate Easter in Church intended to do so again this year despite the pandemic.

With Easter celebrations approaching, quarantine rules have become even stricter: driving of private cars has been forbidden and movement in and out of the four largest cities of Georgia has been restricted.

While most organisations are closed or are working digitally, the Georgian Orthodox Church has continued traditional services. Moreover, the church has refused to call on believers to celebrate Easter at home, and the government seems unwilling to enforce emergency rules on the Church.

Instead, the Prime Minister has hinted that it is the responsibility of citizens to stay home, while the churches should remain open. ‘I’m sure that wise citizens will guess that they should not place responsibility on the church and should not want to hear the call from the church – don’t come to the church’, he stated.     

This is not the first time government officials have used subtle suggestions, or nudges, with the goal of altering people’s church-going habits.

Earlier this month, Paata Imnadze, the highly regarded deputy head of the National Centre for Disease Control and Public Health also voiced a similar view.

‘I would like to address Christian believers. Let’s protect our mother-Church, and our priests, by praying at home and not going to church.’

While such nudges often succeed in changing people’s attitudes and even behaviours, CRRC Georgia’s research shows that in the current situation, this approach may not be working.

To test the impact of Imnadze’s ‘nudge’ on people’s intentions to go to church for Easter celebrations, CRRC Georgia conducted an experiment using Facebook’s A/B test tool.

The tool disseminates two or more announcements which will randomly show up in Facebook users’ news feeds. In this case, Facebook users were randomly shown advertisements to fill out one of the two versions of a questionnaire: one included Imnadze’s statement as an introduction to the survey, while the other did not. The two surveys were identical in every other respect. 

The randomised test was active for 72 hours from 11–14 April and reached 240,000 users, accumulated 22,100 clicks, and resulted in 7,560 completed questionnaires.

Of the 7,560 adults, 42% read or saw Imnadze’s statement before filling out the questionnaire. Analysis of the results did not show any impact from the nudge.

In the two groups, 16% reported that they would celebrate Easter in the church. As expected, far more respondents reported celebrating Easter in the church in the past (38%), suggesting that people have adapted their plans to the emergency situation.

Yet the nudge played no role: regardless of being in the treatment or control group, about 60% of respondents who usually would celebrate Easter in Church reported they would stay home this year, while about 40% still planned to go to church.

Importantly, there was no effect of the nudge across different demographic groups (e.g. men and women, older and younger people).

Further analysis looked at different factors that correlate with whether people changed their choice to celebrate Easter at the Church.

Respondents’ religiosity shows an unsurprising pattern. Frequent churchgoers and respondents who consider religion important in their lives were more likely to stay loyal to their past practise of celebrating Easter in the church than less religious respondents (i.e. those who go to church less frequently and consider religion less important).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, concern about the spread of COVID-19 makes respondents more cautious, and hence, more likely to change Easter celebration practice from church to home.

Women, people with tertiary education, and older respondents are also more likely to move Easter celebrations from church to home, whereas employed respondents are less likely to change their past practice of celebrating in the church.

While the survey gathered a large number of responses, the results should be read with caution.
The survey is clearly not representative of the population of Georgia, which is reflected in a different demographic profile of the Facebook respondents.

Unlike nationally representative surveys, the Facebook sample overrepresented women (82%), the employed (61%), the university-educated (65%), and younger people (the average age was 37). Moreover, it is hard to say whether the survey represents Facebook users in Georgia, since respondents self-selected into the survey.

Nevertheless, the group that saw and did not see Imnadze’s message on the survey were very similar, with identical demographic profiles. Hence, if the treatment and control groups answered the Easter celebration question differently, this could be attributed to the reminder of Imnadze’s nudge.

While it is not possible to exclude the possibility that the tested and similar nudges already impacted the respondents before they completed the Facebook survey, the findings still suggest that subtle suggestions are not sufficient to change people’s Easter holiday plans.

While a significant share of respondents changed their usual ways of celebration, a reminder of Imnadze’s suggestion did not change this.

Religiosity seems to be an obstacle towards adaptation to the current situation: while many believers and frequent churchgoers reported they would celebrate from home, many are still unconvinced and will likely help spread the virus this Sunday unless emergency rules are enforced on the Church as elsewhere in the country.

Is Georgia’s Orthodox Christian population losing (trust in) their religion?

Surveys conducted in Georgia have repeatedly shown that the Georgian Orthodox Church’s leader Patriarch Ilia II is the most trusted public figure in the country. Yet, CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey data from 2008 to 2017 suggests that both the share of Orthodox Christians in Georgia that trust the Church and the degree to which they trust the Church is on the decline. Although the survey does not provide direct evidence, the scandals surrounding the church in recent years could have contributed to this. For instance, in 2017, a priest was convicted of attempting to poison the Secretary of Ilia II. The government has sold land to the Church at symbolic prices on numerous occasions, often leading to negative media coverage. In 2013, priests were involved in an anti-LGBT rights riot.

CB data on Georgia’s Orthodox Christians’ trust towards the Church shows that 75% reported fully trusting it in 2008. Only 33% did in 2017. During the same period, the share of those who reported trusting the Church more moderately (‘rather trust’ responses) increased from 15% to 38%. Combining the options ‘rather trust’ and ‘fully trust’ is also telling. In 2015, a total of 82% of Orthodox Christians reported trusting the Church; 71% did in 2017, an 11 percentage point decline.

Note: Only answers of those who identified themselves as Orthodox Christians are presented in the charts in this blog post. Answer options “Don’t know” and “Refuse to answer,” which made up less than 5% of responses in any given wave of the survey, are not shown in the charts throughout this blog post.

The decline in trust in the Church between 2015 and 2017 was starkest in Tbilisi, where reported trust declined by 18 percentage points. In Tbilisi, the share of people reporting distrust increased, while outside Tbilisi it did not change beyond the margin of error.

The decline in reported trust in the Orthodox Church is not reflected in changes in some forms of religious practice. Orthodox Christians have reported fasting at similar levels since 2008. There are small fluctuations in reported attendance of religious services, but no clear trend.
 

Note: The original answer options “Always fast” and “Often fast” were combined into the category “Often or always fast” on the chart above. The answer options “Rarely fast” and “Never fast” were combined into the category “Never or rarely fast”. 

Note: The original answer options “Everyday”, “More than once a week”, “Once a week”, and “At least once a month” were combined into the category “At least once a month”. Answer options “Less often” and “Never” were combined into the category “Less often or never”. 

While Orthodox Christians in Georgia may not be losing their religion, fewer trust in its key institution - the Church.

The data used in this blog post is available here.

One step forward, two steps back? European integration in Georgia after the Association Agreement

So far, 2014 is shaping up to be the year that Georgia might begin to reap the benefits of its pro-EU and pro-NATO foreign policy. In June, Georgia signed the EU Association Agreement despite fears over Russian agitation. NATO has indicated its readiness to discuss a “substantive package” for Georgia, if not a Membership Action Plan. However, despite these gestures towards closer cooperation, some elements of the decision to sign the Agreement have caused friction. For example, the introduction of an anti-discrimination law in April, that contained protection for sexual minorities, was designed to make the Georgian legal environment more EU-compatible. However, the introduction of this protection resulted in backlash from the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). Thus, although the signing of the Association Agreement is widely seen by Georgians as a step forward for the country, friction over values has the potential to push the integration agenda back.

The Association Agreement is a sign of strengthening political and economic ties with Europe. However, movement towards a shared cultural space and value system has received less attention in the run-up to the signing. As survey results from the 2013 Survey on Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU show, political, economic and institutional ties were often cited as anticipated outcomes of the Agreement. Legal reforms aimed at lessening discrimination and protecting minority rights were not an integral part of the public debate about what EU integration would mean for Georgia.

Note: This survey was conducted by CRRC-Georgia for the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. The respondents could select one option from a show card

The adoption of the European-style anti-discrimination law in April 2014 has sparked a debate about the compatibility of traditional Georgian values with European norms, especially with respect to the protection of sexual minorities. This suggests that the widespread public support (88%) for strengthening ties with the EU in Georgia may be dependent on assumptions about the political or economic nature of the EU, rather than norms and values. Legal reforms related to the Association Agreement have had an immediate impact on Georgian life (unlike closer political and economic ties), and there are an estimated 350 EU laws in the pipeline. The law itself bans all forms of discrimination, whether on the basis of language, gender, religion or sexual orientation. Although the anti-discrimination law is just one of many legal components to the EU-Georgia cooperation, the vocal reaction of the GOC against the inclusion of sexual minorities, which the Patriarch deemed “the legalization of illegality,” suggests that the journey towards greater European integration might pose some challenges.

During a street party that followed the signing of the Association Agreement on June 27, 2014, the Patriarch addressed the crowd with a message of celebration and caution. While describing the event as “a happy day”, the Patriarch reinforced the idea that moving closer to Europe is “not only a huge honor, but also a huge responsibility” for a country with its own ancient culture and values. This is important, especially since that the majority of Georgians (82%) trust their religious institutions – much more than those who trust in the EU (33%). Moreover, in 2013, 52% of Georgians said that they would vote against EU membership because of harm to Georgia’s culture and traditions. Thus, it will be interesting to see whether this percentage increases in 2014. In an article in Foreign Policy, Peter Pomerantsev noted that, “the church's [GOC] opposition to some EU principles puts it on a de facto collision course with EU integration policy."

Thus far, the signing of the Association Agreement has resulted in a celebratory mood in Georgia. If integration is to continue moving forward, continued public support and the commitment of Georgian politicians, EU representatives and religious spokespeople will each be key. This blog has explored the climate in Georgia following the signing of the Association Agreement. It has also focused on attitudes towards the new anti-discrimination law and trust in the EU, as well as in religious institutions. You can read more analysis on trends in Georgians’ attitudes towards the EU here. Also, please visit our Online Data Analysis tool.

The May 17th Events in Tbilisi Revisited

May 17th has become a reference in Tbilisi for the violent protests against LGBT activists that occurred during the rally for the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT) held on that day. Thousands of people, priests among them, took to the streets and attacked the rally of about 50 activists, causing several injuries. From May 18th to June 30th, CRRC conducted a survey in Tbilisi on attitudes towards these protests. This blog presents three main results of the survey. First, tolerance of homosexuality remains low. Second, most respondents disapprove of the use of physical violence, unless traditional or national values are at stake. Third, in general, respondents felt that the presence of priests was justified at the protests, although their confrontational actions were not. 

The majority (97%) of survey respondents were familiar with the May 17th events, and most received their information from television (94%), with acquaintances, social networks and newspapers being far behind. However, the purpose of the event was not well understood. When asked whether a gay parade or a peaceful demonstration for the IDAHOT had been planned, 45% said the former, 40% said the latter, and 15% didn’t know. 

Several questions in the survey provide information about general attitudes towards homosexuality. When asked if sexual minorities should have the same rights as everyone else, 60% said yes. However, about half (49%) agreed with the statement that a good citizen should never respect the rights of sexual minorities. Only 16% said a good citizen should always respect their rights. Women and Tbilisi residents 18 to 37 years old are slightly less intolerant than men (47% of women vs. 52% of men say “never”), and those 58 years and older (38% of 18-37 year olds vs. 61% of those 58+ say “never”), respectively. It should also be noted that intolerance towards sexual minorities is several times higher than intolerance towards ethnic and religious minorities.

When asked to decide which type of person is least desired as a neighbor—between criminals, homosexuals and drug addicts—31% of respondents said they would least prefer a homosexual. Similar to before, women (24%) have a more tolerant view than men (43%), but those 58 years and older appear to be the most tolerant (24%), compared to 30% of those 18 to 37 years old and 37% of those 38 to 57 years old. This may be explained by the fact that 45% of older people perceive a neighbour who is a criminal as the worst option.

Another important feature of the May 17th protest was its brutal character. 87% of respondents felt that “physical violence is always unacceptable”. However, 50% agreed with the statement that “physical violence can be acceptable towards those people or groups who endanger national values” (46% disagreed). 57% of those interviewed also said that a successful peaceful celebration of the IDAHOT would have endangered Georgia. 

Finally, the role of the clergy at the protest was also widely discussed. The day before the protest, the patriarch called for a cancellation of the IDAHOT rally denouncing it as an “encouragement” of “anomaly and disease”. Many Orthodox priests took part in the protest against the rally, and some were at the frontline of the confrontation. In the survey, a majority of people believed that, “The clergy should have gone to the May 17th demonstration” (71%), but only 26% agreed that “The clergy should have directly taken part in the confrontation”. Fewer women than men agreed that the clergy should have gone (68% vs. 76%), but they were almost as likely as men to think that they should have taken part in the confrontation (25% vs. 26%). When broken down by age, the data shows that younger and older people have similar views with 68% of the former and 66% of the latter agreeing to the presence of clergy at the protest, and 22% and 24%, respectively agreeing about their confrontational attitude. Middle-aged people (38-57) are more prone to agree with the clergy’s participation in the protest (77%) and in the confrontation (30%). Lastly, 31% of respondents thought that the clergy who participated in the confrontation should face trial, whereas 57% did not.

To conclude, the survey also asked people to identify what they considered to be the main result of the May 17 events. Their two principal answers broadly sum up the findings of this blog; while 34% viewed the protests as “defending the dignity of Georgians”, 29% saw it as a “confrontation between people”.

For more information on the May 17th events in Tbilisi, see our survey page.

Georgia and Russia: Can positive relations between the populations overcome the political turmoil?

On the third anniversary of the 2008 August war the Russian Foreign Minister said that Russia will not renew ties with Georgia as long as the Georgian President Mikhail Saakhashvili is in power. Relations between the Georgian and Russian governments have been at a standstill since the conflict in 2008. Nevertheless, the attitudes of Georgians towards Russians remain positive.

While relations between the Georgian and Russian governments can be described as troublesome, Georgians remain positive towards the Russian people. According to the Caucasus Barometer 2010, 73% of Georgians approve of doing business with Russians, compared with 79% who approve of doing business with Ukrainians (the highest rated result for this question). Moreover, 42% of Georgians approve of Georgian women marrying Russians which was the second highest rated result for this question after Ukrainians (45%). In addition, data from the Caucasus Barometer suggests that people who have a better knowledge of Russian are more likely to approve of Georgian women marrying Russians. The data also shows that 90% of Georgians think they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of Russian, while 32% think they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of English.

Socio-cultural characteristics such as a sizeable Georgian diaspora in Russia and Orthodox religion may also play a role in the positive perception of Russians by Georgians. The Georgian Ministry of the Diaspora estimates that the number of Georgians residing in Russia varies between 800,000-900,000 people. Also, the strong role of religion in Georgian society might help to explain positive attitudes towards Russians. Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) are good. For example, the ROC recognizes the canonical authority of the GOC over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as was confirmed by both patriarchs during their August 2011 meeting in Kiev to commemorate St. Vladimir Equal-to-the-Apostles the Baptizer of Russia.

Nevertheless, positive attitudes towards the Russian people do not influence Georgia’s predominant pro-Western orientation. According to the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, 70% of Georgians support membership in NATO and 71% think that English should be a mandatory language in schools, while only 16% think that Russian should be a mandatory language in Georgian schools. Georgian-Russian political relations are also at odds with the different approaches towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi claims both territories as an integral part of Georgia, while Moscow has recognized their independence.

Georgians have positive attitudes towards the Russian people despite political turmoil between the Georgian and Russian governments. We do not have data on Russian attitudes towards Georgian people. However, do you think that positive attitudes between people could pave the way to a Georgian-Russian rapprochement?

Georgia Adopts Law on the Status of Religious Minorities

On July 5, 2011 Georgia adopted a new legislative amendment into the country’s civil code stating that religious minority groups with “historic ties to Georgia” or those defined as religions by members of the Council of Europe can register as legal entities of public law. The initial draft of the law specifically mentioned the Roman Catholic Church, Muslim and Jewish communities, Armenian Apostolic Church and the Evangelical Baptist Church as having “close historic ties with Georgia”. However, the final draft did not specifically name these five groups.

The criminal code and Article 19 of the Georgian Constitution address freedom of religion and belief in the country. However, prior to this week Georgia was one of few post-Soviet countries that did not have a statutory law or government resolution on either religion or the legal status of religious associations. The 2002 Concordat between the Georgian government and the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is the exception.

The GOC has considerable influence in Georgian society as the majority (80-84%) of the population belongs to the Orthodox Church. 10-13% identify as Muslim, 4% as Armenian Apostolic and there are less numerous religious minority groups such as Roman Catholics and Evangelical Baptists (2002 census and CB 2010). Additionally, Article 9 of the Georgian Constitution “recognizes the special importance of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgian history but simultaneously declares complete freedom of religious belief and confessions, as well as independence of the church from the state.”

The new law has received considerable public interest and a flurry of media attention, especially in light of the importance of religious issues in the country. Annual data from the Caucasus Barometer survey shows that certain aspects of religion are significant. Attendance at religious services is relatively low (18% of the population attends once a week or more, 17% once a month, 52% attends either only special holidays or less often and 11% never attends). However, 84% of Georgians trust religious institutions and 90% of the population considers religion to be important in daily life (2010 Caucasus Barometer).

The law has gained criticism from the GOC and several Georgian opposition parties, including the Christian Democratic Movement, the New Rights Party and Our Georgia-Free Democrats. The passing also takes place soon after a meeting between Patriarch Ilia II of the GOC and Catholicos Garegin II of the Armenian Apostolic Church in June regarding status and property issues of the respective churches in Armenia and Georgia.

Opponents view the law as undermining the GOC’s role in the country and as having a negative effect on relations between Georgia’s ethnic and religious minority groups. They also argued for more lengthy public discussion about the issue. In contrast, for the ruling party, the passing of the law can be seen as an important step in Georgia’s democratization and as fulfilling the country’s international obligations with respect to freedom of religion. One of the most important follow up questions will be what it specifically means for religious minority groups to register as legal entities of public law.

What do you think? Do you think the new law is a step in the right direction?