Young Georgians do not want a military solution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia, and David Sichinava, Research Director at CRRC Georgia. All views, place names, and terminology used in this article are the words of the authors alone, and may not necessarily reflect the views of OC Media’s editorial board, CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised fears in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that military aggression might be expected from Georgia. As Russia mobilised its military along Ukraine’s borders, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia declared military readiness to avoid ‘possible provocation from Georgian authorities’, while the de facto authorities in South Ossetia ordered an examination of its troops. 

Despite sponsored videos attempting to provoke this type of response in Georgia, as well as Western commentators questioning whether Georgia might attempt a military response, Georgian authorities have not hinted at the prospect of any military incursion in the two regions amidst the war in Ukraine. Government affiliated media have also not made any argument for doing so. 

Moreover, Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories rejects the pursuit of a military solution altogether and aims to achieve the ‘full de-occupation’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through peaceful means.

Recently released data from the CRRC Georgia and Caucasian House Survey on Youth Civic and Political Engagement and Participation in Peacebuilding shows that young people in Georgia support this policy approach. 

The survey was administered in the summer of 2021 and interviewed 1,116 Georgians between the ages of 18–29. 

The survey asked whether the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be resolved by the use of force or through negotiations. 

The overwhelming majority (95%) of young Georgians said that they supported negotiations rather than the use of force. Only 2% said that the conflicts should be resolved by force, while 3% had no opinion.

The majority of young people in Georgia were in favour of reconciliation and forgetting about past hostilities. Almost two-thirds (62%) agreed that it was necessary to forget the past and think about the future together to have peace with Abkhazians and Ossetians. About the same share (64%) said that ordinary people currently living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were as much victims of the conflicts as Georgians. 

At the same time, a majority of young Georgians disagreed (60%) with the idea that ‘it is important for us to be the first to apologise to Abkhazians and Ossetians for war crimes committed by the Georgian side’. A fifth (19%) neither agreed nor disagreed, while 11% agreed with the idea. A further 10% were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Aside from supporting the peaceful resolution of the conflict, a majority of young Georgians (66%) reported they were willing to participate in reconciliation efforts. Ethnic Georgians (69%) were more willing to participate in efforts aimed at reconciliation compared to ethnic minorities (42%). So were those who were working (72%) compared to respondents (62%) who were not. 

Young Georgians who said they knew someone currently living in South Ossetia were more likely to be willing to participate in reconciliation efforts (77%) compared to those who had no acquaintances there (68%). Importantly, having acquaintances in Abkhazia was not associated with willingness to participate in reconciliation efforts.

Young Georgians who claimed that they were well-informed about the conflicts were more likely to express a willingness to participate in reconciliation (82%), than those with lower levels of awareness (57%).

Those who agreed that Georgians should forget about the past and think about the future with Abkhazians and Ossetians were also more predisposed towards participation in reconciliation efforts (75%) compared to those who were against forgetting (56%). Still, the majority in both groups were willing to take part in peacebuilding activities.

The results of the CRRC Georgia/Caucasian House study reflect the generally peaceful attitudes of Georgians towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

An earlier study conducted in April 2020 for Conciliation Resources showed that a majority (71%) of Georgians regardless of age believed that the Georgian government was in a position to step up and improve relations between Georgian and Abkhazian societies. 

A large majority of the public supported direct dialogue with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia (70%). The next most commonly supported step was the identification of common interests and the development of joint solutions to problems (48%). 

In the light of Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, fears arose around whether Georgia might pursue a military escalation towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nonetheless, neither evidence on the ground, nor public opinion in Georgia show an appetite for such a pursuit. 

The Georgian public, including young people, is overwhelmingly against forced re-incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia, and most support the improvement of relations with the societies there. 

While the data presented here was collected prior to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, and public opinion can shift drastically amidst changing political situations, this data is a good reminder that an overwhelming majority of Georgians, including its youth, look for peace, not war.

Note: The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

The analysis was carried out using multinomial regression. The regression modelling the willingness to participate in the reconciliation efforts included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–23, 24-29), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), experience of job loss due to pandemic (lost job or not), current perceived economic rung (lower, medium, higher), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), party affiliation (Governing party, opposition, no party, don’t know/refuse to answer), and durable goods index. Non-demographic variables tested as part of the analysis included interest in current interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (interested, neutral, not interested), interest in Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s politics (interested, neutral, not interested), having acquaintances in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia (having, not having), acquaintance with Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s conflicts (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards the need of forgetting the past and thinking about the future together for peace (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia being as much victims of conflicts as Georgians (agree, neutral, disagree). 

Russia as a threat: the Ukraine crisis and changing public opinion in Georgia

Following 2012 parliamentary elections, attitudes toward Russia in Georgia shifted. While in 2011 51% of the population considered Russia the main enemy of the country, in 2012 only 35% reported the same. Moreover, the share of Georgians who named Russia as Georgia’s main friend increased by 5%. In a post on the CRRC-Georgia blog, this change was explained by a so-called “spiral of silence”. According to this theory, a person refrains from expressing their ideas freely if they feel that their opinions are in the minority. Davit Sichinava has noted that these results can be explained by some citizens’ desire to make their opinions conform to those of the new ruling party. This post examines how attitudes have changed since 2012 toward Russia and whether events in Ukraine have had any influence on it.

The graph below shows that from November 2012 to November 2013, the share of the population that claimed Russia was a real and existing threat to Georgia peaked at 36%. In April 2014, this number reached 50%. Moreover, the amount of Georgians who believe that Russia poses no threat to Georgia at all, decreased by 10%. What could cause such a rapid change in Georgian’s opinions about Russia making them report that Russia is a real and existing threat to Georgia?

When thinking about Russian and Georgian relations after the 2012 parliamentary elections there are a number of important events to take into consideration: the initiation of Georgian-Russian dialogue in the form of the Abashidze-Karasin negotiations, the re-opening of the Russian market to Georgian products, and the so-called borderization of South Ossetia. Obviously, the opening of Russian markets and direct bilateral negotiations are not likely causes of increased negative attitudes toward Russia, while Georgians are against the borderization policy making it a potential cause of negative attitudes towards Russia. Notably, the so-called borderization policy, which started in May of 2013, marks the beginning of a shift in attitudes toward Russia.

Another important event that may be associated with changes in public opinion is the crisis in Ukraine. While the Ukraine crisis is not directly tied to Georgian-Russian relations, Tbilisi has consistently expressed its support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity. Since the crisis there has been a very apparent change in Georgians’ perceptions of Russia as a possible threat. This is further exemplified by the responses to a question on NDI’s April 2014 survey- “which country bears the most responsibility for the crisis in Crimea?” As the graph below shows, 62% of Georgians consider Russia the country which bears the most responsibility for the crisis in the Crimea. Moreover, 66% of Georgians find Crimea’s unification with Russia unacceptable. It is noteworthy that the events in Ukraine which most experts assess as a direct and open Russian aggression against Ukraine started in March of 2014, directly before the April 2014 survey.                                                                          

It is interesting that in August 2014, support for the statement that “Russia is a real and existing threat to Georgia” declined by 8% compared to April. This could mean that Russia appeared to be more threatening to Ukraine (and hence to Georgia) at the onset of the crisis, rather than now as the conflict has protracted in time.  Russia's role in fueling the crisis in Ukraine may remind Georgians of Russia’s intervention in the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s or of the 2008 August war with Russia. In sum, it seems that the events in Ukraine aggravated the sense of a potential future threat from Russia, especially considering the similar Euro-Atlantic policy orientations of both Ukraine and Georgia.

Considering the above, it is not surprising that almost half of the population (46%) believes that the actions taken by the Government of Georgia in support of Ukraine are insufficient and additional actions are needed. Notably, 63% of the population approved of the Georgian government’s condemnation of Russia’s actions in the Crimea.

This post has looked at the impact which events in Ukraine have had on the perception of threat expected from Russia. It appears that the increased level of agreement with the statement that “Russia is a real and existing threat to Georgia” in April may be linked to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. This is supported by the fact that most Georgians believe that Russia bears responsibility for the crisis in Ukraine and that Georgians are against Crimea’s unification with Russia. How Georgian public attitude will change toward Russia and whether the crisis in Ukraine will continue to influence it remains to be seen, but readers interested in exploring the issues discussed above can delve further into Georgian perceptions of Russia here.

By Edisher Baghaturia

Does Refusal to Recognize Elections in Abkhazia Reduce Prospects for Resolution?

A recent New York Times article argues that the failure of Western governments to recognize the latest presidential elections in Abkhazia on August 26, 2011 may hamper conflict resolution. According to the authors, Cooley and Mitchell, Western governments have a “counterproductive disdain” of developments in Abkhazia and isolating Sukhumi will reduce prospects for conflict resolution. The article also sparks a debate about the degree of democratic competition in Georgia and Abkhazia by saying that the recent elections in Abkhazia seemed to be fairly competitive by the standards of countries in the South Caucasus. This all comes at a time when popular perception in Georgia is such that the prospects for reintegration with Georgia have decreased over time and there is no preferred method for finding a solution to the conflict.

According to the article, failure to recognize Abkhazia’s efforts to hold somewhat democratic elections is counterproductive in various ways. First, it unintentionally reinforces Russia’s growing influence in Abkhazia. Second, it “further entrenches the counterproductive position that nothing that happens in Abkhazia, or even the views of the people there, have any bearing on any potential resolution to the conflict” (New York Times, Aug 31 2011, "A Counterproductive Disdain"). This argument raises the question of the EU’s strategy of “engagement without recognition” since European governments have shown little engagement before and after Abkhazia’s presidential elections.

In another article from 2010, the same authors point out that Russian-Abkhaz relations have dramatically changed since the 2008 war. According to their view, the ongoing delegation of basic state functions from Sukhumi to Moscow has further reduced prospects for conflict resolution. Russian troops guarding Abkhazian borders, the Russian ruble in the pockets of Abkhazians, and Russian telephone prefixes (+7) in the region are the most visible signs of this change.

With all of these developments, have the prospects for conflict resolution changed? What do Georgian citizens think are the most important activities to solve the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict? According to CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB), 41% of Georgians think the prospects of Abkhazia becoming an integral part of Georgia have decreased since 2008. 35% think prospects have stayed the same and only 9% believe prospects have increased (14% remain uncertain). Also, a 2010 survey among IDPs in Georgia by CRRC shows that 12% believe Abkhazia will be reintegrated with Georgia within the next 5 years.

When asked what they think is the most important activity as a solution to the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict, 1% of Georgians says recognition of Abkhazia’s independence. An equal amount of the adult population (18%) say civil society should be given a greater role and that a non-use of force agreement should be signed with Abkhazia. A smaller proportion of the population thinks that commencing negotiations with Russia (14%) or signing a non-use of force agreement with Russia (12%) is the most important activity. It is important to note that 17% of Georgians are not sure what would be the most important activity.

What do you think is the most promising approach to resolve the conflict? Do you think the prospects for resolution have decreased?

Who is Russia's Enemy? | Pew Research Center Data

You will have seen that we are much intrigued by the Pew Research Centers. They do surveys on global attitudes, and increasingly we are trying to make some of our questions cohere with their efforts, so that we have a more telling international comparison. (This isn't always easy, since replicating their question may go at the expense of continuity of our old questions.) 

South Ossetia: Enhancing the Public Debate

On 15 April, in front of a packed house at the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Tbilisi, Ron Asmus led a public debate on his new book, A Little War that Shook the World. The evening featured the kind of discussion one would expect: the strategic interests of Russia, the US and Europe, Georgia’s path to democracy and the international mechanisms and organizations that failed to prevent the 2008 August war in South Ossetia.

I will not go into the actual details of the debate, since there was nothing people interested in the Caucasus have not heard before. Instead, I want to use it as an opportunity to illustrate how seemingly smaller-scale research can enhance public debate. Some of the CRRC’s recent projects on the August war and its aftermath, for example, might help to go beyond the usual geostrategic–political rhetoric bandied about.

On 9-10 April 2010 the CRRC, in collaboration with Saferworld, held five focus groups with participants from villages near the administrative boundary line (ABL) with South Ossetia. Focus groups (FG) are a research tool that can help to shed light on the public’s opinions on specific topics. They complement other tools like surveys, where issues and opinions are quantified, by providing insight into how those opinions come into being and the reasons people adopt them.

In the discussions that evolved around questions about community safety and citizens’ understandings of conflict, it quickly became apparent that those who are most affected by the war have a genuine interest in solving the underlying conflict. Many of the FG participants pointed out that mixed Georgian–Ossetian ties go back centuries, and their lives were drastically altered when the ABL between Georgia and South Ossetia was closed. No longer are people allowed to travel freely to see friends or family or to engage in cross-border trade. According to the participants, these severe changes increase the economic and psychological trauma brought about by the war.

It is these everyday concerns of the people most affected that the CRRC wants to reveal to the public. Debates on geostrategic issues, such as the one held by Asmus last week, are important for understanding how the war broke out. However, they generate few concrete recommendations for resolving the problems already existent in the war’s aftermath – problems which are acute for the communities in the areas surrounding South Ossetia.

By giving a voice to the people in the area, the CRRC and Saferworld hope to help refocus public discourse on the most important issue when it comes to geostrategy: making the lives of people safe and peaceful.

The report is not quite public yet, but to be notified when it becomes available, please contact Malte (malte.viefhues@crrccenters.org) or Jesse (jesse.tatum@crrccenters.org).

Georgia & Russia | Russian Analytical Digest

What do Georgians think about Russia? What relationship would they like to have with their northern neighbor? And what do they think about the August conflict? Our data allows a nuanced answer to these questions: although Georgians have a very critical view of Russia’s role in the August conflict, they continue to desire a good political relationship with their northern neighbor, as long as this is not at the expense of close ties with the West. Georgians remain favorable to Russians as individuals, and to doing business with Russia. Culturally, however, Georgians are orienting themselves towards the West. 

Want to know the full picture? 

Read a detailed piece by Nana and Hans in the Russian Analytical Digest (which also contains interesting articles by Cory Welt and Ghia Nodia) here. 

The EU's IIFFMCG Report

Established by a decision from the Council of the European Union on 2 December 2008 and headed by Swiss Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) was undertaken by a Senior Advisory Panel (see the list in Volume I, pp. 40-41), which received help from different experts in a number of governments and organizations, including some from the parties involved in or closely related to the conflict, namely, Russia, South Ossetia, Georgia, and Abkhazia. The main office was based in Geneva, a second one was set up in Tbilisi, and the Mission's members made numerous visits to key sites of the conflict, including the Roki tunnel and the Akhalgori region.

As the report makes clear, the eight-month undertaking is a first for the EU in that it made a decision "to intervene in an armed conflict" (Vol. I, p. 2). It also stresses that the Mission is not a "tribunal" but is aimed at conveying the facts so as to ameliorate confidence- and peace-building measures. Its primary goals were to analyze how the conflict began as well as the subsequent course it followed (Art. 1.2, p. 3). Point 7 (Vol. I, p. 7) emphasizes that the Report is keen to present an official version amidst the maelstrom of views, accusations, and other media, though it also clearly states that it is not able to "claim veracity or completeness in an absolute sense" (Vol. I, point 9, p. 8).

Following an overview of Georgia's turbulent post-Soviet era, Volume I states that Georgia's military response was not justifiable under international law, even if it were in response to S. Ossetian militias shelling Georgian neighborhoods, i.e. GRAD multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) would be considered as disproportionate use of force by the Georgian military (point 9, pp. 22-23). Further, point 20 (p. 23) mentions that Georgian forces did not have the right to attack Russian peacekeepers.

Point 27 (pp. 26-27) addresses the allegations of genocide made by Russia and S. Ossetia against Georgia. The Report concludes that these allegations were unfounded and goes on to remark that it found evidence S. Ossetian and "irregular" armed units forcibly displaced ethnic Georgians following the start of the war. Moreover, the Mission found that this situation remains a serious concern in the Akhalgori district (point 27, p. 27), which is at the southeast end of South Ossetia and is populated mainly by ethnic Georgians.

Volume II is vast (441 pp.). Made up of contributions from the panel of experts, and divided into eight sections, it is a comprehensive overview of Georgian-Russian relations, replete with sources and exclusive interviews, that claims to be both descriptive and to serve as a "legal analysis" (297), particularly with chapter 7, entitled International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. It does indeed serve as a formidable academic work, similar to an International Crisis Group report, for instance. Of special interest are several field interviews conducted by the Mission's experts. Pages 302 and 331, for example, cite interviews with inhabitants who reported that S. Ossetian military men and Russian (i.e. North Caucasian) and Uzbek irregulars looted, burned houses, and stole civilian cars. With such examples, the chapter, while careful not to state in plain terms whether Russian forces committed war crimes (e.g. using words like "may amount to..." (330)), does offer both a narrative that takes the element of civilian suffering fully into account and an analysis that cites examples of incidents directly tied to violations of international law and human rights abuses.

Volume III is a sprawling 638 pages of chronological entries and responses to questionnaires from the four parties which is intended to be a transparent listing of the gathered facts.

In terms of critcism of the report, as Ahto Lobjakas pointed out in his RFE/RL article, simply laying out the facts without making a definitive stand, and thus leaving them open to interpretation, may only serve to further inflate the rhetorical jousting between adversaries.

For example, although Georgia's Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze, said that the Report was "helpful " for Tbilisi, he decried that it did not explicitly indict Russia for military aggression. He also disagreed with the Report's mention of Georgia using "unnecessary" force.

Russia's ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizkov, on the other hand, was more positive on the findings, saying that the blame was rightly placed more on the Georgian side, referring to the shelling of Tskhinvali on the night of 7/8 August (Vol. I point 3, p. 11).

Thus, as more articles and news about the Mission's report appear, what remains certain is that the debate will go on... perhaps as heatedly as it did before.