Georgians largely hold Russia and Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

While over half of all Georgians believe that Russia or Russian President Vladimir Putin holds the most responsibility for the full-scale war in Ukraine, a large minority, 17%, felt they were uncertain who to blame, while another 13% considered Ukraine or its president Volodymyr Zelenskyi personally responsible.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shaped global politics since its start. Past polling has shown that the public in Georgia, a country with its own territorial conflicts with Russia, has broadly supported Ukraine. Data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer survey from Spring 2024 suggests that most people in Georgia hold Putin and Russia responsible for the war.

The data shows that most Georgians (57%) believe that Russia or Putin holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Just one in eight Georgians (13%) considered Ukraine or Zelenskyi personally responsible.

However, notably, 17% of Georgians were uncertain and reported that they did not know who holds the most responsibility for this war.

Further analysis showed that beliefs about responsibility for the war in Ukraine were associated with age, political preferences, and perceptions of the likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

For example, respondents aged 35 and older were less likely to blame Russia or Putin compared to younger respondents aged 18–34.

In turn, women were nine percentage points more likely to report uncertainty, selecting ‘don’t know’ when asked about responsibility for the war in Ukraine, while people living in rural areas were 16 percentage points more likely to be undecided on the issue.

Opposition party supporters were 23 percentage points more likely to blame Russia/Putin than those who supported the ruling Georgian Dream party. They were also 14 percentage points less likely to be undecided about responsibility for the war in Ukraine compared to ruling party supporters.

Respondents who did not provide a party preference on the survey were 15 percentage points less likely to place blame on Zelenskyi or Ukraine compared to Georgian Dream supporters.

Respondents who were uncertain about the risk of Georgia’s involvement in any conflict were significantly less likely to blame either Ukraine/Zelenskyi or Russia/Putin, and were more likely to be undecided.

Most Georgians, particularly the younger generation and opposition party supporters, hold Russia or Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine. Women and people living in rural areas were more likely to be undecided. Those who were uncertain about Georgia’s potential involvement in war also tended to be undecided about who is to blame for the war.

This analysis is based on a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable is ‘Who holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine?’ with three answer options: Russia/Putin, Ukraine/Zelenskyi, and Don’t know. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, education, ethnicity, employment, partisanship, and the perceived likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

Who Do Georgians Blame For Russia's War in Ukraine?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a non-resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia.The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

In the face of conflicting narratives about the causes of the war in Ukraine, most Georgians see Russia and Putin as responsible for the conflict, but a substantial minority lay the blame with the West. Since Russia invaded Ukraine slightly over a year ago, a war of words has erupted over who is to blame for the war, with the general consensus being that Russia needlessly invaded Ukraine.

In contrast to this consensus, the Russian government has spread propaganda blaming Ukraine for the war, accusing the country’s Jewish president of being a Nazi and stating that the country needed to be ‘de-Nazified’.

Against this backdrop, and in light of Georgia’s history with Russia, what does the Georgian public think?

Data from CRRC-Georgia and the National Democratic Institute’s regular polling in Georgia suggests that most blame Russia as a whole, but an increasing proportion of the public blames Vladimir Putin specifically for the war. And while the majority of the public report that the war is Russia or Putin’s fault, one in six Georgians report that some Western actor is at fault for the war, while one in twelve blame Ukraine.

The share of Georgians blaming Russia and Putin for the war shifted in the year following the war, with the share blaming Russia declining from 67% in March of 2022, to 54% in December of 2022. There was a simultaneous rise in the share blaming Putin specifically, from 11% in March 2022 to 25% in December of that year.

A smaller but substantial proportion of the public considers the West to be responsible for the war in Ukraine. While relatively small shares blame NATO (2-3%) and the European Union (2-4%), a relatively high percentage blame the US. One in eleven (9%) blamed the United States in March, which rose to and stayed at 15% in July and December respectively.

Similarly, relatively few Georgians blame Ukraine for the war. This share stood at 5% in March 2022, rose to 11% in July 2022, and then moved to between these shares at 8% as of December 2022.

The remainder of the public is either uncertain about who to blame for the war (14-17%) or names some other factor (2%).

 

It is important to note that respondents could name up to three responses. Therefore, the shares do not necessarily sum to 100% on the chart above. In the first wave of the survey, Vladimir Putin was not specifically asked about, but respondents still named him. In subsequent waves of the survey, Vladimir Putin was added as a response option.

In the most recent wave of the survey, 59% of the public named only Russia or Vladimir Putin as responsible for the war. One in nine (11%) suggested that only Western actors were at fault for the war. A further 7% named at least one Western actor and one Russian actor. The remainder were mostly either uncertain on how to respond (15%) or refused to answer (1%). Other respondents blamed Ukraine as well as some combination of Russian and Western actors.

Who blames who?

The data suggest that men, people belonging to ethnic minorities, and Georgian Dream supporters are more likely to consider the West (including the US, EU, and NATO) at least somewhat responsible for the war, than are women, ethnic Georgians, and those that do not support Georgian Dream.Ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, those that claim they support no particular party, and people living in urban areas are more likely to blame Russia and/or Putin, compared to ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people in rural areas.

Ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, those that claim they support no particular party, and people living in urban areas are more likely to blame Russia and/or Putin, compared to ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people in rural areas.

Men and Georgian Dream supporters are more likely to believe that Ukraine is at fault for the war than women and opposition supporters. 

 

Women, people with vocational education, those outside Tbilisi, poorer people, and people who support Georgian Dream are more likely than men, people with secondary education, those in Tbilisi, wealthier people, and those who support the opposition to be uncertain about the causes of the war.

 

The data do not suggest that any particular group is more or less likely to name at least one Russian actor and one Western actor for the war.

While Russia’s fault in the war is questioned by relatively few in Georgia, the data do show that some groups are more likely than others to believe that Western actors or Ukraine itself is partially or fully at fault. A substantial share also remains uncertain.


Note: The social and demographic breakdowns shown in the article above were generated from a regression analysis. The analysis had someone’s belief about who was at fault for the war as the dependent variable, including naming Russia/Putin or not, naming any Western institution or not, naming both a Western and a Russian actor or not, and naming Ukraine or not. The independent variables included age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, or rural), education level (secondary, vocational, tertiary), wealth (an index of durable goods owned by the respondents’ household), ethnicity (ethnic minority or ethnic Georgian), employment (working, unemployed, or outside the labor force), and party support (Georgian Dream, United National Movement, other opposition, refuse to answer/don’t know/no party). This article only reports on statistically significant differences between groups.

How do Georgians feel about the influx of Russians?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

Recent CRRC data shows that a large majority of the Georgian public is concerned about the migration of Russians to Georgia.

Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, at least 1.2 million Russian citizens have entered Georgia, equivalent to roughly 30% of Georgia’s population. While the number of Russian citizens who have decided to stay in Georgia remains unclear, the impact of this mass migration is strongly felt in rising rents and concerns over the country’s security.

[Read more on OC Media: Suitcases and shattered dreams: fleeing Russians bring crisis to the Caucasus]

This has manifested in political conflict, with the opposition and the ruling Georgian Dream party arguing over the introduction of entry restrictions for Russian citizens.

A recent NDI and CRRC survey from December 2022 shows that this elite-level partisan difference mirrors a policy divide between everyday voters.

According to the findings, Georgians appear to be concerned about Russians entering their country: two-thirds (69%) think that the large number of Russian citizens entering Georgia since the war will likely have a negative impact on Georgia. 

On the other hand, every sixth Georgian (17%) thinks it will have a positive impact, while 8% say that they do not know, and 6% think the recent influx of Russian citizens will have no impact on the country.

After controlling for other socio-demographic variables, Georgian Dream supporters were slightly more optimistic about Russians coming to Georgia than supporters of the largest opposition group, the United National Movement. However, supporters of the ruling party were not different from supporters of other opposition parties or voters who do not support any party in particular on this issue.

Approximately a third of the public (29%) approve of how the government handled the influx of Russian emigrés, while a majority of the public (57%) disapprove — the remaining 13% do not know what to think about the government’s handling of the emigration.

Regression analysis suggests there is a sharp partisan divide between those who support and do not support the authorities’ approach, with Georgian Dream supporters being much more likely to approve of the government’s Russian migration policy, as shown in the graph below.

Slightly more than two-thirds of the public (69%) were also in favour of introducing a visa regime for Russian citizens — including the majority of Georgian Dream’s supporters.

The above data shows two things clearly: a large majority of the public is concerned about the migration of Russian citizens to Georgia, but supporters of the ruling party are more likely to be satisfied with the government’s approach to the Russian influx. 

Beyond partisan lines, however, the data also shows that the majority of Georgians are concerned and want the government to do something about Russian migration.

Inflation and a Georgian’s choice of fuel

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Makhare Atchaidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

A global pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have both contributed to skyrocketing rates of inflation worldwide. Georgia is no exception, as people reevaluated their preferences for fuel throughout the past two years.

In August 2022, Georgia’s inflation rate stood at 10.9%, with the price of petrol rising by 18% and the price of diesel by 45% compared with those of August 2021 — this is due in large part to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In response to rising fuel prices, Georgian drivers have been protesting. In early November 2021, during a period of price increases, Soso Pkhakadze, the chair and president of Wissol Group, one of Georgia’s largest oil companies, stated that fuel prices should be even higher due to globally rising prices. 

While arguably a reasonable point, the comment led to protests among Georgian drivers. The Facebook campaign, No to Fuel Prices, was created on November 3 and more than 162,000 people had joined by April 2022. On 27 March, police detained 20 of the campaign’s protestors for paralysing traffic in central Tbilisi as part of demonstrations over fuel prices. Similar large-scale protests have also taken place in Batumi, Kutaisi, Telavi, and Ozurgeti.

According to Geostat, Georgia’s national statistics office, the price of gasoline in March 2022 increased by 45.7%, while the price of diesel increased by 45.65% compared to the same month of the previous year. 

This is in a context where Georgian drivers already were highly price-oriented when selecting which fuel to purchase. Data from the Transparency International survey on public policy, which CRRC Georgia conducted in 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2019 suggests that low prices and fuel quality were the key factors in people’s decision-making on where to purchase fuel. When respondents were asked what factors affect their choice of fuel, 50% mentioned low prices and 48% indicated that they would prefer higher-quality petrol. A further 15% mentioned proximity to the petrol station. Other factors were mentioned by less than 10% of respondents. 

CRRC Georgia’s Omnibus survey conducted in July 2022 suggests that the importance of fuel prices has increased, with nearly two-thirds (64%) naming low fuel prices as a determining factor — a 14 percentage point increase. Notably, the share of people naming proximity halved between 2019 and 2022.

Note: Caption: Respondents were allowed to give multiple answers. Therefore, percentages do not add up to 100%.

The 2019 data shows that price was a particularly important determinant for people who use non-branded fuel companies, Lukoil customers, and SOCAR customers. In contrast, Rompetrol and Wissol customers were less price-conscious and more concerned with fuel quality.

Note: This chart is based on a binomial logistic regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age groups (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, technical, incomplete or complete tertiary), employment status (employed, unemployed), Wissol fuel use (mentioned, not mentioned), Lukoil fuel use (mentioned, not mentioned), Rompetrol fuel use (mentioned, not mentioned), Gulf fuel use (mentioned, not mentioned), SOCAR fuel use (mentioned, not mentioned), and other fuel use (mentioned, not mentioned).

Given the data above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the vast majority of drivers (96%) are concerned about rising fuel costs, and a large majority (82%) report that they are driving less, according to the July 2022 data.

Taken together, the above shows that drivers are increasingly concerned about the cost of fuel. 

The data used in this article is available here. The replication code for the above analysis is available here.

Despite the war, Georgians differentiate Russia and Russians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Elene Ergeshidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, and Nino Mzhavanadze, an Independent Researcher. The views presented in the article are of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a large-scale migration of Russians to Georgia led to a debate in Georgian society. 

Many perceived the rising number of Russians entering Georgia as a security threat, and a majority wanted visa restrictions to be introduced for Russian citizens. Others empathised with Russians fleeing Putin’s Russia. 

In this context, there were widespread concerns about anti-Russian sentiment and the potential for hate crime and hate speech against Russians in Georgia. 

[Read on OC Media: Russian émigrés face chilly reception in Georgia]

Despite the concerns, data from CRRC and NDI’s polling from March 2022 shows that a majority of Georgians have a positive attitude towards Russian people and a negative attitude towards the Russian state. This maintains a pattern of public opinion that has been present in most surveys which CRRC Georgia has conducted which allow an exploration of the issue, including in multiple waves of the Caucasus Barometer survey and more recently a survey on foreign policy which CRRC conducted for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. 

On the March 2022 CRRC and NDI survey, a majority of Georgians (85%) reported an unfavourable attitude towards the Russian government. A majority (59%) also reported a positive attitude towards Russian people. 

Further analysis suggests that settlement type and ethnicity are correlated with holding unfavourable attitudes towards the Russian government. 

People in Tbilisi were six percentage points more likely to have unfavourable attitudes towards the Russian Government compared to people living in rural areas. Ethnic Georgians were seven percentage points more likely to express unfavourable attitudes towards the Government of Russia than ethnic minorities. 

Note: These charts were generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

Analysis shows that favourable attitudes towards Russian people also vary across demographic groups. 

Men were seven percentage points more likely to express favourable attitudes towards Russians compared to women. People over the age of 35 held more positive attitudes towards Russian people. Ethnic minorities living in Georgia were 28 percentage points more likely to report favourable attitudes than ethnic Georgians. Supporters of the ruling party were 14 and 9 percentage points more likely to hold favourable attitudes towards Russian people compared to opposition supporters and those who do not support any party, respectively. 

Note: These charts were generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

While there was widespread discussion about whether the Georgian public would become more hostile to Russian people following the war in Ukraine and large-scale Russian migration to Georgia, the data shows that people have maintained a distinction between Russia and Russians, with negative attitudes towards the former and positive attitudes towards the latter. 

Georgia’s partisan division in support for Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Georgia’s political landscape has often been described as polarised, though data suggests polarisation in Georgia has little to do with contrasting ideological propositions or public policy.

Despite this, the main political parties on the Georgian political landscape do differ in terms of policy. The ruling party and the major opposition parties have argued for differing foreign policies towards Russia, while the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party attempts not to antagonise Russia. The previously ruling United National Movement is uncompromisingly critical of Georgia’s northern neighbour, on the other hand.

In line with this rhetoric, the recent CRRC Georgia Survey on the War in Ukraine shows that supporters of the different parties often support different policies with regard to Ukraine.

The survey shows that supporters of the ruling party are significantly less likely to think that the government of Georgia should offer more support to Ukraine. Controlling for other factors, Georgian Dream supporters were 34 percentage points less likely than opposition supporters and 21 percentage points less likely than unaffiliated voters to think that the support of the Georgian government should increase.

The survey included several questions regarding different ways to support Ukraine, ranging from temporarily receiving Ukrainian refugees to supplying Ukraine with weapons or allowing volunteers to go to Ukraine to fight. These questions were combined into a simple additive index ranging from 0, implying no support for Ukraine, to 15, meaning maximum support for Ukraine. The mean score on the index was 11.5, meaning that the public tended to be in favor of supporting Ukraine. 

Controlling for social and demographic factors, a regression analysis suggests that opposition supporters tend to be more in favour of supporting Ukraine in various ways than GD supporters, as well as non-partisan voters.

Disparities can be found across party lines when it comes to sanctions against Russia; opposition supporters tend to favour the intensification of international sanctions relative to supporters of GD or respondents that did not select a party they support. Regression analysis suggests opposition supporters were 17 percentage points more likely to think that international sanctions should be more severe against Russia than supporters of the ruling party.

CRRC also asked respondents whether Georgia should take part in sanctions against Russia, and if so, whether the country should join in on all sanctions, take part only in some of them, or not take part in them at all. A regression analysis suggests that GD supporters differ from other groups in their attitudes towards Georgia taking part in the international sanctions.

Supporters of the ruling party are 33 percentage points less likely than opposition supporters and 14 percentage points less likely than voters that did not report which party they support to say that Georgia should take part in all sanctions. However, GD supporters are also more likely than other groups to say that either Georgia should take part in only some of the sanctions or the country should not participate in any sanctions at all. 

Although the public as a whole is quite supportive of Ukraine, condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and approves of a variety of ways to support the government of Ukraine, there are substantial partisan divisions in views of where Georgia’s foreign policy should be.

Georgia Dream supporters diverge from not only opposition supporters, but from individuals that do not support any particular party. They tend to be less supportive of Georgia joining sanctions or the government being more vocal in supporting the government of Ukraine.  

At the same time, opposition supporters diverge from supporters of the ruling party as well as other citizens that do not identify with any party in being more supportive of various ways to support Ukraine and intensification of international sanctions against Russia.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic and multinomial regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower, technical or incomplete higher education/higher), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban areas, or rural areas), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), and party affiliation (Georgia Dream, opposition, and unaffiliated voters).

Georgians want immigration restrictions for Russians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director of CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been an outflow of Russians to the South Caucasus.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and accompanying domestic crackdown in Russia and imposition of sanctions, there has been an outflow of Russians to the South Caucasus — leaving many in Georgia feeling uneasy.

On 7 March, Georgia’s Ministry of Economy estimated that 20,000–25,000 Russians had come to Georgia since the invasion. In Armenia, the government has reported that around 5,000 Russians have been moving to the country daily since the start of the war. 

This mass migration has raised fears in Georgia. It has been argued that Russia could use the presence of a large number of Russian citizens as a pretext for military intervention in the past. As a result, many have begun to propose that Georgia’s lax migration policies be tightened against Russians. In response, further concerns were raised about the implicit Russophobia embedded within this discourse. 

Data from CRRC Georgia’s survey on Ukraine suggests that a majority of the public support the introduction of migration restrictions. Overall, 59% of the public reported that they would support the introduction of migration restrictions. In contrast, 31% were opposed and 9% were uncertain.

When the data is broken down by social and demographic variables, it indicates that support for migration restrictions varies substantially between groups. 

Young people were significantly more supportive of migration restrictions. Controlling for other factors, young people (aged 18–34) had a 60% chance of supporting the introduction of restrictions. By comparison, this drops to 54% among those aged 35–54 and 44% among those who were 55+.

Ethnic minorities were also significantly less supportive of the introduction of migration restrictions. While ethnic Georgians had a 61% chance of supporting restrictions, ethnic minorities had a 44% chance, controlling for other factors. 

Supporters of different parties also held significantly different views. People who supported an opposition party had a 65% chance of supporting restrictions while supporters of the ruling party had a 43% probability of doing so. People who refused to answer which party they supported had a 45% chance of supporting restrictions, while people who were uncertain over which party to support had a 58% chance of supporting restrictions.

The above data reflects the significant concerns of the Georgian public around the war in Ukraine, the uncertainties around what large scale immigration from the Russian Federation would mean for Georgia, and likely anger at Russians for the war which Vladimir Putin has unleashed in Ukraine.

Note: The social and demographic breakdowns shown in this blog post are generated from a regression model. The regression model includes age, sex, IDP status, a simple additive index of durable goods ownership (a common proxy for wealth), ethnicity (minority or not), education level, and party which the respondent supports. The data used in this blog post is available here.

Грузини хочуть, щоби їхній уряд підтримав Україну

Війна Росії з Україною шокувала світ. Вона також шокувала Грузію, а нове опитування від CRRC Georgia викриває ступінь наявних політичних наслідків. 

Наслідки війни, що стосуються зовнішньої та внутрішньої політики Грузії, виявилися доволі масштабними. Офіційна позиція Грузії щодо війни була суперечливою: в той час як прем’єр-міністр Іраклі Гарібашвілі категорично заявив, що Грузія не приєднається до санкцій, накладених Заходом проти Росії, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі почала медійний та дипломатичний бліц у Європі, висловлюючи рішучу підтримку Україні. 

На відміну від реакції влади щодо війни, реакція суспільства була однозначною. Грузини виходять в підтримку України у всіх містах та селах. 

З огляду на війну в Україні та навколишні потрясіння в Грузії, 7-10 березня CRRC Georgia провели опитування, яке охопило 1092 респондента. Результати опитування дозволили зробити висновки щодо того, кого грузини звинувачують у війні (Росію), яких дій грузини прагнуть від свого уряду (підтримати Україну), а також щодо внутрішніх політичних наслідків реакції влади (“Грузинська мрія”  понесла значні втрати у підтримці виборців). 

Грузини звинувачують Росію у війні

Переважна більшість грузинського суспільства покладає відповідальність за війну на Росію (43%) або на Володимира Путіна (37%). Інакше вважають 3% респондентів за винятком 9%, які не визначилися.  

Громадськість також запитали про мотивацію Росії до війни. Отримані дані показали, що більшість вважає, що Росія почала війну аби захопити певні території (34%) чи Україну загалом (25%), щоб відновити Радянський Союз (20%), а також щоб запобігти вступу України в НАТО (17%). Інакше відповіли менш ніж 10% опитаних. 

  

Суспільство хоче, щоб грузинська влада підтримала Україну

Респондентів запитали, чи вважають вони, що уряд Грузії має висловити більшу підтримку уряду України, має залишити наявний рівень підтримки, зменшити рівень підтримки чи не підтримувати взагалі. Значна більшість опитаних вважають, що підтримки має бути більше (61%) або що вона має залишатися на наявному рівні (32%). Лише 2% вважають, що підтримки має бути менше, 1% вважають, що її взагалі не має бути. 

Окрім зазначеного вище, респондентів запитали, чи були на їхню думку прийнятними чи неприйнятними певні дії уряду  у відповідь на кризу. 

Переважна більшість грузин підтримує надання гуманітарної допомоги Україні (97%), прийняття українських біженців (96%), а також надання фінансової допомоги Україні. 

Дві третини опитаних (66%) підтримують ідею надання дозволу грузинським добровольцям поїхати в Україну; уряд Грузії намагався завадити цьому. 

Близько половини (52%) підтримали б грузинську владу у озброєнні України. 

 

Суспільство хоче, щоб Грузія взяла участь у санкціях

Громадськість бажає, аби санкції проти Росії були сильнішими, а більшість хоче, щоб Грузія приєдналася до них. Це різко контрастує з відмовою прем’єр-міністра Іраклі Гарібашвілі приєднатися до санкцій або впровадити власні. 

Опитуваних також запитали, чи вважають вони, що країни, які наклали санкції на Росію, мають посилити їх, утримувати на наявному рівні, зменшити силу санкцій чи не накладати їх на Росію взагалі. 

Результати показали, що переважна більшість вважає, що санкції мають бути посилені (71%) або залишитися на наявному рівні (10%). Лише 4% вважає, що санкції мають бути пом’якшені, 3% відсотки вважають, що вони мають бути зняті взагалі.  

На питання про те, чи уряд Грузії має приєднатися до санкцій, більшість респондентів відповіли ствердно (66%). Думки розділилися щодо того, чи Грузія має приєднатися до всіх санкцій (39%), чи до деяких (27%). Лише 19% відповіли, що Грузія не має приєднуватися до санкцій взагалі. 14% не були певні у цьому питанні. 

Євроатлантичне майбутнє України та Грузії

З огляду на вторгнення Росії, Україна подала заявку до Європейського Союзу, і цей крок швидко наслідували Грузія та Молдова. 

Громадськість рішуче підтримує подання заявки Грузією та Україною на статус кандидата в ЄС. В той же час, відзначаються невеликі зміни думок щодо загальної підтримки членства Грузії в ЄС та НАТО (яка вже була високою) з початку війни. 

Респондентів запитали, наскільки сильно вони підтримують або не підтримують надання Україні та Грузії членства в Європейському Союзі. Ці дані показали високу підтримку грузинським суспільством надання статусу кандидата до ЄС обидвом країнам. 

Респондентів також запитали, чи підтримують вони інтеграцію Грузії в Європейський Союз, НАТО, а також в очолений Росією митний союз. 

Дані опитування “Кавказький барометр 2020”, яке включало в себе подібне  питання, показали, що 73% грузинів підтримували членство в ЄС, 71% підтримували членство в НАТО. Сьогодні, 75% підтримує членство в ЄС і 70% підтримує членство в НАТО, що статистично не відрізняється від даних за 2020 рік. 

Заяви президента та прем’єр-міністра щодо війни

Прем’єр-міністр Грузії Іраклі Гарібашвілі зазнав значної критики щодо своєї реакції на війну. В той час як більшість світової спільноти запровадила санкції у відношенні до Росії, Гарібашвілі твердо заявив, що Грузія не буде брати участі у санкціях. Президент України Володимир Зеленський опублікував твіт з подякою грузинському народу за підтримку, та в той же час розкритикував грузинську владу за її відсутність. 

На противагу заявам прем’єр-міністра, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі отримала широке схвалення за її реакцію відносно конфлікту. Зурабішвілі висловила рішучу підтримку Україні, а також здійснила дипломатичний та медіа-тур країнами Європи у підтримку України. 

Зважаючи на зазначене вище, не дивно, що громадськість підтримує дії президента щодо війни значно більше, ніж дії прем’єр-міністра. 

В той час як 64% погоджуються з діями Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 41% погодилися з діями Гарібашвілі, що показує розрив у 23%. Окрім цього, 15% не схвалили дії Зурабішвілі, а 39% не схвалили дій Гарібашвілі. Таким чином, рейтинг чистого схвалення Зурабішвілі складає +49%, а рейтинг чистого схвалення Гарібашвілі складає +2%. 

 

Якщо розглядати дані, розбиті за партійними уподобаннями, вони демонструють, що вищий рівень ефективності Саломе Зурабішвілі порівняно з Гарібашвілі виходить з більшого рівня підтримки з боку опозиції: в той час як 61% опозиції підтримують дії та реакції Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 32% підтримали дії Гарібашвілі. На противагу, Гарібашвілі та Зурабішвілі мають доволі подібний рівень підтримки серед прихильників “Грузинської мрії”. 

Політичні наслідки

З огляду на непопулярну реакцію Гарібашвілі щодо війни, не дивно, що підтримка “Грузинської мрії” скоротилася. 

Щоб визначити політичні преференції респондентів, в ході опитування ставили такі питання: а) за кого вони б голосували, якщо б парламентські вибори проводилися завтра. Якщо респондент не був певний у своїх симпатіях, пропонувалося відповісти, якій з партій вони віддають перевагу. 

Дані демонструють зниження у 10% в підтримці “Грузинської мрії”. Сьогодні, 22% респондентів підтримали б “Грузинську мрію” на виборах, якщо вони проходили б завтра. Для порівняння, у опитуванні в січні 2022 32% респондентів відповіли на це питання на користь влади. 

Таким чином, “Грузинська мрія”, хоча б тимчасово, втратила близько третини своїх виборців. 

Однак, незрозуміло, чи ця втрата буде перманентною. Дані не показують зростання підтримки опозиції порівняно до даних за січень. Радше, серед громадськості зросли показники невизначеності щодо того, кого б вони підтримали. 

Опитування CRRC Omnibus у січні 2022 показало, що 27% респондентів відповіли, що вони були непевні щодо того, кого вони б підтримали на парламентських виборах, в той час як у березні в опитуванні, присвяченому Україні, 38% респондентів відповіли так само, що демонструє зростання на 12%. 

Дані також демонструють невелике зниження підтримки опозиції: в січні 2022 підтримка опозиції становила 25%, а в березні 2022 вже 20%. 

Доля респондентів, що відмовилися відповідати, яку партію вони б підтримали, змінилася в порівнянні двох опитувань в межах похибки (з 17% в січні до 20% в березні).  

В той час як офіційна реакція на російську війну була апатичною, громадськість одностайно підтримала Україну та майже будь-які дії у допомогу країні в боротьбі проти Росії. Погляди суспільства на євроатлантичне майбутнє Грузії майже не змінилися. Тим не менш, погляди суспільства на владу змінилися, а “Грузинська мрія” втратила, щонайменше тимчасово, близько третини своїх прихильників.   

Автори статті: Дастін Гілбрет, Давид Січінава, Крістіна Вачарадзе, Анано Кіпіані, Ніно Мжаванадзе, Махаре Ачаідзе, співробітники CRRC Georgia. 

Переклад статті та матеріалів виконала Олександра Зур’ян - правозахисниця, співробітниця Центру участі та розвитку (Тбілісі). 

Погляди, висловлені у статті не обов'язково відповідають поглядам CRRC Georgia  або інших пов’язаних організацій. 

Дані, на основі яких базується ця стаття, доступні тут.

Ця стаття була вперше опублікована в рубриці Data Blog від CRRC та OC Media.