Democratic hypocrisy in Tbilisi

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia and Givi Siligadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, the National Endowment of Democracy, or any related entity.

A CRRC Georgia survey found that people living in Tbilisi were more willing to accept democracy-eroding policies if they believed that their preferred party was in power. 

New data released in a CRRC-Georgia policy brief today suggests that a substantial portion of voters in Georgia’s capital tend to be hypocritical in their attitudes towards democracy-eroding policies, being more likely to support them if the party they prefer controls government. However, most do not support anti-democratic policies at all.

Following the first round of municipal elections in October 2021, CRRC-Georgia conducted a representative survey of Tbilisi, in which 1254 randomly sampled individuals took part. Half of the respondents were asked to imagine that their preferred party had won the next parliamentary elections while the other half were asked to imagine their preferred party had lost. 

Afterwards, respondents were asked whether they would support ten different policies, as shown in the chart below. 

Support for each policy varied from 30% (investigation of NGO funding) to 4% (removing supporters of the losing party from government jobs). Support for most policies was low overall, with investigation of NGO funding (30%), initiating investigations of opposition media (25%), investigating the financial backing of the losing party (20%), and restricting the use of election polls (17%) the most supported. 

Other policies such as putting restrictions on protesting election results, giving all leadership positions in parliament to the winning party, initiating constitutional changes without consulting the losing party, initiating electoral reforms without consulting the new opposition, and expanding surveillance operations against political opponents were supported by less than 10% of the Tbilisi public.

However, views on the above propositions varied significantly based on whether or not respondents imagined that their preferred party had won the election. 

The share supporting initiating investigations of the financing of opposition media increased by 12 percentage points if they imagined that their preferred party had won compared to when their preferred party had lost the election.

Support for excluding opposition supporters from leadership positions in parliament and initiating electoral reform without consulting the opposition both increased by 10 points in response to imagining one’s preferred party had won.

The share supporting initiating constitutional changes without consulting the opposition increased by nine points, and the share supporting investigations of the sources of the losing party’s financial backing increased by eight points in response to imagining that a preferred party had won.

Support for restricting protests of election results doubled in response to imagining a preferred party had won, as did support for expanding surveillance of political opponents.

Overall, the data showed that knowing that their preferred political party had won elections increased a person’s tolerance for democracy-eroding policies for one question on average, meaning that the support of voters living in Georgia’s capital for democracy-eroding policies is heavily conditional on the party in power. 

The above pattern is not unique to Georgia, and has been similarly documented in established democracies. However, it does call for reflection among partisans in Georgia. 

Indeed, an alternative framing of the analysis is that imagining your party has lost elections gives one greater support for democracy. Whether partisans in Georgia are willing to pursue that perspective is, however, another matter.

Read in Russian on Jnews.

Are Georgian people afraid of crime?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

A recent survey has found that a slight majority of Georgians are afraid of being victims of crimes, with women, those living in the capital, and supporters of the country’s main opposition party particularly likely to feel concerned. 

In recent years, a number of high-profile crimes have captured the public imagination in Georgia. Whether the Khorava street murders in 2017, the murder of Giorgi Shakarashvili in 2021, or a series of femicides at the end of last year, crime has been a regular part of public discourse. 

But how concerned are people about becoming a victim of crime in Georgia? 

To understand this issue, CRRC Georgia and NDI asked about people’s fears of becoming a victim of seven different crimes in a December 2022 survey. 

The data show that while a slight majority (52%) of people are afraid of falling victim to at least one form of crime asked about on the survey, there is no crime which a majority of people are concerned will affect them.

Among crimes relevant to all respondents, being burgled, mugged, or physically assaulted topped the list of crimes people were worried about, with roughly a third of the public at least sometimes concerned with becoming the victim of one of these crimes. This was followed by concerns about having personal information stolen and being sexually assaulted.

The survey also asked about two crimes which were only relevant to specific groups in the population — car owners and parents. Among relevant respondents, concerns about these crimes were more common than concerns about the other crimes asked about.

Among the 29% of respondents who had children, 37% reported worrying about their child being physically harmed at school at least some of the time. The same share of car owners, 55% of respondents, reported being worried at least sometimes about someone breaking into or stealing their car.

Overall, 12% of the public is concerned with becoming victim to one of the crimes discussed in the survey, while only 2% are concerned with becoming a victim to all seven crimes mentioned.

For reference, survey responses of don’t know, refuse to answer, and never worry were classed as not being concerned about a crime. Respondents who reported that they worried sometimes or frequently about becoming the victim of a crime were classed as being concerned. 

Concern over becoming the victim of crime varies significantly among different groups in society.

Women are 14 percentage points more likely than men to be concerned they will become the victims of crime, after controlling for other factors. 

People aged 55+ are 12 points less likely to be concerned about becoming the victims of one of the crimes than people aged 35-54, and 8 points less likely than people aged 18-34, all else being equal. 

Those in Tbilisi are 15 points more likely to be concerned about becoming the victim of a crime than people in other urban areas, and 24 points more likely than people in rural areas, controlling for other factors.

While roughly a third of people (35%) living in the poorest households in the country are concerned about becoming a victim of one of the above crimes, 59% of those in relatively well-off households are.

Notably, supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party are least concerned about becoming the victims of crime, while supporters of Georgia’s largest opposition party, the United National Movement, are most concerned about becoming the victims of crime. There is a 23 point gap between supporters of the parties, controlling for other factors. 

Supporters of other parties and those who have no apparent political preference fall in between these extremes.

The data show no significant differences between employed people and those not working, ethnic minorities and ethnic Georgians, and people with different levels of education, after accounting for the above noted variables.

Given the number of high-profile incidents of crime in Georgia in recent years, it is perhaps unsurprising that roughly half the public is concerned about becoming the victim of at least one of the crimes asked about in the survey.

The data used in this article is available here.

Are individual Georgians politically polarised?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, the National Endowment for Democracy, or any related entity.

CRRC Georgia data found that individual political polarisation — how committedly partisan a person is — is relatively low in Georgia, despite concerns about the country’s polarisation as a whole. 

Political polarisation is seen as a critical issue in Georgia, so much so that overcoming it is a condition for Georgia’s bid to secure candidate status in the European Union. Indeed, many argue that political polarisation is one of the main causes of Georgia’s democratic backsliding. 

Past research has shown that political polarisation has not led to diverging views on policy or ideology in society. Rather, views seemingly only diverge on individual politicians and explicitly partisan events, like the Rose Revolution and major elections. . 

Newly released research from CRRC Georgia suggests that at most three in ten Georgians can be categorised as affectively polarised, meaning that they distrust an opposing party regardless of their views on policy.

In the newly released study, respondents were asked how often they thought the ruling party and opposition did what the country needed. 

Half of the electorate (52%) thought that the ruling Georgian Dream party rarely or never did what the country needed, while 35% reported that the ruling party often or always does what the country needs. As for the opposition, 71% of the public thinks that the opposition rarely or never does what the country needs, and only 9% of Georgians believe the opposition often or always does what the country needs.

To measure polarisation, the two questions were combined to construct a variable that measures whether an individual is politically polarised.

The logic behind the approach is that people who respond similarly to the two questions can be considered less polarised — they believe that both parties either work for the country or do not. In contrast, people who assess one of the two positively and the other negatively can be considered polarised. 

This produces a scale ranging from zero to four, with zero meaning that the respondent was not polarised at all, reporting identical responses to the two questions, and four meaning that the respondent was very polarised, reporting a very positive attitude towards one party and a very negative attitude towards the other.

On this scale, almost half of the electorate (45%) was not polarised at all, while 4% was highly polarised. A further 15% was quite polarised, scoring 3 out of 4 on the scale. 

A regression analysis suggests that someone’s polarisation is not associated with their sex, education, settlement type, employment status, or frequency of praying (a measure of religiosity). 

On the other hand, respondent polarisation was related to age, ethnicity, frequency of religious attendance, and party preference. Older people, ethnic Georgians, people who attend religious services once a week, and partisans all tend to be more polarised than other individuals.  

It is worth noting that the analysis used two different measures of religiosity because they behave differently with respect to polarisation. 

People who attend religious services often tend to be more polarised than people who attend less frequently or do not attend religious services at all. However, when it comes to frequency of praying, people who pray often are not different from people who pray less often or never when it comes to polarisation. 

Measuring social distance among people with a party allegiance suggested that partisanship only has a moderate impact on friendships. 

Georgian Dream supporters were more likely to say that they would feel uncomfortable with an opposition-leaning friend than voters who did not support any particular party. Similarly, opposition supporters were more likely to report that they would feel uncomfortable with a Georgian Dream-supporting friend than those with no party preference. 

Regardless of these statistically significant differences, a very large majority of the public said that they would feel quite or completely comfortable with a friend with either political leaning.

While Georgian political discourse is often dominated by discussion of polarisation, the data suggests that a majority of Georgians are not polarised.

How do Georgians feel about the influx of Russians?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

Recent CRRC data shows that a large majority of the Georgian public is concerned about the migration of Russians to Georgia.

Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, at least 1.2 million Russian citizens have entered Georgia, equivalent to roughly 30% of Georgia’s population. While the number of Russian citizens who have decided to stay in Georgia remains unclear, the impact of this mass migration is strongly felt in rising rents and concerns over the country’s security.

[Read more on OC Media: Suitcases and shattered dreams: fleeing Russians bring crisis to the Caucasus]

This has manifested in political conflict, with the opposition and the ruling Georgian Dream party arguing over the introduction of entry restrictions for Russian citizens.

A recent NDI and CRRC survey from December 2022 shows that this elite-level partisan difference mirrors a policy divide between everyday voters.

According to the findings, Georgians appear to be concerned about Russians entering their country: two-thirds (69%) think that the large number of Russian citizens entering Georgia since the war will likely have a negative impact on Georgia. 

On the other hand, every sixth Georgian (17%) thinks it will have a positive impact, while 8% say that they do not know, and 6% think the recent influx of Russian citizens will have no impact on the country.

After controlling for other socio-demographic variables, Georgian Dream supporters were slightly more optimistic about Russians coming to Georgia than supporters of the largest opposition group, the United National Movement. However, supporters of the ruling party were not different from supporters of other opposition parties or voters who do not support any party in particular on this issue.

Approximately a third of the public (29%) approve of how the government handled the influx of Russian emigrés, while a majority of the public (57%) disapprove — the remaining 13% do not know what to think about the government’s handling of the emigration.

Regression analysis suggests there is a sharp partisan divide between those who support and do not support the authorities’ approach, with Georgian Dream supporters being much more likely to approve of the government’s Russian migration policy, as shown in the graph below.

Slightly more than two-thirds of the public (69%) were also in favour of introducing a visa regime for Russian citizens — including the majority of Georgian Dream’s supporters.

The above data shows two things clearly: a large majority of the public is concerned about the migration of Russian citizens to Georgia, but supporters of the ruling party are more likely to be satisfied with the government’s approach to the Russian influx. 

Beyond partisan lines, however, the data also shows that the majority of Georgians are concerned and want the government to do something about Russian migration.

How financially literate are people in Georgia?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Koba Turmanidze, CRRC-Georgia's President, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

CRRC Georgia data suggests that about half the Georgian public has a basic understanding of interest and inflation rates.

Saving, spending, borrowing, or investing money are everyday decisions people around the world have to make. Making the right decisions requires a certain degree of financial literacy, which some scholars boil down to understanding the basics of inflation and interest rates.

In a bid to gauge the levels of financial literacy in Georgia, CRRC Georgia used questions developed by professors Annamaria Lusardi and Professor Olivia Mitchell to assess an individual’s understanding of inflation, interest rates, and investment.

Lusardi asked around 16,000 participants in a 15-country study the three questions for a 2019 study, which showed that around one in three people can answer all questions correctly and about a half can understand both inflation and interest rates correctly.

As Caucasus Barometer surveys have shown, people’s lives in Georgia are significantly influenced by inflation and interest rates. While very few people save money in Georgia, people borrow intensively. Notably, since 2015  between one in five and two in five Georgians have named inflation as a top issue in the country. 

With this in mind, CRRC Georgia adapted and replicated two of the questions developed by Lusardi and Mitchel — particularly those about inflation and interest rates.

In a January 2022 Omnibus survey, Georgians were asked to imagine that they had an account with $100 in it, and that the account paid a 2% interest rate. They were then asked whether, after five years, there would be more than $102, exactly $102, or less than $102 in their bank accounts.

The second question measured people’s understanding of inflation: again, people were asked to imagine they had a sum of money in their bank account with an interest of 1%, while prices of goods would increase by 2% annually. The respondents were then asked whether they could buy their usual groceries with the same amount of money over time, or if they would pay more or less.

The majority of the public answered each question correctly. Nearly two-thirds (61%) understood interest rates correctly (8% incorrectly, 29% were uncertain, and the remainder refused to answer), and 64% understood inflation correctly (10% incorrectly, 25% were uncertain, and the remaining respondents refused to answer the question). Overall, 51% answered both questions correctly, 26% at least one correctly, and 24% both incorrectly or with uncertainty.

The most important factors associated with financial literacy are education levels and ethnicity. 

Individuals who are more educated are more likely to be financially literate: those with technical education 10 percentage points higher, and those with tertiary education 21 percentage points higher than individuals with secondary education or lower.

Ethnic Georgians are 28 percentage points more likely to answer financial literacy questions correctly than ethnic minorities. 

Notably, internally displaced persons are less likely to understand inflation rates correctly than non-IDPs, but understand interest rates at similar levels. 

Other factors, such as gender, age, having children in a household, employment status, and wealth, are not associated with financial literacy.

When compared with other countries, where similar questions were asked, the results from Georgia show significant similarities and differences. While about 50% can answer both inflation and interest rate questions correctly, just like in other countries, the Georgian data does not confirm gender and age differences documented elsewhere. In contrast, having lower educational attainment and being an ethnic minority is associated with less financial literacy in Georgia. 

The data used in this post is available here.

How has Georgia changed in the last decade?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

A recent survey suggests that Georgians tend to believe that poverty, crime, and corruption have increased in the last decade, while affordable healthcare has become more accessible. However, available public data does not always match these assessments. 

Recent public opinion surveys suggest that Georgians feel increasingly worried about where the country is headed. As of August 2022, less than a quarter of the electorate believed that Georgia was going in ‘the right direction’. 

While the overarching assessment is quite negative, the public’s views on specific issues is more variable, adding nuance to the picture. 

The August 2022 CRRC/NDI survey asked respondents how they thought things had changed over the last decade in Georgia, in nine key policy areas. According to the data, at least half of the public think poverty, crime, and territorial integrity have worsened over the last decade.  In contrast, the public was most positive about progress in terms of affordable health care and freedom of speech, with roughly a third of the public believing the situation had improved for both issues.

While two thirds of the public think that poverty has worsened, World Bank data suggests that poverty in Georgia has declined over the past decades. Although there are ups and downs in the data over the years, there has been a decline in the share of Georgians living on under $6.85 (converted into purchasing power parity) a day, from 66% in 2012 to 58% in 2020. The percentage of Georgians living in poverty did, however, increase in 2020, likely in response to the pandemic. A similar trend is present for the $2.15 poverty line (converted into purchasing power parity), with declines from 11% to 6%.

Roughly three in five Georgians (57%) believe that crime has worsened over the last decade. Official statistics seem to confirm people’s negative views, with Georgia registering 56,300 crimes in 2021, compared to less than 40,000 ten years prior. However, in 2018 the Ministry of Internal Affairs changed its crime recording methodology in a way that meant that a greater range of crimes were recorded. As a result, it is not possible to unequivocally claim that crime has substantially increased over the last 10 years.

Two in five Georgians think that corruption (43%) has worsened in the last decade. However, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) suggests that corruption has not varied much over the last decade, with a slight improvement from 2013-2018 and slight decline since.

With regards to education, 40% of the public feel it has worsened. But data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), a study intended to evaluate national education systems, suggests that Georgia has slightly improved its scores in the last decade, albeit with a slight decline since 2015. 

Some of the most positive public assessments were for affordable healthcare. About a third of the public (36%) believe that the situation around affordable healthcare has improved in the last decade. Data from the World Health Organisation appears to corroborate this, as it suggests that domestic private health expenditure in Georgia has declined as a share of total health expenditure from 77% to 59% of spending. However, it must also be noted that lesser private and greater public expenditure is no guarantee of better quality health care services. 

In terms of freedom of speech, a third of Georgians believe that it has improved over the last ten years. Data from the Varieties of Democracy project suggest that Georgia’s scores did improve in 2012-2013, but have declined since 2016. 

As for the court system, roughly one in three people (31%) think it has worsened over the last decade, but the Varieties of Democracy project suggests that Georgia’s score on the rule of law index has not changed since 2008. 

The public tends to think that the situation in Georgia in terms of poverty, crime, and territorial integrity has worsened over the last decade, while feeling most positive about freedom of speech and access to affordable healthcare. However, these sentiments are not reliably supported by publicly available data on the issues.

Nudging Georgians to self-test for HIV

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, UNDP Georgia, Caritas Czech Republic, Tanadgoma, or The United Nations Development Programme under the Czech-UNDP Partnership for SDGs.

CRRC Georgia data suggests incentivising people to test for HIV and making tests more accessible can encourage more young people to self-test.

HIV and AIDS are highly stigmatised diseases in Georgia: a 2020 report found that half the public would not buy vegetables from someone they knew had HIV, and two in five do not think HIV-positive children should be able to attend school with other children.

This stigma stands in the way of more people being tested for HIV, a critical issue in Georgia.

While the country is on track to meet international standards for the share of HIV-positive people receiving treatment and for those receiving treatment to have viral loads suppressed, only one in three people (36%) with HIV is estimated to be aware of their HIV status.

In this context, CRRC Georgia conducted a study in partnership with Caritas Czech Republic, Tanadgoma, and UNDP in Georgia with the financial support of The United Nations Development Programme under the Czech-UNDP Partnership for SDGs to promote self-testing among young people. The tests were offered by Selftest.ge.  

The study found that running a smartphone raffle and minimising the amount of information needed to order a test made young people more willing to participate in HIV self-testing.

The method was found to be comparable in cost to some of the least expensive global interventions used to encourage people to self-test.

To reach these conclusions, the study made use of three randomised control trials (RCT) — the gold standard for scientific evidence.  RCTs randomly assign large groups of individuals to receive different interventions. By randomly assigning individuals to receive different interventions, researchers can ascertain that the only difference between the groups on average is that one received the intervention and the other did not.

In total, each randomised control trial had between 38,000 and 54,000 participants, reaching 16-22% of those aged 18–34 using Facebook in Batumi, Kutaisi, and Tbilisi.

The randomised control trials tested three messages against a basic control message. The first message attempted to assuage people’s fears of being diagnosed with HIV. The second message highlighted that the services of selftest.ge were highly confidential and sensitive to young people’s needs. The third message offered a chance to enter a raffle for an iPhone 13.

The first study found that the iPhone 13 message was more effective than the two others at getting people to click through to the order page, followed by the message which focused on user confidentiality. In contrast to expectations, the message that attempted to assuage young people’s fears about a positive test result had a negative effect — people were less likely to click this message than the neutral control message.

Despite the large scale of clickthrough achieved in the trial, few people ordered self-tests. Project team members suspected that this may have stemmed from individuals not paying full attention to the messages. Therefore, a second trial was conducted with the same messages, but adding a one-sentence highlight of the key message to the Facebook post. However, this failed to produce more orders, with only one HIV self-test order coming through during the second randomised control trial despite thousands of clicks.

In the third and final trial, the study team inferred that the order form was too detailed and complicated for users. A new and simplified order form was trialled on Facebook with the two most effective messages (focusing on anonymity and the iPhone 13 raffle).

This final study started to lead to orders, with the combination of the iPhone 13 raffle and the simplified order form leading to the most self-test orders. In terms of the cost per order, this combination of a simple order form and the iPhone 13 raffle lead to a cost per self-test order of $2.66. This compares favourably to studies conducted internationally, which have identified the cost of testing promotion in the realm of $2 to $50+. 

While the stigma associated with HIV and AIDS in Georgia is a large-scale societal problem, enabling young people to access self-testing is critical to ensuring that people living with HIV know that they have it, and in turn, can seek treatment. This study provides one viable path for actors working on the issue to address this challenge.

The full policy brief which this report is based on is available here.

This post was written within the scope of the project Behavioral insights for low uptake of HIV testing in Georgia, which is implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through the Challenge Fund, with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

The content of this material does not necessarily represent the official views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, or of the United Nations, including UNDP, or UN Member States.

Georgians increasingly feel mistreated by the government

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

Recent CRRC Georgia data suggests that people in Georgia’s age and foreign policy preferences affect how they feel the government is treating them.

The public’s perception of the fairness of the government’s actions is critical to governance and may reflect the quality of democracy in a country. Today, Georgians tend to feel like their country is no longer a democracy, while the public feels that people like them are not being treated fairly by the government.

According to data CRRC Georgia collected for the Europe Foundation since 2009 through a survey on Georgian attitudes towards the EU, the share of Georgians who disagree with the opinion that people like them are being treated unfairly by the government has increased from 46% in 2009 to 60% in 2021. 

Today, twice as many people think that the government treats people like them unfairly as those who feel otherwise.

In the 2021 data, older people (55+) were more likely to agree with the opinion that in Georgia, people like them are treated fairly by the government than younger people (18–35). Other social and demographic variables were not statistically associated with whether or not someone thinks the government treats someone like them more or less fairly.

People’s perceptions of how democratic Georgia is, which country can best support Georgia currently, and support for EU membership are correlated with people’s views of whether people like them are treated fairly by the government. 

People who report that they would vote against EU membership were 18 percentage points more likely to agree that the government treats them fairly than those who report that they would vote for EU membership.

People who report that the USA can currently give the best support to Georgia were 18 percentage points less likely to agree with the statement that people are treated fairly by the government compared to people who report that Russia can best support Georgia.

People who think that Georgia is not a democracy yet, but is developing in that direction or think that Georgia is a democratic country with room for improvement were 13 and 25 percentage points more likely to agree that they are treated fairly than people who think that Georgia might become a democracy in the future, but it is not developing in that direction now. 

With the perception that Georgia’s democracy is backsliding, so too comes the public perception that the government is increasingly not treating people like them fairly. However, older people and people who think Russia can best support Georgia were more satisfied with how the government treats them. 

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (Secondary or lower; Secondary technical; Higher; type of settlement (capital, urban, rural); who can currently best support Georgia (EU, USA, Russia), how democratic Georgia is (Georgia might become a democracy in the future, but it is not developing in that direction now; Georgia is not a democracy yet, but it is developing in that direction; Georgia is a democratic country, but there is still room for improvement); Agree/disagree with the statement: "I am Georgian, and therefore I am European”); Would vote for or against EU membership? (For EU membership; Against EU membership; Would not vote at all).

Georgians increasingly agree that minority groups face challenges in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Sasha Slobodov, an International Fellow at CRRC-Georgia, The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

In a recent CRRC survey on discrimination in Georgia, more Georgians agreed that a range of minority groups face challenges in the country than did three years prior, and they increasingly agree on the main issues that those groups face. 

A survey on hate crime, hate speech, and discrimination in Georgia CRRC Georgia conducted for the Council of Europe in 2018 and 2021 found a number of changes in attitudes among the Georgian population toward the issues that minority groups face.

When asked what the biggest issue was that ethnic minorities faced in Georgia, the most frequently noted issue was lack of knowledge of the Georgian language in both 2018 (38%) and in 2021 (47%). For religious minorities, hate speech was believed to be the main issue they faced in both 2018 (15%) and 2021 (17%). 

For women, in 2018, domestic violence was the issue (34%) most commonly cited, increasing to 39% in 2021. As for people with disabilities, a plurality of the public believed that employers preferring not to hire people with disabilities was the main issue they faced in 2018 (39%). This rose to 46% in 2021.  Being a victim of hate crime was considered the largest issue for LGBT people (20%). This number increased to 25% in 2021.

In both years, when asked what the main issues faced by each minority group were, respondents were also given the option to answer that the group faced no issues. Across all groups, the number of respondents who believed that the minority faced no issues decreased. Religious minorities were most often perceived to have no issues (38% in 2018, 27% in 2021), followed closely by women (34% in 2018, 17% in 2021), and then ethnic minorities (26% in 2018, 11% in 2021). The lowest percentage of respondents believed that people with disabilities (17% in 2018, 9% in 2021) and LGBT people (17% in 2018, 9% in 2021) faced no issues at all. 

Many respondents reported that they did not know what the most important issue different minority groups faced was. People were least aware of the issues that LGBT people face (22% in 2018, 18% in 2021), followed closely by religious minorities (19% in 2018, 20% in 2021), and people with disabilities (19% in 2018, 16% in 2021). In both 2018 and 2021,14% reported that they did not know what the primary issue faced by ethnic minorities was. Few people also said they did not know what issues women face, at 12% in 2018 and 14% in 2021.

The above data suggests that Georgians increasingly agree on the biggest issues minority groups face, and that the share of people who believe that minority groups face no issues decreased between 2018 and 2021. Respondents were more likely to agree on the primary issues faced by people belonging to ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and women, meaning that majorities and minorities were likely to give increasingly similar responses. There was less consensus about the major issues LGBT people and religious minorities face.