Prof. Neil MacFarlane on the August war and its implications

How has the politics in the region changed after the August war? Professor Neil MacFarlane gave a public lecture at the Center for Social Sciences of Tbilisi State University on May 13, 2009. His lecture was devoted to the Implications of the War in Georgia for the International Relations of the Caucasus.

According to Professor MacFarlane, the war has fundamentally changed international relations in the South Caucasus. He noted that although it is too early to draw final conclusions, but some shifts following the war can be highlighted already.

Increased Russian influence in the region – After restoring political order and recovering from the economic turmoil of the 1990s, Russia’s sphere of interest in the near abroad was next on Putin’s list of tasks. According to Dr. MacFarlane, control over the South Caucasus makes control over the North Caucasus easier for Russia. However, Georgia had been challenging Russian’s aspirations for control in the region by declaring itself a liberal, democratic western-oriented country. By intervening with its military, Russia showed that it is both capable and willing to assert its influence.

Reduced US engagement – The change of the administration in the US and the financial crisis played decreased US engagement in Georgia. The Obama administration is seeking to restore the US relationship with Russia and will not sacrifice that relationship for Georgia’s sake, according to Dr. MacFarlane. Moreover, due to the financial crisis, one of the first cuts the US will make will be in money given for aid.

Increased EU involvement – Professor MacFarlane described the Western response to the war in August as “shameful”. Moreover, most of the steps (albeit symbolic) taken by the EU during the crisis were rather personality driven (referring to Sarkozy). However, after the war the EU has increased its presence in the region through its monitoring missions and moderators.

Prospects for the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – The war provided an incentive for Armenia to diversify its relationships and reduce its security dependency on Russia by starting talks with Turkey. The positive developments in the Armenia - Turkey relationship may lead to Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement.

Professor Neil MacFarlane is the Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at St. Annes College, University of Oxford. Professor MacFarlane is a specialist on the regional dynamics of the former Soviet Union. He is also interested in the impact of international organizations in the management and resolution of civil conflicts and in the political and economic transitions of former communist states. Professor MacFarlane works with the Center for Social Sciences and comes for regular visits. You can consult the CSS website for further information.

Georgian Protests | Getting the Numbers Right

Georgia has seen long-standing protests, now lasting for almost 5 weeks. Some opposition supporters have expressed surprise why so few people continue to come to the protests, with only a few thousand coming out onto the street for current protest events. "How is it", one supporter wondered, "that we talked to people in February and March and practically everyone was dissatisfied, but now we only have a handful actually out supporting us? Did we get it wrong?"

They got it right and wrong at the same time. Very roughly (and apologies in advance for the generalization), we can observe the following distribution in Georgia at this point. 20% - 30% of the population support the government. 20% support the more strident opposition. 50% to 60% are undecided politically, or only have a weak affiliation (say, with the relatively new Christian Democrats). The key to the political contest is winning over those that are undecided, many of whom voted with the government in the last two elections. They are dissatisfied with certain aspects of the government, but also not committed to any current alternative.

Put in other terms:

• 20-30% want stability
• 20% want change, even if this is risky (since they believe the government to be a force of destabilization)
• 50-60% want significant change, but also sufficient stability

This means that for the opposition, they could have found up to 80% of the population agreeing with them that they want change -- but with limited research, it was difficult for the opposition to ascertain that the overwhelming majority only wanted change up to a point, and only if stability could be guaranteed. The example illustrates how surface impressions can mislead, and how more detailed opinion research would have been needed to guide an appropriate opposition strategy.

Georgian Asylum Applications Rise: Significance

In several surveys , we have asked the question: "would you leave Georgia if you had the chance?" We believe that this question is a good measure to gauge people's perception of their current situation.

We wondered if perhaps another interesting way to get at the state of Georgians' attitude toward Georgia is to look at asylum applications. Since 1990, according to UNHCR data, 79,121 asylum application have been filed in Europe and North America. While this could equate to fewer that 79,121 people, since people could have filed multiple applications, the number is significant. While asylum applications before the Rose Revolution had been rising dramatically, they began to fall after 2004.

However, last year witnessed a renewed uptick in asylum applications. Fascinatingly from a research perspective, the locus of asylum applications for Georgians has also migrated.



So what exactly does this tell us? As seen in the graph above, the locus of almost all asylum applications in Europe and the United States in the early 1990s were in Germany. BAMF, the German Office for Migration and Refugees was notoriously lax in the '90s and at one point Germany was getting 300,000 asylum applications a year. This lead to a controversial and difficult battle in Germany, which finally changed its asylum law and streamlined its processes. A new efficiency took hold. Whereas before, long backlogs had made it easy for migrants to work while their asylum cases was being processed (and generally rejected), a host of agreements and EU level legislation made it much easier for Germany to deport Georgians. As a result we see the dramatic decline in the percentage of Georgian asylum applicants placing claims in Germany.

Switzerland is seen as offering the best return package. It is commonly known among Georgian migrants that one should file an asylum claim in Switzerland to return back to Georgia. This may explain the constant, yet low level of Swiss claims.

The major change, however, is Greece. In 2007 and 2008, 39 percent and 40 percent of all asylum applications made by Georgians in either Europe or the US were lodged in Greece. The feminization of labor migration and Georgians connection to Greece through the large Pontic Greek community, which predominantly migrated to Greece, has led to large scale employment of Georgians in domestic care in Greece. However, why are the asylum applications jumping. One reason may be that Greece is cracking down on the visa overstayers and those not allowed to be in Greece (documenting unauthorized work is more difficult). If the asylum process is working slowly in Greece, then it may be a good opportunity for Georgians to have temporary leave to remain in Greece (i.e. be on Greek soil legally) and work under the table. However, we aren't sure and think more research into this would be worthwhile. Ultimately, it may be less a sign of increased dissatisfaction but more a result of changes in European Member States with regard to implementation of migration and asylum law.

Either way the results are fascinating.

PhD thesis: What are the Motives for Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan?

The perception that the global rise of Islamic activism is nurtured by a phenomenon depicted as “Global Jihad” is contested in a recent PhD dissertation titled "Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context". Dr. Sofie Bedford focused upon the growing Juma (Shiite) and the Abu Bakr (Sunni) mosque communions in Baku and argues in her thesis that they are, by and large, being nurtured by politics on a national level. The mobilization of Islamic activism in Azerbaijan can be understood as a result of:

(a) The younger generations wish to break ties with Soviet institutional structures, in particular those that are characterized by authoritative measures towards individual choice
(b) Discontent with societal development after Azerbaijan’s independence

Azerbaijan, considered as one of the least religious nations in the world, has since the end of the 1990’s experienced repressive state measures towards domestic Islamic movements. The pretext for state sanctioned clampdowns against the growing national opposition with distinguishable Islamic features required, according to decision makers, unorthodox countermeasures.

“By re-imposing strict state control over the religious practitioners and the religious organizations, the leadership in the independent republic hoped, just as their Soviet predecessors, to neutralize the oppositional potential in religion in order to avoid a development as in neighboring Iran. Some Moslem groups that questioned the religious structures got classified as oppositional and were actively opposed by the state”. Sofie Bedford

Friday prayers at the Abu Bakr mosque in Baku, Azerbaijan

Bedford argues that a crucial component of the state repression that strengthened Islamists consisted of official negative propaganda on the Abu Bakr mosque as a “nest for violent wahabis” and the Juma communion as “radical Shiites planning an Islamic revolution”. Instead of ending the mobilization of the mosque attendees, the state’s counterstrategy back clashed and strengthened the affinity of the targeted groups as discontent with corrupt state policies thrived.

“Amongst the visitors, and many others, Juma and Abu Bakr came to symbolize an unafraid, creative and free Islam which gave renewed popularity and, consequently, increasing numbers of attendees. It is important to stress that even if there were many similarities between the mobilization processes in the Juma and Abu Bakr communions, the study shows interesting differences, in particular in their interaction with the state in the later stages of the mobilization processes”.

In order to access the full PhD dissertation, please follow this link. In addition to the dissertation, we would also like to recommend this shorter article titled “Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan” for our readers out there.

Public Opinion in Azerbaijan and the Islamic World

A colleague of ours recently went to Washington D.C for a presentation by WorldPublicOpinion.org, an international network of research centers studying public opinion. Here is what she reported:

I attended an event on the release of a new study on public opinion in the Islamic world on terrorism, al Qaeda, and US policies. Although the research includes Azerbaijan, the study’s focus is the region in immediate proximity to Israel and Afghanistan. Most of the results of the poll are quite predictable. In general terms, the perception of US goals and policies are that they are driven by economic interests, a desire to spread Western values, democracy and Christianity.

For those that find it useful, these are some of the findings in Azerbaijan:

- 81% disapprove of attacks on civilians in US and 75% disapprove of attacks on US civilians working in Islamic countries

- 66% think that the US having naval forces based in the Persian Gulf is a bad idea

- 77% think that the majority of the people in the Middle East disapprove of the US having naval forces based in the Persian Gulf

- 65% think that the US seeks to weaken and divide the Islamic world

- 60% think that its goal is to spread Christianity

- 90% believe that it is a US goal to maintain control over the oil resources of the Middle East

- 78% think that the US tries to promote international laws for other countries, but is hypocritical because it often does not follow these rules itself

- 47% think that the US is often disrespectful to the Islamic world, but out of ignorance and insensitivity

- 37% think that the US purposely tries to humiliate the Islamic world

- On Islamist participation in politics: 75% think all people should have the right to organize themselves into political parties and run candidates, including Islamist groups

As you can see, the findings are aimed at formulating policy implications for the new US administration.

Interested in further information? Here is where you can access the full report and the questionnaire for the survey.

Banking and Financial Services in the Caucasus | CRRC Data

Have banking and financial services penetrated most households in the South Caucasus? Due to the topicality of finance news, an investigation on the usage of banking and financial services in the Caucasus seems justified. As banks fall, get nationalized and panic is spreading, our DI data on the usage of banking/financial services can be useful to understand the 2007 baseline. For instance: How many households in the South Caucasus have saving accounts that could, theoretically, be frozen if the financial situation further deteriorates?

As one can see in the graph above, banking/financial services are not used by the majority of the DI’s respondents. 66% in Georgia have not used banking/financial services compared to 57% in Armenia and 53% in Azerbaijan. Not many households are at risk of having their savings eaten up since only 1% of households in the region have savings accounts. It is remarkable that loans have been taken by so many Armenians (18%), but note that these people may not be owing money right now. For a look at household exposure, check our older post.

Now, let’s have a look at the usage of banking cards, which ought not to be confused with savings accounts. Although that few households have used banking/financial services in the South Caucasus, the numbers on usage of banking card is relatively high in the region, with Armenia being the exception that confirms the rule. 5% in rural Armenia and 23% in the capital are bearers of banking cards. Comparing this with 30% in rural Azerbaijan and 58% in its capital, one can see that the penetration of banking cards in Armenian households is relatively small. However, the largest regional differences are to be found in Georgia. Only 9% of households in rural Georgia have banking cards compared to 55% in its capital.

We also have data on public trust towards banks. But here one important limitation of the data above is that it is from 2007, so that it may not be sufficiently up to date. However, the DI 2008 will soon be available online (and yes, if the data show large inconsistencies, there will be a blog post on it). For the data above, check the CRRC Data Initiative (DI) 2007.

Life in Transition Results | Region Comparison

The EBRD Life in Transition Survey, as we at the CRRC blog previously mentioned, is available for download. The survey, measuring attitudes and values amongst 28 transitional countries divided in to three sub-regions, is one of the most extensive and impressive survey efforts conducted and encompasses all the post-socialist countries (plus Turkey). The three sub-regions are as following:

- Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (CEB)

- South-Eastern Europe (SEE)

- The Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia (CIS, which includes the South Caucasus)

The CRRC blog has often presented cross-comparisons of the Caucasian countries on a wide variety of subjects based on data from our own Data Initiative (DI). The EBRD report, sharing some of the variables from our DI, allows for a broader comparison of the attitudes, values and material standards between the former socialist countries. While the survey was conducted in 2006/2007, much of the data remains relevant.

Some noteworthy comparative data:

-The general agreement between the three sub-regions is that the level of trust between people has declined after the fall of communism. The CIS region had, according to 72 % of its respondents, societies where people could be trusted before 1989. Today, only 34 % shares this assertion. But, in comparison to CEB (31%) and SEE (25 %), the CIS sticks out as the region where people's trust in other individuals is the highest.

- 40 % in the CIS and CEB agree that the economic situation is better today than before 1989. The SEE, on the other hand, is showing a severely pessimistic stance in this regard since only 20 % of its respondents agreed to this assertion.

- According to the survey, corruption has thrived with the transition. Only 19 % in the CIS thinks that corruption has been reduced in their country since 1989. For CEB only 12 %, and in SEE only 9 % believe that corruption has reduced since 1989.

- Also the view on the political situation is rather gloomy in all three regions. As little as 25 % believe that the political situation is better today than before 1989 in the SEE region. The CIS proves more optimistic with 40 % of its respondents agreeing to this assertion.

- However, despite the negative responses on contemporary trust in society, corruption, politics and economics, the three sub-regions show a marked preference for democracy and market economy. This could be partly explained by the high optimism that the respondents in the three sub-regions hold about the future. The CIS, holding the most optimistic respondents, had 60 % of its respondents agreeing to the claim that children who are born today will have a better life than their own generation. (Or is maybe an issue that people are less hesitant to complain in CEB and SEE?)

Preferences for political and economic systems

This is just a small pick from the report Life in Transition – A Survey of People’s Experiences and Attitudes from the EBRD. The full report includes data on topics, such as, Material Well-Being, Views on Transition, Values/Priorities and Corruption/Trust, separately for each of the transitional countries. A fantastic resource for researchers!

Follow this link to access the EBRD report, its questionnaires and data.

Study on School Violence in Georgia | UNICEF

The UN Study on Violence against Children, presented in the UN General Assembly in October 2006, has been followed up with an individual country report on School Violence in Georgia. The cross-regional study has a sampling plan including over 1300 children from 93 Georgian schools. The study illustrates a generally sad school environment in Georgia where as much as 47,1% of the school pupils have reported physical violence and 47,5% psychological violence during the last year. Below are some of the findings that capture the rate of victimization to physical, psychological or sexual violence in Georgian schools:

The graph above illustrates that different forms of abuse is following different trends across age groups. Whereas physical violence decreases as children grow older, psychological abuse reaches its peak among 12-13 year olds and thereafter decreases marginally in the coming years. Sexual violence increases steadily as children grow older but the significance is statistically very small considering the fact that the margin of error is ± 3%. However, the actual number of sexual violence is higher than what is indicated in the graph above. UNICEF points out that reporting of sexual victimization has a low frequency which makes reporting of some cases of sexual violence go unreported.

Scrutinizing the indicators of gender differences entails significant differences between boys and girls. In all of the three violence variables, Georgian boys reported a higher grade of victimization to physical, psychological and sexual violence. According to UNICEF, this makes the Georgian school environment to stick out globally since girls usually indicate a higher rate of psychological victimization than boys in equivalent studies undertaken in other countries.

Despite the fact that nearly half of the pupils in Georgian schools have been subject to one or another form of violence, the overwhelming majority feels either safe in the school environment and/or likes to go there. But, these numbers should not be taken as an indicator that captures the overall perception of personal safety of children. The school environment may be a safe environment for ¾ of Georgian children but can also indicate that it functions as a substitute and/or a haven for children with a worse home environment.

In order to access the full report in English, click here, and for Georgian, here.
You can access the webpage of the UN Study on Violence against Children, where the World Report on Violence against Children is accessible (coming soon in an Azerbaijani version), by following this link.

Carnegie Research Fellowship Program!

CRRC is happy to announce the Carnegie Research Fellowship Program (CRFP). The program offers exceptional research opportunities in the United States for scholars from the South Caucasus.

Specifically, scholars in the social sciences and the humanities may apply for individual, non-degree research opportunities at universities and institutes in the United States. The program is directed at advanced researchers that already have a demonstrated track record in research. The research period lasts up to a full semester (4 months), starting either September 2009 or January 2010. In 2008-2009, two fellows from Georgia and one from Armenia have been sent to Harvard University, University of Chicago and University of Washington to do their research.

Individuals who are eligible to participate in the fellowship program:

• Citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
• Advanced graduate students, university faculty and scholars at any stage in their careers who have not recently conducted research projects at U.S. institutions.
• Scholars who hold a “Kandidatskaya” degree or higher, or who are working towards a “Kandidatskaya” degree at the time of application.
• Scholars who have publications (advanced graduate students may cite papers presented at academic conferences) in a particular field.
• Scholars who have a level of proficiency in written and spoken English that is sufficient to conduct independent research and engage colleagues.
• Scholars who are able to receive and maintain a United States J-1 visa.
• Scholars who are able to begin the CRFP in the United States in September 2009, or January 2010.
  

NCEEER, the American Councils, and the CRRC do not discriminate on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, national or ethnic origin, and disability. For more information please visit NCEEER website.

Applications need to be submitted in a hard copy to your local CRRC office. Deadline for applications is April 30, 5 p.m., 2009. We suggest applicants to study details in the guidelines and the application form closely, and in good time, to avoid disappointment. We will be accepting applications in the social sciences and the humanities. All costs for the scholars are covered, including round-trip airfare.

CRF

View more presentations from crrccenters.

The Carnegie Research Fellowship presents an extraordinary chance to researchers that can advance their work through a period of self-directed study in the US. Note that the application process is very competitive, since a concise research proposal is expected.

In order to get application materials, go to CRRC website. If you are interested in getting further training on how to improve your application, please email nana+nceeer@crrccenters.org with 'interactive online trainings' in the subject line.

Caucasus Exceptionalism in Google Maps

While this post is not directly related to social sciences, maps have lots of great social science applications. You can map all kinds of data. One example of this is the Funnel the Money Project.

We keep waiting for Google maps to come out with more data on the Caucasus including basic regional divisions and roads. You see, the Caucasus is a blank slate, except for settlement names.


At first we wondered if this was just a regional thing, so we looked at Turkey. There the data is magnificent. Regional boundaries, and even minor roads are there all the way up to the Georgian border.



Then, we thought it might be a post-Soviet thing. So we looked at Russia. North Ossetia even has good maps similar to Turkey's.

Well, maybe it's just the southern tier of the Former Soviet Union, we thought. However, to our surprise, we saw that Kyrgyzstan (and all of Central Asia) for that matter had road data and Bishkek was even outlined. Sure, it wasn't as good as Turkey or Russia (there were not regional boundaries), but it was significantly better than the Caucasus.

Then we started thinking about the poorest and most war torn of states. Maybe they didn't have road data or other geographic boundaries.

Yet lo and behold, Afghanistan's roads are clearly marked -- though regions aren't.

What about Somalia? Roads again.

Or East Timor? Well, there is only one road, but I am not sure how many there are in the country. Though this map shows more roads.

Finally, we cruised the entire world. The Caucasus are the only three countries without road data.

We know that this data exists for the Caucasus. So, what's up Google?

Gallup: Azerbaijan is One of Least Religious Nations

According to a Gallup poll, Azerbaijan is considered to be one of the least religious countries in the world. Now, whereas this may be shocking news for those that perceive people in predominantly Muslim countries as devoted or even fanatical believers, those with experience of Azerbaijan probably would shrug their shoulders about this finding. But what exactly does least mean, and what causes the Azerbaijani lifestyle to be the most secular in the Moslem world?

How does religiosity in Azerbaijan look according to CRRC Data Initiative (DI)? According to our dataset, 97,2% of Azerbaijani identify themselves as Muslims, although this does not mean that religion is practiced on a daily basis by all of them. 14% of the Azerbaijani respondents pray every day, 30% admit that they do so “less often” and 25% of the Azeri’s say that they never bow in the direction of Mecca.

How about practice of religion in Azerbaijan from a regional perspective? Indicators determining importance of religion in people’s decision-making show that neighboring Armenians attach the same weight to religion as the Azerbaijani. Georgians, on the other hand, indicate that religion plays a much more important role in their daily lives in contrast to its two neighboring nations. For a more elaborate cross South Caucasian comparison on religious practices, check out this previous CRRC blog post.

Our dataset can not provide a conclusive answer to the second question on why the Azerbaijani lifestyle tends to be secular to its nature. One could point to the effects that Soviet rule might have had on expression of religiosity or that Azerbaijani, in general, perceives Western concepts of secularization and modernization as ideals. However, the depth of Azerbaijan’s secularity has also a pre-Soviet history to it. The country’s own version of Islam, one that has been heavily influenced by Sufi mystics over the centuries, has contributed to the un-dogmatic interpretation of religious decrees that is characteristic for secular nations, such as Azerbaijan.

These are just some possible explanations to the state of religiosity in Azerbaijan. If readers out there have other opinions, insights or critique on this issue, please comment!

Securing Personal Safety in the Caucasus | CRRC Data

Who secures personal safety in the South Caucasus? CRRC DI has an answer to this question and a surprising answer at that. We asked around 8000 households in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to evaluate how well criminal leaders, friends, relatives, media, neighbors, NGOs, Ombudsmen, police, private security agencies and Prosecutor’s office secure personal safety. For now let’s just focus on the three components: the Ombudsmen, police and the criminal leaders.

In Armenia, ironically, criminal leaders have top positions in the chart of groups/institutions that effectively secure personal safety of the population with 22% of the respondents evaluating them positively. Criminal leaders are not far from the police; moreover, while a similar percentage of respondents (22.1% vs. 22.9%) finds Ombudsmen and criminal leaders effective in securing personal safety, more respondents actually find Ombudsmen ineffective, by comparison with criminal leaders (52.3% vs. 47.1%).

How does the situation look in the neighboring countries? In Georgia, the percent of those who positively evaluate how criminal leaders secure personal safety (arguably relatively high) is around 13%; it would be interesting to compare these numbers with the data prior to Saakashvili reforms. (We actually have some data from 2004 in a different file, so let us know if you are interested in the comparison!) In Azerbaijan, only 7.2% assess criminal leaders effective in securing personal safety against 87.5% of those who find them ineffective.

Among the three South Caucasus countries Armenia shows the lowest level of trust in the police, while the highest level of trust being observed in Azerbaijan – almost 60%. Trust in the police in Georgia is not very high considering the fact that it is seen as one of the main successes of the post-revolution government. From our data we can see that the trust in police had decreased after the murder case of Sandro Girgvliani in 2006, but it is going up again.

CRRC DI allows exploring this topic further by looking at other components such as how relatives, friends or the Prosecutor’s office secure personal safety. More comparisons (age, settlement type, education, and so on) can be done thanks to the rich demographic bloc. Time comparison is also possible, since we have some data starting 2004. The datasets are available at CRRC website.

Caucasus Currencies against the US Dollar

How have Caucasus currencies developed against the dollar? This question is not entirely trivial, since significant parts of the local economy are dollarised. Some colleagues, for example, have their salaries denominated in dollars.


As the above chart shows, the Armenian currency appreciated quite sharply against the dollar. The other currencies also appreciated, but remained a little more stable. How to interpret this? We turn to EBRD's 2008 Transition Report.

With Azerbaijan, the report tells us that in "an attempt to slow imported inflation and reduce the impact of the weaker dollar on domestic inflation, the NBA [National Bank of Azerbaijan] switched the targeted currency from the US dollar (effective peg) to a currency basket that currently comprises 70% US dollars and 30% euros." (p. 101)

Georgia, the Transition Report notes, has also pegged and defended its currency, trying to keep it stable; as a result "international reserves fell from 1.5 billion USD to 1.04 billion USD at end-September 2008" (p. 129). The EBRD report does not note anything on Armenian exchange rates, except for a continuing consumer price inflation of just below 12%, annually (August 2008).

Over the next few months, exchange rates are going to be one of the issues to watch. Large fluctuations could make life more difficult. In Azerbaijan, the EBRD suggests that "real exchange rate appreciation (through either nominal depreciation or higher inflation, or both) is inevitable. A tighter fiscal policy will be necessary to control inflation of the medium-term." (p. 101)

And on Georgia: "Given the still high level of dollarisation in the banking sector (more than 60% of lending is in foreign currency), a possible depreciation of the currency would affect the quality of banks' portfolios as the repayment capacity of unhedged corporates [sic] and retail clients weakens." (p. 128)

The Armenian economy seems less dollarised, but, as the report notes, its real estate boom was heavily dependent on remittances. As those decrease, one would expect some impact on the currency as well.

Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Local Self- Government in Azerbaijan

An article entitled “Social Capital, Civic Engagement and the Performance of Local Self- Government in Azerbaijan” by Rafail Hasanov, CRRC 2007 Research Fellowship recipient from Azerbaijan, was published in Nationalities Papers.

The research addresses two questions: what is the role of social capital in civic engagement in the municipalities of three regions of Azerbaijan and how are the norms and networks of civic engagement linked to the quality of public life and performance of local government.

The major finding of the research is that while the legislation offers opportunities for the independence of institutions of local government at all levels, in reality, municipalities are subordinate to executive authority and operate on the basis of an uncertain system of laws and rules, resulting in their limited authority, influence and responsibilities.

Another interesting conclusion is that municipalities are more closely linked with citizens in rural areas, where smaller and less dense communities are typical. However, many citizens still mistrust this relatively new local institution. Moreover, the overall involvement of citizens in all sorts of associations and participation in joint NGO-municipality projects, which serve as the basis for functional local government, is low.

Fair and transparent elections, merit-based personnel selection and expanding municipalities' financial resources are the areas that would need the most improvement in Azerbaijan to ensure responsible and effective local self-government, according to the author.

As a way to increase the efficiency of municipalities, the study recommends regular reporting to the population about the work that has been completed by municipalities, frequent meetings with the population and responsiveness to people’s needs, budgetary transparency and increased staff competence. It is also necessary to gradually replace the currently prevailing vertical networks of civil participation with the horizontal form of interaction in communities.

Social Capital, Civic Engagement And The Performance

View SlideShare presentation or Upload your own.

For more information, check out the research paper of Rafail Hasanov, or the journal article.

Christian Welzel from World Value Survey visits CRRC

Christian Welzel, Professor at Jacobs University in Bremen and Vice President of the World Values Survey (WVS), held a lecture on his findings at the Tbilisi State University on the 23rd of January. The World Values Survey has conducted five waves of surveys from 1981 to 2007. In total, this has given them coverage of 90 % of the world’s population and representative national data for 97 societies. The data of WVS gives a general position on values for surveyed societies, indicates the direction of trends and illustrates their subsequent impact on social, political and economic life.

Here are some interesting points of the lecture:

• Data from the Global Value Surveys contradict the assertion of an ongoing global convergence of values/ideas. While data tend in the same “emancipatory” direction in all global regions, they do so parallely. Consequently, regional differences in values do neither decrease nor increase.
• Happiness has been increasing steadily since 1981 in the world (amongst 45 of 52 surveyed countries). The only societies that have experienced regression in this respect were the post-socialist countries during the 90’s. The incentives for enhancing happiness are, according to Welzel, increasing levels of democratization, tolerance and economic development.
• Secular values, encompassing variables such as levels of inter-ethnic tolerance and gender equality, are generally increasing in the world. However, a few countries are experiencing notable regression, amongst which Russia and Turkey stands out.
• Levels of national pride are generally lower in countries that have suffered losses in wars (Japan) or have gone through stages of major disintegration (Russia).
  
  

The lecture included a presentation of an updated “global culture map” (similar to the previous Inglehart-Welzel map, shown below). Christian Welzel explained the two sets of dimensions that make out the axis’s that creates an illustration of how the general worldviews between cultural regions differ. The South Caucasian countries are juxtaposed in the “Ex Communist” cultural sphere. In spite of all their differences, the South Caucasus countries are tightly packed together (note that this is mid-90’s data though, and that Welzel's newest map is a little different).

The Traditional vs. Secular-rational values axis reflects importance of religious values, i.e. on issues such as deference to authority, divorce, abortion etcetera. The Survival vs. Self-expression axis is, other than a scale for economic development, an indication on how much individuals in a given society can concentrate on self expression values that gives priority to issues, such as, tolerance, gender equality and decision-making in economic and political life.

As regards the World Value Surveys data for the South Caucasus, one can not track changing trends in the region since it has only been included in one of the wave of surveys (1994-1999). However, good news: the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (CRRC’s mothership) has sponsored data to be collected in Georgia in 2008. We will let you know as soon as the data is available.

A journalist's account of the lecture is here. Want to investigate the works of the World Value Surveys, access other graphs or conduct you own online analysis? Click here.

Heritage Foundation | Index of Economic Freedom 2008

(We today noticed that we forgot to post this earlier -- apologies!)

The Heritage Foundation provides visitors with the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, which covers 162 countries across 10 specific freedoms such as trade freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, and property rights. The 2008 Index provides an even clearer picture of economic freedom by using data-driven equations which allows countries to be graded between scores of 0 and 100.

According to the 2008 assessment, Azerbaijan’s economy is 55.3% free, which makes it 107^th in the world. If we look at the distribution, Azerbaijan falls into Mostly Unfree category.

Azerbaijan has considerable challenges in Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property Rights and Freedom from Corruption. Its overall score is insignificantly different (0.5% points) than the last year. Azerbaijan is ranked 18^th out of 30 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and its overall score is below the world average.

For more info on Azerbaijan, click _here.

Georgia is in a much better situation than Azerbaijan, having a 69.2% free economy, which makes it the world’s 32^nd freest economy. Its overall score is 0.1% point lower than last year. Similar to Azerbaijan, two categories remain significantly below the world average: Property Rights and Freedom from Corruption. Property Rights may reflect the 2006 and 2007 situation, in which old (illegally, as the government alleged) privatizations were rescinded. As for corruption, is the data really plausible? According to the CRRC Data Initiative (DI) 2007, only 1% of the respondents in Georgia say they had to pay a bribe in the previous year.

Moreover, Georgia is ranked 18^th out of 41 counties in the European Region, and its overall score is equal to the regional average. For more info on Georgia, click here.

From the South Caucasus countries Armenia has the best score. It ranks 28^th with 70.3% freedom, just narrowly beating Georgia.

But Armenia, like Georgia, scores way below the world average in Property rights and Freedom from Corruption categories. In Georgia's case, we are not convinced by the accuracy of the score on Freedom from Corruption. Note a further post on this issue, for more detail.

To view scores and rankings for any country, or to find out which are the top ten countries, along with detailed data and background analysis, click here.

Remittances in the Caucasus: EBRD Releases Results

EBRD has released the results of its study on remittances in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. A
unique aspect of the study in Post-Soviet territory is that it not only surveys migrants in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, but it also carried out interviews with migrants themselves in Russia.
Many results, at first glance replicate findings from other studies as well as the Global Development Network study we are currently working on (stay tuned for more).

• Remittance money sent is generally only spent on basic needs.
• Migrants to Russia tend to be younger and male.
• Most migrants use the banking sector to transfer money (though many don’t have bank accounts) – but there is an extensive courier trade for remittances.
• Few migrants are interested in business or economic development in their countries of origin.
  

These findings have significant policy implications, not least because it shows that Caucasus migration varies from, say, Latin American patterns. Your comments on possible policy implications are welcome.

Bendixen & Associates, renowned for their polling of Latinos in the United States and the across Spanish-speaking world, carried out the study. Undoubtedly, B&A won the bid as the result of their expertise in carrying out remittance studies in Latin America. However, some facts of the study are curious and we would like to find out more than the scant information on methodology available online (particularly compared to EBRD’s amazingly documented Life in Transition Survey).

1. There is no mention of the sampling frame used in any of the countries. What strategy did B&A use to find households? Census lists are extremely outdated in both Georgia and Azerbaijan.
2. The report mentions a wide variety of interview languages employed for the study in Azerbaijan – including Tat and Farsi. B&A says, however, that all interviews were conducted in Georgian in Georgia. We find this surprising, since non-Russian speaking minorities in Azerbaijan are a very small percentage of the population and linguistically well integrated. This is not the case in Georgia were sizable ethnically homogeneous communities do not speak the titular language (Georgian). As the study specifically mentions the particular status of Armenian families in Samtskhe-Javekheti, it would be interesting to find out how the interviewers communicated with these households.
   
3. The Azerbaijan sample provides statistics based on regions. However, four regions out of eleven appear to be omitted. Guba-Khachmaz, which is in Northern Azerbaijan; Naxcivan, Azerbaijan’s exclave, which borders Turkey, and Kalbajar-Lachin and Dagliq Qarabag, which are both currently partially occupied – though there are regions under Azerbaijani control. If there was no sampling done in these regions, it should be stated, as the sample may then have certain biases in the national remitances picture. Naxcivan has distinct migration patterns with Turkey and many non-ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Guba-Khachmaz.
   
4. On the follow up study in Russia, B&A’s explanation of the sampling frame is also opaque. It states in one of the reports posted on the Internet that it got its information from the Federal State Statistics Service and that this information was updated. In another report, it claims that the data on households was gleaned from household surveys. Either way they report the following numbers: 903,000 Azerbaijanis, 344,000 Moldovans and 283,000 Georgians. There may be a confounding factors in these counterintutive numbers. Many migrants, as the study notes, are already citizens of Russia. Yet many of those who migrate to Russia and now have citizenship were ethnic Russians, who themselves may have been born in Russia and migrated to the Caucasus during Soviet times. Furthermore, many ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan fled not to Armenia but to Russia after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Many of these ethnic Russian and Armenian families may have fewer (or no) connections with their former country of residence and this may yield very different dynamics. Again, some information on this would also be interesting.

We hope that the EBRD will release more information soon and even the data. So stay tuned for further updates.