The public on the conflicts in the South Caucasus

On July 18, 2015 thousands of Georgians gathered in Tbilisi protesting Russia’s “creeping occupation” as South Ossetia based Russian troops continue to draw the border along the Administrative Border Line between Georgia and the occupied territory of  South Ossetia. The unresolved territorial conflicts over South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are major sources of instability in the South Caucasus. These conflicts are often referred to as ticking bombs, and despite numerous common challenges, the region is claimed to be “more divided than united” mainly because of these conflicts and because of the competing interests of regional powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran. All three South Caucasian states have different political relations with these states and towards the West.

In 2013, CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey asked the populations of the countries of the South Caucasus about their opinions on the territorial disputes in their own and in neighbouring countries – namely, the conflicts over Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. This blog post looks at the findings.

Assuming that the population of each country was informed about the conflict in their own country, the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan were asked if they had heard about the conflict in Abkhazia, while the population in Georgia was asked if they had heard about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Only those who reported having heard about these conflicts were asked follow-up questions. The data shows that a larger share of the Georgian population has heard about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (62%) compared to the shares of the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan that have heard about the conflict in Abkhazia (49% and 43% respectively).

In respect to each conflict, questions about potential solutions were asked. Speaking about Armenians’ attitudes towards possible solutions of the conflict in Abkhazia, Armenians most commonly think Abkhazia should be an independent country (46%). The next most commonly held view was that Abkhazia should be a part of Russia (26%). Only 7% of Armenians would favor Abkhazia as a part of Georgia.

Note: The question was asked to the 49% of Armenians who reported having heard about the conflict in Abkhazia.

In contrast, the Azerbaijani public most commonly would favor having Abkhazia as a formal part of Georgia (77%) and 12% would support the idea of having Abkhazia as an independent country. Less than 1% would favor having it as a formal part of Russia.

Note: The question was asked to the 43% of Azerbaijanis who reported having heard about the conflict in Abkhazia.

The Georgian population is overwhelmingly in favor of having Abkhazia as a formal part of Georgia without autonomy (73%), and 33% believe it should have a high degree of autonomy within Georgia. Only 3% favors Abkhazia as an independent country.

The opinions over the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh differ across the countries as well. Given that Armenia and Azerbaijan are the two sides involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is unsurprising that the populations of these countries express radically different opinions about the possible future of this conflict. Armenians most commonly would favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia (73%). More than half (54%) would also favor having it as an independent country, but would find it absolutely unacceptable for Nagorno-Karabakh to be a part of Azerbaijan.

The absolute majority (95%) of Azerbaijanis would favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Azerbaijan. Notably less – only about a third of the population – would favor the scenario of having Nagorno-Karabakh with a high degree of autonomy within Azerbaijan. Unlike Armenians, Azerbaijanis do not at all favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country.

As for the Georgian public’s attitudes towards possible solutions of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, slightly less than half of Georgians who reported they have heard about this conflict either could not answer the questions about the future status of this territory, or refused to answer the questions. As for the rest, more people would favor having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Azerbaijan (26%) than of Armenia (9%).

Note: The question was asked to the 62% of Georgians who reported to have known about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This blog post looked at how public opinion on territorial conflicts in the region varies across the South Caucasian states. Overall, Georgian and Azerbaijani public opinion on the preferences about the future of Abkhazia is more similar than the public opinion in Armenia. As the opinions over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani public attitudes are sharper than the attitudes of Armenians, while Georgians largely avoid reporting their opinions, or do not have any. Yet, notably more Georgians which do have opinions about the possible solution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh are in favor of having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Azerbaijan than of having it as a formal part of Armenia. Considering the geopolitical realities, these findings are not surprising. Georgia and Azerbaijan are in a quite similar situation, as both have lost territories, while Armenia de-facto controls Nagorno-Karabakh with Russia’s support. As Svante Cornell et al. (2005) argue in their work on South Caucasian conflicts, the conflict in Abkhazia has the same symbolic importance for Georgia as the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has for Azerbaijan, as both countries were defeated in these conflicts against a numerically much smaller enemy relying on external support, while Armenia feels less urgency to find a solution and is interested in preserving the military status quo.

To learn more about public opinion on the conflicts in the South Caucasus, take a look at CRRC’s earlier blog posts, When is a war not a war?, Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for difficult reconciliation (Armenia) and Engagement without recognition? and check out our Online Data Analysis platform.

The recent history of the South Caucasus as seen by the world’s media – Part 1, Armenia and Azerbaijan

History has been a qualitative discipline and has often been considered part of the humanities, well, historically, but the emergence of big data is likely to extend the use of quantitative methods in historical research in the long run. Big data projects have aimed at everything from finding out where to pick fruit in your city to mapping the prevalence of AIDS in the United States, but a recent project, Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) has compiled a massive database of print media coverage in over 100 languages including Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian. Originally created by Kalev Leetaru and Philip Schrodt at Georgetown University, the GDELT database contains about a quarter of a billion uniquely coded units starting from 1979.

One simple operation to perform with the data is to look at the intensity of a country’s representation in media reports globally. In order to make comparisons over time, the data is normalized using a special algorithm to account for the amount of media disseminated globally in a given time period. We observe the average monthly intensity of media coverage between January, 1979 and October, 2014. After extracting and normalizing the data, what emerges is a snapshot of climatic moments in South Caucasian history that were reported on internationally. By comparing the timing of intensity of coverage with reporting on events in major media outlets such as the New York Times, we are able to identify which events garnered international attention and caused peaks in intensity of coverage.

What appears and will be unsurprising to any Caucasus watcher is that in many ways, the destinies of Armenia and Azerbaijan are tied together due to the Nagrno Karabakh conflict. This fact appears prominently in the graphs below with peaks 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Armenia and peaks 2, 3, and 4 in Azerbaijan tied to the conflict.

Paths do diverge, however, and most of the peaks on the graphs below are country specific rather than Karabakh related. In Armenia, peak 1 marks the 1983 terrorist attack perpetrated by Armenian nationalists in France at a Turkish Airlines check-in counter, while the 1979 Iranian Revolution seems to be the cause of Azerbaijan’s first peak.

Coups and coup attempts are upheavals each South Caucasian country has experienced. Notably, in Azerbaijan the 1993 coup which brought Heydar Aliyev to power (peak 5) and the 1999 parliamentary shootings in Armenia (peak 8) both created spikes in global news coverage.

Note: In this graph, the country’s mean monthly share of global media coverage (defined as all media contained within the GDELT database) is shown. The table below gives a summary of events in Armenia according to the peak they correspond with:

Armenia
Peak	Event	Peak	Event
1	Orly Airport attack	7	Taking of Kelbajar
2	Start of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict	8	Armenian parliament shooting
3	Spitak earthquake	9	Armenia and Turkey sign agreement to normalize relations
4	Black January	10	Barack Obama's speech on Armenian Genocide
5	Operation Ring	11	Presidential and municipal elections, protest rallies
6	Major armed confrontation between Armenian, Azerbaijani and Soviet forces

In 2009, Armenia appears in the international news with a peak caused by a breakthrough in talks on the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, followed by the failure to actually normalize relations (peak 9). In 2010, Barack Obama’s speech on the Armenian Genocide failed to mention the word “genocide,” despite his election campaign promises to the Armenian American community to the contrary, leading to peak 10. Peak 11 marks domestic protests following presidential elections in 2013, but the event which captured the greatest share of the world’s attention was the 1988 Spitak earthquake (peak 3).

Note: In this graph, the country’s mean monthly share of global media coverage (defined as all media contained within the GDELT database) is shown. The table below gives a summary of events in Azerbaijan according to the peak they correspond with. A quick glance at the Azerbaijan table shows two events marked with questions marks – peaks 8 and 11, and the month and year of their occurrence. Despite our best efforts, we were unable to identify the specific events which these peaks correspond to. If you know what these peaks represent, we would love to hear your ideas, so please discuss them on our Facebook page, here.

Azerbaijan
Peak	Event	Peak	Event
1	Iranian revolution	8	?- August, 2001
2	Start of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict	9	Azerbaijan Constitutional referendum
3	Black January	10	Azerbaijan Presidential elections. Ilham Aliyev gets elected
4	Major armed confrontation between Armenian, Azerbaijani and Soviet forces	11	?-August, 2004
5	Aliyev comes to power through coup	12	Azerbaijan Parliamentary elections
6	First oil has been produced	13	First oil shipped from the BTC pipeline
7	Azerbaijan joins Council of Europe	14	Eurovision song contest dispute with Russia on alleged vote rigging

In Azerbaijan, peak 6 appears to be reports of the first oil to be piped out of the country based on the 1994 “contract of the century”, which itself appears to garner media attention after peak 5 (it is important to remember that events were identified based on timing, and with relatively small peaks, it is possible to misidentify events). Azerbaijan also has a peak related to the Eurovision song contest (peak 14), but, interestingly, not in May of 2012 when the country hosted the event. The hosting of Eurovision in Azerbaijan did not lead to a spike in coverage, in spite of the fact that it was billed by Azerbaijani authorities as a mega event and generally considered a controversial location for the event due to  the country’s poor human rights record and prevalence of homophobic attitudes despite the event’s large popularity among the LGBT community. A year later, in May 2013, a spike in coverage coincides with the Eurovision voting scandal involving Russia and Azerbaijan. While Russian singer Dina Garipova finished second among Azerbaijani voters, Azerbaijan did not award any points to the singer.

This brings us to the question - what else wasn’t being talked about in Armenia and Azerbaijan? Some events which received less attention from the world's media than one might expect (they are there, but comparably small) are the 2008 presidential election protests in Armenia, and the “contract of the century” in Azerbaijan, signed in 1994 by the government with a conglomerate of Western oil companies.

In sum, the GDELT database is an interesting tool.  While still not fully explored and having some issues, it is a big data project which will likely spur on future developments in the social sciences. On Thursday, we will explore the global media coverage of the third South Caucasus country, Georgia.

When is a war not a war?

When is a war not a war? While it may seem commonsensical that a country cannot simultaneously be at war and at peace, the prevalence of several ‘frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space defies simple categorization. If we take the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia or South Ossetia as an example, a quick internet search shows that there was a five-day war in 2008 that ended on the 12th of August with a preliminary ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, according to CRRC’s most recent Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey in 2013, almost no Georgians think that the conflict in Abkhazia had been resolved. Alternatively, Armenians and Azerbaijanis tend to support the idea that resolution has been achieved in Abkhazia (with 27% and 13%, respectively selecting this option), while differing significantly on their opinions about the status of their own territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh (with 38% of the Azerbaijani population placing this as their highest national concern, compared to only 3% of Armenians). This raises the possibility that conflict is as much about perceptions as it is about actual military confrontation, and that national, regional and international conflict narratives can diverge significantly.

This disparity in narratives underlines a definitional problem in the political sciences when it comes to conflict resolution, war and peace. The Correlates of War project uses the annual number of casualties to track the duration of wars and conflicts on both an inter- and intrastate level. According to this project, a war is deemed over once the annual death toll drops below 1,000. The problem is that while open armed conflict might cease, a conflict can be far from resolved.

Thus, the conclusion that Georgia’s own territorial disputes can be condensed into five days underestimates the enduring negative impact of the status quo on all sides. Trade and travel are prohibited for inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. De-isolation tops Abkhaz policy priorities, while the government in Tbilisi faces the ongoing challenge of settling and providing for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In addition to the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia conflicts, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is also called ‘frozen’, although experts like Thomas de Waal have suggested that the term ‘simmering’ might be a more appropriate designation. CRRC data is also instructive in this regard. When asked about the top two issues facing their respective countries, 38% of Azerbaijanis named unresolved territorial disputes as the number one problem in Azerbaijan, while 3% of Armenians and 10% of Georgians said the same. The figures in Azerbaijan and Georgia strongly suggest that these issues are not ‘frozen’ (or resolved) in the minds of the local population, although economic concerns also dominate throughout the region.

This blog has shown that national perceptions of conflict can contradict both regional and international narratives. This suggests that our current measures of war and peace are missing an important dimension. The CB provides a starting point for exploring the subject of war narratives. You can find comments about past perceptions of conflict resolution for the Azerbaijani-Armenian case here and for the Georgian case here. You can also access a report on Russian public opinion towards the future of these disputes here. Annual survey data for the South Caucasus region is also available for analysis on the online CB platform.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for a Difficult Reconciliation (Armenia)

This blog focuses on public opinion in Armenia regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict using data from the 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB). This follows a similar blog on the same set of questions asked in Azerbaijan. The results show some interesting similarities and dissimilarities between the two neighboring countries. Both populations show a great deal of uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved. Over half of the Armenian population believes that a resolution can be found by peaceful negotiations. Also, most of the population thinks Russia, rather than Turkey, should be involved in the conflict resolution process. Finally, over half of the Armenian population favors recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia, and over half say they would also accept Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country.

Source: CB 2009, 2010, 2011

The figure above shows that unemployment continues to be the most important issue in the country (44% in 2011)—compared to Azerbaijan in which unemployment is the second most important issue (after territorial integrity). With respect to perspectives on conflict resolution, 38% of Armenians have no idea about when the conflict will be resolved and 24% think Armenia and Azerbaijan will never be able to find a solution. 4% think that the territorial conflict has already been resolved, and 3% believe there will be a resolution within the next year. Finally, 18% are confident that a solution will be found within 10 years, and 12% say this will occur in more than 10 years.

Source: CB 2011

Despite this widespread uncertainty, Armenians are more confident about there being a possible peaceful resolution to the conflict rather than a resolution by force. Just about 61% believe that a solution can be found within the next 5 years by peaceful negotiations. About 21% consider the recourse to force very and rather likely (taken together) within the next 5 years.

With regard to favored solutions to the conflict, 60% of Armenians favor recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia. Just over half of the population (58%) says they would also accept Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country. As in the results from Azerbaijan, very few Armenians think joint governance of the region by Armenia and Azerbaijan is a good idea (76% of Armenians say they would not accept this). Finally, the majority say they would never accept Nagorno Karabakh being within Azerbaijani boundaries without autonomy (74%), even if the region were granted a certain degree of autonomy (77%).

Source: CB 2011

 Finally, when asked which countries or groups should be involved as a third party in the peace dialogue, 72% of Armenians favor Russia, followed by 49% who favor France, and similar figures as found in Azerbaijan for the European Union (43% compared to 40% in Azerbaijan) and the United States (36% compared to 35% in Azerbaijan). Only 8% of Armenians favor Turkey being involved in finding a solution. However, it is worth noting that a large number of respondents from both Armenia (72%) and Azerbaijan (53%) would welcome greater involvement from Russia.

Source: CB 2011

Taken together, Armenian and Azerbaijani populations both display uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved. In Armenia more than half of the population believes that a solution can be found within the next 5 years by peaceful negotiations. More Armenians prefer Russia to Turkey as the main third party to be involved in the conflict resolution process. Finally, with regard to possible solutions, over half of the Armenian population would welcome formal recognition of Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of their country and 58% say they are ready to accept it as an independent country.

Interested in knowing more about these survey questions and how they differ with respect to socio-demographic groups in Armenia? Visit CRRC’s fun and easy Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/

Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for a Difficult Reconciliation (Azerbaijan)

Many domestic and international observers consider the territorial dispute over Nagorno Karabakh to be one of the most significant issues in Azerbaijan. Gibler and Miller (2012) argue that "states must often settle territorial issues with their neighbors in order to democratize" ("Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies and Their Disputes"). The 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB) covered several questions in Azerbaijan and Armenia about Nagorno Karabakh. This blog will cover the results in Azerbaijan and the next blog will cover the results in Armenia. The results show that the territorial problem is considered one of the most important issues in Azerbaijan. There is also a great deal of uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved, and whether a solution would be achieved by peaceful negotiations or by force. Additionally, most of the population in Azerbaijan thinks Turkey should be involved in the conflict resolution process, and a majority of Azerbaijanis favor the integration of the area within the national boundaries of Azerbaijan.

 Source: CB 2011, 2010, 2009

About one third (31%) of Azerbaijanis in 2011 consider territorial integrity to be the most important issue in the country—followed by unemployment (28%). This is a substantial drop from 2010 when just over half of the population found territorial integrity to be the most important issue in the country. There is no notable variation in opinion across age groups, gender or level of education. For example, men are as concerned about this issue (32%) as women (30%). 

In general, uncertainty and pessimism are the most widespread feelings about finding a solution to the conflict. About 34% of Azerbaijanis have no idea when the conflict will be resolved. 10% think Azerbaijan and Armenia will never be able to find a solution. 5% believe the problem will be resolved within the next year, 24% say in 2-5 years, 12% in 6-10 years and 12% in more than 10 years. The remaining 3% believe that the conflict has already been resolved. 

Public opinion is also split about whether a potential solution would most likely be achieved by peaceful negotiations or by force. Just about 51% in Azerbaijan think a solution will come about by peaceful negotiations and 42% think a forceful solution would be expected. In addition, survey respondents were asked to indicate their level of acceptance over separately listed potential outcomes to the conflict. The majority (90%) favor the integration of Nagorno Karabakh within the national boundaries of Azerbaijan (without any kind of regional autonomy). 23% definitely favor granting the region some degree of autonomy (28% would accept autonomy under some circumstances and 40% would never accept it). Other provided options such as joint governance of the region by Armenia and Azerbaijan, the establishment of an independent state of Nagorno Karabakh, or making the territory a formal part of Armenia are not favored by the majority of the population (84%, 82% and 95%, respectively). 

Source: CB 2011

 

The 2011 CB also asked Azerbaijanis about which countries or groups they think should be involved in helping to solve the conflict. The majority of Azerbaijanis welcome heavier involvement by Turkey (86%). Russia is preferred as the second option, consistently with the recent development of dialogue promoted by Moscow ("Russia to continue to push for Nagorny Karabakh Dialogue"). This is followed by the European Union (40%), United States (35%), and France’s involvement is the least favored at 15%. 

Source: CB 2011

Thus, the survey results show that there is a large interest in the Nagorno Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan. Many are unsure about when the conflict will be resolved, and whether a solution would be achieved by peaceful negotiations or by force. Most of the population favors the integration of the area within the national boundaries of Azerbaijan and see a large role for Turkey in the conflict resolution process.

Interested in knowing more about these survey questions and how they differ with respect to socio-demographic groups in Azerbaijan? Visit CRRC’s fun and easy Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/