Inequality of Job Opportunities Across the South Caucasus

The World Development Report 2013, which was newly released and presented in Tbilisi a couple of weeks  ago states that, “The concept of equality of opportunity, which can be traced back to John Rawls and Robert Nozick, stems from the idea that an individual’s chances of success in life should not be caused by circumstances that are beyond the individual’s control, such as gender, ethnicity, location of birth, or family background.” The report is mainly devoted to investigating jobs challenges and problems of employment, including unequal opportunities to find a job due to specific circumstances. This report included a chart from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LTS) that identifies the level of inequality of job opportunities based on circumstances, age and education across countries (i.e. the “Dissimilarity Index” or D index). Differences in the results among countries can be observed in the table below, yet data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) show shifting priorities for obtaining a good job in the South Caucasus countries.

The LTS chart from 2006 indicates that education is a major source of inequality of job opportunities in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the inequality D-index for Armenia was approximately 11 times higher than in Georgia and 3 times higher than in Azerbaijan. For Georgia and Azerbaijan, circumstances such as gender, ethnicity, parental education and political affiliation influenced the inequality of job opportunities. In contrast, these circumstances constituted the least share of the D-index in Armenia. Age was found to be least influential in all three countries, yet, it was about 3 times larger in Armenia and Azerbaijan than in Georgia. 

The more recent 2012 CB asked about factors that Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis consider most important for getting a good job in their countries. CB data show that connections is considered to be the most important factor for getting a job in Armenia and Azerbaijan, whereas education is considered to be the most important factor in Georgia. Education is also deemed to be the second most important factor in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, doing favors for the ‘right’ people stands as the third most important factor in Azerbaijan, while professional abilities is third for Georgia and Armenia. Appearance and age are considered to be more important factors for getting a good job in Armenia than in other two countries, whereas hard work, luck and talent are perceived to hold more weight in Georgia.

This blog has shown that there are different perceptions about how different factors relate to job opportunities in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Whereas education, circumstances and age are shown to be the most basic reasons for job inequality in the LTS survey, connections and education are the dominant factors for getting a good job in all 3 countries according to the CB. 

If you are interested in issues regarding attitudes towards getting a good job please visit CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Political Participation and Democracy in Azerbaijan

For a functioning democracy, democratic attitudes are important as well as basic political rights. Attitudes toward democracy and participation in political life show the extent of a population’s support to and the legitimacy of a democratic system. The 2011 Caucasus Barometer provides insight to what people think about democratic principles and the democratic process in Azerbaijan. The data shows that voting in elections and democracy (as a political regime) both receive approval by over half of the population. However, particular political actions such as participation in protests receive only little affirmation. Furthermore, the current political system in Azerbaijan is not perceived to be an effective democracy by most Azerbaijanis.

The survey shows that institutional forms of participation such as voting in elections are perceived to be important by 64% of Azerbaijanis. In addition to considering voting very important, 62% said they voted in the last national election and 74% said they certainly or most probably would participate if presidential elections were held that following Sunday.

However, less institutional forms of political participation such as protests receive little support. Only 7% of the adult Azerbaijani population strongly agrees and another 21% agree to the statement that, “People should participate in protest actions, as this shows the government that the people are in charge”. In contrast, 16% very strongly agree and another 32% agree that, “People should not participate in protest actions against the government, as it threatens stability in the country”. The data indicates that support for this type of political involvement is rather low in Azerbaijan.

Regarding general attitudes towards democracy, the data reveals that the majority of Azerbaijanis do not perceive their country to be a full democracy. As the chart shows, 14% do not consider Azerbaijan to be a democracy. 30% think that their country is a democracy but with major problems, and 31% believe the country is a democracy but with minor problems. Only 10% think the country is a full democracy.

Even though the general public opinion is that Azerbaijan is not a full democracy today, just over half of the population supports a democratic system. According to the data, 52% of the Azerbaijanis prefer democracy to any other kind of government. In contrast, 14% say there are some circumstances in which a non-democratic government can be preferable, and another 18% say it does not matter what kind of government they have.

Thus, the results indicate that institutional forms of political participation such as voting have more approval than less institutional forms such as attending protest actions. Furthermore, people in Azerbaijan seem to support the idea of democracy although the majority holds that their country is not a full democracy yet.

Democracy in Georgia

In the wake of Russian protests for free and fair elections— one of the hallmarks of democracy— the international community has again turned its attention on democratization in the post-Soviet region. Democracy, in its various forms, represents something different to everyone. So what does it mean for Georgians? Do Georgians consider Georgia to be a democratic state in its present form? What are their perceptions of democracy? CRRC, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute-Georgia, conducted a repeated survey on public attitudes in Georgia from November 2008 to September 2011 in which respondents were asked a series of questions about democracy. Survey results show that just under half of the population considers Georgia to be a democracy. Also, most Georgians associate democracy with liberty, freedom of speech, media and expression, rather than government accountability and free and fair elections.

From April 2010 to September 2011, Georgians were asked ‘Is Georgia a democracy now’? The figure below shows that since July 2010 there has been a steady increase in the percentage of Georgians who believe Georgia is a democracy with 45% believing so in September 2011.

When asked to gauge the extent of Georgia’s transition to democracy in the September 2011 survey, 39% of Georgians said ‘Georgia is already a democracy but still needs improvement’, while 28% said Georgia is not a democracy, but is moving in that direction. In contrast, only 5% of Georgians believe Georgia is not and will never be a democracy.

Thus, the data shows that just under half of the population (45%) considers Georgia to be a democracy, and many people believe Georgia is either already a democracy that needs improvement or is not yet a democracy but is still developing in that direction. But what does democracy mean to Georgians? The 2011 survey asked, ‘What does democracy mean to you?’ 47% of Georgians interpret democracy to mean freedom of speech/media/hearing different views. 42% associate democracy with liberty and 40% say equality before the law/protection of justice. In contrast, only 7% say government accountability and 16% think democracy means free and fair elections. The results elicit a strong difference in the Georgian interpretation of democracy which prizes liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views above free and fair elections.

Respondents were allowed to provide their own responses. The percentages do not add to 100% because respondents could name up to three items.

Thus, survey data tells us that the percentage of Georgians who think Georgia is a democracy is increasing over time, that there is room for improvement, and that the concept of democracy is more associated with liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views, than government accountability and free and fair elections. This is important in light of recent global events in which ordinary citizens have begun to challenge their state systems and certain features of their democracy.

How do you think Georgia fairs on its path to democracy? Has Georgia reached its goal or is there still room for improvement?

Life in Transition Results | Region Comparison

The EBRD Life in Transition Survey, as we at the CRRC blog previously mentioned, is available for download. The survey, measuring attitudes and values amongst 28 transitional countries divided in to three sub-regions, is one of the most extensive and impressive survey efforts conducted and encompasses all the post-socialist countries (plus Turkey). The three sub-regions are as following:

- Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (CEB)

- South-Eastern Europe (SEE)

- The Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia (CIS, which includes the South Caucasus)

The CRRC blog has often presented cross-comparisons of the Caucasian countries on a wide variety of subjects based on data from our own Data Initiative (DI). The EBRD report, sharing some of the variables from our DI, allows for a broader comparison of the attitudes, values and material standards between the former socialist countries. While the survey was conducted in 2006/2007, much of the data remains relevant.

Some noteworthy comparative data:

-The general agreement between the three sub-regions is that the level of trust between people has declined after the fall of communism. The CIS region had, according to 72 % of its respondents, societies where people could be trusted before 1989. Today, only 34 % shares this assertion. But, in comparison to CEB (31%) and SEE (25 %), the CIS sticks out as the region where people's trust in other individuals is the highest.

- 40 % in the CIS and CEB agree that the economic situation is better today than before 1989. The SEE, on the other hand, is showing a severely pessimistic stance in this regard since only 20 % of its respondents agreed to this assertion.

- According to the survey, corruption has thrived with the transition. Only 19 % in the CIS thinks that corruption has been reduced in their country since 1989. For CEB only 12 %, and in SEE only 9 % believe that corruption has reduced since 1989.

- Also the view on the political situation is rather gloomy in all three regions. As little as 25 % believe that the political situation is better today than before 1989 in the SEE region. The CIS proves more optimistic with 40 % of its respondents agreeing to this assertion.

- However, despite the negative responses on contemporary trust in society, corruption, politics and economics, the three sub-regions show a marked preference for democracy and market economy. This could be partly explained by the high optimism that the respondents in the three sub-regions hold about the future. The CIS, holding the most optimistic respondents, had 60 % of its respondents agreeing to the claim that children who are born today will have a better life than their own generation. (Or is maybe an issue that people are less hesitant to complain in CEB and SEE?)

Preferences for political and economic systems

This is just a small pick from the report Life in Transition – A Survey of People’s Experiences and Attitudes from the EBRD. The full report includes data on topics, such as, Material Well-Being, Views on Transition, Values/Priorities and Corruption/Trust, separately for each of the transitional countries. A fantastic resource for researchers!

Follow this link to access the EBRD report, its questionnaires and data.

EBRD Life in Transition Survey | worth analyzing!

One of the most impressive recent survey efforts, measuring attitudes about different countries in transition, has been undertaken by EBRD. Called Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), this is an attempt to look at how 29 'transitioning' countries have developed following 1989. The survey tracks "public attitudes, well-being, and the impact of economic and political change".

LiTS is both encouraging and sobering at the same time. What is encouraging is that overall people, in spite of many hardships, do not want a return to centralized, authoritarian systems. At the same time, incomplete transition has left many people equivocal with regards to market systems. EBRD also notes that social capital remains in short supply.

The basic idea is set out succinctly in this EBRD presentation.

Life in Transition 2

View SlideShare presentation or Upload your own. (tags: ebrd economy)

(Note that we really think such presentations should be available under a Creative Commons license, since technically we are not sure whether we're allowed to share this, although it's available online.)

But beyond this, LiTS offers much more, and much more detail on the Caucasus. Let's look at some of the findings in more detail.

1. Satisfaction with life is relatively low in Armenia, and the old and poor tend to be most dissatisfied. Only 20% of those aged over 50 are satisfied with their lives. And among the poor, the situation is even worse: only 16% of those with lower income are satisfied with their lives. The situation is similar in Georgia, where only 12% of those aged 50-64 are satisfied with their life. By contrast, satisfaction with the economic and political situation is relatively strong in Azerbaijan, particularly among the 50- 64 age group. This seems to tally with what we saw in our own 2007 Data Initiative (although interesting to compare and contrast with Elvin Effendi's work).
2. In Armenia support for democracy and a market economy is weak, with just one in four favoring a combination of the two. In Georgia, there are high levels of support for democracy, but less for a market economy, with those aged over 65 most strongly opposed to both (over 50%). In Azerbaijan, support for democracy and a market economy is high, with the middle-aged the most supportive. However, there also is little interest in the political and economic system, with four out of ten believing that the type of political/economic system does not matter.
3. Azerbaijanis' trust in public institutions, especially in the presidency, government and the political parties is among the highest in the region. By contrast, trust in public institutions is very low in Armenia. The armed forces is the only public institution in Armenia that enjoys public trust.
4. Georgians report a decline of corruption in the country and the frequency of “irregular payments” to the public officials is significantly lower than elsewhere in the CIS regions. “Irregular payments”, especially in the healthcare and education spheres, remain relatively high both in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
5. In all three South Caucasus countries people surveyed are more optimistic about the future of their children. The optimism is significantly higher in Georgia, where almost 70% of those surveyed believe that their children’s lives will be better than their own.

Separately, we are really impressed by this entire effort. It is a genuine public good. EBRD is frank about discussing shortcomings and challenges in the societies (and therefore note that the views are those of the Office of the Chief Economist, not necessarily of the entire Bank). This is incredibly refreshing in an environment where blandness prevails. The data set is publicly accessible, there's detailed documentation about questionnaire, fieldwork, methodology. And most of the material is available online.

The full printed report (soon in our libraries, if you find it too expensive) is written so well that it makes engaging bedtime reading. Our only huge regret is that these discussions seem not to have been carried into the relevant societies. If any donor is short of creative ideas, surely this is a way to go: let's get this data studied and analyzed locally, and let's get the discussions onto TV. (If anyone needs help with the dataset, let us know, or come to our offices.)

Gender, Georgia and the “F” Word

Georgian women have a significant history of being politically active and engaged. In fact, more women than men died in the April 1989 massacre by Soviet forces in Tbilisi. During Georgia’s nationalist movement, and indeed through many of its transitions, issues of gender equality were viewed as peripheral, if not irrelevant. Tamar Sabedashvili, commissioned by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, took a retroactive look at Georgia’s democratic developments from 1991-2003 with an emphasis on the post-Rose Revolution period. She sought to explore how these transitions have affected women, if women have an increased presence in politics, or if a robust women’s movement has been spurred.

Much of Sabedashvili’s commentary is predictable. It is not shocking that Georgian women have not made large strides in representation in politics or increased wages and job opportunities. Georgia has de jure gender equality, which is convenient while on the books, but largely immaterial in practice. She articulates two major reasons for this stagnation, one being that women’s groups do not articulate their needs well, and a general lack of political will.

What was particularly interesting was Sabedashvili’s review of the actual wording in the Georgian Constitution, which is replete with institutionalized paternalism. Women are mentioned only twice in the Constitution, in the same class as minors, and contextualized by their roles as mothers and spouses. The Constitution confers responsibility on the state as guarantor of gender equality but the quality of legislation is sorely lacking, and legislation itself is not sufficient to uproot such deeply entrenched attitudes as on the competency of women in politics (a poll found that in general men were believed to be “better politicians” than women) and the traditionalist influence of the Church. The Constitution uses gender-neutral terminology such as “citizen,” “person,” and “individual,” as though it is unnecessary to differentiate citizens on the basis of sex; Sabedashvili reminds us that the “history of legal thought” regarded men as the subjects of law, so terminology should be changed to read “men and women” instead of just “persons.”

Georgian Constitutional Article 6, Paragraph 2 declares that international law – both treaty-based and customary- takes precedence over domestic normative acts. International law however needs first to be implemented in the form of domestic legislation. Georgia cannot complete its treaty obligations on gender equality without first implementing operational corresponding legislation- and then applying that legislation.

In exploring the problems associated with guaranteeing human rights, Sabedashvili referenced the “possession paradox,” the problem that arises when a person has the right to something without the corresponding right (and actual practice) to enforcement of said right.

Sabedashvili’s article brings up many interesting and varied questions on the relevance of Western feminist thought, cultural relativism, and gender equality in Georgia, which can be expanded to include many developing countries and the general international discourse. The influence of the Church in Georgia is immeasurable, and is a great contributing factor in conservative and paternalistic attitudes towards women in Georgia. The passage of October 2000’s UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security put a female representative in the Georgia’s Office of the State Minister for Conflict Resolution but women as of yet not been invited to the formal conflict resolution process.

One of the key propositions Sabedashvili gives is for Georgian women’s groups to identify roadblocks and create strategies to cooperate with each other and better influence policymakers. International development organizations can consult and disseminate aid until there is none left to give, but without an authentic grassroots movement and a targeted Georgian approach to these problems, their actions and roles in Georgian society will be limited.

Sabedashvili's paper can be found here.

Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi: Similarities and Differences

The term metropolis has gained increased intellectual backing in recent years. Indeed, several social researchers have postulated that, due to the dyanism of large cities, cities will continue to look more theoretically similar to each other. A postulate of this theory is that urban and rural communities within the same countries will continue to diverge in terms of behavior on a wide range of issues. Samvel Manukyan's research locates itself within this debate and begins to develop some indicators for comparing urban development across the South Caucasus. The scholar conducted a cross-country analysis of the sociopolitical processes in the capital cities of Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi.

By analyzing the regional CRRC Data Initiative (DI) 2004 database, Manukyan constructed several typologies of SC capitals’ societies and used mathematical methods to explain the socioeconomic, political, demographic and cultural trends in the region. For instance, he introduced the term “traditionality index,” which is a function of various elements of social behavior. Among other results, he found that men and women in Tbilisi had the most liberal behavior, followed by Yerevan; and that people were most conservative (traditional) in Baku. Overall, Manukyan found that the post-Soviet transition has led to the reconstruction of national self-identification across the South Caucasus capitals. In his 150-page report the researcher developed tools (indices) to measure how the three South Caucasus capitals follow specific patterns in terms of freedom of behavior, as well as the level of tolerance both within and across societies. In his research, the fellow cooperated with Irakli Sakandelidze from Georgia and Inshallah Gafarov from Azerbaijan.

Not surprisingly, the research shows that the South Caucasus cities may not have many of the characteristics of metropolises. However, the research creates a framework to investigate the continuing transitions on the capital cities of Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan.

Manukyan's report, in Armenian, is available here.