Public Perceptions of Georgia's Potential Involvement in a War

Most Georgians believe it is unlikely the country will become involved in a war, though a significant minority remain unsure. Perceptions of war risk differ across demographic groups and are strongly shaped by political views and media trust.

Peace is the core issue that Georgian Dream and its supporters frequently present as the government’s primary achievement. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine the ruling party has increasingly emphasized the threat of potential conflict and portray the preservation of peace as a key element of their success and a pillar of political stability.

In this context, understanding how the public perceives the likelihood of war becomes especially relevant. Data from CRRC Georgia’s spring 2024 Caucasus Barometer survey  suggests that a majority (62%) of the public considers it unlikely that Georgia will become involved in any war, while 16% consider it as likely. Nearly one in five people (21%) remain uncertain on the issue.

Further analysis shows that perceptions of the likelihood that Georgia may become involved in any war is associated with demographic factors such as age, education, and type of settlement. Older individuals (55+) are 15 percentage points while people between 35 and 54 years of age are 11 percentage points less likely to believe that Georgia will become involved in a war compared to younger people. Those with a technical secondary education perceive a higher risk of involvement than people with a lower level of education. Meanwhile, rural residents are more uncertain about the likelihood of war and are also less likely to think that war is likely.  

Notably respondent’s sex, employment status, ethnicity or household wealth does not significantly influence this perception.

Media trust is another important factor. Those who do not trust television are 12 percentage points more likely, and those who do not watch TV channels are 8 percentage points more likely, to perceive a higher risk of war compared to those who trust Imedi TV. Notably those who report that they trust Rustavi 2 for news on politics and events are 13 percentage point less likely to believe that Georgia will stay out of a war compared to those who trust Imedi TV.

Political preferences also appear to influence perceptions around the likelihood of war. People who support opposition parties are 10 points more likely to say that Georgia is likely to become involved in any war. Respondents who did not provide a party preference about party support are 5 percentage points more likely to respond “Don’t know” to the war risk question and 11 percentage points less likely to say war is unlikely compared to Georgian dream supporters.

Furthermore, beliefs about who is responsible for the war inUkraine are also associated with perceptions of the likelihood that Georgia will become involved in a war. Respondents who blame Ukraine or Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the war are 9 percentage point more likely to perceive that it is unlikely Georgia will be involved in any war, compared to those who blame Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In contrast, respondents who answered “Don’t Know” regarding responsibility are 19 percentage points less likely to believe that Georgia’s involvement in any war is unlikely, compared to those who blame Russia or Putin. Furthermore, those who are uncertain about who holds responsibility are also more likely to be undecided about Georgia’s potential involvement in a war, with 24 percentage point higher likelihood of choosing “Don’t Know” about risk of war. Finally, those who blame Ukraine or Zelensky are 10 points less likely to be undecided about Georgia’s potential involvement in a war compared to those who blame Russia or Putin.

Finally, perceptions of the country’s political direction are also linked to how people assess the risk of Georgia becoming involved in a war. People who believe Georgia is going in the right direction are 16 percentage points more likely to say war is unlikely compared to those who think it’s going in the wrong direction. Respondents who don’t know how the country is doing politically are less likely to say war is unlikely and more likely to say they don’t know about a risk of war. Those who think there’s no change in the political direction are 7 percentage points more likely to say “Don’t know” about a risk of war.

Finally, respondents who support Georgia’s EU membership are 9 percentage points less likely to believe that it is likely Georgia will become involved in a war, compared to those who do not support EU membership. In contrast, support for NATO membership shows no significant association with perceptions of war risk.

Overall, perceptions of Georgia’s potential involvement in a war is shaped not only by demographics, but also by political views, media trust, beliefs about responsibility for the war in Ukraine, perceptions of the country’s domestic politics and support of EU membership. Those who do not trust TV or watch TV are more likely to perceive a higher risk of Georgia’s involvement in a war. People who support opposition parties are also more likely to view the risk of involvement as higher. On the other hand, those who believe Georgia is going in the right direction are more likely to say war is unlikely, while those who feel there is no change in the political direction are more likely to say “Don’t know” about the risk of a war. Similarly, respondents who blame Ukraine or Zelensky for the war are more likely to think that Georgia will not become involved in any conflict. Notably, support for Georgia’s EU membership is associated with a lower perceived likelihood of the country becoming involved in a war.

This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia.

This analysis is based on a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable is ‘How likely or unlikely is it that Georgia gets involved in any war?’ with three answer options: Unlikely, Likely, and Don’t Know. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, education, ethnicity, employment, household wealth index, partisanship, trust towards TV stations, who holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine, In which direction is Georgia’s domestic politics going, to what extent would you support Georgia’s membership in the EU and to what extent you support Georgia’s membership in-NATO.

Georgians largely hold Russia and Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

While over half of all Georgians believe that Russia or Russian President Vladimir Putin holds the most responsibility for the full-scale war in Ukraine, a large minority, 17%, felt they were uncertain who to blame, while another 13% considered Ukraine or its president Volodymyr Zelenskyi personally responsible.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shaped global politics since its start. Past polling has shown that the public in Georgia, a country with its own territorial conflicts with Russia, has broadly supported Ukraine. Data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer survey from Spring 2024 suggests that most people in Georgia hold Putin and Russia responsible for the war.

The data shows that most Georgians (57%) believe that Russia or Putin holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Just one in eight Georgians (13%) considered Ukraine or Zelenskyi personally responsible.

However, notably, 17% of Georgians were uncertain and reported that they did not know who holds the most responsibility for this war.

Further analysis showed that beliefs about responsibility for the war in Ukraine were associated with age, political preferences, and perceptions of the likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

For example, respondents aged 35 and older were less likely to blame Russia or Putin compared to younger respondents aged 18–34.

In turn, women were nine percentage points more likely to report uncertainty, selecting ‘don’t know’ when asked about responsibility for the war in Ukraine, while people living in rural areas were 16 percentage points more likely to be undecided on the issue.

Opposition party supporters were 23 percentage points more likely to blame Russia/Putin than those who supported the ruling Georgian Dream party. They were also 14 percentage points less likely to be undecided about responsibility for the war in Ukraine compared to ruling party supporters.

Respondents who did not provide a party preference on the survey were 15 percentage points less likely to place blame on Zelenskyi or Ukraine compared to Georgian Dream supporters.

Respondents who were uncertain about the risk of Georgia’s involvement in any conflict were significantly less likely to blame either Ukraine/Zelenskyi or Russia/Putin, and were more likely to be undecided.

Most Georgians, particularly the younger generation and opposition party supporters, hold Russia or Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine. Women and people living in rural areas were more likely to be undecided. Those who were uncertain about Georgia’s potential involvement in war also tended to be undecided about who is to blame for the war.

This analysis is based on a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable is ‘Who holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine?’ with three answer options: Russia/Putin, Ukraine/Zelenskyi, and Don’t know. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, education, ethnicity, employment, partisanship, and the perceived likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

Who Do Georgians Blame For Russia's War in Ukraine?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a non-resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia.The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

In the face of conflicting narratives about the causes of the war in Ukraine, most Georgians see Russia and Putin as responsible for the conflict, but a substantial minority lay the blame with the West. Since Russia invaded Ukraine slightly over a year ago, a war of words has erupted over who is to blame for the war, with the general consensus being that Russia needlessly invaded Ukraine.

In contrast to this consensus, the Russian government has spread propaganda blaming Ukraine for the war, accusing the country’s Jewish president of being a Nazi and stating that the country needed to be ‘de-Nazified’.

Against this backdrop, and in light of Georgia’s history with Russia, what does the Georgian public think?

Data from CRRC-Georgia and the National Democratic Institute’s regular polling in Georgia suggests that most blame Russia as a whole, but an increasing proportion of the public blames Vladimir Putin specifically for the war. And while the majority of the public report that the war is Russia or Putin’s fault, one in six Georgians report that some Western actor is at fault for the war, while one in twelve blame Ukraine.

The share of Georgians blaming Russia and Putin for the war shifted in the year following the war, with the share blaming Russia declining from 67% in March of 2022, to 54% in December of 2022. There was a simultaneous rise in the share blaming Putin specifically, from 11% in March 2022 to 25% in December of that year.

A smaller but substantial proportion of the public considers the West to be responsible for the war in Ukraine. While relatively small shares blame NATO (2-3%) and the European Union (2-4%), a relatively high percentage blame the US. One in eleven (9%) blamed the United States in March, which rose to and stayed at 15% in July and December respectively.

Similarly, relatively few Georgians blame Ukraine for the war. This share stood at 5% in March 2022, rose to 11% in July 2022, and then moved to between these shares at 8% as of December 2022.

The remainder of the public is either uncertain about who to blame for the war (14-17%) or names some other factor (2%).

 

It is important to note that respondents could name up to three responses. Therefore, the shares do not necessarily sum to 100% on the chart above. In the first wave of the survey, Vladimir Putin was not specifically asked about, but respondents still named him. In subsequent waves of the survey, Vladimir Putin was added as a response option.

In the most recent wave of the survey, 59% of the public named only Russia or Vladimir Putin as responsible for the war. One in nine (11%) suggested that only Western actors were at fault for the war. A further 7% named at least one Western actor and one Russian actor. The remainder were mostly either uncertain on how to respond (15%) or refused to answer (1%). Other respondents blamed Ukraine as well as some combination of Russian and Western actors.

Who blames who?

The data suggest that men, people belonging to ethnic minorities, and Georgian Dream supporters are more likely to consider the West (including the US, EU, and NATO) at least somewhat responsible for the war, than are women, ethnic Georgians, and those that do not support Georgian Dream.Ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, those that claim they support no particular party, and people living in urban areas are more likely to blame Russia and/or Putin, compared to ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people in rural areas.

Ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, those that claim they support no particular party, and people living in urban areas are more likely to blame Russia and/or Putin, compared to ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people in rural areas.

Men and Georgian Dream supporters are more likely to believe that Ukraine is at fault for the war than women and opposition supporters. 

 

Women, people with vocational education, those outside Tbilisi, poorer people, and people who support Georgian Dream are more likely than men, people with secondary education, those in Tbilisi, wealthier people, and those who support the opposition to be uncertain about the causes of the war.

 

The data do not suggest that any particular group is more or less likely to name at least one Russian actor and one Western actor for the war.

While Russia’s fault in the war is questioned by relatively few in Georgia, the data do show that some groups are more likely than others to believe that Western actors or Ukraine itself is partially or fully at fault. A substantial share also remains uncertain.


Note: The social and demographic breakdowns shown in the article above were generated from a regression analysis. The analysis had someone’s belief about who was at fault for the war as the dependent variable, including naming Russia/Putin or not, naming any Western institution or not, naming both a Western and a Russian actor or not, and naming Ukraine or not. The independent variables included age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, or rural), education level (secondary, vocational, tertiary), wealth (an index of durable goods owned by the respondents’ household), ethnicity (ethnic minority or ethnic Georgian), employment (working, unemployed, or outside the labor force), and party support (Georgian Dream, United National Movement, other opposition, refuse to answer/don’t know/no party). This article only reports on statistically significant differences between groups.