New Year’s twice, even if you don’t believe in Santa

[This piece originally appeared in Georgian on Liberali, here]

December. Cold. Christmas decorations in the streets. New Year. Champagne. Satsivi and Gozinaki. Presents. Santa Claus. December 25. Or January 6? Then New Year’s once again, but the old one. 2017 resolutions and the wish on New Year’s Eve that is bound to come true.

What are the population of Georgia’s New Year’s plans? CRRC-Georgia asked on December 1-13 in a phone survey of adults in Georgia. Unsurprisingly, people in Georgia follow established traditions. A large majority (73%) plan to ring in the New Year at home. Nine per cent more will meet it in a friend’s or relative’s home. Meeting the New Year outside in the street or in a restaurant and café is not yet common, and only one per cent of Georgians plan to. Another 15% had not decided in the first half of December where they would celebrate the New Year.

Since a large majority of people celebrate New Year’s at home, holiday decorations are important. Only 4% of the population does not plan to have a Christmas tree. A large majority (76%) will have an artificial tree and about one tenth (13%) a natural tree. Meanwhile, 59% of people also plan to have Chichilaki at home.

Traditionally, one of the main components of New Year’s celebrations is the New Year’s feast. Of the dishes from the New Year’s table, over one third (38%) of Georgia’s adult population singles out Satsivi, about a fourth (24%) Gozinaki and about one tenth (9%) fried suckling pig as their favorite.

For many, New Year’s is associated with presents. About two thirds of Georgia’s population (62%) plan to buy presents for family members. Some people used to believe or still believe that presents come from Santa (Tovlis Babu). It appears that about one third of Georgia’s adult population believed in Santa through the age of 10. However, almost one fourth (24%) never believed in Santa. Despite this, the magic of New Year’s Eve is not lost on the majority. Two thirds of the Georgian population (66%) have made a wish on New Year’s.

New Year’s, with its feast, Christmas tree and fireworks, is celebrated twice in Georgia. An absolute majority of people (88%) say they celebrate the Old New Year as well as well as the new one. People also seem to be interested in the Chinese calendar and closely follow which animal is the symbol of the coming year. A majority of Georgians (68%) plan to or already have bought a rooster souvenir for 2017, the year of the rooster.

Just as New Year’s has two days, so too does Christmas – the latter is celebrated on different dates by different Christian churches. About two thirds of the Georgian population (64%) believes Christmas should be celebrated on January 7. However, about one tenth of people (12%) say Christmas in Georgia should be celebrated on December 25. At the same time, not so small a share of the Georgian population (18%) reports that Christmas, like New Year’s, should be celebrated on both days.

Having holidays twice is not so uncommon in Georgia after all.

Electoral forensics on the 2016 parliamentary elections

In order to help monitor the fidelity of the October 2016 parliamentary election results, CRRC-Georgia has carried out quantitative analysis of election-related statistics within the auspices of the Detecting Election Fraud through Data Analysis (DEFDA) project. Within the project we used methods from the field of election forensics. Election forensics is a field in political science that attempts to identify election day issues through looking at statistical patterns in election returns. This blog post reports the results of our analysis of the 2016 proportional election results. The full report of the analysis is available here.

Our analysis suggests that the results of the 2016 elections were roughly equivalent to the 2012 proportional list elections.

Before going further into the results, two caveats and a note on methods are needed. To start with the two caveats:

• Results are probabilistic. A test may return a statistically anomalous result, and this suggests that a given result is highly unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The way in which we calculate the test statistics is likely to provide 1 false positive for every 100 tests performed.
• If a test does suggest a statistical anomaly, it does not necessarily mean that election-related malfeasance caused the result, but that it may have. Statistical anomalies can be caused by benign activities such as strategic voting or divergent voting patterns within a region. Electoral malfeasance does often cause a positive test result, however. Hence, substantive knowledge and judgment of each positive test are required to determine whether malfeasance actually did occur.

When it comes to methods, to be frank, they are relatively complex. Rather than dive into the details here, we recommend that interested readers see Hicken and Mebane, 2015, here. Below we present the results of the following election forensics tests:

• Mean of second digit in turnout;
• Skew of turnout;
• Kurtosis of turnout;
• Means of the final digit in turnout;
• Frequency of zeros and fives in the final digit in turnout;
• Unimodality test of turnout distribution.

Results

In 2016, three of the six tests were set off:

By comparison, in 2012 two of six tests were also set off. However, one test – of the second digit mean – was exceptionally close to being set off. Due to the nature of the method – bootstrapping uses resampling with replacement – this test just as well could have been set off if run again.

Given the borderline nature of the 2012 tests, providing a conclusive comparison of the two elections is somewhat difficult. However, since the test results are roughly equivalent, the tests are indicative rather than definitive, and the elections by most accounts have been considered broadly free and fair, despite having clear issues, and the 2012 elections were considered to be broadly free and fair, despite also having clear issues, we consider the 2016 election results to also be broadly free and fair.
For more on the subject, take a look at our final report for the DEFDA project, available here.

Note: The DEFDA project is funded by the Embassy of the United States of America in Georgia, however, none of the views expressed in the above blog post represent the views of the US Embassy in Georgia or any related US Government entity.

Number of logical inconsistencies in 2016 election protocols decline

Following the 2016 parliamentary elections, a number of politicians questioned the results based on logical inconsistencies on election protocols. Some of the election protocols, which summarize election results for individual voting stations, reported that more voters had come to the polls than actually cast ballots while others reported that more votes had been cast than voters came to the polling station.  While both did happen, the Central Election Commission has made dramatic improvements compared to Georgia’s 2012 parliamentary elections.

In the 2012 parliamentary elections, according to an analysis of data the Central Election Commission provided, in the proportional list elections alone there were over 30,000 more voters that came to the polls than cast ballots. In 2016, there were less than 3000 such voters – a clear improvement.

Not only were there more voters than votes in many precincts – there were more votes cast than voters that came to the polls, again according to the official record. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, there were 696 more votes than signatures for those votes. By comparison, in 2016 there were 76 – again a clear improvement.

A third logical inconsistency present in the data is declining turnout. In the 2012 elections, in 8 precincts, there were more votes at 12PM than at 5PM. That is to say that the precincts recorded declining turnout. In 2016, by contrast, only one precinct reported declining turnout, again, a clear improvement.

While the CEC has clearly improved its recording of the vote in 2016, and small mismatches are bound to happen, any voter may reasonably ask themselves – if the CEC cannot make election protocols add up, how do I know my vote counted? Thus, we strongly recommend that the CEC make efforts to minimize the number of logical inconsistencies in future elections. Some recommendations on how the CEC might do so are available in our report on the 2016 elections.

Note: The DEFDA project is funded by the Embassy of the United States of America in Georgia, however, none of the views expressed in the above blog post represent the views of the US Embassy in Georgia or any related US Government entity.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance (Part 3)

As the first blog post in this series highlighted, approval by Georgians for doing business with members of other ethnic groups is, overall, declining. When it comes to Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities, Georgians are even less approving. These latter attitudes vary by settlement type, age, and level of education. As in the previous blog posts in this series, only the answers of ethnic Georgians are presented in this blog post.

Georgians living in the capital report the highest approval of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities. On average, there is a 14 percentage point difference between the population of the capital and rural settlements. The biggest gap is with Americans (19%): 54% of Georgians in Tbilisi approve of Georgian women marrying Americans, while only 35% of the rural population say the same. The gap is smallest with Russians: 55% in the capital and 45% in rural settlements approve of Georgian women marrying Russians.

Note: Only shares of those answering “Approve” are presented on the charts in this blog post. 

Differences between the answers of people of different ages are also noteworthy, though the gaps are smaller. Overall, younger people show greater approval of Georgian women marrying foreigners. The biggest gap is observed in respect to marrying Americans (14%): while 50% of young people 18 to 35 approve of Georgian women marrying Americans, only 36% of older people (56+) say the same.

Differences by education level are also informative. The higher a person’s level of education, the more s/he tends to approve of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities. On average, there is a ten percentage point gap between people with secondary or lower education and those with tertiary education. As with settlement types and age groups, the largest gap is observed in relation to Americans. Only 37% of people with secondary or lower education approve of Georgian women marrying Americans, while 51% of people with tertiary education report the same.

Approval by Georgians of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities varies by settlement type, education, and, to a lesser extent, by age. Interestingly, the gaps between the groups are consistently greatest when it comes to (dis)approval of Georgian women marrying Americans.

To take a deeper look at the data used in this blog post, try out our online data analysis tool.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance (Part 2)

In the previous blog post, we saw that Georgians report approval of doing business with representatives of other ethnic groups less than in the past. Based on CRRC’s 2015 Caucasus Barometer data, this blog post looks at how (dis)approval differs for Georgians of different ages, and living in different settlement types. 

People living in rural settlements report disapproval of business relations with representatives of the other ethnic groups asked about more often than residents of the capital and other urban settlements. On average, 56% of rural residents report approval of doing business with the 11 other ethnicities asked about over time, while the average for Tbilisi residents is 78%. 

Note: Only the answers of those answering “Approve” are shown on the charts in this blog post. 

The highest reported levels of approval of doing business with foreigners in rural settlements was with Russians and Ukrainians, both at 69%. By comparison, in the capital, 83% and 89% approved of doing business with Russians and Ukrainians, respectively. The largest differences between the attitudes of the population of rural settlements and the capital are when it comes to Jews and Kurds/Yezidis, with approximately 30 percentage point gaps. 

Differences in the attitudes by age are also noteworthy, though the gaps are not as large as in the case of settlement types. On average, there is a 10 percentage point difference between the youngest (18-35) and the oldest group (56+). Georgians who are 56 and older show less approval of doing business with non-Georgians asked about, with the largest difference in the case of Americans: 79% of 18 to 35 year olds approve of doing business with them, while only 61% of people older than 56 say the same. The gap is almost the same in the case of Ukrainians. 

Young Georgians and those living in the capital and other urban settlements approve of doing business with people of other ethnicities more than older Georgians and those living in rural settlements. In the next blog post in this series, we present findings on who approves of Georgian women marrying men of other ethnicities. 

Explore more about attitudes towards non-Georgians in Georgia here.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance (Part 1)

Overall, the population of Georgia reports supporting inter-ethnic business relations. Yet, CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB) longitudinal data show this support is declining. In 2015, Georgians were less likely to report approval of doing business with representatives of all ethnicities asked about than they were in 2009. Interestingly, only (dis)approval of doing business with Russians did not change. These trends are presented in this blog post.

While there is a general downward trend in approval of doing business with non-Georgians between 2009 and 2015, the largest drops were observed between 2009 and 2010 and then between 2013 and 2015. In 2015, the highest level of approval was for doing business with Russians (76%, discussed below separately) and Americans (72%). The lowest reported level of approval was for doing business with Kurds (55%). The relative positions of different ethnicities have been largely stable over time.

Note: Only the shares of ethnic Georgians answering “Approve” are shown on this chart. CB was not conducted in 2014.

CB survey results show that Georgians’ support for doing business with other Caucasians is also declining. In 2015, the highest reported level of approval of doing business with other Caucasian groups was with Abkhazians (69%), while the lowest was with Armenians (60%). Both of these levels of approval are much lower than in 2009. The biggest drops between 2009 and 2015 are in approval of doing business with Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which declined by 15 and 17 percentage points, respectively.

Note: Only the shares of ethnic Georgians answering “Approve” are shown in this chart. CB was not conducted in 2014. 

At the same time, clearly stated disapproval of doing business with all the above ethnicities is increasing. In other words, an active substitution of disapproval for approval is observed.

Of the ethnicities CB asked about, only (dis)approval of doing business with Russians has been steady between 2009 and 2015, exhibiting only minor fluctuations.

The decrease in approval and increase in disapproval of Georgians doing business with other ethnicities over the past six years is considerable. Except Russians, approval of doing business with even the most liked ethnicities CB asked about is declining. In addition, data measuring (dis)approval of doing business with Greeks, Italians, and Iranians, which only exists for some years, also shows a decline in approval over time. Importantly, the rates of approval for doing business with non-Georgians are already systematically higher than rates of approval for Georgian women marrying non-Georgians.

Explore more about attitudes towards non-Georgians in Georgia here.

Georgians and other ethnic groups: understanding (in)tolerance

From the events of May 17th, 2013 when Orthodox priests and their supporters attacked demonstrators at an International Day Against Homophobia rally, to more recently when “sausage-wielding nationalists” attacked a vegan café in Tbilisi, various forms of intolerance have put Georgia into headlines internationally in recent years.

The coming posts on Social Science in the Caucasus will use CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer data (CB) to explore indicators of ethnic (in)tolerance in Georgia. Specifically, we use two questions:

• Can you please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with an [ethnic group]?
• Would you approve or disapprove of women of your ethnicity marrying an [ethnic group]?

The blog posts in this series only report the answers of ethnic Georgians.

The data reveals a number of interesting trends and patterns. Today’s post looks at which ethnicities Georgians approve of doing business with and how (dis)approval has changed over time. Diving further into this issue, the second post looks at how (dis)approval of doing business with other ethnicities differs by age and settlement type. The third post mirrors the second, looking at (dis)approval of Georgian women marrying non-Georgians by age, settlement type, and education level.

Part 1 of this series is available here.
Part 2 of this series is available here.
Part 3 of this series is available here.

Georgian parliamentary elections 2016 - Gender and ethnic minority representation on party lists

[This post was co-published with our partner, civil.ge]

The results of the 2016 Parliamentary elections in Georgia reveal some interesting patterns about the representation of women and ethnic minorities in Georgian politics. In the run-up to the election, lawmakers considered instituting gender quotas to come closer to the United Nations’ target of 30% of seats in parliament filled by women. Civil society organizations also lamented low ethnic minority participation in elections in Georgia. In this election cycle, women won 24 out of 150 seats (16.0%) in the upcoming parliament, and ethnic minority candidates won 11 seats (7.3%). While these figures still fall well short of international recommendations, Georgia’s next parliament will have the highest share of women and ethnic minorities that it ever has.

However, substantial roadblocks to the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in electoral politics still exist. After the 2012 elections, the European Center for Minority Issues assessed party list composition as one of the major factors preventing women and representatives of ethnic minorities from being represented fairly in the parliament of Georgia. The infographic below shows the top six vote-getting parties in the 2016 election, ranked by shares of women and representatives of ethnic minorities on their party lists.

Not surprisingly, in the two parties that are led by women (Nino Burjanadze - Democratic Movement and the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia, chaired by Irma Inashvili), women tend to be better represented throughout the entire list, in spite of the fact that these two parties are generally seen as conservative by international observers. Importantly, the party that won a constitutional majority, the Georgian Dream (GD), had the lowest share of women on its party list (11.6%) of the top six parties. However, female candidates’ average number on the GD party list was 14 positions higher than that of male candidates (respectively, 65.7 and 79.7).

In terms of ethnic minorities, the upcoming parliament will include representatives of several ethnic groups, including Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Ossetians, Abkhaz, and Yezidis. Of the top six parties, the United National Movement (UNM) had the most ethnic minorities on its list, including Samira Ismailova, the first Azerbaijani female majoritarian candidate in Georgia’s history. Election results show that GD and UNM are still dominant in districts heavily populated by ethnic minorities, although a few other parties have made efforts to include similar or even greater shares of ethnic minority candidates on their party lists.

To explore this subject further, take a look at our Online Data Analysis platform, which has a number of surveys which asked about attitudes towards ethnic minority and gender representation in parliament. Also, take a look at CRRC blog posts on the representation of women in Georgia’s parliament compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan and public opinion about women in parliament in Georgia.

Books in Georgia

Who watches foreign television news in Georgia?

Foreign influence in Georgia's media is a popular topic of discussion for the press, academic researchers, politicians, and press freedom watchdog groups alike. However, they focus mainly on media sources’ countries of origin, content of news reporting, and the effect(s) on public opinion in Georgia. Missing from the conversation is an understanding of who actually consumes foreign media in Georgia. This is an important piece of the puzzle. A link between foreign media consumption and voting behavior in Georgia is a popular supposition, but is impossible to test without an understanding of who foreign media’s audience is. The June 2016 CRRC-NDI survey Public Attitudes in Georgia provides interesting information about some characteristics of foreign language TV viewers in Georgia. Notably, the survey results show that while more viewers of news programs on foreign language TV channels reported that they would vote if elections were held tomorrow, there are not large differences in support for the four major political parties in Georgia between those who watch news on foreign TV and those who only watch Georgian-language news programs.

TV is the main source of information about politics and current events for a majority of Georgia's population—77% pick TV as their primary source, and an additional 12% choose it as their secondary source. However, only 23% of the population of Georgia, irrespective of whether they name TV as their primary or secondary source of information, reports watching programs on politics and current events on foreign TV channels. Four out of the five most frequently mentioned foreign language TV channels watched by these 23% broadcast in the Russian language (Russia Channel One, RTR, Russia 1 and Russia 24), while the fifth (Euronews) broadcasts in both English and Russian.

How does the 23% of Georgia’s population that watches programs on politics and current events on foreign TV channels compare demographically and politically to the rest, who report only watching news on Georgian-language channels? Some characteristics of the former group are intuitive. For example, about half of the population of ethnic minority settlements (52%) report watching the news on foreign language TV channels. In contrast, only a quarter of the population in urban settlements outside of Tbilisi report watching the news on foreign language TV channels, while those living in Georgia’s rural non-ethnic minority settlements report the lowest viewership (14%).

A larger share of viewers 36 and older tend to watch foreign (especially Russian-language) TV channels for information on politics and current events than younger viewers. This likely reflects the patterns of knowledge of the Russian language in Georgia. According to the CRRC’s 2015 Caucasus Barometer survey, 40% of Georgia’s population 35 and younger report either not having any knowledge, or a beginner’s level of knowledge of the Russian language, compared to only 19% of the population between 36 and 55, and 27% of the population who are 56 and older.

On the other hand, some characteristics of foreign news program audiences in Georgia are not as obvious. For example, a slightly higher share (25%) of those who reported that they would vote in parliamentary elections if they were held tomorrow watch foreign language news programs than likely abstainers (19%). Twenty-eight percent of decided voters also reported that they follow programs on politics and current events on foreign channels, compared to 20% of undecided voters.

Note: A 10-point scale was used to record the answers to the question, “If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, would you vote or not?”, where option 1 corresponded to the answer “Certainly will not vote”, and option 10 corresponded to the answer “Will certainly vote”. For this blog post, the original scale was recoded, so that those choosing option 10 were coded as “Likely voters” (67%), while all those choosing options were grouped into “Likely abstainers” (33%).

If viewers of foreign TV news report slightly more often that they are likely to vote, and that they have made a decision regarding who to vote for, the question emerges – are their political affiliations any different from their counterparts who only watch domestic TV news? Interestingly, the party preferences of the two audiences show no statistically significant differences between them. Even when the data are separated further to distinguish between viewers of Russian-language TV and other foreign language TV, there is no difference in reported party preferences between the groups.

Hence, watching programs on politics and current events on foreign TV channels does not appear to tilt voters towards particular parties. Deciding which political party to vote for in Georgia is a complex process. Understandably, voters take into account a large number of individual, social, and political factors when making decisions at the voting booth. While viewers of foreign TV news may be slightly more willing to vote, and surer of their voting choices, the choices they make are similar to those who watch domestic TV channels.

To explore the data in more depth, try CRRC's Online Data Analysis tool. If you are interested in the landscape of popular media in Georgia, check out CRRC's earlier blog posts on the role of the Georgian Public Broadcaster, Georgia's press freedom ranking, and Russia's influence on Georgia's media.

Perceptions of closeness: Opinions about which regions’ traditions and modern culture are closest to Armenian’s and Georgian’s

CRRC’s 2015 Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey asked the populations of Georgia and Armenia to identify the regions in the world whose traditions and modern culture are, in their opinion, closest to Armenia’s and Georgia’s. While most people in both countries feel closest to neighboring countries, many found it difficult to answer the questions. While there are many commonalities in responses to these questions in Armenia and Georgia, there are also minor differences.

Two questions were asked in CB. One focused on traditions and the other on modern culture. In both cases, the same show card was offered to the respondents. When it comes to traditions, the populations of both countries named most often “neighboring countries in the South Caucasus”, but this answer was more common in Armenia (36%) than in Georgia (27%). Interestingly, in both countries people found it similarly difficult to answer this question. Roughly one third of Armenians (30%) and Georgians (36%) could not or refused to answer the question.

Besides similarities, there are also differences. The “European part of Russia” was the second most common answer in Georgia (15%), and the third most common in Armenia (8%). In Armenia, “Neighboring countries in Asia” was the second most common answer, although the difference in frequencies of naming these regions in Armenia is within the margin of error. It is clear though that the population of Georgia generally does not consider the traditions of “Neighboring countries in Asia” to be close to Georgian traditions.  

The responses did not change much when people were asked which region’s modern culture they considered closest to their own. Slightly more Armenians (30%) named neighboring countries in the South Caucasus than did Georgians (23%), and the “European part of Russia” was, again, the second most common response in Georgia (13%) and third in Armenia (8%), with even higher shares of those answering “Don’t know”. Importantly, comparison of the answers to these two questions suggests that the populations of these countries do not see important differences between the traditions, on the one hand, and modern cultures, on the other hand, of the regions worldwide. 

Interestingly, in both countries, responses are quite similar in different settlement types (Georgia, Armenia), age groups (Georgia, Armenia), and by gender (Georgia, Armenia).

Despite minor differences, the populations of Armenia and Georgia have similar views about their cultures’ propinquity to other cultures in the world. Yet, in both countries a large share of the population find it difficult to answer the respective questions.

The datasets used in this blog post and related documentation are available at CRRC’s online data analysis platform. 

Trends in the data: Changes in Employment Sector and Type of Employment in Georgia

According to CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB) surveys from 2008 to 2015, the self-reported employment rate is rather stable in Georgia – approximately 35%. This blog post looks at the trends in CB data on primary employment sector and type of primary workplace. Throughout the post, only the answers of those who reported being employed – slightly above a third of the population – are analyzed.

In 2015, as in previous waves of CB, the largest share of those who considered themselves employed – 14% – reported being employed in the agriculture, hunting, or forestry sector. Importantly, however, this share has declined considerably since 2008, when 29% of the employed reported being employed in this sector. Over the same period, the shares of those employed in other major sectors (trade, education, construction) have remained stable.

Note: In addition to actual responses of “Other”, several other options of low frequency are also included in this category on the chart above. That is, category “Other” in this chart includes responses “Healthcare and Social work”, “Financial Intermediation and Banking”, “Hotels, Restaurants, Cafes”, “Manufacturing”, “Transport and Storage”, “Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply” and “Mining and Quarrying”. 

A similar downward trend is observed between 2008 and 2015 in the share of employees who reported “owning a business without employees.” While in 2008, this share was about a third of those who were employed, roughly equal to those employed by state organizations, it decreased to 21% in 2015.

Although these two findings are not necessarily related, they show interesting trends in the employment situation in Georgia. Fewer people report working in the agriculture, hunting, and forestry sector, and fewer people report being sole proprietors than in the past. Both these trends suggest that the composition of the Georgian labor market may be shifting, and both call for further and thorough analysis.

CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey data and respective documentation are available at our online data analysis tool.

Analysis of Preliminary Election Results

[The final results of the DEFDA project's election forensics are available here. This blog post misreports one statistic (second digit mean of the 2012 proportional list results) due to a coding error during analysis. The above linked blog presents the final results.]

In order to help monitor the fidelity of the October 2016 parliamentary election results, CRRC-Georgia has carried out quantitative analysis of election-related statistics within the auspices of the Detecting Election Fraud through Data Analysis (DEFDA) project. Within the project we used methods from the field of election forensics. Election forensics is a field in political science that attempts to identify election day issues through looking at statistical patterns in election returns. This blog post reports the results of our analysis.

Our preliminary analysis suggests that the quality of the 2016 proportional list elections when it comes to election day was equivalent to the 2012 proportional list elections.

Before diving further into the results, several notes are needed. First, the data we used is preliminary. Jumpstart Georgia coordinated the double blind entry of election protocols with volunteers. We used their database, which is available here.  Second, the results presented in this blog post are based on data downloaded from Jumpstart’s platform on October 11th. Since then, the CEC appears to have added additional amendments to election protocols, which may change results.  Third, the analysis presented in this blog post is based on protocols from the 3491 protocols available on the 11th. Fourth, the test results are probabilistic. False positives should be expected 1 in 100 times. Fifth, the test results require substantive knowledge of the situation to interpret.

Below we present the results of the following election forensics tests:

• Mean of second digit in turnout;
• Skew of turnout;
• Kurtosis of turnout;
• Means of the final digit in turnout;
• Frequency of zeros and fives in the final digit in turnout;
• Unimodality test of turnout distribution.

Without getting into too much detail, we use a statistical method known as bootstrapping to generate a range of numbers by which the actually observed value for the above numbers could have fallen by chance (except for the final test, which looks at how many modes the distribution of turnout has). We then check whether the theoretically expected value for each is within the range generated by bootstrapping. In instances when the expected value does not fall within the generated range, it suggests the need for further investigation. The math and theory behind the above indicators is rather complex, and so here, rather than presenting this in more detail, we recommend interested readers take a look at Allen Hicken and Walter Mebane Jr.’s Guide to Election Forensics.

Below are the preliminary results of the above tests for the 2012 and 2016 proportional elections.

As the table shows, three test results were suspicious in 2012. The table below shows the results of the tests for the 2016 elections.

As you can see from the above results, in both elections, three tests were set off. Our interpretation of this is that the proportional elections, in terms of election day polling place activities, were roughly equivalent in quality as the 2012 elections. Given that the 2012 elections were considered to be broadly free and fair, our preliminary analysis suggests that the 2016 elections were broadly free and fair as well.

It is important to remember that these results are preliminary, and a blog post on our final results is forthcoming. For more on the subject, take a look at our past blog posts on the subject and keep an eye out for our report on the subject which will come out following the second round of the majoritarian elections.

Note: The DEFDA project is funded by the Embassy of the United States of America in Georgia, however, none of the views expressed in the above blog post represent the views of the US Embassy in Georgia or any related US Government entity.

Georgia is voting this Saturday. Here are 7 things you should know

[Note: This post was originally published on the Washington Post's Monkey Cage on Thursday, October 6, 2016. The original post is available here. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Transparify, University of Colorado, Boulder, or any donor.]

By David Sichinava and Dustin Gilbreath

Voters are heading to the polls on October 8th in Georgia, the ex-Soviet republic, to elect its 150-seat parliament. For a country that has experienced near-continual political instability for the last 25 years, things have been calmer than usual this election season. Here’s what’s happening:

1. Things were relatively calm, and then a car bomb went off

Georgia has a history of colorful leaders and raucous elections. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, a prison torture scandal rocked the political landscape. In a not-so-democratic maneuver in 2014, Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili announced his Georgian Dream (GD) party “will not allow victory of any other political force in any town or district.”

In comparison, these elections had appeared quite calm. Current Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili has emphasized that while he expects GD to win, the most important thing is that the elections are free and fair. His tweets emphasize progress on governance and electoral reforms, and he invited numerous poll monitors to the October 8 elections.

There have been unruly moments. Rival politicians doused each other with water during a talk show - and on September 27, a recording surfaced  on YouTube suggesting the current opposition United National Movement (UNM) party might support a coup.

Then, on October 4th a bomb went off in a UNM politician’s car. While it is unclear who was responsible, the Prime Minister warned on Wednesday that the blast could be an attempt to destabilize the country just days before the October election.

2. The two main parties are likely to win seats

There are 25 parties running in the current elections. Polls to date suggest both GD and UNM will obtain seats in parliament. This may signal an important step - Georgia’s party system may be stabilizing. In the past, each government turnover saw the previous ruling party disappear altogether. The polling suggests the UNM appears to have developed a strong party base.

3. Georgian Dream may have a slight edge 

In Georgia’s mixed electoral system, there are 73 single-member constituency seats up for election, but candidates must have over 50 percent of the vote to win a seat outright. The remaining 77 seats go to parties by proportional representation - parties maintain a list of their candidates, but must win at least 5 percent of the national vote to claim their share of these seats.

The party list system may give GD a slight edge as they are leading in the polls. GD is also likely to win more seats in the individual races, because first-past-the-post elections favor the larger parties. Former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili predicts his GD party will get 100 seats in parliament. In 2008, the UNM pulled off a similar feat to what Georgian Dream is planning: with 59 percent of the party list vote, they took 79 percent of the overall seats in parliament.

4. A new electoral law protects the equality of the vote, but the redistricting is perhaps less than equal 

Last year, the Constitutional Court ruled the country’s electoral boundaries were unconstitutional. The issue was the one-person, one-vote principle. In Kutaisi, 162,732 voters elected one representative in the first-past-the-post races. So did 5,810 voters in mountainous Kazbegi, meaning their vote had 28 times as much influence as a Kutaisian voter.

In response, the government redistricted – but there’s some evidence of gerrymandering. Our research shows that Georgian Dream would have won nine extra seats in 2012 if the new electoral system had been in place. And there are a few funny-looking electoral districts that have non-contiguous territory, which likely will give GD an electoral advantage.

A 2016 map showing some of Georgia’s new single-member constituency districts electoral districts. Areas from different administrative regions combined to form the 13th district, while districts 31 and 32 have non-contiguous sections.

Data: Central Elections Commission of Georgia and Caucasus Research Resource Centers-Georgia

Figure: David Sichinava

5. What’s likely to happen to pro-Russian parties? 

The coming parliament is likely to represent the political center, rather than parties at the pro-Russian or pro-Western extremes. The (quasi) pro-Russian party most likely to gain seats is the Patriot’s Alliance. While survey data suggest Patriot’s Alliance supporters are likely to support a Russia-oriented foreign policy, the party’s platform is largely pro-Western, and their website is only in English.

One pro-Russian party was booted off the ballot following public outrage from their first campaign ad. In the ad, the Centrist party had offered to “legalize” Russian military bases, pass legislation allowing dual Georgian-Russian citizenship, and raise pensions to Russian-levels.

6. What about pro-Western parties? 

The GD leadership has sought to assure the West that the country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic organizations is a top priority. The country remains heavily involved in NATO operations in Afghanistan, and still hopes to join NATO. In July, Georgia’s Association Agreement with the E.U. came into force. The E.U. indicated it wants to see clean elections if Georgia hopes to see implementation of a program granting visa-free access to E.U. countries.

But the new parliament may have few if any members of the Republican Party or the Free Democrats, two parties that hold staunch pro-Western views. In recent polling the Free Democrats almost hit the 5 percent threshold needed to win seats in the party list elections. The Republicans didn’t. It’s not clear how either party’s heavyweights like current Republican Speaker of Parliament David Usupashvili or the Free Democrats’ Irakli Alasania will fare in their single-constituency votes.

7. Many voters have yet to decide

A CRRC-Georgia and National Democratic Institute pre-election poll showed that only 49 percent of likely voters were decided. Although subsequent polling has shown lower levels of uncertainty, many voters may not decide until they get to the voting booth.

The fact that they will be able to decide at the voting booth, however, is an important point. The problems Georgia seems to be facing in its party politics are looking more like the ones facing a democracy.

David Sichinava is a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Behavioral Sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and formerly a senior researcher at CRRC-Georgia.

Dustin Gilbreath is a policy analyst at CRRC-Georgia, and the communications manager at Transparify, an organization that promotes think tank financial transparency. He co-edits CRRC’s blog Social Science in the Caucasus.

The views expressed in this article represent the views of the authors alone, and do not represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Transparify, University of Colorado, Boulder, or any donor.

Companies’ lack of interest in DCFTA trade may slow benefits

Positive expectations abound in Georgia around the potential impact of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) Agreement with the EU. Yet, it is still unclear if the agreement’s trade-related components have increased trade. According to CRRC-Georgia’s Tax Perceptions Survey conducted from September to November 2015 for USAID’s Governing for Growth (G4G) project, only 6% of surveyed companies traded with the EU under the DCFTA Agreement. Moreover, according to the same survey, most Georgian companies report not being interested in trading in the DCFTA. This is a troubling finding, since, by law, all Georgian companies will eventually have to comply with DCFTA standards whether they export or not. That is to say, even if companies are not interested in exporting to the EU, the standards of their products will still need to increase. This will benefit consumers in the long run, but may hurt companies in the short term during the period of approximation of Georgian legislation with the EU’s.

When looking at the difference in absolute value of exports from Georgia to the EU one year before the agreement entered into force (September 2013 to August 2014) and the year after (September 2014 to August 2015), we see that it fell by 10% in US dollars, while the value of imports from the EU increased by 2% in USD. While the devaluation of the lari could be one explanation why the value fell, there was still a 7% drop in exports valued in lari. This decrease in exports is unexpected, given that DCFTA removed almost all tariffs between the EU and Georgia.

This change can be partially explained by the value of exports fluctuating from year to year.  The value of exports was particularly high during the period of September 2013 to August 2014, 61% higher in respect to the preceding 12-month period.

In addition to the absolute value of exports to the EU declining after the implementation of the DCFTA, the share of Georgia’s exports heading to the EU has not increased substantially either. Between September 2012 and August 2013, 17% of Georgia’s exports went to the EU. In the subsequent 12-month period, the respective share was 25%, and increased to just 26% in the year following DCFTA’s implementation in September 2014. That is to say, following DCFTA, the share of Georgian exports going to the EU increased by only one percentage point.

The EU is an important trade partner for Georgia, and the DCFTA should lead to increased trade between the EU and Georgia over time. However, it appears that it is yet to bear fruit in terms of exports to the EU. One factor that may be contributing to this is that, to a certain extent, the Government of Georgia has taken an "if we build it, they will come" approach to the implementation of the DCFTA. While the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia provides information to companies that want to export, there are few tailored forms of promotion outside general awareness-raising. This may explain why CRRC survey findings show that a majority of companies, even many of those involved in external trade, report to be uninterested in the DCFTA.

The Tax Perceptions Survey showed that 90% of surveyed companies do not trade under the DCFTA regime. Of these companies, 69% said it was because they were not interested, 11% because they did not know about it, and 8% because they could not satisfy the terms.

It makes sense that not every company would trade under the DCFTA agreement - a corner shop, for example, is unlikely to have a product to export after all. However, companies that export also expressed disinterest. Seventy percent of these companies reported they do not take advantage of the DCFTA and almost half (46%) reported they were not interested in it.

This lack of interest is a clear issue. The DCFTA Agreement will eventually require the approximation of Georgian legislation with the EU’s, and the vast majority of companies will need to comply with the terms of the agreement. Although this will result in improved quality of many products on the Georgian market, it will also create additional costs for businesses. Without greater interest in exporting, these costs will not be offset by the increased trade, potentially bringing pain upon the local economy.

The survey didn’t ask about why companies are not interested in the DCFTA. Hence, further research should be done to gather comprehensive information on the issue. In the meantime, the EU and the Government of Georgia should be alert to the fact that targeted outreach is needed to encourage companies to meet DCFTA requirements and provide support to make this process as painless as possible. Outreach should also target exporters to explain to them how they can benefit from the DCFTA.

Trends in the Data: Declining Trust and Rising Ambivalence towards the Media in Georgia

CRRC has written before about the ambivalent attitude of the population of Georgia towards journalists. Based on CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey data, this post explores the population’s trust in the media over time, showing that it has been declining steadily since 2008, while ambivalence, demonstrated by the finding that people have difficulty stating their opinion and opt instead for either/or options, has been increasing. 

Between 2008 and 2015, reported trust in the media declined by 28 percentage points in Georgia. The biggest drops are between 2008 and 2009 and between 2011 and 2012. Interestingly, over the same period, the reported level of distrust in the media has remained rather steady. Ambivalence, however, is rising. The share of the population responding that they “neither trust nor distrust” the media climbed from 28% in 2008 to 54% in 2015.

Note: A 5-point scale was used during the survey. For this chart, answer options “Fully trust” and “Trust” have been combined into ’Trust’ and answer options “Fully distrust” and “Distrust” have been combined into ’Distrust’. Caucasus Barometer was not carried out in 2014.

The decline in trust and rise in ambivalence towards the media is consistent with responses to other CB questions on the media. Over time, the population’s positive assessment of how well TV journalists inform the population about what is going on in the country has also declined, while their ambivalence has risen. Since both trends are steady, this change seems to be less of a question of a reaction to specific events and more of a general shift. Between 2009 and 2015, positive assessments of how well TV journalists inform people dropped by 14 percentage points while ambivalence increased by 12 percentage points. As in the answers about general trust in the media, reported negative assessments remain stable.

Note: A 5-point scale was used during the survey. For this chart, answer options “Very well” and “Quite well” have been combined into option ‘Well’ and answer options “Very poorly” and “Quite poorly” have been combined into ‘Poorly’. 

Similar patterns can be discerned with regards to whether the Georgian population thinks that TV journalists serve their interests. Since 2009, the share of the population who reported believing that TV journalists, overall, serve the interests of people like them decreased by 13 percentage points, while ambivalence increased by 15 percentage points. 

Note: A 5-point scale was used during the survey. For this chart, answer options “Completely agree” and “Somewhat agree” have been combined into option ’Agree’ and answer options “Completely disagree” and “Somewhat disagree” have been combined into ’Disagree’. This question was not asked in 2013. 

The population of Georgia’s trust in the media has been steadily declining since 2008. Interestingly, this decline coincides with an increase in ambivalent attitudes rather than distrust. The same is reflected in assessments of how well TV journalists keep the public informed and how well they represent the interests of “regular” people. In all cases, positive assessments have decreased, while ambivalence has increased. If the trends marked here are indeed general shifts in attitudes towards the media, as the data for available years suggests, this has the potential to point to long-term changes that are less attached to specific political events or media scandals and may indicate avenues for further research on public opinion in Georgia about the media. 

The datasets used in this blog post and related documentation are available at our online data analysis platform. 

Employment and income in Georgia: Differences by educational attainment

According to the data of the National Statistics Office of Georgia for 2005-2016, there are approximately 100,000 students in Georgian tertiary educational institutions. Around the world, education generally contributes to increased individual income, and Georgia would not be expected to be an exception in this regard. Still, the role of tertiary education in the professional lives of the population of Georgia has not been studied thoroughly. Based on CRRC’s 2015 Caucasus Barometer survey, this blog post looks at the share of the population that has completed tertiary education, what share of those are employed and in what positions, how much their personal income is, and how the employment situation of those with tertiary education differs from the situation of those who did not obtain a degree.

The answers to the following questions, which used show cards are analyzed in this blog post:

• What is the highest level of education you have achieved to date? 
• A show card listing levels of education was used.
• Which of the following best describes your situation?
• A show card with the following answer options was used:
• Retired and not working;
• Student and not working;
• Housewife and not working;
• Unemployed;
• Working either part-time or full time (even if the respondent is retired / is a student), including seasonal work;
• Self-employed (even if the respondent is retired / is a student), including seasonal work;
• Self-employed (even if the respondent is retired / is a student), including seasonal work;
• Other.
• Which of the following best describes the job you do?
• A show card listing a hierarchy of job types was used.
• Speaking about your personal monetary income last month, after all taxes are paid, to which of the following groups do you belong?
• A show card with income groups was used.

Thirty percent of Georgia’s population reports having completed tertiary education (Bachelor’s, Master’s, Specialist’s or post-graduate degree). As the chart below shows, 29% of those without tertiary education report being employed compared to 49% of those with tertiary education.

Note: Answer options to the question “What is the highest level of education you have achieved to date?” were recoded in the following way: “No primary education”, “Primary education (either complete or incomplete)”, “Incomplete secondary education”, “Completed secondary education”, “Secondary technical education” and “Incomplete higher education”  were combined into “Do not have tertiary education”. Answer options “Completed higher education” and “Post-graduate degree” were combined into “Have tertiary education”.

Answer options to the question “Which of the following best describes your situation?” were recoded in the following way: “Working either part-time or full time (even if retired / a student), including seasonal work”, “Self-employed (even if retired / a student), including seasonal work” were grouped as “Employed”. Those who answered “Disabled and unable to work” and “Other” (2%) were excluded from the analysis. Answer options: “Retired and not working", "Student and not working", "Housewife and not working", and "Unemployed" were grouped as “Unemployed”. Within this group, those who answered “Yes” to the question “Are you currently interested in a job, or not?” were grouped as “Unemployed who are interested in a job”, while those who answered “No” were grouped as “Unemployed who are not interested in a job”.  

Answers “Don’t know” and "Refuse to answer” to either of these questions were also excluded from the analysis. Overall, 4% of cases were excluded. 

As for job positions, most of those with tertiary education who were employed at the time of the survey (28%) were employed as professionals (in the fields of science, healthcare, education, business, law, culture, etc.). On the other hand, most of those without tertiary education who were employed at the time of the survey (18%), reported working in the service sector (e.g., as salespersons, including personal care workers, e.g. baby sitters). 

The higher the income group, the higher is the share of those with tertiary education in it. For example, almost there are almost 2.5 times as many people with tertiary education among those who earned above GEL 600 the month before the survey, compared to those without tertiary education. A Mann-Whitney test shows that the difference between these groups is statistically significant. 

Note: Answer options to the question “Speaking about your personal monetary income last month, after all taxes are paid, to which of the following groups do you belong?” were recoded in the following way: options “GEL 601 to GEL 1000”, “GEL 1001 to GEL 2000”, “GEL 2001 to GEL 3000” and “More than GEL 3000” were grouped as “More than GEL 600”. Answer options “Up to GEL 120” and “GEL 121 to GEL 240” were grouped as “Up to GEL 240”. Those who answered “0”, “Don’t know”, and “Refuse to answer” were excluded from the analysis (36% of cases).

The findings presented in this blog post show that, like in many other countries, tertiary education plays a positive role for employment prospects in Georgia. People with tertiary education are more likely to be employed compared to those who do not have tertiary education. The largest group of those with tertiary education is employed as professionals, while those without tertiary education are most frequently employed as service workers. Importantly, the income of those with tertiary education tends to be higher. In all cases, the differences between those with and without tertiary education are statistically significant.

For more information about the impact of education, see CRRC’s earlier blog posts including Educated parents, educated children? And Connections or education? On the most important factors for getting a good job in Georgia. For more data, check out our Online Data Analysis tool.