Education in Azerbaijan: A Snapshot

According to last month’s World Bank Azerbaijan Partnership Program Snapshot, there is an increased sense of urgency in Azerbaijan for long-term reform of the country’s education system. In its one-page education summary, the report describes Azerbaijan’s high primary school enrollment but details three important concerns: 1) low preschool enrollment, 2) low participation in higher education, and 3) an overall low quality of education.

According to Azerbaijan’s State Statistics Committee, only 16% of children between the ages of one and five attended preschool in 2012. However, there is a large gap in preschool attendence between urban and rural areas; in urban areas 23% of children aged 1-5 attend preschool, while this figure is 8.6% in rural areas. 

Created with data from the State Statistics Committee

The World Bank reports a slightly higher preschool enrollment rate in Azerbaijan at 27%, while the 2011 PIRLS-an international reading assessment study- reports that 36% of Azerbaijani fourth grade children attended preschool. Azerbaijan has one of the highest percentages of children without a preschool education among the 45 countries included in the PIRLS study.

*All data is from 2011 except the “Like countries” category which uses the latest available data from each country. (This was 2011 for all countries except 2012 for Kazakhstan, 2008 for Georgia, 2010 for Turkey, and Turkmenistan is not included because there is no data). Created with data from the World Bank. Downloaded from  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRE.ENRR/countries?display=default.

Low rates of preschool enrollment in Azerbaijan are particularly puzzling because Azerbaijan is also an upper middle income country according to the World Bank, yet it has a much lower preschool enrollment rate than many other upper middle income countries. Additionally, most Azerbaijanis place high value on preschool education. According to the the 2011 Caucasus Barometer, 85% of Azerbaijanis agreed that kindergarten is an important part of a child’s development. 

The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2011) “Caucasus Barometer". Retrieved through ODA - http://www.crrc.ge/oda/ on {May 2, 2013}. Available at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/?dataset=17&row=176

However, nearly 100% of Azerbaijani children attended primary school (grades 1 to 4) in 2011 according to Azerbaijan’s State Statistics Committee. This puts Azerbaijan on pace to achieve full primary school enrollment which is the major educational metric tracked by the Millennium Development Goals. World Bank data corroborates high primary school enrollment rates, but suggests that a small proportion of children (4%) may not attend school at all. The gap between gross and net enrollment suggests that some children attend primary school outside the suggested age range— they either enroll late or finish late.

 Primary School Enrollment in Azerbaijan

World Bank data on gross enrollment, net enrollment, and primary completion rate (male and female).

State Statistics Committee education data. *For a full explanation of gross and net enrollment see this helpful post by Friedrich Huebler.

According to the World Bank, Azerbaijan’s university enrollment rate is 20%— the second lowest in the CIS region and well below the averages for Europe and Central Asia, for upper middle income countries, and for “like countries” in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In fact, within the CIS only Uzbekistan (and possibly Turkmenistan but there is no data) shows a lower percentage of students attending university than Azerbaijan (9%). 

Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR/countries?display=default.

Nevertheless, enrollment figures are increasing. The percent of secondary school graduates who have been accepted to university has risen from 21.7% to 27.4% since 2010. The number of students enrolling in university each year has risen 16% over the last three years, even though the percent of applicants has remained relatively constant at 60%. This means that more applicants are being accepted.

University Enrollment in Azerbaijan

State Students Admission Commission (SSAC) data compiled from annual reports available at http://www.tqdk.gov.az/az/statistics/.

Despite the fact that the ‘success’ rate for university applicants has risen by over 24% in the past three years, score distributions from the 2010-2012 State Students Admissions Commission university admissions exams show slightly decreasing scores during this time period. A possible explanation for the increasing number of students accepted with lower scores is that the test is becoming more difficult while the university admissions cut-off for lower scores has become more flexible. 

State Students Admission Commission (SSAC) data compiled from annual reports available at http://www.tqdk.gov.az/az/statistics/

Although Azerbaijan’s education system is making strides, there is still a lot of work to be done to create an inclusive system that provides opportunities for all children, and which develops Azerbaijan’s human capital. Azerbaijan’s spending on education has increased from 1.2 to 1.4 billion AZN between 2010 and 2012, but this is a decrease from 10% to 8.8% of the state’s total spending (because overall state spending has increased by a much higher percentage). Spending on education is currently 3.5% of the GDP, and while education spending is not considered to be a good indicator of education quality, the overall downward trend of social spending on education might be a problem. 


Contributed by Vitaly Radsky from the Center for Innovations in Education Policy Unit, and former CRRC International Fellow

Freedom of Press in the South Caucasus

Freedom of press is one of the indicators of a free society (e.g., immunity of communications media from censorship or governmental control). Freedom House’s 2012 analysis of Freedom of Press found that only 14.5% of the world’s population live in countries with a free press, while 45% have a partly free press, and 40.5% live in an environment without a free press. As for the South Caucasus region, Georgia was classified as having a partly free press ranking 111 out of 197 countries, similar to Bangladesh, Kenya and Mauritania which were among countries classified as partly free. Both Armenia (rank 149) and Azerbaijan (rank 172) were classified as having a “not free” press. This blog discusses the changing situation with regard to media freedom in the South Caucasus, as well as perceptions of trust in the media. It also highlights a gap between media freedom and trust in media in the region.

The Freedom of Press survey was first conducted in 1980 and has annually assessed the level of media freedom and editorial independence worldwide ever since. Freedom House provides analytical reports for 197 countries and territories and assigns them with a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). The score is composed of 23 methodological questions that are divided into three categories: legal, political and economic environment. Primary attention is given to the political environment for press circulation, referring to the ability to operate freely and without fear of persecution. The degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information determines the classification of its media as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having a “Free” media, while scores of 31 to 60 indicate “Partly Free”, and 61 to 100 represents “Not Free”.

In 2012 Georgia was the only country to make significant improvement in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia – it moved from 55 to 52 points (out of 100). This was primarily due to the establishment of new publications, the issue of a broadcast license to a media group critical to the government (TV9), and enforced provisions for media ownership. However, a few deficiencies have remained. For instance, the Georgian National Communications Commission has been broadly reported to have limitations, delays in the access to information, and a lack of independence from political parties.

The report also identified Azerbaijan, Russia and Kazakhstan as countries of special concern in the region (i.e. not free). Freedom House’s country overview of Azerbaijan explains that journalists continue to be persecuted and imprisoned, authorities use economic and political pressure to maintain control over major media outlets, and the 2000 Law on Mass Media remains inoperative.

In Armenia, press freedom also remains restricted. The media environment remains controlled despite several amendments and legal protections that have been in place since the 2008 presidential election. In addition, close ties between government authorities and media owners encourage journalist self-censorship, particularly in the broadcast sector.

Freedom House data also allows us to follow its Freedom of Press index over time. According to the index, freedom of press has worsened (again, 0=best and 100=worst) in Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994. Furthermore, while press freedom in Armenia has worsened from 1994 to 2009, there was a slight improvement from 2009 to 2012. The freedom of press index has fluctuated more in Azerbaijan, although it steadily deteriorated from 2004 to 2012. Georgia’s index sharply improved from 1994 to 2000, after which it worsened from 2000 to 2009, and began improving again from 2009 to 2012.

It is also difficult to find a direct link between changing freedom of press since 1994 and trust in the media. According to the Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey, the level of trust in the media has also varied in these countries from 2008 to 2012. The overall picture that emerges after combining results from the CB and the freedom of press index is interesting. Although the Freedom of Press index has slightly worsened from 2011 to 2011 in Azerbaijan, trust in the media during that period sharply increased. On the contrary, Georgian trust in the media has decreased since 2009 although the index of freedom of press improved. Thus, the freedom of press index does not directly tell us much about how much societies trust media. 

The South Caucasus has not yet achieved a completely free press. However, according to Freedom House, freedom of the press index is improving in Georgia, whereas the index is stable in Armenia and worsening in Azerbaijan. This blog discussed major criticisms about the press environment by Freedom House, as well as the interchanging level of trust in the media in the South Caucasus.

You are invited to see the full 2012 Freedom House report and to find out more about trust in institutions using the CRRC Caucasus Barometer.

A Contradiction Between Civil Liberties and Democracy in Azerbaijan

Many conversations about civil liberties focus on the freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. According to Freedom House, these civil liberties play an essential role in measuring the robustness of democracies worldwide. CRRC data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) shows a disjoint between perceptions of democracy and civil liberties in Azerbaijan. Specifically, the data suggest that in Azerbaijan, which is categorized as a Not-Free country according to the Freedom House 2012 rankings, people perceive that their country is either a full democracy or one with minor problems more than the other two South Caucasus countries. This blog reveals the ambiguity of the relationship between civil liberties and perceptions of democracy in Azerbaijan and provides comparisons with Georgia and Armenia.

Democracy means something different to different people. The perception of democracy is different in three countries of the South Caucasus. For instance, even though the Economist Intelligence Unit rankings show Azerbaijan as an authoritarian regime, Azerbaijanis themselves perceive their country to be more democratic than citizens in Armenia and Georgia. Despite the fact that Azerbaijanis recognize a number of weaknesses of civil liberties in their country (e.g., an unfair court system and controlled freedom of expression), the 2012 CB shows that about half of the population assess Azerbaijan as a full democracy or democracy with minor problems.

Less than a half of Azerbaijanis identified the most recent national election (2010 parliamentary election) as fair, compared to 54% of Armenians (2012 parliamentary election) and 87% of Georgians (2012 parliamentary election). Azerbaijanis are also more skeptical about their participation in elections and its importance for citizens although voting in fair elections is an essential feature of a functioning democracy. Two thirds (68%) of Azerbaijanis say they would participate in a presidential election the following Sunday, and approximately one fourth (24%) doubt that voting is important for citizens. While these results focus specifically on electoral process, they are also major indicators of civil liberties.

Freedom of assembly and expression are additional indicators of democracy. Over half of Armenians (66%) and Georgians (55%) agreed that people should take part in protest actions against the government to show the government that the people are in charge, whereas only 29% of Azerbaijanis said the same. There is a similar tendency regarding freedom of expression. Just under half of the Azerbaijan population (47%) think people have the right to openly say what they think (in comparison with two thirds in other two countries). Additionally, 19% of Azerbaijanis agreed that it is important for a good citizen to be critical towards the government, compared to more than half of Georgian and Armenian populations (55% and 53% respectively).

CB data also suggest a strong feeling of inequality before the law and government in all three countries. Only half of the populations in Azerbaijan and Georgia believe that people are treated fairly by the government, whereas one fifth of Armenians agreed. Additionally, the results are even more controversial regarding the legal system; only around one tenth (approximately 13%) of each population believes their court system treats everyone equally. This means that laws, policies, and practices do not guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population. However, one third of Azerbaijanis trust in their court system although the majority does not believe that it is equal for everyone.

Despite problems with certain civil liberties in the South Caucasus, many people still believe that their country is a democracy or a democracy with minor problems. This is most recognizable in Azerbaijan where many people distrust court system, question the fairness of elections, and remain concerned about the right to criticize the government or participate in protest actions. Moreover, the Economist Intelligence Unit named Azerbaijan a strong authoritarian regime although half of the population believes it is represented by a democratic government or a democracy with minor problems. This seeming contradiction in perceptions of democracy as measured by subjective and objective measures would be an excellent topic for further research.

If you want to explore more about these questions, visit the 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset. 

Nostalgia for Stalin in Georgia: Between Respect and Unjustifiable Actions

A recent assessment of attitudes towards Stalin in Georgia has been broadly discussed within the country, as well as abroad. Many have considered Georgia to be a “Stalin-favorable country” since Stalin himself was an ethnic Georgian. However, using data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB), this post shows that while there remains widespread respect for Stalin, the methods of his rule are far from desirable in today’s Georgia. Also, attitudes towards Stalin in Georgia are compared to those in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Overall, the CB data reveals that Georgians have more positive views towards Stalin than Armenians and Azerbaijanis. However, only a very small proportion in each country admires Stalin. Respect and sympathy are the prevailing characteristics that Georgians use to describe Stalin, whereas it is indifference in Armenia and disgust in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis were also most likely to say they don’t know who Stalin is (22%), compared to 9% in Armenia and 5% in Georgia. 

Survey respondents were provided with a list of 7 attributes and asked to select only one word that best described their attitude towards Stalin. “I don’t know who Stalin is”, “don’t know” and “refuse to answer” were not listed as answer options, but were recorded if mentioned by respondents. 

According to the CB, only a small percentage in each country believes that the sacrifice of the Soviet people was definitely justified because of the results achieved (5%-7%). The data also shows that around half of each of the populations think the sacrifice was definitely not justified. Therefore, the positive features attributed to Stalin in Georgia do not overshadow the sacrifices made by the Soviet people during his rule.

Moreover, very few people in the South Caucasus see themselves living in a country ruled by a person like Stalin. This includes Georgians who attributed more respect and sympathy towards Stalin than Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Over half of the population in each country says they would probably or definitely not like to live and work in such a country.

Although many people in the South Caucasus believe the sacrifices made under Stalin cannot be justified and they would not want to live in a country ruled by a leader like Stalin, more than two fifths of adults (55% in Armenia, 44% in Azerbaijan, and 68% in Georgia) believe Stalin was a wise leader who brought power and prosperity to the Soviet Union.  It is interesting to note that even in Georgia, where well over half of the population thinks Stalin was a wise leader who brought prosperity, this positive attitude is not related to a desire for a non-democratic style of leadership. 69% of Georgians who strongly consider Stalin to have been a wise leader prefer democracy to any other kind of government, whereas only 7% prefer a non-democratic government under certain circumstances (another 7% is indifferent). Thus, the majority of Georgians consider democracy to be the best form of government for today’s Georgia even though many feel respect for Stalin as a leader. In addition, 69% of Georgians who completely agree that Stalin was a wise leader support NATO membership and 73% support joining the EU. Thus, respect for Stalin does not indicate support for non-democracy or a turn away from Western institutions.

Finally, CB data shows that Armenians feel that they will always have need for a leader like Stalin to a larger extent than Georgians or Azerbaijanis. 38% of Armenians say they will always feel the need for a leader like him who would come and restore order, compared to 28% of Georgians and 19% of Azerbaijanis who say the same.

This blog has shown that over half of the populations in the South Caucasus feel the sacrifices of the Soviet people under Stalin were not justified and they do not desire to live in a country with a ruler like him. Yet, many people in all three countries view him as a wise leader who brought prosperity to the Soviet Union. Although Georgians have far more respect and sympathy for Stalin than Armenians and Azerbaijanis, most Georgians continue to be oriented towards membership in Western organizations such as NATO and the EU. Thus, the data agrees with the assessment in Carnegie Endowment’s 2013 report entitled “The Stalin Puzzle” that “for Georgians, Stalin is much more a national icon than a political model.” 

For more data on the attitudes towards Stalin in the South Caucasus, please visit the new 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset. 

Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE): ‘Interpreting the Past’ work package in Telavi

“The historical events that happen in people’s formative years leave a permanent imprint on people’s memories” concluded one of the founding fathers of classical sociology, Karl Mannheim, in 1952. Georgian teenagers today remember living in a country where electricity failures and lack of money for basic needs were common everyday issues. Their perceptions are as dramatic as the perceptions of adults, especially for IDPs from the separatist region of Abkhazia. The experiences of young IDPs represent one of the most salient topics in Georgia’s post-Soviet history – an unexpected and often tragic reality the country has had to face since the 1990s. Since the issue is, to date, largely understudied by historians and social scientists, all we can rely on to learn more about these experiences are the narratives of IDP youth themselves. These narratives are closely connected with various aspects of post-Soviet transformation.

One of the aims of the recent Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement (MYPLACE) project’s work package ‘Interpreting the Past: The construction and transmission of historical memory’ in Telavi was to reveal how IDP youth view the history of Georgia and, specifically, the period of the war in Abkhazia. Some questions examined were how young IDPs and their lives are viewed by their non-IDP peers, and how close or how distant these two groups are from each other. Through participant observation in a non-academic partner institution (YMCA-Telavi), expert interviews, and focus group discussions with young people, CRRC researchers tried to shape outlines of history and self-identification that prevail among youth. Young respondents, however, often needed additional explanations when questions about ‘official’ vs. ‘unofficial’ interpretations of history were asked.

At the beginning of the 1990s, people in Georgia had to deal with separatist movements for autonomy, the rise of militarized criminal groups and the outbreak of strife between supporters and opponents of the newly elected president. Although most of the young people that were questioned by MYPLACE did not remember life in Abkhazia (many of those born in Telavi had never been to Abkhazia), they admitted to having a very strong self-identification with the IDP group and often did not see themselves and their families staying in Telavi forever. Rather, they saw themselves returning to Abkhazia at some point after the conflict is resolved.

Young respondents also did not expect the ongoing IDP situation to last for such a long time. There was an overwhelming and long-lasting hope that IDPs would spend a much shorter time away from their homes, and that they would be able to return home relatively soon. Even today this myth of a quick return plays a very important role in the self-identification of the respondents and members of their families. Very young respondents who have spent their entire lives in Telavi are also reluctant to consider Telavi to be their true home. This shows that this group of IDPs is not fully integrated into Telavi society, in spite of having lived there for two decades.

According to official rhetoric, they should eventually be given the possibility to return to their homes in Abkhazia once the conflict is resolved and their security is guaranteed. However, there is no realistic estimate of when (and if) this could actually happen (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2012).

Discussing this experience with teenagers enables us to see the process of transmission of memory (mostly within families) regarding important and painful historical events. At the same time, we are able to observe the attitudes of young people (both IDP and non-IDP) towards the processes which have occurred in Telavi during recent years.

A schoolteacher from Telavi mentioned that many of the tragic events that she has read about in her world history books (e.g., territorial conflict, civil war, IDPs, political terror) have all happened in Georgia within the past 20 years. One of the difficult challenges for today’s Georgia is to encourage IDP youth to redefine themselves in the new environment, give them opportunities and encourage them to find their place in current Georgian history.

The full report from this project is available at the CRRC-Georgia website.

High Abortion Rates vs. Conservative Views against Abortion in the South Caucasus

There is a tension in the South Caucasus between high rates of abortion (and sex-selective abortion) and overwhelmingly conservative attitudes against it. Abortion rates in Georgia and Armenia are higher than the EU average and the rate in Azerbaijan is below. A 2010 article by the Economist placed Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th, respectively, on a list of countries worldwide where the numbers of girls are off balance at birth - China ranks first. This blog aims to explore attitudes towards abortion and gender in the South Caucasus, and shows that while there are widespread conservative attitudes against abortion, it remains frequently carried out.

Data from 2010 World Health Organization (WHO) report on abortion rates show that there are more abortions among women of reproductive age (15-44 years) in Georgia and Armenia relative to the average in the European Union (See chart below). The abortion rates in the South Caucasus region also vary considerably; the number of abortions per 1,000 live births is lower than the EU average (222) in Azerbaijan (162), whereas it stands at 274 in Armenia, and 408 in Georgia.

The high rate of abortion in the South Caucasus is also linked to sex-selective abortion, whereby pregnancies are terminated if the fetus is female. Male newborns outnumber females by more than 10% in the South Caucasus. For every 100 girls, there are 112 boys in Armenia, 114 boys in Azerbaijan, and 111 in Georgia according to the 2011 CIA World Factbook. Additionally, in 2011 the European Commission declared that “Prenatal sex selection is to be condemned as a phenomenon which finds its roots in a culture of gender inequality”. Thus, the sex-selective abortion problem in the South Caucasus may be a consequence of a greater cultural issue. Another considerable factor is the lower number of children that families in the South Caucasus have over time. For example, in the mid-sixties each family had 3 children on average in Georgia, 4 in Armenia and 5 in Azerbaijan, whereas, according to the 2012 World Factbook, the average number of children per family is now 1.46 in Georgia, 1.38 in Armenia, and 1.92 in Azerbaijan. With a choice of 1 to 2 children, many families in the South Caucasus prefer to have a boy instead.

Data from the 2010 CB also shows that people of both genders are more likely to say they prefer a son. Men in Georgia and Armenia indicate the greatest preference to have a male child (approximately 60%), whereas one third (33%) of Azerbaijani men agree. CB data also indicates that the gender of a child matters least in Azerbaijan and most in Armenia, whereas in all three countries men are more likely than women to say that they want a boy.

Yet, despite the high rate of abortions, and specifically sex-selective abortions, the CB 2011 shows that attitudes towards abortion in these countries remain very conservative. Well over half of the Georgian (76%) and Armenian (61%) populations believe that abortion can “never be justified” (This question was measured on a 1-5 scale where 1 =”never justified”, 5=”always justified”. The question was not asked in Azerbaijan). 

Moreover, the high rates of abortion are puzzling in these countries where the majority of the population says religion is important in daily life (92% in Georgia, 92% in Armenia and 80% in Azerbaijan according to the CB 2012), and where trusted religious authoritative bodies (i.e. Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgia, Armenian Apostolic Church in Armenia, and both Shia and Sunni Islamic Organizations in Azerbaijan) consistently advocate against abortion.

How can we explain these conservative attitudes against abortion along with the high rate of abortion in the South Caucasus? Is it a familiarity with abortion as a method of contraception from the Soviet Union, the availability of sex-selective technology, cultural attitudes, or something else? What do you think?

International Day of Happiness

This year an International Day of Happiness will be celebrated for the first time on March 20th. In 2012, the United Nations (UN) declared this day to be an official holiday to highlight the importance of happiness as a fundamental human aim and to call upon countries to approach public policy in ways that improve the well-being of their citizens. This aim was inspired by the Gross National Happiness Index which was developed in Bhutan to measure prosperity by gauging its citizens' happiness. The index measures the average economic, environmental, physical, political and social wellness of Bhutanese society based on survey data. Although this specific index does not exist in other countries, several surveys worldwide have asked how happy people consider themselves to be.

The annual Caucasus Barometer (CB) asks people in all three countries of the South Caucasus, “How happy would you say you are?” The results reveal that Azerbaijanis have consistently evaluated their level of happiness lower than Armenians and Georgians within the past 3 years, although it has increased from 2010 to 2012. The level of happiness in Armenia has also slightly increased from 2010 to 2012, whereas in Georgia it has remained higher than in the other 2 countries. 

 This question was asked on a 1 to 10 scale where 1=Not happy at all and 10=Very happy. 

The results shown here combine the responses for items 8, 9 and 10 on this scale.

Some think happiness is a result of high economic performance. Yet, this is easily refuted by looking at the Gallup’s 2012 list of “happiest nations” in the world which is topped by several relatively poor countries in South America and South Asia. Additionally, this analysis gives insight into people’s expectations about their well-being and finances in the coming year. This measure is called “Net Hope on Economy”. In 2012, Gallup asked 1,000 people in 54 countries if they feel that the next year will be a year of economic prosperity, economic difficulty or remain the same. Net Hope on Economy was calculated by deducting the percent optimistic (hopeful about economic prospects in 2013) from the percent pessimistic (those who see greater economic difficulty in 2013). The results show that Georgians rank #1 and Azerbaijanis rank #2 on this list of 54 countries, with the highest hopes of economic prosperity for 2013. Armenians ranked #22 with slightly more pessimists than optimists.  

Source: WIN-Gallup International Association,

Global Barometer of Hope and Happiness, December 30, 2012

The CB 2012 also asks about future economic expectations, but specifically regarding children. Georgians, Armenia and Azerbaijanis were asked, “Do you think your children will be better off or worse off financially than you are when they are your age?” The results reveal that between two fifths to two thirds of people in the South Caucasus are optimistic. Georgians are the most positive, followed by Azerbaijanis and Armenians whose results are closer to each other.  

In this blog we aimed to show the pursuit of new measures of well-being and happiness. Some movements have embraced new ways of measuring prosperity through happiness or future expectations, thus showing that economic indices are not solely important. 

On the occasion of the first International Day of Happiness, we wish everybody to live up to their expectations and to achieve the underlying meaning of this day. 

Access the full Gallup report here and the CB 2012 here for more information on this data.