The French Senate Bill and Armenian Perceptions on Turkey

As the New York Times reports, on January 23, 2012 the French Senate “approved a bill […] criminalizing the denial of officially recognized genocides, including the Armenian genocide begun in 1915.” The bill has fanned tensions between Turkey and France, emphasizing the complexities of politics and perceptions. Turkish immigrants and French citizens of Turkish origin in Paris, as well as Turks in Ankara and in Istanbul have protested against the bill. Publicity has emphasized Turkey’s objections to the bill as well as the country’s perspective on the events of 1915.

Less attention has been given to the country and population of Armenia itself, leaving many questions unanswered. What does this mean for the future of Armenia-Turkey relations, as well as popular perceptions in these countries? And what are these perceptions to start out with? The 2010 CB asked Armenians how they think the population of Turkey perceives both the country of Armenia and its population. These set of questions were exclusively asked in Armenia and pertain to the population and country of Armenia, rather than the perceptions of Armenians throughout the world or in Turkey. When asked, “Please tell me, in your opinion, how negative or how positive is the population of Turkey's general attitude towards Armenians?” 62% of Armenians felt Turkey’s population had a negative attitude towards Armenians. 17% of Armenians felt Turkey’s population had a generally positive attitude towards Armenians.

Similarly, people were asked, “In your opinion, how negative or how positive is the population of Turkey's general attitude towards the country of Armenia?” More than half of the population (69%) of Armenia felt that Turkey’s population had a negative attitude towards Armenia and 9% thought Turkey’s population had a positive view of Armenia.

Recent politics has highlighted the historical events, while perceptions guide interactions. However, the data has shown that in some instances economic factors overshadow politics and perceptions. This is emphasized by 2010 CB data that shows a willingness on the part of Armenians to conduct business with Turks despite what they perceive to be Turkish discontent towards Armenians and Armenia. In response to the question, ‘Would you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with Turks?’ 45% of Armenians said they approved of conducting business with Turks while 53% said they did not approve.

The data indicates more negative perceptions of Turkish attitudes towards Armenia and Armenians than positive. Yet, almost half of the adult population of Armenia is willing to conduct business with Turks. This could prove to be a mediating factor between the two countries. The economic benefits of trade with Turkey as perceived by Armenians are presented in a previous blog, “Armenian attitudes towards opening the border with Turkey”. But what impact will the new bill have on the future of political, social and economic relationships between Turkey and Armenia? Will it alter Armenian-Turkish public perceptions?

Georgian Attitudes to Judicial Independence | EWMI JILEP report

Recently we undertook extensive research into judicial independence in Georgia for EWMI. This is what EWMI just put up on the website:

On January 24, 2012, at 13:00, at Hotel Betsy, the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) presented its study entitled, “Attitudes towards the Judicial System in Georgia.” The study was supported by the Judicial Independence and Legal Empowerment Project (JILEP), implemented by the East West Management Institute (EWMI) and funded by USAID.

Since 2003, much has been done to reform the Georgian judicial system, from the establishment of the High School of Justice, to the restructuring of the High Council of Justice, to making major changes in the makeup of the judiciary and prosecutor’s office. However, these successes are accompanied by serious concerns, particularly regarding judicial independence. International organizations from the Council of Europe to the US State Department have urged further reform of the system.

Relatively little research has been conducted to ascertain how Georgians themselves feel about their judicial system. It is with this in mind, that the East West Management Institute engaged the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), to undertake a comprehensive study of public attitudes toward the judicial system. CRRC employed a methodology that included citizen surveys, focus groups, and interviews which resulted in robust findings grounded in both quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

Representatives of the Georgian judiciary, non-governmental and international organizations working in the area of rule of law attended the presentation.

The link to the article is here. And find the report, which we tried to keep crisp and accessible while also rich in nuance and detail, by clicking here.

EU Survey Report Released: Knowledge and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia

On January 16, 2012 the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and CRRC presented a report entitled “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the European Union in Georgia” based on nationwide surveys conducted in Georgia by CRRC in 2009 and 2011. The 2009 survey was the first comprehensive study of Georgian attitudes towards the European Union. Koba Turmanidze, Country Director of CRRC-Georgia presented the report. Following the presentation, a panel of representatives from the EU Delegation, including Boris Iarochevitch and Oliver Reisner, the Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany--Ortwin Hennig, and Dr. Kakha Gogolashvili--Director of Center for EU Studies at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) gave commentary on the data and its potential implications for the Georgia-EU relationship.

The data reveals that a majority of Georgians (80%) support Georgia joining the EU. As described in the report, support for Georgia’s membership in the EU has increased over time, but so too has support for EU membership for all other Eastern Partnership countries, as well as Turkey and Russia. While support for membership is high, knowledge of what exactly membership entails and the overall functions of the EU can be strengthened.

As noted by the panel, the findings of the report imply that Georgia is moving in the right direction for EU membership in several areas. Georgians’ support is compatible with the objectives of membership; however, there are many areas that need to be improved. Representatives from the EU delegation suggested increasing efforts to educate Georgians about collaborative efforts between Georgia and the EU. Overall, the report indicates a positive relationship with the EU and has generated enthusiasm among scholars and politicians alike.

Those interested in learning more about the study can access the datasets at CRRC’s Online Data Analysis (ODA) webpage. The report is also available in English and Georgian on CRRC’s website.

Democracy in Georgia

In the wake of Russian protests for free and fair elections— one of the hallmarks of democracy— the international community has again turned its attention on democratization in the post-Soviet region. Democracy, in its various forms, represents something different to everyone. So what does it mean for Georgians? Do Georgians consider Georgia to be a democratic state in its present form? What are their perceptions of democracy? CRRC, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute-Georgia, conducted a repeated survey on public attitudes in Georgia from November 2008 to September 2011 in which respondents were asked a series of questions about democracy. Survey results show that just under half of the population considers Georgia to be a democracy. Also, most Georgians associate democracy with liberty, freedom of speech, media and expression, rather than government accountability and free and fair elections.

From April 2010 to September 2011, Georgians were asked ‘Is Georgia a democracy now’? The figure below shows that since July 2010 there has been a steady increase in the percentage of Georgians who believe Georgia is a democracy with 45% believing so in September 2011.

When asked to gauge the extent of Georgia’s transition to democracy in the September 2011 survey, 39% of Georgians said ‘Georgia is already a democracy but still needs improvement’, while 28% said Georgia is not a democracy, but is moving in that direction. In contrast, only 5% of Georgians believe Georgia is not and will never be a democracy.

Thus, the data shows that just under half of the population (45%) considers Georgia to be a democracy, and many people believe Georgia is either already a democracy that needs improvement or is not yet a democracy but is still developing in that direction. But what does democracy mean to Georgians? The 2011 survey asked, ‘What does democracy mean to you?’ 47% of Georgians interpret democracy to mean freedom of speech/media/hearing different views. 42% associate democracy with liberty and 40% say equality before the law/protection of justice. In contrast, only 7% say government accountability and 16% think democracy means free and fair elections. The results elicit a strong difference in the Georgian interpretation of democracy which prizes liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views above free and fair elections.

Respondents were allowed to provide their own responses. The percentages do not add to 100% because respondents could name up to three items.

Thus, survey data tells us that the percentage of Georgians who think Georgia is a democracy is increasing over time, that there is room for improvement, and that the concept of democracy is more associated with liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views, than government accountability and free and fair elections. This is important in light of recent global events in which ordinary citizens have begun to challenge their state systems and certain features of their democracy.

How do you think Georgia fairs on its path to democracy? Has Georgia reached its goal or is there still room for improvement?

Boy or Girl? Child Gender Preference in the South Caucasus

Survey data shows that there is a strong preference for male children over female children throughout the South Caucasus. As mentioned in the March 4, 2010 edition of The Economist, after 1991 there has been an increase in the ratio of boys to girls in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The sex ratio rose from 103-106 boys to 100 girls in 1991 to 115-120 boys to 100 girls by 2000. The 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB) indicates that gender preferences in the South Caucasus remain skewed in favor of males with 54% of Armenians, 27% of Azerbaijanis and 46% of Georgians prefer to have male children if given a choice.

The 2010 CB asked people living in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia the following question—“If a family has one child, what would be the preferred gender of the child?” The answers were unprompted as respondents were not given a list of possible responses such as “girl”, “boy” or “it does not matter”. Overall, Armenians and Georgians prefer boys to girls while more than half of Azerbaijanis claim gender “does not matter”.

The preference for male children holds when the data is split by male and female respondents. Results from Armenia show the highest preference for a male child with 59% of men and 50% of women who prefer a boy, compared to 5% of men and 14% of women who prefer a girl. In Georgia 57% of men and 36% of women prefer a boy and 5% of men and 12% of women prefer a girl. In Azerbaijan 60%-68% of men and women say the sex of the child ‘does not matter’.

When sliced by settlement type (capital, urban and rural), the data shows that rural inhabitants in all three countries prefer male children over female children. 57% of the rural Georgian population prefers boys and this figure is 71% in Armenia. Azerbaijan, on the other hand continues the trend of perceived impartiality with 32% of rural respondents preferring boys.

Despite a relatively high percentage of claims that gender “does not matter” in the three countries, there is a low percentage of individuals whose overall preference is for a girl. On the whole, Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians are more inclined to say they prefer boys or that it “does not matter”, rather than say they prefer girls. For example, in Azerbaijan—the country with the highest percentage of claims that gender “does not matter”—only 9% of the adult population prefers girls. This trend is similar in Georgia and Armenia in which there is a 9-10% preference for girls. Thus, the data shows that there is a strong preference for male children over female children in the South Caucasus.

Why do you think this is the case?

Can a Cut NATO Supply Route Through Russia Benefit Georgia and Azerbaijan?

The 20th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is upon us, and US-Russian tensions have risen as Russia contemplates terminating the NATO supply route through Russia. International news reports such as The New York Times detail the threat as a “death blow” to the U.S.-led NATO mission in Afghanistan and indicate that this could be a blessing in disguise for NATO hopeful Georgia, as well as for Azerbaijan.

NATO has two main transportation routes via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which connects Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus: the NDN North and NDN South. The NDN North transit route initiates in Latvia, crosses through Russian territory and enters Afghanistan via the Afghan-Uzbek border. The potential blessing for Georgia and Azerbaijan lies in NATO’s NDN South transit route that spans from the port of Poti in Georgia to the Afghan-Uzbek border. The potential termination of the NDN North route leaves the NDN South route as a viable alternative. The NDN South route currently facilitates the transportation of 30% of the U.S.-NATO supplies to Afghanistan, as reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Should Russia close its borders to NATO, and the NDN North route cease to function, this could provide an opportunity for economic diversification in the way of transit fees for Georgia and Azerbaijan. This move could also open trade possibilities between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, as well as add leverage for future NATO membership.

Map from Google Earth. Courtesy of CSIS

Therefore, the issues at hand are two-fold. Are Georgia and Azerbaijan willing or prepared for further commitments to the NDN South transit route? What implications does this have for both the future of Georgian and Azerbaijani NATO membership as well as commercial trade?

First, CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB), shows that NATO membership is supported (fully and somewhat) by 70% of the Georgian population. Support for NATO membership is less in Azerbaijan where 44% of the population is supportive (fully and somewhat) (See the previous post by Nikola for more details). Thus, increased use of the NDN South route could generate an opportunity to demonstrate further interests in NATO membership. Based on public support for NATO membership, more use of the NDN South route could be welcomed.

Second, more traffic through the NDN South route could economically benefit Georgia and Azerbaijan. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) shows that trade in commercial services (including transport) is a growing industry in Georgia. As indicated below, Georgia has seen an increase from 2009 to 2010 in import and export transportation (excluding government services). Azerbaijan has seen a slight decline in export transportation, but an increase in import transportation.

Data retrieved from WTO website

Thus, Georgia and Azerbaijan could benefit at least economically if Russia decides to cut off the NDN North transit route.

Labor Migration Article | Zvezda Dermendzhieva

In a recent article in Post-Communist Economies, Zvezda Dermendzhieva uses Caucasus Barometer data to compare labour migration from the South Caucasus.

We found one of the more remarkable results to be that "while individuals with higher education are not more likely to become migrants in general, having higher education is associated with up to four times higher probability of migration to a high-income OECD country among Armenians and Georgians. The results are in line with theoretical arguments that skill distribution and returns to education in the host country relative to the home country affect the selection of migrants, and that the cost of migration plays an important role in the migration decision."

Zvezda Dermendzhieva also suggests that migration indirectly contributes to economic development by raising local incomes in demand. In the same vein, she finds "a significant correlation between having a migrant and running a family business in Armenia, which suggests that migrants' earnings can provide scarce capital for business investment and support the development of the private sector in the region."

Interested in finding out more? Check the online abstract here.