Do Armenians and Georgians support protests?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tamar Uzunashvili, a Junior Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey, a majority of Georgians support protests. In comparison, while over half of the Armenian population is in favour of protests, support has been on the decline since 2019.

Protests in the South Caucasus have intensified recently, particularly in Georgia, where demonstrations have surged since the ruling Georgian Dream party first introduced the controversial Foreign Agent Law in 2023. Over the past year in Georgia, protests have occurred almost daily, particularly since the government’s November 2024 announcement that it was halting the country’s EU accession bid.  Similarly, Armenia has witnessed significant protests between 2017 and 2024, driven by political revolution and war.

Data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey shows that until 2021, public support for protest participation was consistently higher in Armenia than in Georgia. In 2021, attitudes were similar, but in 2024, more people in Georgia believed that people should participate in protests than those in Armenia.

In Georgia, support for protest participation declined between 2008 and 2011. In 2012, it surged by 22 points, with data collection taking place after prison abuse scandals — which showed the humiliation, torture, and inhumane treatment of prisoners — and parliamentary elections that year. In subsequent years, attitudes slowly rose and reached a stable point in 2017, after which there has been little change in attitudes.

In Armenia, support fluctuated between 2008 and 2012 and then stabilised between 2013 and 2019. Since then, however, support has decreased sharply, falling to 50% in 2024 from 71% in 2019.

A regression analysis of 2024 data demonstrates that attitudes vary among different social and demographic groups.

Gender and education were significant predictors of supporting protest in Armenia. Men were more likely than women to have a positive attitude towards participating in protests by 16 percentage points.

People with tertiary education were 22 percentage points more likely to support protest participation compared to those with secondary or lower education, and 10 percentage points more likely to support protests than individuals with secondary technical education.

People in Yerevan were more likely to support participation in a protest than people who live in rural or urban areas, where the probability of supporting protests was almost equal.

In Armenia, younger people (18–34) were more likely to support protests than older people (55+).

Wealth, partisanship, and employment did not predict attitudes in Armenia.

In Georgia, the data shows that people were more likely to support protests than oppose them across settlement types. At the same time, individuals who live in the capital were more likely to have positive attitudes toward protests than people in other urban or rural areas.

The data also varied across age groups, with young people (18–34) being substantially more likely to support protests than those who are 55 and older.

Those who support Georgian Dream were less likely to have a positive attitude toward protests than individuals who do not support any political party. People who support the opposition and those who refused to report which party they support had similar attitudes to individuals who did not support any party.

Employment was also a factor, with employed individuals more likely to support protest participation than those who were not employed.

Gender and wealth were not associated with attitudes towards protests in Georgia.

Support for protests is generally high in both Georgia and Armenia, though on the decline in Armenia. Across both countries, younger people are more inclined to support protests.

The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis includes gender (male and female), settlement type (capital, urban, and rural), age group (18–34, 35–54, and 55+), education (secondary and lower, secondary technical, and higher than secondary), a wealth index (0–13), employment (employed and unemployed) and partisanship (no party, Georgian Dream, opposition, and refused to answer) as predictor variables.

Increasing optimism for the future in Armenia and Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tinatin Gagoshidze, a Junior Researcher fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Since the Velvet Revolution, Armenians across a wide cross-section of society have become increasingly more optimistic about their country’s future. In comparison, Georgians have seen only a modest increase in optimism over the time period, with the uptick concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.

Both Armenia and Georgia have experienced significant political, economic, and social changes over the last decade. In Armenia, the changes have coincided with more Armenians believing that eventually everything will be fine, while in Georgia, there has been a largely steady though slightly upward trend, according to the Caucasus Barometer survey.

In 2017, nearly half of the Armenian population (46%) believed that the situation in their country would never improve. In contrast, more people in Georgia viewed their country’s future positively (68%).

In 2019, optimism in the Armenian population toward the future roughly doubled (80%), surpassing the share with an optimistic outlook in Georgia (69%).  This change took place following Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, which brought Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power.

Between 2019 and 2024, Georgians’ optimism about the future increased by six percentage points, coming to match the share of optimism in Armenia.

These changes in attitudes varied by social and demographic variables.

In Armenia, after the initial increase in optimism following the Velvet Revolution, those aged 35–54 gradually became less optimistic, while other age groups’ attitudes did not change significantly.

In Georgia, optimism rose among people 54 and under between 2019 and 2021, while it rose for older people between 2021 and 2024.

In Armenia, men became less optimistic about the future over time, while in Georgia, both men and women have gradually become more optimistic.

The data shows consistent trends over time in the Georgian population regarding people’s perceptions of their country’s future based on their level of education. However, Georgians with a higher education tend to have a more positive outlook on the country’s future compared to those with a secondary technical education or lower education levels.

In contrast, opinions among Armenians about their country’s future do not fluctuate substantially based on level of education.

Data from Georgia indicates that employed individuals are more optimistic about the country’s future than those who are not working. For example, in 2024, approximately 82% of employed people believed that everything would eventually be fine in Georgia, compared to 70% of people who were not working.

In Armenia, however, working people’s attitudes have declined slightly over time.

The data also shows that residents of rural areas in Georgia view the country’s future more negatively than those living in the capital. Attitudes became more positive between 2019 and 2024 for people in Tbilisi and rose substantially in other urban areas (by 19 percentage points) between 2021 and 2024.

In contrast, in Armenia, optimism is lowest in Yerevan, where attitudes became more negative between 2021 and 2024. Otherwise, attitudes have largely been stable across settlement types.

In 2024, levels of optimism for the future were quite similar in Armenia and Georgia, with optimism having increased substantially in Armenia, following the country’s Velvet Revolution and rising modestly in Georgia. In Armenia, increases in optimism were wide-spread across society, while in Georgia recent changes seem concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.

Armenians and Georgians lack confidence in their ability to influence politics

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Melor Shengelia, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, both Armenians and Georgians tend to lack confidence in their influence on politics. However, Armenians in general are significantly less willing to participate in politics.

Both Armenian and Georgian politics have experienced dramatic protests over the last decade. Over the past three years, Georgia has experienced significant political unrest due to the ruling Georgian Dream party’s domestic crackdown and drift away from Euro-Atlantic integration. In Armenia, the political landscape has evolved since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, when mass protests brought current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan into power.

Though both countries have been host to mass public movements, data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer suggests that people’s perceptions of their political power differ between the two countries.

In Armenia, more people believed that politics and government were too complicated for the average person to understand. While this opinion was also common in Georgia, it was expressed significantly less often.

A statistical model demonstrates that people in Georgia living in urban areas outside of Tbilisi were more likely to agree than disagree with the statement, ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on’.

Younger people aged 18–34 were less likely to agree with this statement compared to people from older age groups.

The model also suggests that in Georgia, women were more likely to agree that politics were too complicated to understand compared to men.

Education was also a significant predictor of whether someone agreed or disagreed with the statement. People with a higher education were less likely to agree and more likely to disagree with this opinion compared to people with a lower education level.

Ethnic Georgians were also more prone to disagree with this statement compared to ethnic minorities.

In Armenia, however, demographic variables were not statistically significant predictors of feelings towards how complicated politics are.

Data related to whether people felt they had a say in what their government does similarly showed that people in both Armenia and Georgia were not confident in their ability to influence politics.

In Armenia, 64% of the public agreed that they did not have any say in the government’s actions. In Georgia, on the other hand, less, albeit half (52%) of the public, believed they lacked a say and influence in what their government does.

Regression analysis demonstrates that in both Armenia and Georgia, people who lived in rural areas were less likely to agree with the above statement compared to people from the capitals.

In Armenia, older people were more likely to agree with the statement compared to people aged 18–34. This variable was not a significant predictor in Georgia.

Additionally, while gender, education level, employment status, ethnicity, and ownership of durable goods (a common proxy for wealth) were included in the regression, none were statistically significant predictors in either country.

In both countries, people tended to lack confidence in their influence on politics while also feeling indifferent about their role in political life. While this trend was observed in both Armenia and Georgia, people in Armenia were significantly less willing to participate in politics and were less likely to perceive their role as important in political processes.

Note: The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the Caucasus Barometer 2024 dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (secondary or lower, secondary technical, higher than secondary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Georgians overwhelming see gender equality as important to country’s future success

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Nino Lobzhanidze, a Junior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, UN Women, or any related entity.

A recent UN Women and CRRC Georgia study has found that the vast majority of Georgians find it important to work towards a more equal society.

The survey focused on a wide range of issues related to gender equality in Georgia, from the need for quality childcare services to women’s representation in politics and business.

According to the data collected, between 79%–98% of respondents believed that improvements in social and police rights, more equal sharing of domestic work, and a greater representation of women in leadership positions were important for Georgia’s future.

Looking at the role of women in leadership positions specifically, 79% believed that more opportunities for women in business was important; 77% believed the same for women in politics; and 75% believed it was important for women to have more opportunities in decision-making roles writ large.

The survey also assessed attitudes toward fundamental rights and social policies. A large majority (83%) considered improved access to higher education for women important. A similarly large majority (84%) supported affordable healthcare for women. The idea that respect for women’s rights in all areas is essential for the country’s success had 91% agreement.

Attitudes toward the workplace and family equality were also assessed. When addressing workplace equality, 96% of respondents supported equal pay for equal work, regardless of gender. A large majority (87%) also agreed on the importance of an ‘equal distribution of unpaid housework between spouses or partners’.

Overall, 65% of the public agreed with all nine of the above statements. A regression analysis suggests that gender was the only statistically significant predictor of whether a person agreed with all of the statements or not, with 73% of women agreeing with all nine statements compared to 56% of men, controlling for other factors. The data showed no significant differences on this account when it came to age, ethnicity, settlement type, education level, or employment status.

It is clear that a large majority of the public agrees that improving women’s rights is important for the country’s future, including the importance of equal pay and the fair distribution of household labour. Perhaps unsurprisingly, women were more likely to support all of these things than men, but still, a clear majority of both men and women believe these issues are important to Georgia’s future.

The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables:  age (16–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55+); sex (male or female); settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); education level (secondary or lower; vocational; and completed or uncompleted higher education); ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); and employment status (employed or not working).

Blog | Most Georgians believe personal freedoms do not extend to choices around sex

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media.  This article was written by Salome Dolidze and Zachary Fabos, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UN Women, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

According to a new UN Women survey, although many Georgians believe both men and women are largely free to make decisions regarding their future, this does not extend to one’s choices around sex.

The majority of Georgians believe they have a high degree of control over their lives, the March survey has found. This extends to choices regarding one’s education, making financial decisions, finding employment, and when and with whom to marry.

However, according to the same survey, such freedoms do not extend to choices involving sex before marriage or having more than one sexual partner in one’s lifetime, especially when asked in relation to women.

Georgian men and women were asked to indicate how much control they believe to have over their own life and how much control others have over theirs. Generally, men and women alike, granted themselves a higher degree of control than others, with 68% of respondents indicating they have a lot of control over their own life. Even so, men are still believed to have more control, with 65% of respondents stating that most men have a lot of control over their lives compared to 51% believing the same for most women. Interestingly, men are more likely to say that they have a lot of control over their lives compared to women.

Georgians felt similarly when asked about the freedom to choose whom they marry — overall, 75% claimed to have a lot of influence in choosing whom they marry.

Again, Georgians agreed that most men have more influence in this choice than most women. However, a majority (69%) still believed most women have a lot of influence in deciding whom to marry.

Broken down by gender, 68% of women believed they have a lot of influence in deciding whom to marry, compared to 83% of men.

Opinion differed among Georgians when asked about choices regarding sex before marriage and having more than one sexual partner in one’s lifetime.

When asked if it was justifiable for people to have a sexual relationship before marriage and to have several sexual partners in one’s lifetime, Georgians generally stated that it was somewhat more justifiable for men to do so compared to women. A slight majority (51%) of Georgians believed it was justifiable for men to have a sexual relationship before marriage, compared to 30% believing the same for women. Although most Georgians believed it was unjustifiable for both men and women to have several sexual partners in their lifetime, it was perceived as more justifiable for men by 12 percentage points, compared to women.

In addition, individuals 35 and older, those living outside Tbilisi, and those who had higher education were more likely to say that it was not at all justifiable for women to have sexual relationships before marriage than younger people, residents of Tbilisi, and ethnic Georgians.

Likewise, people living outside Tbilisi and those aged 55 and over were more likely to say that it was not at all justifiable for women to have several sexual partners in their lifetime than people living in the capital and younger people.

The results of the UN Women survey demonstrate a clear disassociation between personal freedoms and sexual autonomy among Georgians. Although many Georgians believe men and women are free to make decisions regarding their relationships, finances, and futures, such liberties do not extend to one’s choices around sex.

The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables:  age (16–24, 25–34, 35–54, 55+); Sex (male or female); settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); education level (Secondary or lower, vocational, tertiary); ethnicity (Ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); and employment status (employed or not working). The data used in the article is available here.

Georgians largely hold Russia and Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia.

While over half of all Georgians believe that Russia or Russian President Vladimir Putin holds the most responsibility for the full-scale war in Ukraine, a large minority, 17%, felt they were uncertain who to blame, while another 13% considered Ukraine or its president Volodymyr Zelenskyi personally responsible.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shaped global politics since its start. Past polling has shown that the public in Georgia, a country with its own territorial conflicts with Russia, has broadly supported Ukraine. Data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer survey from Spring 2024 suggests that most people in Georgia hold Putin and Russia responsible for the war.

The data shows that most Georgians (57%) believe that Russia or Putin holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Just one in eight Georgians (13%) considered Ukraine or Zelenskyi personally responsible.

However, notably, 17% of Georgians were uncertain and reported that they did not know who holds the most responsibility for this war.

Further analysis showed that beliefs about responsibility for the war in Ukraine were associated with age, political preferences, and perceptions of the likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

For example, respondents aged 35 and older were less likely to blame Russia or Putin compared to younger respondents aged 18–34.

In turn, women were nine percentage points more likely to report uncertainty, selecting ‘don’t know’ when asked about responsibility for the war in Ukraine, while people living in rural areas were 16 percentage points more likely to be undecided on the issue.

Opposition party supporters were 23 percentage points more likely to blame Russia/Putin than those who supported the ruling Georgian Dream party. They were also 14 percentage points less likely to be undecided about responsibility for the war in Ukraine compared to ruling party supporters.

Respondents who did not provide a party preference on the survey were 15 percentage points less likely to place blame on Zelenskyi or Ukraine compared to Georgian Dream supporters.

Respondents who were uncertain about the risk of Georgia’s involvement in any conflict were significantly less likely to blame either Ukraine/Zelenskyi or Russia/Putin, and were more likely to be undecided.

Most Georgians, particularly the younger generation and opposition party supporters, hold Russia or Putin responsible for the war in Ukraine. Women and people living in rural areas were more likely to be undecided. Those who were uncertain about Georgia’s potential involvement in war also tended to be undecided about who is to blame for the war.

This analysis is based on a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable is ‘Who holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine?’ with three answer options: Russia/Putin, Ukraine/Zelenskyi, and Don’t know. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, education, ethnicity, employment, partisanship, and the perceived likelihood of Georgia’s involvement in any war.

Is quality education in Georgia really accessible for all?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Salome Dolidze and Kristine Vacharadze. The views expressed in the article are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

A newly released UN Women and CRRC Georgia report has found that the majority of Georgians believe access to quality education is equal between men and women, and that such an education is relatively easy to obtain.

According to a 2021 Pew Research Centre report, young women are more likely than men to attend college, a trend that is consistent across the globe.

This trend is also observed in Georgia, where the proportion of female students is higher than that of male students — according to official statistics, in the 2024–2025 school year, 53% of university students were female and 47% male.

Despite the statistics, according to data gathered by UN Women and CRRC Georgia, most Georgians believe access to quality education is fairly equitable between genders, though opinions vary slightly when it comes to men’s versus women’s access.

According to the new UN Women and CRRC Georgia report, 62% of the Georgian population agree that it is easy for women to receive a quality education. A slightly larger share (66%) believe that the same is true for men. Fewer (59%) think that a quality education is easily accessible to them in Georgia.

Regarding the question of how easy it is to access quality education in Georgia, regression analyses show that younger people (16–24), those who are employed, and individuals with at least some higher education are more likely to perceive access to quality education for themselves in Georgia as easy compared to older individuals, the unemployed, and those with lower levels of education. This perception did not vary by gender, settlement type, or ethnicity, controlling for other factors.

Opinions on men’s and women’s access to education in Georgia vary. People who are not working and those aged 35–44 are less likely to perceive women’s access to quality education as easy, compared to employed individuals and younger age groups. This attitude does not vary by education level, gender, settlement type, or ethnicity, all else equal.

Similarly, demographic factors such as employment status, ethnicity, and settlement type predict perceptions of men’s access to education. Ethnic minorities, people in urban areas, and employed individuals are more likely to perceive men’s access to quality education as relatively easy, compared to ethnic Georgians, residents of the capital, and those who are not employed.

The vast majority (88%) of the population disagrees with the statement that it is more important for a boy to obtain a university education than a girl. The perceived social norms are similar to personal attitudes, though there is greater uncertainty over what the social norm is.

One in seven (15%) believe that the majority of people in their community think education is more important for boys than girls. A similar share is uncertain, and 69% disagree. A regression model does not indicate any statistically significant differences between demographic groups on these questions.

The prevailing belief among the population of Georgia is that access to quality education is equal and relatively easy to obtain for the majority of men and women, as well as for themselves. The findings suggest that while most Georgians believe there is equal access to quality education for men and women, subtle differences in perceptions exist across demographics. Social norms largely support gender equality in education, with a small minority feeling that boys’ education is more valued.

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables:  age (16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55+); Sex (male or female); settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); education level (secondary or lower, vocational, completed or uncompleted higher education); ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); and employment status (employed or unemployed).