Georgia’s changing priorities at the UN General Assembly

 Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A quantitative analysis of the speeches made by Georgia’s leaders at the annual UN General Assembly found that their themes and priorities changed after the change of government in 2012, with Georgian Dream leaders more positive and discussing Russia less negatively than their predecessors. 

The UN General Assembly (UNGA), currently in its 78th session, meets annually in September and offers an opportunity for the heads of state or government of every country to raise the issues that they consider most pressing, as well as addressing an international audience from one of the highest tribunes of the world. 

Georgian political leaders have been no exception to this. Examining their speeches from 2007 to 2022 at the UNGA using quantitative text analysis allows patterns associated with the change in government in 2012 to be identified. 

Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the previous United National Movement (UNM) government, made longer speeches, and spoke more often, more negatively, and more harshly about Russia. In comparison, Georgian Dream’s leaders and President Salome Zurabishvili have been less likely to mention Russia, instead focusing on broader concepts such as development, security, and peace. The data suggests a clear shift in Georgia’s foreign policy discourse. 

Speech length

Saakashvili made longer speeches than Georgian Dream’s leaders, with his speeches on average containing 3360 words. His 2007 speech was the shortest (2723 words) and his last speech in 2013 the longest (4758 words). In contrast, an average speech after Georgian Dream took over was 2277 words, with Kvirikashvili's 2017 address the shortest (1915 words), and Zurabishvili’s 2019 speech the longest (3205 words).

General sentiment

Sentiment analysis of the speeches shows that Saakashvili was generally more negative in his speeches than Georgian Dream’s Prime Ministers. The two speeches with the highest frequency of negative words are Saakashvili’s in 2008 and 2011, while the two most positive speeches are Gharibashvili’s in 2015 and 2021. However, it's important to highlight that Zurabishvili's overall sentiment differs from that of Georgian Dream leaders, with her speech recording a significantly more negative sentiment. 

Russia in Georgian leaders’ UNGA speeches

Due to the formal style of speeches at the UN General Assembly, many of the highest frequency words in Saakashvili’s speeches and those of Georgian Dream’s leaders are the same. However, there are some notable differences.

Saakashvili frequently mentioned Russia and the word ‘freedom’, while Georgian Dream’s leaders mentioned security, education, development, and human rights more frequently. 

In total, Saakashvili mentioned Russia/Russians 105 times (once in every 224 words) while Georgian Dream leaders did the same 55 times (once in every 373 words). The UNM leader mentioned freedom 51 times (once in every 461 words) while Georgian Dream’s leaders mentioned it 28 times (once in every 732 words). 

However, Georgian Dream’s leaders mentioned security 52 times (once in every 394 words), compared to Saakashvili’s 17 (once in every 1384 words). Georgian Dream also mentioned development 92 times (once in every 223 words), while Saakashvili said it 25 times (once in every 941 words). GD mentioned human rights roughly twice as often (once in every 683 words) as Saakashvili (once in every 1568 words), and referred to education 42 times (once in every 488 words) while Saakashvili mentioned it six times (once in every 3920 words). 

Note: Some of the words in the above word clouds are misspelled. This stems from the analysis method using core parts of words rather than the full word to conduct analysis, a process known as stemming. For instance, the analysis counts peace, peaceful, and peacebuilding in the same manner.

The context of the above mentions is important as well. The following graph demonstrates the number of mentions of ‘Russia’/’Russians’ in a negative context as well as the term ‘occupation’. Saakashvili referred to Russia negatively every 320 words, while GD leaders mentioned Russia in a negative context every 510 words. 

Saakashvili’s attitude towards mentioning Russia changed during his time in power. In his speeches just after the 2008 war, he did not explicitly name Russia when speaking about the country in a negative light; for example, in 2008, he stated that ‘Georgia [...] was invaded by our neighbour’. However, in his later speeches, his negative references to Russia were more explicit. In his last speech at the UN General Assembly in 2013, Saakashvili referred to Russia negatively 34 times and mentioned ‘occupation’ six times. By comparison, Georgian Dream’s leaders mentioned Russia negatively only a handful of times in their speeches. 

Note: Only direct mentions are counted. 

A closer inspection of sentiments suggests that Saakashvili used harsher language when referring to Russian activities in Georgia than Georgian Dream leaders. More specifically, the most frequently mentioned negative terms Saakashvili used were brutal, destroy, danger, tank, attack, fear, kill, and conflict. In contrast, Georgian Dream’s leaders and Zurabishvili’s highest-frequency negative words associated with Russia are conflict, severe, difficult, threat, and hard. 

While Georgian Dream’s leaders use the term ‘terror’, it does not refer to Russian occupation. 

In terms of positive words, Saakashvili put greater emphasis on the term ‘freedom’, while Georgian Dream leaders prioritised the word ‘success’ more often. 

An analysis tool known as topic modeling suggests that the main themes of Saakashvili’s addresses revolve around Russia, the Georgian nation, peace, and democratic governance. Examining the top nine topics suggests there are several recurring terms in Saakashvili’s speeches at the UN General Assembly: Russia (topics 1, 8), war and invasion (topics 2, 4), new and nation (topics 2,5,9), peace (topics 6,7), and democratic governance (topic 3).

Topic modeling of the Georgian Dream PMs and Zurabishvili’s speeches suggest that their priorities differ from Saakashvili’s. In their top nine topics, none refer explicitly to Russia. Their speeches mostly focused on development (topics 1,2,5,8,9), security (topics 1, 2, 5), peace (topics 3, 4,6), Europe (topics 2,3, 6), rights (5,9), and the economy (7,8). One of the topics (8) does include the term occupation, but mainly in the context of economic development.

The above analysis suggests a shift in foreign policy priorities and Georgia’s international positioning after Georgian Dream came into power. While Saakashvili used harsher and more negative terms, and referred to Russia more regularly, Georgian Dream’s Prime Ministers have been relatively reluctant to refer to Russia explicitly. Instead, they have focused their speeches to the UN on security, development, the economy, and peace. 

Russian émigrés in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, tens of thousands of Russian nationals moved to Georgia, with many choosing to stay. A CRRC survey found that Russian respondents  in Georgia believe that Russia is not a democracy, have mixed views about Georgia’s political direction, and feel relatively secure in Georgia. 

After Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgia emerged as a popular destination for Russian citizens fleeing their country. According to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, between February and September 2022, about 100,000 Russian nationals entered the country and chose to stay. 

Many Georgians are concerned about the influx and believe it might have a detrimental impact on the country, and the attitudes of Russian émigrés about both Georgia and Russian politics have been hotly debated. 

To understand these attitudes, in the spring and early summer of 2023, CRRC-Georgia employing non-probability based sampling methods, polled over 1,000 Russian nationals who emigrated to Georgia after February 2022. The data show that, at least for those surveyed, Russians in Georgia left due to the war, seeking security, and feel they have found it in Georgia. With regard to politics, the Russians surveyed are extremely negative about Russian President Vladimir Putin, relatively positive about opposition leader Alexei Navalny, and believe that Russia is not a democracy. 

Migrating to Georgia

The poll asked respondents to name the primary reasons for choosing Georgia. A plurality of respondents (28%) cited security in Georgia. One in six (17%) mentioned the cost of living, and one in seven (14%) mentioned the ease of getting to Georgia. No more than 10% of respondents named the other available response options.

Three quarters of those surveyed (74%) report they have at least one Georgian friend. Nearly half (44%) reported having a Georgian friend before coming to Georgia after February 2022. More than half of the respondents (57%) stated they made new Georgian friends after moving to the country.

A majority (78%) say they are very or quite satisfied with their life in Georgia. One in six (16%) are neither satisfied nor unsatisfied. One in twenty (6%) report they are very or rather unsatisfied with life in Georgia.

Most Russians feel physically secure living in Georgia. A third of the respondents (33%) felt very safe, and 56% said they felt quite safe. Only 8% reported feeling neither safe nor unsafe, and 3% said they felt very unsafe or rather unsafe.

Since moving to Georgia, nine in ten respondents (89%) opened a bank account, two-thirds (68%) received money transfers from Russia, three in ten (30%) opened or registered a business, and 6% purchased real estate. 

The reported duration of respondents’ stays in Georgia is mixed, with a large share uncertain of how long they’ll stay. Half (49%) plan to remain in Georgia for at least a year. A further 14% plan to spend more than six months, but less than a year. One in twenty (6%) plan to stay for more than four months, but no more than six. Other periods were reported by less than 5% of the sample. A quarter of the Russians surveyed Russians (25%) have yet to decide how long they will remain in Georgia.

The émigrés overwhelmingly trust Georgians.  Nine in ten (91%) fully or mostly trust residents of Georgia, while only 8% say that they do not trust Georgians.

Attitudes towards Georgian politics

The Russians surveyed tend to think Georgia qualifies as a democracy, but they are divided over the scale of its political issues. More than a third of the respondents think Georgia is either a full democracy (3%) or a democracy with minor problems (35%). Slightly over half believe Georgia is a democracy with major problems (56%). Only 3% consider Georgia not at all democratic, and the remaining 3% do not know.

The émigrés generally rate Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s performance negatively, whereas they primarily rate that of President Salome Zurabishvili positively. Only 19% of respondents thought the PM's performance was very or quite positive, whereas 74% said the President's performance was very or quite positive.

Leaving Russia

Similar to earlier studies of displaced Russians in Georgia, the major reasons for leaving Russia were the political situation in Russia, the conflict in Ukraine, and the ‘partial’ mobilisation that took place in September 2022. The political situation in Russia was cited by an overwhelming majority of responders (87%). 73% mentioned the conflict with Ukraine. Slightly less than a third (29%) of Russians polled stated the announcement of 'partial' mobilisation was among the primary triggers prompting their departure.

The polled Russians maintain regular contact with their friends and family who remain in Russia. A little more than a quarter of those polled (27%) said they communicated with friends and family in Russia on a daily basis. Half of those polled indicated they spoke with them at least once a week. 16% indicated they spoke with friends and family in Russia at least once a month but not every week. Fewer respondents reported talking with friends and family less often.  

Moreover, the interviewed Russians have no plans to return to Russia anytime soon. The vast majority of Russians polled (93%) said they would not return to Russia in the foreseeable future.

Attitudes towards Russian politics

When questioned about their overall opinion of Russia, respondents tend to assess the country unfavourably. Two-thirds (66%) of Russians in the survey had negative feelings about Russia. A little more than a quarter of them (28%) were optimistic, while 6% were unsure and refused to answer the question.

Respondents trust other Russians who left more than those that stayed. While 76% of respondents reported trusting Russians who left, 49% reported trusting Russians who stayed.

The respondents were certain that Russia does not qualify as a democracy, with 94% reporting Russia is not a democracy at all. 

Respondents tend to evaluate Russian President Vladimir Putin very negatively and Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny quite positively. Nine in ten respondents (89%) assessed Putin’s performance very negatively, and 5% rather negatively. Eight in ten respondents (79%) assessed Navalny’s performance positively.

The Russians interviewed in the above survey overwhelmingly left due to the war, and came to Georgia for security. The above data suggests they have found it, and they are satisfied with life here. They have relatively positive views of Georgia’s democracy, while assessing President Zurabishvili positively and Prime Minister Gharibashvili negatively. They tend to hold highly negative views of Putin, and quite positive views of Navalny. They recognise Russia is not a democracy.

This blog is based on a larger report, available here.

NOTE: Due to the non-probability sampling method, the results are only applicable to the respondents (N=1008) and not to the whole population of Russian citizens residing in Georgia.   

What Georgians read on Wikipedia

 Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Hans Gutbrod, who teaches at Ilia State University. Hans was previously the Regional Director of Caucasus Research Resource Centers. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

Analysing the most-visited Georgian-language pages on Wikipedia gives an insight into the priorities and interests of Georgian users of the site, with some surprises.

In the depths of the internet, a little-known site listing the page views of different sites gives access to a particular treasure: the 100 most visited Georgian-language Wikipedia entries since 2015, highlighting what people have been drawn to over the last seven years. 

Some of the top pages may not come as a surprise to those familiar with the country’s attitude to its history and culture. 

For example, Georgian-language Wikipedia usage shows a strong interest in the country’s kings. David IV Aghmashenebeli (the Builder) is the third most visited page on Georgian Wikipedia, followed by Queen Tamar (5), Erekle II (10), Vakhtang I Gorgasali (11), and Parnavaz I (28). The first and only living Georgian among the top 100 is Georgian footballer and Napoli left-winger Kvicha Kvaratskhelia (48). 

Poetry, poets, and writers are also popular, led by Ilia Chavchavadze (8), The Knight in the Panther’s Skin (12), Vazha-Pshavela (14), Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani (20), Shota Rustaveli (23), Akaki Tsereteli (25) and Galaktion Tabidze (32), and playwright and director Sandro Akhmeteli (40). The painter Niko Pirosmani (56) is also among the top 10 artists that Georgians look up on Wikipedia. Composers, however, appear not to be looked up frequently. 

Is the curiosity genuine, or are children cribbing for school? Ilia Chavchavadze is most in demand in November (26,700 views) and of least interest in August (3,900 views). This pattern seems to align with the curricular season, though perhaps it is good if teachers encourage kids to wander the pastures of ‘the largest and most-read reference work in history’. 

Sharka Blue (23) was not a name I recognised. On inspection, it turns out that Sharka Blue lists ‘Assume the Position 4’ among her oeuvre. You would be wrong to expect that to be a tactical recommendation for a debating competition.

The prominence of her page looks likely to be attributable to Georgian Wikipedia having a full list of her professional filmography — something that no other language appears to have. Only 60% of her page views are from a mobile device, when otherwise the average is above 80%.

Sharka notwithstanding, women are systematically underrepresented in Georgian Wikipedia. Queen Tamar is the only woman in the top 20, and when speaking about her, many men — especially during toasts —  will anyway insist she was so formidable as to be a mepe, a king. The next women are far down the list, with the Martyrdom of Shushanik (77), Queen Elizabeth II (79), and Saint Nino (84), making for a total of five women versus 25 men among the top 100 entries. 

Geographical information is highly sought after on Georgian Wikipedia. The fourth most popular entry is Ukraine, closely followed by the List of Countries (7), National Flags (15), Russia (18), the United States of America (22), and Earth (26). As might be expected, interest in Ukraine and Russia spiked in February/March of 2022. 

Mexico, an increasingly popular destination for those seeking to travel onward to the US, remains the 919th most visited page with stable interest across the years, suggesting that Wikipedia is not where potential migrants do their research.

The word ‘tolerance’ (85) is amongst the top 100 Georgian-language Wikipedia pages, as is ‘liberalism’ (91). Otherwise, verbs (36), adjectives (49), metaphor (80), and synonyms (86), rank high, suggesting once again that a significant proportion of the online encyclopedia’s Georgian-language users may be students. 

One odd feature in Georgia, but also Armenia and Azerbaijan, is that the single most visited page is the entry for Carles Puigdemont, the Catalan politician, with half a million page visits in total. As less than 0.2% of the visits are from a mobile device, when otherwise this is how Wikipedia is usually accessed, there probably are bots at work. 

The high-intensity visits started in early 2020 and have been high since, with a short trough across the three countries at the same time in December 2021. The Georgian page for Puigdemont was created as a translation from the Russian entry. It has been reported that Puigdemont’s associates have visited Moscow, and may have even sought assistance there. 

Georgia's most viewed page after that? Ahead of the page for the country itself, it is the entry for Europebet. Perhaps eager customers have been jumping on the first link in Google, as an accidental (if potentially informative) detour before clicking through to the gambling site. An alternative interpretation is that people are impatiently clicking on the top listing in hopes of finding news of their favourite team. 

Such sporting enthusiasm is evident in article edits. Georgia’s most edited entry is that of footballer Khvicha Kvaratskhelia (286 edits), followed by Argentinian footballer Lionel Messi (107 edits, 83rd most viewed entry), as avid fans update their players’ scores. 

Major gaps remain in what is accessible on Georgian Wikipedia. For example, while according to WHO data, 28% of children in Georgia are overweight or obese, there is no entry on the subject in Georgian that parents or health professionals might use for reference. In Armenia, at least, the English entry seems to have been translated.

Other entries remain stubs. The Georgian-language entry on inflation has 113 words. By comparison, those that read English can find an article that is more than 80 times as detailed, with over 9000 words, describing causes as well as methods of controlling inflation. With inflation in Georgia running at 12% per year, the issue matters for most families. Macroeconomic teaching and research on inflation in Georgia could be complemented by making information on the issue available to all.

Wikipedia in the region rests on the work of few contributors. When it comes to Admins, the entire Caucasus contingent would fit on a mid-sized bus: 14 in Azerbaijan, 11 in Armenia, six in Georgia, five for Megrelian, and two for the Abkhaz language. 

When things are easy to improve, they should not ever be complained about. Wikipedia squarely fits into that category. Any user can help to add information, as long as it is well-documented with a reliable source. One would hope that universities get more engaged, too, to encourage lecturers and students to add their micro-contribution to knowledge – arguably the most fruitful assignment as it serves the world, not just a single assessment. 

Wikipedia, as it turns out, does not just hold information – it also holds information about information, in telling us what is of most interest. In this way, it opens yet another window onto Georgia and onto the world. 

This article was written by Hans Gutbrod, who teaches at Ilia State University. Hans was previously the Regional Director of Caucasus Research Resource Centers. This analysis is based on a presentation at the CRRC methods conference in June 2023. For a regional comparison, see this article on EurasiaNet. The author extends a special thanks to Giorgi Melashvili for pointing out how to retrieve the listings. The full list is here. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Georgians continue to support gender parity in parliament

 Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia and Nino Topchishvili, a Junior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia. . The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity. 

More than half of the Georgian public support a gender-balanced parliament, with women, young people, and those not aligned with the ruling party more in favour of a 50/50 gender split. 

Legislation passed in Georgia in 2020 required parties to nominate at least one out of every four candidates on their electoral lists be women, to their electoral lists, with this number increasing to one in three by 2028, promoting women's participation in politics.  However, due to the first-past-the-post component of elections, less than one quarter of current parliamentarians are women.  

In parallel to legislative changes, public opinion is becoming more supportive of women in leadership positions, with CRRC and NDI’s surveys from 2014 to the present showing a consistent increase in the share of the population that believes that an equal gender split in parliament is ideal.

Since 2022, a majority of the Georgian public has reported that the ideal proportion of men and women in parliament is 50% male and 50% female. 

The share of the public supporting this position rose from 49% to 59% between 2021 and 2022, remaining at a similar level of 62% in 2023. By comparison, only 32% reported agreeing with this position in 2014. 

The rise in people reporting an equal split between men and women in parliament coincides with a decline in the share of people reporting that 30% or less women and 70% or more men would be the ideal share. This percentage dropped from 55% in 2014 to 19% in 2023.

Further analysis shows that age, gender, and partisanship are associated with views about gender balance in parliament.

Women are 13 percentage points more likely to support an equal share of men and women in parliament than men. Older people (55+) are 12 percentage points less likely to support a gender-balanced parliament compared to young people (18-34). 

People who report that there is no party close to them are 12 percentage points more likely to choose equal representation of men and women in parliament than Georgian Dream supporters.

Education level, settlement type, ethnicity, and wealth are not associated with support for an equal share of men and women in parliament, controlling for other factors.

The above data show that the public is increasingly in favour of having more women in Georgia’s parliament, with women, people under 55, and those who do not support Georgian Dream most in favour of that.

The above analysis is based on a logistic regression, where the dependent variable is equal support for male and female members of parliament or another response. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, ethnicity, wealth, education, and partisanship. 

CRRC’s 9th Annual Conference: New Frontiers: The South Caucasus Amidst New Challenges

On June 22 and 23, the Caucasus Research Resource Centers in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia hosted the 9th annual methods conference. This year the conference focused on the  Russian-Ukrainian and how it has altered the geopolitical, economic, and demographic state of the South Caucasus. 

The first day of the conference featured four panels, on issues ranging from values, mobilization, and activism in the South Caucasus to migration to and from the region. 

The first day also featured a round table on  Archival Access and Openness in the Caucasus and Eurasia, with speakers from Berkeley, Cambridge, and Princeton, among other universities. 

The second day of the conference featured two panels, with the first looking at new economic geographies of the region, and the second focused on intercommunal relations in the South Caucasus. 

The conference concluded with a methods workshop, focused on Empowering Research Subjects with Photovoice in the South Caucasus.

The full conference video will be available from CRRC Georgia’s YouTube Channel in the near future, here.

The conference abstract book is available here. 

What Do Non-Partisans Think of Politicians and Parties in Georgia?

Note: Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Zachary Fabos, an International Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A CRRC analysis found that, of the plurality of Georgians who do not feel any party aligns with their views, most dislike Georgia’s leading political figures and parties.

Controversy over Georgia’s leading politicians’ actions and statements is commonplace. Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s recent statements on the war in Ukraine and the subsequent criticism surrounding it is just one recent example.

Typically, an individual’s reaction to such controversy is connected to their political views and party alignment. However, a plurality of Georgians either do not know which party their views align with or feel their views do not align with any party, according to CRRC Georgia’s January 2023 Omnibus survey. This segment of the Georgian public is critical of all political figures and parties they are surveyed on, regardless of a politician’s political affiliation.

Participants of CRRC Georgia’s Omnibus Survey were asked which party best aligned with their views. A plurality (47%) of Georgians either do not know or believe no party aligns with their views. A quarter (24%) indicated their views align with Georgian Dream, while 11% reported the United National Movement (UNM) did. 12% chose other parties, and the remaining 6% refused to answer.

As the plurality of respondents do not know, or feel no party aligns with their views, what do they think of some of the country’s leading political figures?

Respondents that indicated don’t know or no party aligns with their views disliked all the political figures they were asked about. However, this group was most critical of Georgian Dream party chairman Irakli Kobakhidze and former UNM chairman Nika Melia with a net favourability of -50% each, with 13% reporting they liked Kobakhidze, and 63% reporting they disliked him. The nonpartisans, and the public more generally, were least critical of Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze, with a net favourability of -7% amongst those who supported no party. The rest of the political figures in the survey fell somewhere between, all with negative net favourability among this group.

 

The degree to which these respondents’ criticism is nonpartisan is reinforced by data from those that indicated either the Georgian Dream party or UNM was closest to their views. Among these partisan respondents, likes and dislikes sharply align with partisanship.

Georgian Dream supporters greatly dislike political figures associated with the UNM, with former President Mikheil Saakashvili receiving -67% net favourability, and former party chairman Nika Melia -84% net favourability. Support for political figures associated with Georgian Dream is consistently positive. However, party chair Irakli Kobakhidze and President Salome Zourabichvili, an independent who was strongly supported in her election by Georgian Dream, received the lowest net favourability scores of the group with 34% and 29%, respectively.

Similarly, those indicating the UNM is closest to their views strongly supported opposition-aligned political figures, while being critical of those associated with Georgian Dream. Amongst this group, for example, Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili received a net favourability score of -68%. In contrast, UNM supporters have highly positive attitudes towards Saakashvili, who had a net favourability of 83%, the highest net favourability rating of any political figure in all groups regardless of party.

Opinions on the two leading parties among nonpartisans were largely critical, as 60% stated they disliked Georgian Dream while 67% disliked the UNM. Although the group was more likely to like the ruling party (21%) than the opposition (13%), positive perceptions of both parties were relatively uncommon.

This group was similarly critical of all other parties they were surveyed on, with all being disliked by a majority (at least 60%), or more of the group. The most liked of the third parties was former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia, with 15% of those in the group of nonpartisans questioned indicating they liked the party. The least liked was the far-right Conservative Movement, at 6%.

 

Note: Response options to the question on the above chart included like a lot, like more than dislike, dislike more than like, and do not like at all in addition to don’t know, refuse to answer, and I have not heard of this party. The chart above merges responses of like a lot and like more than dislike as like. It also combines responses of dislike more than like and do not like at all into dislike.

The data shows that party allegiance, or lack thereof, is associated with Georgians’ opinions on political figures. As a plurality of those surveyed do not align themselves with any one party’s beliefs, many Georgians are left not sympathising with any party, and largely dislike most major political figures.

Do Georgians Feel Like They are Being Spied on by the Government?

 Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC-Georgia, or any related entity.

Nearly half of the Georgian public think that they or their family members are under government surveillance at least some of the time.

Georgia has consistently had controversies around surveillance over the past two political administrations, as both the United National Movement and Georgian Dream governments have had extensive access to communications.

In September 2021, a massive cache of files allegedly belonging to the State Security Services (SSG) was leaked, causing a scandal in Georgia and stirring fears of mass surveillance among the public.

[Read more on OC Media: Datablog | Georgian public opinion on the SSG files]

Though Georgian Dream initially made some reforms in this area upon coming to power, recent legislative changes have largely rolled back on this progress. In light of the consistent scandals, it is perhaps unsurprising that nearly half the public thinks that they are being surveilled in one form or another, according to a recent survey CRRC-Georgia conducted for the Social Justice Center.

The survey asked respondents how much they felt that the SSG surveilled them or their family members in everyday life through the following means:

    Listening to their phone calls;
    Monitoring their social media activity;
    Informants in their neighbourhood, community, or workplace and;
    Physical surveillance.

The data suggest that the public is most likely to think that security services listen to their phone calls, with 36% reporting they believe this happens sometimes or always.

Social media monitoring was the second-most common form of surveillance people believed to be subject to, with one in five (20%) believing this happens sometimes or always. Approximately one in six (17%) believe that there are government informants at their workplace, in their community, or in their neighbourhood. Direct surveillance is believed to be least common among the public, with only 6% reporting they believe this happens to them sometimes or always.

 

Overall, 44% of the public reported that they believe the government monitors them in one of the above manners. One in five (21%) named one means of surveillance on the survey, one in eight (13%) reported two means of surveillance while one in ten (10%) reported three or four means of surveillance.

 

When the data is broken down by social and demographic variables, a number of patterns emerge: first, older people (55+) are significantly less likely to believe they are under surveillance than those between 18–34 or 35–54.

Second, people who support the opposition are 25 points more likely than Georgian Dream supporters to believe they are under surveillance at least sometimes. Similarly, nonpartisans are seven points more likely to believe that they are being surveilled than supporters of the ruling party.

A regression that included the above variables did not show any significant differences between men and women, ethnic minorities and ethnic Georgians, IDPs and non-IDPs, wealthier and poorer households, people in different types of settlement, those with differing levels of education, those working and not, and working the public and private sectors.

 

The above data suggests that nearly half the public thinks the government is surveilling them, with opposition supporters being particularly likely to believe the government is watching.

The data in this article is available here.