International Day of Happiness

This year an International Day of Happiness will be celebrated for the first time on March 20th. In 2012, the United Nations (UN) declared this day to be an official holiday to highlight the importance of happiness as a fundamental human aim and to call upon countries to approach public policy in ways that improve the well-being of their citizens. This aim was inspired by the Gross National Happiness Index which was developed in Bhutan to measure prosperity by gauging its citizens' happiness. The index measures the average economic, environmental, physical, political and social wellness of Bhutanese society based on survey data. Although this specific index does not exist in other countries, several surveys worldwide have asked how happy people consider themselves to be.

The annual Caucasus Barometer (CB) asks people in all three countries of the South Caucasus, “How happy would you say you are?” The results reveal that Azerbaijanis have consistently evaluated their level of happiness lower than Armenians and Georgians within the past 3 years, although it has increased from 2010 to 2012. The level of happiness in Armenia has also slightly increased from 2010 to 2012, whereas in Georgia it has remained higher than in the other 2 countries. 

 This question was asked on a 1 to 10 scale where 1=Not happy at all and 10=Very happy. 

The results shown here combine the responses for items 8, 9 and 10 on this scale.

Some think happiness is a result of high economic performance. Yet, this is easily refuted by looking at the Gallup’s 2012 list of “happiest nations” in the world which is topped by several relatively poor countries in South America and South Asia. Additionally, this analysis gives insight into people’s expectations about their well-being and finances in the coming year. This measure is called “Net Hope on Economy”. In 2012, Gallup asked 1,000 people in 54 countries if they feel that the next year will be a year of economic prosperity, economic difficulty or remain the same. Net Hope on Economy was calculated by deducting the percent optimistic (hopeful about economic prospects in 2013) from the percent pessimistic (those who see greater economic difficulty in 2013). The results show that Georgians rank #1 and Azerbaijanis rank #2 on this list of 54 countries, with the highest hopes of economic prosperity for 2013. Armenians ranked #22 with slightly more pessimists than optimists.  

Source: WIN-Gallup International Association,

Global Barometer of Hope and Happiness, December 30, 2012

The CB 2012 also asks about future economic expectations, but specifically regarding children. Georgians, Armenia and Azerbaijanis were asked, “Do you think your children will be better off or worse off financially than you are when they are your age?” The results reveal that between two fifths to two thirds of people in the South Caucasus are optimistic. Georgians are the most positive, followed by Azerbaijanis and Armenians whose results are closer to each other.  

In this blog we aimed to show the pursuit of new measures of well-being and happiness. Some movements have embraced new ways of measuring prosperity through happiness or future expectations, thus showing that economic indices are not solely important. 

On the occasion of the first International Day of Happiness, we wish everybody to live up to their expectations and to achieve the underlying meaning of this day. 

Access the full Gallup report here and the CB 2012 here for more information on this data. 

Gender Attitudes toward Education in Azerbaijan

Girls outperform boys in science in Azerbaijan, according to data from a recent article in the New York Times entitled, “Girls Lead in Science Exam, but Not in the United States”. This article discusses results from a worldwide test conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) among 15-year-olds in 65 developed countries 2009. As indicated by the test, Azerbaijan’s scores were on the lower end of the surveyed countries. Female participants, however, had an average score of 377, while males scored an average of 370, a difference of slightly less than 2%. Though this difference is arguably inconsequential, CRRC data suggest that there are slight variations in Azerbaijani males’ and females’ attitudes toward the value of education in general.

According to the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB), Azerbaijani women place greater value on education than do their male counterparts. The CB 2012 survey showed that 22% of Azerbaijani women indicated education as the most important factor for finding a good job, as compared to 19% of male respondents—although the difference between these two figures is small and barely within the margin of error.

Similarly, data from CRRC’s 2012 Social Capital, Media andGender Survey (commissioned by SIDA) indicate higher levels of education-related activism among Azerbaijani women. Whereas nearly 30% of Azerbaijani women indicated at least some involvement in education, school, or parents’ committees in the last twelve months, only 22% of Azerbaijani men indicated involvement in similar education-related organizations.

Azerbaijani women's proclivity for reading was also higher. According to 2012 SIDA data, 40% of women respondents indicated they had read a book in the last six months, while the number for men stood at 33%

Though CRRC data suggest that Azerbaijani women might be involved in more educational activities and place greater value on education for getting a good job than men, CB 2012 indicated that Azerbaijani women actually have lower levels of post-secondary education than their male counterparts. For example, 18% of Azerbaijani men indicated that they had achieved post-secondary education, while the figure for women was slightly lower at 13%.

Though the variations in the above cases are generally quite small, CRRC data are consistent with the OECD's test and indicate that women may be slightly more attuned to the value of education than men in Azerbaijan. Although women's educational value and performance in science exceed men's, Azerbaijani women still appear to be less represented in terms of post-secondary education. 

For more data on education and attitudes in Azerbaijan visit the new 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset.

Inequality of Job Opportunities Across the South Caucasus

The World Development Report 2013, which was newly released and presented in Tbilisi a couple of weeks  ago states that, “The concept of equality of opportunity, which can be traced back to John Rawls and Robert Nozick, stems from the idea that an individual’s chances of success in life should not be caused by circumstances that are beyond the individual’s control, such as gender, ethnicity, location of birth, or family background.” The report is mainly devoted to investigating jobs challenges and problems of employment, including unequal opportunities to find a job due to specific circumstances. This report included a chart from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LTS) that identifies the level of inequality of job opportunities based on circumstances, age and education across countries (i.e. the “Dissimilarity Index” or D index). Differences in the results among countries can be observed in the table below, yet data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) show shifting priorities for obtaining a good job in the South Caucasus countries.

The LTS chart from 2006 indicates that education is a major source of inequality of job opportunities in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the inequality D-index for Armenia was approximately 11 times higher than in Georgia and 3 times higher than in Azerbaijan. For Georgia and Azerbaijan, circumstances such as gender, ethnicity, parental education and political affiliation influenced the inequality of job opportunities. In contrast, these circumstances constituted the least share of the D-index in Armenia. Age was found to be least influential in all three countries, yet, it was about 3 times larger in Armenia and Azerbaijan than in Georgia. 

The more recent 2012 CB asked about factors that Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis consider most important for getting a good job in their countries. CB data show that connections is considered to be the most important factor for getting a job in Armenia and Azerbaijan, whereas education is considered to be the most important factor in Georgia. Education is also deemed to be the second most important factor in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, doing favors for the ‘right’ people stands as the third most important factor in Azerbaijan, while professional abilities is third for Georgia and Armenia. Appearance and age are considered to be more important factors for getting a good job in Armenia than in other two countries, whereas hard work, luck and talent are perceived to hold more weight in Georgia.

This blog has shown that there are different perceptions about how different factors relate to job opportunities in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Whereas education, circumstances and age are shown to be the most basic reasons for job inequality in the LTS survey, connections and education are the dominant factors for getting a good job in all 3 countries according to the CB. 

If you are interested in issues regarding attitudes towards getting a good job please visit CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Internet and Computer Usage in Azerbaijan

The level of computer and Internet usage has become a salient issue in Azerbaijan in recent years, particularly in light of efforts to diversify the country's hydrocarbon-rich economy through the development of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. Taking into consideration a number of bold ICT development initiatives, what do levels of computer and Internet usage actually look like in Azerbaijan? This blog underlines various contradictory statistics and seeks to provide a realistic measure of Internet and computer penetration among Azerbaijanis.

In March 2012, the State Fund for the Development of IT under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (MCIT) was created by presidential decree. An additional presidential decree in November 2012 called for the establishment of a High Technology Park in Azerbaijan for the “preparation of new and high technologies, research in the field of energy efficiency, space and telecommunications, information technology and communications.” Concurrently, MCIT indicates that broadband Internet access has grown significantly since its inception in 2006, while also claiming that Internet access is, at least theoretically, available to all of Azerbaijan’s population given “the fact that mobile penetration in Azerbaijan exceeded 100%”.

Accordingly, MCIT’s Internet penetration statistics for 2011 are quite high. The number of computer users in Azerbaijan stood at 48%, while the figure for Internet users was 65%. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, likewise indicated a high Internet penetration rate for 2011 with a reported 50% of Azerbaijanis using the Internet. ITU’s statistics come from administrative data sources that compile various data from telecommunications operators, and they indicate that Internet penetration has grown by over 80% since 2009 and by nearly 200% since 2008.

Data from CRRC’s 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) suggest lower levels of Internet penetration in Azerbaijan. 59% of Azerbaijanis claimed to “never” use the Internet in 2012, while 12% indicated they did not know what the Internet was. In contrast, 19% of Azerbaijanis stated they used Internet once a week or more, with 7% indicating they used Internet at least once a month or less often. Despite the overall low frequency of Internet usage in 2012, there has been an increase in Internet usage since 2011.

As a whole, CB data from 2011 and 2012 suggest significantly lower levels of Internet penetration in comparison to ITU and MCIT figures.

Regarding computer ownership, data from CRRC’s 2012 SocialCapital, Media, and Gender Survey (commissioned by SIDA) indicated that 25% of Azerbaijani households owned a personal computer. Out of those individuals who indicated household PC ownership, 73% claimed to have Internet access through a personal computer—roughly 18% of the population. These data are relatively consistent with recent Gallup data on home Internet access. According to Gallup’s 2011 Worldwide Tracking, 15% of Azerbaijanis had access to Internet at home, while 2012 polling indicated that the number had increased to 22%.

Data on Internet penetration and computer usage in Azerbaijan are obviously quite varied. Given that ITU and MCIT data come from similar sources, however, it seems reasonable that actual levels of Internet and computer usage are lower than statistics from official and UN sources.

It is apparent that Azerbaijan would like to develop its ICT sector through the implementation of high-profile, “supply-side” development initiatives. In addition to the State Fund for the Development of IT and the planned High Technology Park, the MCIT could possibly support its goals by encouraging increased computer and Internet penetration at the grassroots level. If more Azerbaijanis were made aware of the benefits of the Internet, it is conceivable that Azerbaijan may be able to develop a more Internet savvy population and in turn create the necessary human capital to support its ICT initiatives.

For more information on Internet and technology in Azerbaijan visit the new 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset.

Visa Liberalization Prospects in Georgia – the Way Open for Temporary Emigrants?

Last week the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, presented the Georgian government with a Visa Liberalization Plan between Georgia and the EU. This is significant progress from the previous Visa Facilitation Agreement from 2010 which eased the visa application process for Georgian citizens wanting to go to the EU. Under this previous agreement, the cost of an EU visa was reduced from €60 to €35 for Georgian citizens, and a maximum wait time of 10 days was established for a decision regarding the visa. However, in general the process of receiving an EU visa has remained rather complicated. Now, further reforms in document security, border control, migration, public order and human rights are required for a final agreement over an eventual visa-free regime. The final visa liberalization rules are expected to be implemented before the upcoming Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit on November 28-29, 2013.

Yet, there may be economic and social consequences from the EU an eventual visa-free regime. As the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reveals in its country overview for Georgia, development of the country’s migration management system and a lack of economic opportunities at home are two major migration challenges facing Georgia. According to the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB), while only 6% of Georgians would want to permanently live elsewhere, 42% of Georgians would like to temporarily live elsewhere. 

Georgians who are unemployed and looking for a job (59%) are more interested in temporarily going abroad than those who are not interested in a job.

Additionally, students are the more interested in temporary migration than other groups.  87% of students said they would leave Georgia for a certain period of time to live somewhere else if they had a chance. Also, just over half of unemployed and less than half of those who currently have a job, are self-employed or are homemakers would like to temporarily emigrate. 

The results of the CB 2012 also show that younger Georgians are more interested in temporary emigration than those in older age groups. 67% of Georgians aged 18-35 said they would like to live outside Georgia if there was an opportunity, whereas less than half of Georgians 36-55 years old and a one-fifth of those 56 years or older said the same.

A final visa-free agreement could trigger immigration flows from Georgia to EU countries, especially as particular subsets of Georgians (e.g., younger, students, unemployed, and job-seekers) desire to leave the country for a certain period of time. Therefore, migration flows due to unemployment and difficulties while searching for a job might be controlled by promoting job counseling and placement centers, increasing employment prospects within Georgia and creating flexibility to adapt to changing labor market needs. 

To explore more about job and employment related questions in Georgia, we welcome you to download the new 2012 CB dataset here.

Before and After the Elections: Shifting Public Opinion in Georgia

The Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2012 attracted much international interest and ushered in an important turn in Georgian politics. In 2012 CRRC conducted four waves of a Survey on Political Attitudes in Georgia for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (funded by the Swedish International development Cooperation Agency-SIDA) in order to track changes in public opinion associated with these major political events. The fieldwork for these surveys took place in February, June, August and November and covered economic and political perceptions, attitudes toward democracy and on-going reforms, as well as various domestic and international affairs. Each wave surveyed about 2,000 people in Georgia. The data from NDI surveys allow comparative analysis of public opinion before and after the elections and reveal some interesting trends. This blog post aims to show two of many changes in public opinion that occurred in Georgia in 2012.

The first change discussed in this blog post concerns the perception of democracy in Georgia. Respondents in all waves of NDI survey were asked about their perceptions of democracy in Georgia before and after the elections. The percentage of people who think that Georgia is not a democracy yet, but it is developing in that direction significantly increased after the elections (34%). In line with that, the percentage of people who think that Georgia might become a democracy in the future, but it is not developing in that direction now decreased from 14% in August to 5% in November. To sum up, public opinion follows the opinion of some analysts (see Cory Welt in CAD) and after the elections more people in Georgia think that Georgia has a better chance to become a democracy in the future.

Source: NDI survey on political attitudes in Georgia, Wave 9 (February, 2012), Wave 10 (June, 2012), Wave 11 (August, 2012), Wave 12 (November, 2012)

 

In order to shed more light on this picture it is useful to consider what Georgians mean by democracy. The question, “What does democracy mean to you?” was asked in all waves of survey. The result is more or less unchangeable throughout all four waves and thus only the latest data is shown. For just over half of the population, democracy means freedom of speech/hearing different views (55%), followed by equality before the low (43%) and protection of human rights (33%).

Source: NDI Survey on Political Attitudes in Georgia, Wave 12 (November, 2012)

A second change relates to perceptions of Russia. As a recent article in the New York Times states, it was one of the campaign promises of Georgia’s new Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili “to repair the country’s badly frayed relationship with its huge neighbor”. The data shown on the chart indicate how public opinion reflects political changes and that the process of repairing the relationship between Georgia and Russia has already started in people’s minds.

In February and November 2012 CRRC, on behalf of NDI asked Georgians about their perceptions of Russia. The results show that the percentage of Georgians who think that Russia is no threat to Georgia at all increased significantly over the short period of time. In February only 8% of Georgians thought that Russia is no threat to Georgia at all, while this share increased to 22% in November. Respectively, there is a slight decrease in the number of people who think that Russia is a real and existing threat to Georgia (49% to 40%).

Source: NDI survey on political attitudes in Georgia, Wave 9 (February, 2012), Wave 12 (November, 2012)

To sum up, this blog has shown that political events which took place in 2012 are associated with some important changes in public opinion in Georgia. A question which could be worth further exploration is if political events influence public opinion or if public opinion allows political changes to happen? What do you think is the case in Georgia? We would like to hear your thoughts on that.

If you are interested in exploring further data from NDI surveys, you can download power point presentations from here.

Georgia’s Workforce Development Study

By Ana Diakonidze

In August 2012 CRRC launched the study of Georgia’s Workforce Development system, commissioned by the World Bank. Document review and key informant interviews have been used as main research methods in this study. On 19th of December, the World Bank office in Tbilisi hosted a workshop which aimed at presenting and validating the preliminary findings of the study. The workshop was attended by government representatives, training providers, industry and international donor community.

Workforce Development (WfD) is one of the several policy domains under Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative of the World Bank’s Human Development Network. The objective of the program is to create tools and resources for benchmarking the performance of the education and training system in generating the skills demanded by employers. Under this initiative, worldwide data covering various policy dimensions are being collected. This initiative involves assessment of strategic decisions for WfD, coordination of state and non-state actors, involvement of training providers and employers in WfD policy making, funding and other relevant topics.

Currently, the study report is being finalized. It will outline and explain reasoning behind assigning particular scores to each dimension assessed during the study. The scores are assigned to each policy goal and determine the level of development of the system. According to SABER there are four levels of workforce system development: latent, emerging, established and advanced. The scores help to identify where a particular country stands on this continuum. The figure above explains the four different levels of WfD for policy in terms of policy goal 1. The end goal of this exercise is to support Georgian policy makers in their search for promising options and approaches to achieve better results in WfD.

Comparing Societal Values in the South Caucasus

Values and traditions can shape the ways in which people behave and perceive themselves and others within and across societies. Drawing on data from the 2012 Survey on Social Capital, Media, and Gender in Azerbaijan and the 2011 Survey on Social Cohesion in Armenia, this blog explores different values that, according to Azerbaijanis and Armenians, characterize contemporary Azerbaijani and Armenian societies, respectively. Based on CRRC’s surveys, people in Azerbaijan and Armenia reveal many similar values that define their societies today. In addition, the blog addresses the importance of family in Georgia, using the 2008 World Values Survey (WVS).

Ihe majority of Azerbaijanis think that having children (92%) and a family (89%) is very important in Azerbaijani society. Azerbaijanis also named respect for the Republic of Azerbaijan (84%), the elderly (83%), traditions (81%), and for the Azerbaijani language (77%) as building blocks of the society. 74% of the population places importance on education. Finally, according to the CRRC survey, respect for the history of Azerbaijan (74%) and respect for religious institutions (71%) also characterize contemporary Azerbaijani society.

Similar to Azerbaijanis, the overwhelming majority of Armenians think that having children (96%) and a family (92%) are important in Armenian society. The majority of Armenians also regard education (85%) and respect of traditions (82%) as rather important. Respect for the history of Armenia (78%), for religious institutions (77%), the Armenian language (76%), the Republic of Armenia (74%), and respect for elderly (66%) are also said to define Armenian society today.

The CRRC data show that the majority of Azerbaijanis and Armenians share similar values that they believe characterize their respective societies.  While CRRC did not conduct these particular surveys in Georgia, the 2008 WVS did ask Georgians about the importance of family in their lives. In this regard, 89% of Azerbaijanis, 92% of Armenians, and 99% of Georgians said that family plays an important role in their respective societies.

More information can be found by visiting http://www.crrc.ge/oda/ and http://www.crrccenters.org/activities/research/?id=52.

Exploring Emotions and Life Satisfaction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

From 2009 to 2011, Gallup conducted surveys in over 150 countries to compare how people feel about their lives and what emotions they experience during the day. Based on these surveys, Singapore was considered as the least emotional society (ranked 1st) out of 151 countries surveyed, while the Philippines was named as the most emotional nation (ranked 151st) out of all countries surveyed. Georgia ranked as the 2nd least emotional society after Singapore. Azerbaijan ranked the 15th and Armenia ranked the 38th least emotional nations. This blog explores these findings in comparison to CRRC’s 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey questions on feelings and life satisfaction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

In each country, Gallup focused on peoples’ experiences of five positive and five negative emotions. Positive emotions were feeling well-rested, being treated with respect, experiencing enjoyment, smiling and laughing a lot, as well as learning or doing something interesting. Negative emotions included feeling angry, being sad, stressed, or worried, and experiencing physical pain. Gallup then averaged the percentage of people in each country who said they experienced each of the 10 positive and negative emotions. The results show Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan ranking relatively low on emotionality.

Emotional Countries, ChartsBin.com, viewed 6th December, 2012, <http://chartsbin.com/view/9263>

CRRC’s 2011 CB also asked people in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to describe their feelings, but for specific questions rather than a set of positive and negative emotions that were averaged. 26% of Armenians, 8% of Azerbaijanis, and 13% of Georgians said they experience a general sense of emptiness. In comparison, 48% in Armenia, 66% in Azerbaijan, and 60% in Georgia said that this statement did not describe their feelings.

About half of the population in Armenia (51%) and Georgia (55%) said that they felt happy, followed by just under half of the Azerbaijani population (40%) who also said that they were happy. In turn, 15% of Armenians, 19% of Azerbaijanis, and 12% of Georgians reported feeling unhappy.   

About a third of the population in Armenia (30%), a quarter in Azerbaijan (24%), and over a third in Georgia (36%) said that, all things considered, they were generally satisfied with lives. Somewhat similar percentages indicate that people were unsatisfied in each country. 

In conclusion, Gallup and CRRC reveal somewhat different results in terms of emotional experiences and overall life satisfaction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. While Gallup measured the average percentage of respondents who reported experiencing any of the 10 negative or positive emotions daily, CRRC took a different approach by focusing on Armenians’, Azerbaijanis’, and Georgians’ general experiences of feeling happy, general life satisfaction, and a general sense of emptiness. 

The Modalities of Azerbaijan's Islamic Revival

Islamic revival on the societal level has become a much-touted subject in Azerbaijan in recent years. Ongoing controversy over an informal state ban on hijabs in the country's public education institutions, along with a number of recent government-sponsored research projects and conferences on religion, attest to the increasing salience of Islam as a social and political issue, even as the Azerbaijani state remains staunchly secular and instrumentalizes Islam primarily for legitimization purposes.

Yet, if Azerbaijani society is indeed experiencing an Islamic revival, what are the manifestations of its increasing religiosity? According to data from the Caucasus Barometer (CB) and CRRC's 2012 Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey (SIDA), religious indicators such as overt religious practices and trust in religious institutions have actually shown negative trends in the last five years. Nevertheless, other indicators suggest that Azerbaijanis' private religious practices and conceptions of personal religiosity may be gaining greater currency.

According to the CB 2008, 10% of people in Azerbaijan claimed to attend religious services on at least a weekly basis, while 7% and 36% attended at least once a month or on special holidays, respectively. Around 20% of Azerbaijanis attended services "less often" and nearly 30% "never" attended.

Religious service attendance has changed little in the last five years. According to the 2012 survey, only 6% of Azerbaijanis said they attended services at least once a week, with 11% indicating they attended at least once a month and 40% claiming only on religious holidays. Almost 25% and 20% of Azerbaijanis claimed they attended services "less often" and "never", respectively.

Azerbaijanis' trust in religious institutions likewise decreased between 2008 and 2011. In addition to local mosques, the institutions in question could refer to the Caucasus Muslim Board - a state-affiliated organization including Shia and Sunni leadership due to Azerbaijan's approximate 60/30% Shia-Sunni population - and the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations - likewise a state-affiliated entity, tasked with regulating religious organizations operating in the country.

The institutional trust factor is especially significant, as research suggests that a country's level of religiosity depends on the authority of its religious institutions (Chaves 1994). In turn, this authority is measured by the degree of individuals' confidence in religious institutions (Kleiman, Ramsey, & Palazzo 1996). According to the CB from 2008 to 2011, there was a 17% decrease in the number of Azerbaijanis who "fully trust" religious institutions, with a slight decrease for those who trust religious institutions "a lot" and no change for those who "somewhat" trust said institutions.

Despite decreases in active religiosity, CRRC data suggest that personal conceptions of religiosity and private religious practices are becoming more important for Azerbaijanis. Between 2010 and 2012, the combined total of Azerbaijanis who claimed they were "quite" or "very" religious increased from 16% to 27%. During the same period, those claiming they were "somewhat religious" jumped from 23% to 32%.

Perhaps even more telling are 2012 data measuring the frequency of praying at home. Despite low mosque attendance, a sizeable 30% of Azerbaijanis claimed to pray at home at least once a day, while 27% said they prayed at home at least once a week and 12% once a month.

Other sources of data suggest similar trends. A 2011 poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Research indicated that 21% of Azerbaijanis were interested in religious questions "to a large extent", while 46% expressed interest "to a certain extent" and 24% to a "lesser extent." Only 9% of Azerbaijanis claimed they had "virtually no interest" in religious questions.

Even if overt religious indicators such as mosque attendance and trust remain quite low, the fact that Azerbaijanis increasingly think of themselves as more religious indicates that religiosity may be growing on a more personal, passive level. That over 50% of Azerbaijanis pray at home on at least a weekly basis is likewise an indication that private religious practices may be serving as the primary modalities of Azerbaijan's Islamic revitalization.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Language, Ethnicity, Religion, and National Values

This blog looks at public attitudes on whether or not speaking the titular language, belonging to the predominant religion or sharing national values are perceived as necessary to be a member of Armenian or Azerbaijani society. Data from the 2012 survey on Social Capital, Media and Gender conducted in Azerbaijan and the 2011 survey on Social Cohesion conducted in Armenia show that sharing national values, belonging to the predominant religious group, and speaking the titular language are important for being considered members of Armenian or Azerbaijani society by much of these populations.  

74% of Armenians think it is not possible to belong to Armenian society without sharing the national values, while a minority of Armenians (21%) think it is possible to belong to Armenian society if one does not share Armenian national values. Less than half of the Azerbaijani population (44%) believes that it is possible to belong to the Azerbaijani society without sharing national values. 

                                              Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Language can play a functional role by bringing together or dividing social groups. In Armenia, 65% of the population believes it is not possible to belong to Armenian society if one does not speak the Armenian language. Similar to sharing national values, just under half (48%) of Azerbaijanis think it is not possible to belong to Azerbaijani society if one does not speak the Azerbaijani language. 

                                              Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Public attitudes on ethnicity and belonging are similar in the two countries. In Armenia, which is the most ethnically homogenous country of the former Soviet Union (98% ethnic Armenian), more than half of the population (53%) thinks it is possible to belong to Armenian society as well as belong to an ethnic group other than the titular majority. Similarly, the 2012 survey in Azerbaijan shows that 54% agree that it is possible to belong to Azerbaijani society and to a different ethnic group at the same time.  

                                               Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

While attitudes on ethnicity and belonging are similar in both countries, there is a striking difference in whether or not the populations believe a person can belong to their respective society if they do not belong to the predominant religion. Over half of Armenians (66%) say it is not possible to belong to Armenian society if a person does not belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. In contrast, about one third of the Azerbaijani population (34%) says the same with respect to Azerbaijani society and being Muslim.   

                                          Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

These CRRC surveys show that there are strong opinions on the relationship between holding national values, speaking the titular language, belonging to the predominant religion, having a non-titular ethnicity, and belonging to Armenian or Azerbaijani society. To explore about these and related questions, please visit  http://www.crrc.ge/oda/ and http://www.crrccenters.org/activities/research/?id=52.

Trust and Agency in Azerbaijan: Personal Relationships versus Civic Institutions

Civic engagement in the former Soviet Union has been - with some exceptions - quite low since the breakup of the USSR. Data from the 2012 Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey suggest that Azerbaijanis' trust and membership in civic groups and social organizations remain low, while efficacy in personal and local relationships is generally high. Consequently, this discrepancy in trust has ramifications for how Azerbaijanis address personal and community problems.

Civic engagement in Azerbaijan is low across the board. CRRC data show that participation in political unions/parties stands at 14%, while participation in religious groups and justice/human rights organizations measures at 6% and 12%, respectively.

Politically less sensitive organizations also garner low levels of participation. Only 22% of Azerbaijanis claimed they were involved in neighborhood and community organizations, while 10% were involved in groups dedicated to healthy and disability.

If low levels of membership in civic groups entail a fundamental lack of trust in such groups, alternative measures show more accurately where Azerbaijanis place their trust. When asked about other groups, 97% of respondents claimed to trust family members “a lot.” Neighbors also scored high on the trust scale, with 84% of Azerbaijanis indicating at least a fair amount of trust.

Accordingly, Azerbaijanis spend considerable amounts of free time with family members and neighbors. Almost 90% of Azerbaijanis said they spend time with family at least a few times a week, while 64% indicated the same for neighbors. Moreover, 40% claimed to spend time with friends at least a few times a week.

Levels of trust and association diminish, however, in relation to more distant, non-familial social networks (refer to chart 2). Exactly 70% of Azerbaijanis claimed to have little or no trust toward other Azerbaijanis. Similarly, nearly 60% indicated little or no trust toward residents in their surrounding village/town/region. Unsurprisingly, 80% of people in Azerbaijan indicated little or no trust toward people they did not know.

Thus, Azerbaijanis’ trust in family members, friends, and immediate neighbors is generally high, while their involvement in civic groups remains low. Minimal civic engagement may be a function of Azerbaijanis’ lack of efficacy in civic groups, as well as the fact that participation in such groups entails association with more distant social actors in whom Azerbaijanis have lower levels of trust.

Levels of trust and civic engagement also impact on how Azerbaijanis address personal and local problems. Over 15% of Azerbaijanis indicated they “always” talk about personal problems with relatives; 32% “often” discuss such problems, while 29% “sometimes” discuss personal problems with family members. Furthermore, respondents expressed the highest levels of confidence in friends and family members in matters of financial and job support.

Azerbaijanis likewise address certain community issues through personal/local relationships. Nearly 50% of Azerbaijanis stated they discuss communal problems with neighbors at least “sometimes”. Similarly, 41% of respondents indicated that neighbors clean common spaces communally, while 45% indicated that neighbors clean such spaces alternately.

Given traditionally low levels of membership in civic groups and trust in distant social networks, it seems unlikely that civic engagement in Azerbaijan will increase in the near future. However, as long as familial and immediate personal connections remain vibrant, it is plausible that Azerbaijanis will be able to leverage social capital in order to deal with personal and community issues. To examine this issue in greater detail, readers can explore the Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey dataset using CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Roads and Safety in the South Caucasus

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), every year about 1.3 million people die as a result of road accidents worldwide. In 2011, the UN launched the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020. A year later, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/66/L.43 to improve road safety conditions worldwide. This blog addresses satisfaction with road conditions and road safety in the former Soviet Union, specifically in the South Caucasus region.

GALLUP surveys conducted in 2011 show that only 36% of the adult population in the former Soviet Union is satisfied with the roads and highways in areas where they live.  In part, the surveys focused on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, Moldova, the Ukraine, and Belarus. Satisfaction with roads is highest in Georgia (69%) and lowest in Moldova (17%). In the South Caucasus, Georgia is followed by Azerbaijan (51%) and Armenia (37%). 

In general, unsafe vehicles, poor road infrastructure, careless driving habits, drunk-driving, and speeding are major causes of traffic accidents in the region.  Based on the WHO European Status Report on Road Safety, mortality rates from traffic injuries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have increased since the late 1980s compared to the EU. However, it is also important to note that there are differences within the EU region as well.
  

From the late 2000s, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia have adopted road safety legislature and promoted safety campaigns, such as the 2010 Road Safety Program Project in Azerbaijan, the 2009 National Road Safety Strategy for Armenia and Yerevan and Five Year Action Plan, and road safety enforcement measures and traffic policing in Georgia. These campaigns can have a positive impact on society. Improving roads and highways in the region might contribute to the fact that, according to the WHO European Health for All Database (HFA-DB), death rates for road traffic accidents have been generally decreasing since the late 90s in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Compared to the 1990s, the standard of roads has improved in the South Caucasus. However, careless driving practices are still common, and it takes much longer to change driving culture. Overall, traffic injuries can continue to be prevented by improving road infrastructure, enforcing speed limits, preventing driving while intoxicated, and promoting more road safety campaigns in the region.

Corruption in the South Caucasus

Corruption and paying a bribe was not uncommon in the former Soviet Union. However, following the collapse of the USSR, rampant corruption began to permeate virtually every aspect of daily life in newly independent Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005). Reports by international organizations, such as Transparency International and International Alert, have revealed perceptions about the high level of corruption that has affected political, social, and economic live throughout the South Caucasus. Since the late 1990s, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have engaged in several anti-corruption campaigns (e.g., the Anti-Corruption Strategy and Implementation Action Plans in Georgia and Armenia, USAID Mobilizing Action Against Corruption (MAAC) in Armenia, and the 2012-2015 National Action Plan to Combat Corruption in Azerbaijan) that have yielded varying results. Bribing is one form of corruption that CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer has addressed. Since 2007, CRRC has been conducting the Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey on social, political, economic, and cultural processes in the South Caucasus region, and has asked several questions on bribing over the years. This blog explores data on these questions in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia based on the 2008, 2010 and 2011 surveys. The 2009 CB did not include any questions on bribes.

According to the 2008 CB survey data, 34% of the Azerbaijani population said that they, or members of their household, had been in a situation during the last 12 months when they had to pay a bribe in order to get a service or preferential treatment. In Armenia, 9% of the adult population said that they or their relatives had to pay a bribe during the last 12 months, and 4% of Georgians said the same.    

Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Data from the 2010 CB survey show some change in corruption rates for Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 2010, 30% of Azerbaijanis said they had paid a bribe during the last 12 months.  The rate for Armenia remained unchanged (9%), while only 1% in Georgia reported paying a bribe within the previous year.    

The 2011 CB reveals decreasing rates for all South Caucasian states. Based on the most recent CB survey, 27% of the Azerbaijani population said they paid a bribe during the last 12 months, followed by 6% of people in Armenia. Georgia seems to have been the most successful in fighting corruption with no person saying they had paid a bribe during the last 12 months.  

Even though corruption persists in many forms in the South Caucasus, the CB data show that between 2008 and 2011 the percentage of people who reported paying bribes decreased in the South Caucasus. With such a sensitive question, it is important to pay attention to the proportion of responses between the countries. What factors do you think have contributed to such differences in the region?

You can further explore the CB data sets by visiting CRRC’s interactive Online Data Analysis tool at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/.

Georgian Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change?

The results of the October parliamentary elections in Georgia have raised questions regarding the future trajectory of Georgian foreign policy. One of the priorities of Georgian foreign policy has been European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Will the new Georgian government initiate major changes and redirect Georgia’s foreign policy that has been supported by the National United Movement? Will Georgia promote closer cooperation with Russia? What do Georgians think about the direction of the country’s foreign relations in general? This blog specifically explores Georgians' attitudes toward the importance of strengthening ties with the EU, NATO, Russia, and the US using data from CRRC’s 2011 survey on Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia. As the CRRC data show, half of Georgia’s population is interested in the country’s foreign policy. Moreover, Georgians support closer cooperation with the EU, NATO, CIS, the US, and Russia.   

The EU survey reveals that 51% of Georgians show an interest in the country’s foreign policy. Similarly, half of the Georgian population is interested in Georgian domestic policy.

  

When split by age groups, about 31% of Georgians aged 18 to 35 show interest in Georgian foreign affairs. Up to 54% of the Georgian population between 36 and 55 years old tend to be interested in these matters. Finally, Georgians aged 56 or more seem to be most interested (56%) in Georgian foreign policy.

When asked about the importance of strengthening ties between Georgia and a number of political, economic, and intergovernmental organizations, 95% of Georgians believe that it is important to promote closer cooperation with the EU. The majority of Georgians (90%) also think that Georgia should strengthen ties with NATO, and although Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 2008, over half of the population (78%) thinks that Georgia should strengthen ties with the CIS.   

Georgian attitudes about political and economic cooperation between Georgia, the EU, the US, and Russia is also noteworthy. Over half of the adult population thinks Georgia should have closest political cooperation with the US (58%) and the EU (54%). In addition, 50% believe Georgia should have closest political cooperation with Russia.    

With respect to economic relations, a high percentage of the population thinks that the country should establish closest economic cooperation with the US (71%), the EU (66%), and Russia (47%). Many Georgians are also open to the prospect of having business relations with Russians. In this regard, 81% of the Georgians note that they would approve of people of their ethnicity doing business with Russians. 

In sum, data from the 2011 EU survey reveals that many Georgians show an interest in the country’s foreign policy, and consider the US, Russia, EU, NATO, and the CIS to be important to Georgia’s political and economic development. 

To learn more about the 2011 EU Survey, click here. 

Youth and Politics in Georgia

Since 2011, CRRC has been involved in the Memory, Youth, Political Legacy, and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE), a four-year project funded by the European Commission. The project aims at exploring young people’s social participation in Georgia influenced by historical contexts of totalitarianism and populism in Europe. Among others, the objectives of the MYPLACE project include (1) conceptualization of youth civic engagement and youth activism in national, regional, and European frameworks; (2) understanding and measuring cross-regional political participation of the young generation based on ethnicity, class, and gender differences; and (3) studying populist and radical youth activism in order to contribute to policymaking and the management of youth political extremism across Europe. 

This project research is based on a mixed method approach consisting of survey data, including the CRRC data, interviews, and ethnographic research instruments. This methodology aims at not only generating fresh data within the pan-European context but also measuring different levels of participation as well as understanding the meanings that young people attach to it.        

      

MYPLACE team members from CRRC have recently published a blog about youth political participation and interest in the upcoming October parliamentary elections in Georgia. To access the blog, click here. 

To Vote or Not to Vote? Civic Participation in Georgia

By Milena Oganesyan

As Georgians prepare for parliamentary elections set for October 1, 2012, political parties have entered the final stage of the pre-elections race. One of the important attributes of active citizenship and civic engagement is voting in elections. This blog explores Georgians’ attitudes toward voting in elections based on age group and gender differences. In this regard, CRRC conducted a countrywide survey in 2011 on Georgians’ attitudes about volunteerism and civic participation in Georgia. The survey revealed that 75% of Georgians living in the capital think that voting in elections is a very important characteristic of a good citizen. Over half of those living in urban (68%) and rural (57%) areas also believe that a good citizen should participate in voting. However, Georgians in the capital seem to be more engaged in political processes in the country than those in urban and rural areas.

When survey respondents were asked whether they would vote if the parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, up to 64% said they would participate. At the same time, about 12% of Georgian citizens did not intend to cast their votes.

When split by age groups, the data show that Georgians aged 36 or older are more willing to participate in parliamentary elections (up to 66%) than the younger age group. Thus, the older generation seems to be more actively engaged in voting.

However, there are no significant differences in Georgians’ decisions to vote in parliamentary elections, when split by gender. In conclusion, based on the 2011 Volunteerism and Civic Participation survey, more than half of those surveyed in Georgia said that they would vote if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and most Georgians agree that voting is an important element of civic participation.

You can explore these and related questions regarding Georgia and the wider South Caucasus region by visiting CRRC’s interactive Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for a Difficult Reconciliation (Armenia)

This blog focuses on public opinion in Armenia regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict using data from the 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB). This follows a similar blog on the same set of questions asked in Azerbaijan. The results show some interesting similarities and dissimilarities between the two neighboring countries. Both populations show a great deal of uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved. Over half of the Armenian population believes that a resolution can be found by peaceful negotiations. Also, most of the population thinks Russia, rather than Turkey, should be involved in the conflict resolution process. Finally, over half of the Armenian population favors recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia, and over half say they would also accept Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country.

Source: CB 2009, 2010, 2011

The figure above shows that unemployment continues to be the most important issue in the country (44% in 2011)—compared to Azerbaijan in which unemployment is the second most important issue (after territorial integrity). With respect to perspectives on conflict resolution, 38% of Armenians have no idea about when the conflict will be resolved and 24% think Armenia and Azerbaijan will never be able to find a solution. 4% think that the territorial conflict has already been resolved, and 3% believe there will be a resolution within the next year. Finally, 18% are confident that a solution will be found within 10 years, and 12% say this will occur in more than 10 years.

Source: CB 2011

Despite this widespread uncertainty, Armenians are more confident about there being a possible peaceful resolution to the conflict rather than a resolution by force. Just about 61% believe that a solution can be found within the next 5 years by peaceful negotiations. About 21% consider the recourse to force very and rather likely (taken together) within the next 5 years.

With regard to favored solutions to the conflict, 60% of Armenians favor recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia. Just over half of the population (58%) says they would also accept Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country. As in the results from Azerbaijan, very few Armenians think joint governance of the region by Armenia and Azerbaijan is a good idea (76% of Armenians say they would not accept this). Finally, the majority say they would never accept Nagorno Karabakh being within Azerbaijani boundaries without autonomy (74%), even if the region were granted a certain degree of autonomy (77%).

Source: CB 2011

 Finally, when asked which countries or groups should be involved as a third party in the peace dialogue, 72% of Armenians favor Russia, followed by 49% who favor France, and similar figures as found in Azerbaijan for the European Union (43% compared to 40% in Azerbaijan) and the United States (36% compared to 35% in Azerbaijan). Only 8% of Armenians favor Turkey being involved in finding a solution. However, it is worth noting that a large number of respondents from both Armenia (72%) and Azerbaijan (53%) would welcome greater involvement from Russia.

Source: CB 2011

Taken together, Armenian and Azerbaijani populations both display uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved. In Armenia more than half of the population believes that a solution can be found within the next 5 years by peaceful negotiations. More Armenians prefer Russia to Turkey as the main third party to be involved in the conflict resolution process. Finally, with regard to possible solutions, over half of the Armenian population would welcome formal recognition of Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of their country and 58% say they are ready to accept it as an independent country.

Interested in knowing more about these survey questions and how they differ with respect to socio-demographic groups in Armenia? Visit CRRC’s fun and easy Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/