Media Freedom in the Caucasus

May 3 is World Press Freedom Day, and an occasion to look at how the three countries are doing in terms of press freedom. Freedom House has released a comprehensive report with detailed summaries.

In the Caucasus, these are the results

• Georgia is ranked 122, and as "partially free"
• Armenia comes in at 142, and considered "not free"
• Azerbaijan shares the rank of 164th with Russia, both described as "not free"

By comparison, Latvia is at 31, Turkey 105, Ukraine 112, Saudi Arabia 178 and China 181.


In regional rankings, Georgia's cup is at least half full. In Freedom House's map (see above), it is a little yellow speck. Except for the Baltics, only Ukraine is doing better among post-Soviet states. In this relative post-Soviet ranking, Armenia follows after Georgia. Azerbaijan is not far down that list, lagging behind Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. In other words, the Baltics are way ahead, the Caucasus trails after Ukraine, but generally does better than Russia, Belarus or Central Asia (with Bishkek sneaking ahead of Baku).

So much for the rankings. Freedom House actually provides an extensive summary of the methodology, describing how they evaluate the legal, political and economic environment for press freedom. The weightings are plausible and including the economic environment for press freedom makes a lot of sense.

The narrative summaries provide details to back up the claims. Extensive libel laws in Armenia make it possible for powerful people to suppress criticism. Similarly, Freedom House says that defamation lawsuits seem to be a favorite method of silencing critical journalists in Azerbaijan. The interior minister alone brought five cases last year. But the report also documents several cases of intimidation, beatings, and one unresolved high-profile murder in Baku. In Georgia, a mix of government pressure and journalist self-censorship remain a problem. Not documented, but certainly a factor, is the sheer clumsiness of the Georgian government in handling the media: journalists tell farcical stories about hunting down basic information from government representatives.

In all of the countries, the commercial viability of independent media limits the freedom of expression. An independent Public Broadcaster is a desirable solution, but the very notion of independence is both a precondition and a result of a more mature democracy.

Comparing Local Governance in Armenia, Georgia

Political reporting is often focused on the capitals. However, for the majority of the population politics remains strictly local, with local governance having a huge impact on life. After all, it is the municipalities that provide drinking water, clear waste, and provide minimal infrastructure for economic activity. So how do the three countries differ?

A cross-border evaluation for a GTZ project which we did in the years 2004 and 2005 found the following differences in local government: by and large, Armenia had the most enterprising leaders of municipalities. In Georgia, local governance often was struggling. In Azerbaijan, the executive branch (through the ex-coms) had a disproportionate influence, usually displacing elected leaders, but could also get things done.

One of the shortest explanations for the difference between Armenia and Georgia is structural. Armenia removed the Soviet rayon structure (a mid-level administrative unit, best translated as a district, with typical populations ranging from 20.000 inhabitants upward, and rarely smaller than 500 km²), leaving only oblast/region (referred to as Marz) and municipalities. By contrast, Georgia retained the rayons, and the Gamgebellis (heads of rayon) dominated local life -- so much so that when Shevardnadze was fraudulently returned to office on April 9, 2000, an election watchdog summarized the event as "Gamgebellis elect President".

In effect, the Gamgebellis often suffocate local initiative, and nominally independent, elected heads of municipalities end up taking their orders in the district capital. In Armenia, without this mid-level intervention, the heads of the municipalities just need to get things done. The Marz capital can be far away, and the governor cannot watch 25 heads of municipalities simultaneously.

On the ground, politicians recognize the difference. As an Armenian governor explained with a shrug: Georgia needs the rayon structure, since it is too heterogenous to support larger cohesive units. Some changes are underway in Georgia, but recent research by a political scientist (soon to be published, stay tuned) found that the structural change had not yet had an impact on the way local government works.

Public Opinion in Armenia on America, Darfur, Genocide and Climate Change

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org have released their data from several of their most recent World Public Opinion -- Global Issues surveys. The surveys cover 18 countries and the Palestinian territories and includes Armenia! (Why Armenia was chosen is an interesting issue -- anybody who knows or has thoughts about this, we would welcome your commentary.)

In Armenia, the fieldwork was carried out by the Armenian Center for National and International Studies. In the survey documentation, it states that the Armenian survey was done in 1300 nationally representative households using face-to-face interviews. However, how a nationally representative sample was obtained is not mentioned. Also, the sampling frame is not discussed. This leaves many questions of quality in terms of representativeness.

Nevertheless, the data is quite fascinating and it would be great to be able to compare among the South Caucasus countries. Four surveys were recently released: "Views of the United States," "Genocide and Darfur," "Climate Change and the Global Environment," "Labor and Environmental Standards in Trade Agreements." The former three will be covered briefly in this blog entry.

Views of the United States

Armenia's views of the United States appear to fall in the middle of the surveyed countries. 63% of Armenians responded that they thought that the "U.S. is playing the role of world policemen more than it should be." However, even more Americans (76%) agreed with this statement. Indeed, only in one country -- Philippines -- did more than half of the population disagree with the statement.

Asked, if they trust the U.S. to act responsibly in the world, 27% of Armenians said "not at all" and 31% "not very much." This puts Armenia squarely in the middle of responding countries. Argentina is the most distrustful (69% "not at all" and 15% "not very much" and Israel (56% "a great deal" and 25% "somwhat") the most trustful.


Genocide and Darfur

Questions related to Genocide would seem particularly interesting to ask in Armenia, given the hotly debated use of the term in the Armenian context. So how do Armenians respond? When asked if the UN has the responsibility to intervene against the will of a government where the genocide is taking place, 66% of Armenians thought that the UN had that responsibility--though a large percentage (19%) said they were not sure or declined to answer.

However, the survey indicates that Armenian interest in the politics of genocide may not transfer to other contexts-- or perhaps there is no media coverage. When asked if the UN had the right to intervene in Darfur, 46% of Armenians said they were not sure or declined to answer (similarly high rates occurred in Ukraine, Poland, Thailand and Argentina). Of those who answered, the largest percentage (29%) did think that the UN had the responsibility to authorize intervention.

Climate Change and the Global Environment

According to the survey, Armenians respond similarly to Russians. When given a series of statements ranking the importance of global warming, 19% of Armenian and 22% of Russians chose the statement that took global warming the least seriously, saying that "Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs." Only India had a higher percentage that chose this response -- 24% -- though the U.S. did not do much better at 17%. The margin of error is different in each country, so maybe the U.S. is worse than Armenia but not nearly as conscious as Thailand, where only 7% chose the response.

The Least Healthy City in the World?

So, where is the least healthy city in the world? According to Mercer Human Resource Consulting, "The lowest-ranking city for health and sanitation is Baku in Azerbaijan, which scores just 27.6. Other low-scoring cities include Dhaka in Bangladesh, Antananarivo in Madagascar and Port Au Prince in Haiti, which score 29.6, 30.1 and 34 respectively."
Mercer takes into consideration the following indicators:

• Hospital Services;
• Medical Supplies;
  
• Infectious Diseases;
  
• Water Potability;
• Troublesome and destructive animals/insects;
• Waste Removal;
  
• Sewage and Air Pollution.

Of course, one must keep in mind that Mercer is not an academic survey. Mercer is a consulting firm that sells reports to businesses looking at adjusting such items as hardship pay and cost of living adjustments to expats (mainly from Europe and North America) posted throughout the world; they charge heavily for their services. In fact, we decided that it was not worth the 370 dollars to compare two cities.

Furthermore, their methodology is not publicly available. While Baku may have health problems, it is hard to imagine that it deserves a score lower than Port-au-Prince or Dhaka (of course no offense to these cities intended).

We'd love to hear your opinion and other data for or against Mercer's results. Please post a comment.

World Values Survey | Visualizing where we are

This is the Inglehart-Welzel map based on the World Values Survey. Up front, note that much of this data comes from the mid-1990s. Still, it's an impressive overview and various positions on this map correlate with other attitudes. Where the Caucasus is, the endorsement of divorce, single child families, respect for authority and post-materialist values are far away. Disaggregated and in response to direct questions, Armenia is least happy, Georgia in between and Azerbaijan happiest.

All these details are well documented on the exemplary website (see above), which also contains more material that may be interesting to explore.

How has the Caucasus changed? We integrated some key questions from the World Values Survey questionnaire into this year's Data Initiative, so stay posted for updates on recent changes. (Moreover, some other surveys have been using similar questions, but we don't yet have the data sets.)

IRI Release New Georgian Poll | Questions and Highlights

IRI has released a new poll chock full of data (to see all their polls, click here). They interviewed 1500 Georgian voters over the age of 18 in February 2007. This yields an image of political developments, but also provides suggestions to political parties on what the electorate cares about.

We have some misgivings on this poll as a research tool (see below), but let me present some brief highlights.

Conflict

• Relations with the CIS remain cold. 60% think that Georgia should not remain a member of the organization.

• Optimism about resolving armed conflict has significantly dropped. In the recent poll, 32% of respondents now don’t know if South Ossetia will return under Georgian control and 17% of respondents believe it will take more than 6 years. In presumably the same poll done in 2004, 21% thought that South Ossetia would be returned to Georgian control within a year. Now only 5 % believe this will occur.

• Over 90% still oppose using force in resolving the separatist conflicts.

Politics

• In data supported by CRRC’s Data Initiative, trust in the judicial system remains low, according to the poll. After unemployment, the judiciary is the field most in need of reform, according to respondents. Additionally, 78% of respondents are not satisfied with the Girgvliani court decision.

• Other things being equal, 50% of voters would choose a male candidate over a female, whereas only 6% would prefer the female (42% claiming indifference). 8% believe that women have too much power in Georgia (we'd love to see what these 8% think about other issues; are they the male part of the 16% who would like to see a return of constitutional monarchy, for example?).

• 42% of respondents believe abortion should be made illegal, while 38% believe it shouldn't. (Again, we'd like to see how that breaks down into male and female respondents.)

• In an interesting statistic about participatory democracy, 59% of respondents did not know the name of the majoritarian MP of their rayon. Nevertheless, half thought that their MP was doing a bad job (whoever that person is). If IRI would make the data set publicly available, lots of interesting comparisons could be made here. What is the relationship between knowledge of the majoritarian MP and judgment of his job? This among other indicators, could judge how effectively politicians were making themselves stand out as individuals. Another reason to promote open data sources!

• In a statistic that may break with impressions created by public discussion, 56% of respondents support the new statue of St. George on Freedom Square. Again, the breakdown of who these supporters would be interesting to know, as I have a feeling they correlate with other behaviors.

• 37% believe that many people are afraid to openly express their views. This number has been climbing slowly, but steadily from a baseline of 22% in October 2004. Only 8% believe that the government fully respects citizen's human rights. At the same time, 48% believe the country is developing in the right direction, up from 39% in April 2006.
  

• Unsurprisingly, unemployment and relations with Russian were the government's biggest failures, while electricity and paving roads the government’s biggest successes. The respondents also thought that unemployment is the largest problem that Georgia is facing.

• Impressively, only 2% reported having to pay a bribe in the last 12 months to get a service or decision, and 78% believed that the criminal situation had improved (showing a consistent trend over the last few years).

Data, data, data!!!

For this survey to become a research tool, it would be desirable if IRI would

• make the raw data set available, allowing researchers to look for correlations;

• tell us about sampling, and non-response, to give a better understanding what type of data we are looking at;

• release the Georgian questionnaire, so that one can find out exactly what was asked.

It would desirable if such basic transparency requirements became a standard for surveys financed by international donors.

Migration Resource Centers: Data on Those Seeking Advice About Leaving Georgia

IOM collects data on those people who use their Migration Resource Centers. While the sample is certainly not representative of the population, it provides insights into those seeking advice about leaving the country in the areas where IOM operates resource centers. IOM conducted 384 interviews in its centers in Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Gurjaani.

Some features of IOM's statistics stand out. First, 58% of respondents are unemployed and looking for a job, while 26% are only employed part-time. Of those unemployed, 16% have been unemployed for more than 5 years and another 29% have been unemployed for over a year, showing a high degree of structural unemployment within the group of those looking to migrate. Interestingly, very few of the unemployed are officially registered.

What do potential migrants prefer to do abroad? The data shows a quite realistic understanding of opportunities for Georgian migrants. 30% would like to work as a caregiver, 8% in the restaurant/hotel industry, and 7% in the agrarian sector. 19% say they will take any job that they can find.

Migrants' preferred countries of destination are not surprising, particularly given the current tensions between Russia and Georgia. The United States, Greece, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada and Ukraine top the list of places Georgian potential migrants would like to go. IOM's data also supports network theories of migration. When asked why they want to go to their preferred country of destination, over half of respondents say it is because they have friends who can help them there.



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Divorce Rates: the seven-year-itch?

According to popular lore, marriages often break up after around seven years. What does the Georgian data say? How long have those who are getting divorced typically been married?

Georgian data does not support the seven-year itch hypothesis. Divorces seem to be pretty equally distributed across the years, with some fluctuations, year-by-year.

In some ways, a fairly high number of divorces still takes place after 15 years (according to the data, the number of couples breaking up after more than 20 years is the single largest group of divorcees, but it consolidates all 20+ data).

As for the total divorce number, it has remained stable from 2001 to 2005, at around 1900 divorces per year. By comparison, around 13.000 people married annually, with an upward tendency more recently (2005 a bumper year, with 18.012 marriages).

According to one divorce league table (some inconsistency here), Georgia has about 12% divorces per marriage, Azerbaijan 15%, Armenia at 18%. Matrimonial harmony, or at least stubborn persistence, compared to Kyrgyzstan (25), Kazakhstan (39), United States (41), Russia (65) or Belarus (69). Take another league table in which divorces are listed by 1000 people, and the US comes first in divorces (4.95), Russia third (3.36), and Georgia would still come below Syria, with less than 0.5 divorces per 1000 people.

The Georgian data, and much more engaging information, is available on these pages of the Georgian Department of Statistics.

(Incomplete) BigMac Index for the Caucasus

When comparing iPod pricing across the South Caucasus, we promised more information on the Big Mac index. As described then, the Big Mac index has been suggested by the Economist as a measure of purchasing power parity. The argument is that Big Macs across countries bundle identical products and services, and therefore can serve as a comparable basket.

Unfortunately, the comparison is incomplete: no McDonald's yet in Yerevan (with various explanations offered, including that the region is served through Turkey). That may lend some credence to the Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention, which suggests that countries that have McDonald's are less likely to be in conflict with each other, because they are in the same globalized orbit. (But this theory happens to be dubious, so Ron MacDonald is not yet standing in line for the Nobel Peace Prize.)

How do Georgia and Azerbaijan compare? In Azerbaijan, a Big Mac goes for 2.5 New Azerbaijani Manat, which currently puts it at 2.73 US dollars. At 4.60 GEL, the Georgian Big Mac is at 2.60 USD, 13 Cents less.

Comparing this with the 2006 Big Mac Index (admittedly one that looks forward to an update), the Caucasus is between Hungary (2.90) and Mexico/South Korea (2.63). If you believe the theory behind the index, the Caucasus is sort of close to purchasing power parity, since the American Big Mac costs $3.10.

By comparison, the Euro-BigMac is at 3.86 USD, the Swiss at 5.10, but the Chinese Yen, radically undervalued, at 1.30. Strikingly, the Russian Big Mac is a lot cheaper and goes for 1.83 USD, and the Ukrainian is in the same league at 1.88 dollars.

As with the iPod, pricing may be driven by maximising the margins, not by the actual basket. MacDonald's in both countries is an upmarket product. In Russia and Ukraine it plays to the mass market and is priced accordingly.

Scale will also play a role: with few restaurants in the Caucasus, McDonald's does not enjoy the advantages of scale. On that level, the index underlines that the local cost of doing business still is higher than it will be in Poland, Ukraine, Russia or Hungary.

Comments welcome.

Economic Liberty as a Response to Georgia's Social Problems

Murtaz Kvirkvaia, a CRRC fellow, investigated a range of social problems in Georgia. According to his findings, 55% of the population lives on the brink of poverty and 9.6% of the population is extremely poor. By Kvirkvaia’s estimations, the unemployment rate is 3.5 times higher than the official data claim and a third of economically active citizens are jobless.

However, the most vulnerable of groups, the fellow argues, are pensioners. The analysis showed that the pension system is founded on an intergenerational contract, where today’s pensions are being paid by future generations, which makes pensioners’ social problems impossible to resolve.

Based on his research, the fellow put forth a framework to resolve Georgia’s social problems. He argues that the state cannot play the leading role in resolving social problems for the majority of the population, like it used to do during the Soviet era. Accordingly, Kvirkvaia considers economic liberty as the main factor in economic growth and the best solution to social problems. Economic liberty would enable the government to liberate itself from the necessity of solving economic and social problems that should not fall within its purview. For instance, the fellow argues that a system based on an intergenerational contract, which underlies what is known as the “Bismarck model” for pension systems, is effective only in cases where the number of employed people is four times larger than the number of pensioners; this is clearly not the case in Georgia, which must develop a pension system that is more reliant on the market.

If you are interested in research about economic liberty in Georgia, you can get in touch with the scholar directly.

Methods of Political Corruption in Armenia

Part of the problem in coping with corruption is actually identifying the methods that corrupt officials use to besmirch their office. These techniques often vary from country to country and prove difficult for non-locals to fully understand.

To help clarify methods of corruption in Armenia, Masis Poghoyan analyzed the undemocratic techniques used during political elections and developed recommendations to promote free and transparent political campaigns and democratic elections in the country. He conducted this research using qualitative methods including expert interviews and focus groups.

From his research, Poghoyan developed a typology of the undemocratic methods used in Armenia, which included categories such as “usage of resources available to the candidates occupying administrative posts,” “application of pressure on voters,” “buying/bribing of voters,” “manipulation of public opinion” and “falsification of election results.” He gave a detailed explanation of each undemocratic technique and its subtypes and showed that these techniques were often combined.

Based on his typology, Poghoyan developed a set of recommendations for combating fraudulent election processes, which include the implementation of legislative reforms, public information campaigns, the provision of consultation/training to voters, and the improvement of the election commissions. The researcher's paper is available from the CRRC-Armenia Web site, however, we also encourage you to get in touch with the scholar directly. His email address is also available on the CRRC-Armenia Web site.

Cows in the Caucasus: overgrazing, underfed

How do we get a measure on what's happening with agriculture? It turns out that dairy farming provides powerful indicators. According to an IFC expert, the average Georgian cow yields 1000 liters of milk per year. By comparison, a wholesome Swedish cow can provide up to 9000 liters.

Intensive Western farming practices may not be a desirable model -- they require investment, expertise, and bring their own perverse results. Nor can practices be transplanted: under current circumstances, the expert said, a Holsten cow in Georgia simply would not survive.

But the status quo is not sustainable either. There are an estimated 700.000 cows in Georgia, severely overgrazing the pastures (together with the sheep, and overall numbers are growing). It is a classic example of the tragedy of the commons: a free resource for which there is unlimited appetite eventually gets exploited beyond carrying capacity. In the Caucasus overgrazing leads to desertification and erosion, while also destroying the habitat of other species.

If properly fed and kept, the average Georgian cow could provide 4000 liters. What is missing? Expertise is in short supply, and so much farming is subsistence-based that it is difficult to introduce better practices. Cows themselves count as capital, so farmers don't think much about increasing the productivity of individual cows, but rather want to have more of them. Larger dairy farms are very rare. Nor are the cows bred systematically. Investment would be required, but there is little capital. One of the problems is also that milk powder, subsidized by the European Union, apparently is smuggled in from Russia and makes dairy farming uncompetitive (many locally-made milk products actually are made from EU milk powder, rather than from local milk).

Land reform may be one solution, but there is little political appetite for it. In the meantime, various organizations are working with farmers to bring more expertise. Fortunately, it is easy to demonstrate the impact of better practices, so some farmers are catching on.

Households and Their Economic Condition

Ekaterine Pirtskhalava analyzed the incomes and perceptions of poverty and wealth in the three South Caucasus countries, based on the 2004 CRRC Data Initiative data. At the same time, she studied similarities and differences in the profile of poverty and reasons leading to it across the three countries.

The survey data elucidate the difficult economic conditions in which citizens of the three countries live. Those families that perceive themselves to be poor or extremely poor families compose the largest percentage of respondents in Georgia (48.7%), and a slightly smaller percentage (46.2%) in Armenia. The situation is much better in Azerbaijan, where only 37.9% consider their families poor and improvements over the past three years were noted by one third of respondents. The perception that the economic situation was worsening was more prevalent among Armenian households (26.2%) compared to Azerbaijani (13.9%) and Georgian households (3.6%). Georgian respondents were, by far, the most optimistic about their future. The study showed that 79.4% of Georgian respondents believed that their economic situation would improve. This may be partially attributed to the drastic political change of November, 2003.

Gender also clearly plays a role in the economic well-being of families. Of female-headed households, 54.4% (compared to 41.0% of male-headed households) described their households as poor. The average income of male-headed households was substantially higher at 167.8 dollars compared to female-headed households where the average income was only 115.5 dollars. Female-headed families were not only poorer than male-headed households, but they more often perceive their economic status as having worsened. According to the findings, 37.8% of female-headed households compared to 31.8% of male-headed ones pointed to the worsening of their economic condition during past three years. This research raises important questions about how to help single women raising children in the South Caucasus.

Minority Youth in Georgia

Nino Japaridze analyzed what is needed to integrate Azeri and Armenian youths into Georgian public life.

What are some of their main grievances? The focus groups (ethnic minorities and Georgians) in Tbilisi, Marneuli, Bolnisi and Akhaltsikhe showed that education is a major problem. Minorities don’t know Georgian, and therefore said that they were not able to participate in the national university entrance exams. As a consequence, they were not happy about the educational reform.

What else? Youths say they need employment. They also want places for entertainment, a space that is for them to socialize. Drug addiction was mentioned as a big problem.

Japaridze's recommendations are not new, but almost by default one sounds like a broken record when talking about minority integration:

1. give minority groups the feeling that grievances are being heard and addressed;
2. offer Georgian language classes;
3. provide training courses on rights, so that citizens know and can exercise their rights;
4. start regional healthcare reform;
5. facilitate investment, to reduce unemployment.

Additionally, Japaridze used the CRRC Data Initiative 2004 to analyze the attitude of South Caucasians toward certain groups of people (homosexuals, drug addicts, alcoholics, those with HIV, and people having tuberculosis). According to the data, Georgians are most tolerant, with Armenians second, followed by Azerbaijanis. Most respondents prefer marriage with the same nationalities, but regarding friendship a third of the respondents express no national preferences.

Details on our website.

OSCE on Islamic and Ethnic Identities

The OSCE has recently released a new discussion paper entitled, "Islamic and Ethnic Identities in Azerbaijan: Emerging Trends and Tensions"(in PDF format).

In the paper, Hema Kotecha, aims to analyze sources of instability in Azerbaijan emanating from Islamic and ethnic groups. Overall, the report provides a decent overview of many of the main ethnic and Islamic identities now prevalent in Azerbaijan and gives some description of how they interact with the Azerbaijani state; the report does better with the ethnic identities than it does with the religious ones. However, the report aptly notes the difficult of disentangling these various identities and the author often struggles to succinctly summarize the relationships between the various groups.

The report also gives some interesting statistics. For instance, the author notes that in one survey, "83% of respondents considered the religious affiliation of a marriage partner to be important. Yet the total number of respondents who identified themselves as 'religious' (dine inananlar) and 'devout' (dindarlar) is lower, 78.3%, indicating that those who are simply 'respectful towards religion,' 'atheist,' or neither, religious identity is an important factor" (Kotecha 2007: 3). But the scholar fails to meet basic academic standards of documentation by not naming the survey from which these statistics came from or what kind of sample was involved when these data were collected.

Indeed, the report highlights the continued role of anecdotal evidence in research in Azerbaijan and raises the need for more comprehensive survey data. The paper also raises the problem of of interviewing local elites and claiming they represent the population as a whole. Local elites in places like Zaqatala or Khachmaz are certainly not the Baku intelligentsia, however, they may not represent people who do not take part at all in local politics or civil society.

The problems in both interviewing and quantitative data collection show the need of having researchers who invest in the long term. Most of the religious developments in Azerbaijan will not easily be understood by people who have not invested considerable time and resources--often years--and this kind of investment is rarely undertaken by outside consultants.

iPods in the Caucasus: Indexing or Pricing?

Half-serious, half-joking, the Economist put forward the Big Mac Index as a comparative tool to measure purchasing power and currency valuation. The idea was that McDonald's, wherever it is, has standardized procedures for doing identical Big Macs -- consequently price differences should be fairly indicative of discrepancies in purchasing power. An overview of the idea is here (somewhat ungenerously, the Economist makes its Burgernomics available only to subscribers).

Recently an Australian bank suggested a similar comparison of iPods. Arguably this is more of an indicator for smart predatory pricing, since iPods sell for much more than their production costs. So what does this mean for our region of the world? You probably would expect sales price in the South Caucasus to be fairly homogenous.

Well, it isn't. Taking the 2 GB Nano iPod for comparison, the newly opened Apple shop in Yerevan asks its customers for a cool 288 US dollars. In Tbilisi, the same iPod will set you back 224 US dollars, whereas in Baku, the Apple website lists its price as 199 US dollars.

Various explanations are being offered. Azerbaijan may have a larger local customer base, allowing them to charge less for the individual item. Armenia may have higher transport costs, or simply a dealer that can keep a very straight face. It is also possible that many Armenian customers actually shop abroad, and those that are left locally are prepared to pay the premium. Internationally, the Caucasus stretches across the higher medium-range. In Brazil the same iPod Nano costs a whopping 327 US dollars, in the US a mere 149. Azerbaijan is somewhere close to the UK, Ireland, Finland. Details, with some discussion, here.

Further hypotheses welcome. Thanks to JonathanK for pointing out the topic, and our CRRC staff for instant research. A comparison of the Big Mac Index in the Caucasus to follow.

Child Poverty in Armenia

Gohar Jerbashian conducted a detailed, multi-dimensional analysis of child poverty in Armenia. She analyzed the data available from the CRRC 2004 Data Initiative and from the Family Poverty Benefit (FPB) databases and conducted a content analysis of other sources. By exploring various types of socially vulnerable families (for example, those who lost their income earners, experienced hardships because of the inadequacy of survivors’ pensions, or had two or more children under the age of 14) she found that neither survivors’ pensions nor FPB provided needy children with adequate financial resources to enable them to sustain decent living standards and acquire skills and knowledge to lift them out of poverty and take part fully in Armenian society.

As a result of her research, Jerbashian provided a set of policy recommendations to combat child poverty in Armenia, the most important of which included covering poor children with quality state-funded early childhood development programs, increasing the level of single parent employment, increasing the minimum wage, introducing tax credits for families with children, revising school programs and increasing childhood health care.

Jerbashian’s paper, in English, can be found here.

The Life of Conscripts in the Georgian Army

Rusudan Nadiradze analyzed problems of Georgian conscripts doing their compulsory military service. Throughout 2005, she conducted interviews with 57 soldiers of 4 military units in different regions of Georgia, and with 4 experts. While reform is in progress, the situation in military units changes daily. Therefore, social and living conditions vary.

The study shows a considerable difference between conditions in small versus big military units. Barracks of small military units are better equipped and there is enough space for the soldiers. In smaller units, the food is healthier, and more is available, too. Hygiene and clothing provision, however, tend to be problematic for both types of military units. The research also indicates that in smaller military units the relationship within and between ranks is better. In these smaller units, comradeship is easier to establish, therefore deeper conflicts are very rare, and this makes it easier for conscripts. On the whole, servicemen in small military units tend to be more satisfied with their work than soldiers in bigger military contingents.

Some of the respondents think that harsh conditions are an indispensable part of military life. Overcoming hardship is often associated with strength and bravery. During the interviews, soldiers also talked about reasons of desertion (unfortunately no quantitative data on desertion available). According to the soldiers, the main causes of desertion are the harsh social and living conditions, but in most of the cases these are additional personal conflicts. Most of the respondents are not aware about their rights; none of them have ever contacted any institution regarding their rights, because there is no real precedent or practice of exercising one's rights in this way.

The experts that Nadiradze interviewed think that a lot needs to be done to transform Georgian soldiers into a professional army: officers need to be trained to understand human rights; there should be more public control over the army; to establish army discipline, relevant principles and regulations should be developed; the government has to clamp down on all violations; all procedures need to be fully legalized and codified, and, as Nadiradze says “unlawful relations must be prevented”.

Since army reform is a priority for the Georgian government (and vital for moving closer to NATO), this bottom-up view of the conditions adds a valuable perspective. It would be interesting, furthermore, to study the socialization processes in the smaller units, and how they draw on established Georgian socialization practices.

Georgian language reports available on our website.

Facets of Women's Unemployment in Armenia

What kind of differences are there in the way men and women approach unemployment in Armenia?

Anahit Mkrtchyan’s main explanation for Armenian women’s high unemployment rate and political inactivity is the fact that women’s behavior is directed towards survival instead of development and self-expression in the public sphere.

Furthermore, Mkrtchyan found that a very small share of unemployed women applied for state or private employment agencies in Armenia (11% and 3.2% respectively). Mkrtchyan explained the latter as a result of the fact that a) Armenian women want to avoid having the stigma associated with the unemployed; b) they avoid boring bureaucratic procedures, c) “good” jobs are not publicly announced (the information is disseminated mainly through a network of friends/relatives).

The scholar published a paper and recommendations, both in Armenian.

Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi: Similarities and Differences

The term metropolis has gained increased intellectual backing in recent years. Indeed, several social researchers have postulated that, due to the dyanism of large cities, cities will continue to look more theoretically similar to each other. A postulate of this theory is that urban and rural communities within the same countries will continue to diverge in terms of behavior on a wide range of issues. Samvel Manukyan's research locates itself within this debate and begins to develop some indicators for comparing urban development across the South Caucasus. The scholar conducted a cross-country analysis of the sociopolitical processes in the capital cities of Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi.

By analyzing the regional CRRC Data Initiative (DI) 2004 database, Manukyan constructed several typologies of SC capitals’ societies and used mathematical methods to explain the socioeconomic, political, demographic and cultural trends in the region. For instance, he introduced the term “traditionality index,” which is a function of various elements of social behavior. Among other results, he found that men and women in Tbilisi had the most liberal behavior, followed by Yerevan; and that people were most conservative (traditional) in Baku. Overall, Manukyan found that the post-Soviet transition has led to the reconstruction of national self-identification across the South Caucasus capitals. In his 150-page report the researcher developed tools (indices) to measure how the three South Caucasus capitals follow specific patterns in terms of freedom of behavior, as well as the level of tolerance both within and across societies. In his research, the fellow cooperated with Irakli Sakandelidze from Georgia and Inshallah Gafarov from Azerbaijan.

Not surprisingly, the research shows that the South Caucasus cities may not have many of the characteristics of metropolises. However, the research creates a framework to investigate the continuing transitions on the capital cities of Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan.

Manukyan's report, in Armenian, is available here.