Do people have enough information about COVID-19 in Georgia?

Note: This article was first published on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone, and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the National Democratic Institute, or any related entity.

Since the pandemic hit Georgia in February, the Georgian government has taken several measures to raise awareness about it. But are the public actually well informed?

Since March 2020, the Georgian Government has been conducting large scale information campaigns through traditional and online media, has launched an informational web portal, StopCov.ge, and has even launched a smartphone app providing information about contact with infected people.

In light of these communications, it is perhaps unsurprising that data from the CRRC-NDI December 2020 survey shows that a majority of Georgia’s population says they have enough information about the services they might need in relation to COVID-19. However, men and those less well off are less likely to know how to access services.

The survey asked respondents if they knew where to get a COVID-19 test, how to get medical assistance, and how to treat COVID-19 at home. 

People were most informed about how to get the medical assistance. Around four in five said if they or a family member needed it, they would know how to treat COVID-19 at home. 

A smaller proportion, though still a majority, reported knowing where to get a free or affordable test for COVID-19. Even so, almost a third of Georgia’s population does not know where to get a test and one in five reports not knowing how to treat COVID-19 at home.

Even though this knowledge is self-reported, it is still important to pay attention to what people feel less informed about as well as who feels less informed. 

A regression model suggests that even though the vast majority knows how to get medical assistance, women, people aged 18–34, and people with tertiary education are slightly more likely to say they know how to get medical assistance than men, people who are 55 or older and people with secondary or lower education. 

The more durable goods a person owns (a proxy for wealth), the more likely that person is to say that they know how to get medical assistance. No differences were observed between people in different settlement types or employment statuses.

The regression model also shows that women and people with tertiary education are more likely to know how to treat COVID-19 at home than men and people with secondary technical, secondary, or lower education. 

The wealthier a person is, the more likely that person is to say that they know how to treat COVID-19 at home. There were no significant differences between people of different ages, settlement types, or employment statuses.

As for knowledge of where to get a COVID-19 test, the regression model suggests that women are more likely than men to say they know where to get a free or affordable test. 

People with tertiary education were 1.3 times more likely to say they know where to get a test compared to people with secondary or lower education.  

Employed people were more likely to say they knew where to get a free or affordable COVID-19 test than people who were not working. As in the case of knowing how to get medical assistance and treat COVID-19 at home, the more household items a person owns, the more likely that person is to say that they know where to get the test. 

Again, there were no differences between people in different age groups or settlement types.

The December 2020 survey data shows that a majority of Georgia’s population reports knowing where to get a COVID-19 test, how to get medical assistance, and how to treat COVID-19 at home. 

People appear least informed about where to get a test done.  

Women and people with better economic situations consistently reported knowing the above mentioned more often than men and people with worse economic situations.

For more data on people’s attitudes towards COVID-19 related issues, see the dataset on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

Despite gains in 2020, Georgia’s institutions remain poorly trusted

Note: This article was published on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint publication of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The newly released 2020 Georgia Caucasus Barometer shows that trust in most institutions rose significantly since the start of the pandemic, but some institutions gained more than others.

This shows that the rallying around the flag effect, previously demonstrated for people’s assessments of the performance of institutions in the spring of 2020, has also led to large increases in trust towards them.

In December 2020, when the survey was conducted, religious institutions and the army were the most trusted institutions in the country. By contrast, political parties had the least amount of trust, followed by a large number of institutions that 25%–30% of people reported trusting.

While these levels of trust are not particularly high for most institutions, on average they were still 10 percentage points higher than the previous year. No institution saw a decline in trust. 

For seven of the fourteen institutions asked about, there was a double-digit increase in the share of the population trusting them. The executive government experienced the strongest gain of 19 percentage points compared to 2019. 

The media, the healthcare system, religious institutions, local government, political parties, and parliament also all experienced large gains in trust. By comparison, NGOs and banks did not gain a significant amount of trust during the pandemic.

Even though there has been an almost universal rise in trust in Georgia’s institutions, the country is still behind where it was in terms of institutional trust compared to 2008, the first year for which comparable data is available.

Trust is up in political parties, the executive government, and the army compared to the 2008 baseline. It has not changed significantly for local government, the police, the courts, or religious institutions. It has declined for the president, banks, the media, NGOs, parliament, the education system, and even the healthcare system. 

While the pandemic, and the largely effective institutional responses to it, likely explains the rise in trust in institutions between 2019 and 2020, trust in most of them remains low. 

Indeed, despite the gains in trust in 2020, most institutions are still less trusted than they were in 2008.

The data used in this article is available here.

Are Georgia's risk-loving men to blame for the spread of COVID-19?

Note: This article was published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog.  This article was written by Dr. Koba Turmanidze, Director of CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Popular sayings often associate risk-taking with hefty payoffs. Perhaps the most widely used proverb about the subject in the region suggests that if you don’t take risks, you don’t get to drink champagne. 

While risky people may enjoy a glass of champagne someday, this article argues that a love of risk, especially among Georgian men, also threatens society’s fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.   

CRRC’s June 2020 COVID-19 Monitor survey shows that half the Georgian public are risk-tolerant (51%), 41% dislike taking risks, and 8% do not have an opinion. A regression analysis suggests that risk tolerance does not vary across several respondent characteristics such as age group, education level, type of settlement, or household economic conditions. However, risk tolerance is related to gender and employment status, controlling for the characteristics previously listed. Men are 18 percentage points more likely to be risk-tolerant than women. Moreover, employed and unemployed people are about 15 percentage points more likely to accept risk-taking than people who are not in the active labour force. 

When it comes to potentially risky behaviour in the pandemic, during the week prior to the survey, 52% reported they had spent time with people outside of their household, 33% said they socialized at someone’s house, and 19% appear to have used public transport. Respondents’ answers on these three questions are summarized in a variable measuring risky behaviour, which takes the value of one if the respondent reports any of the three actions and a zero if the respondent reports none. 

A regression analysis was conducted that relates risky behaviour to risk tolerance, controlling for respondents’ demographic characteristics. The analysis indicates a significant relation between risk tolerance and risky behaviour: risk-tolerant people are eight percentage points more likely to engage in at least one of the above noted risky actions. Gender and age are also relevant for risk-taking: men are nine percentage points more likely to engage in risky actions than women. Also, older people (55+) are 18 percentage points less likely to behave in a risky way compared to people belonging to the age group between 18 and 34.

Since gender is related to both risk tolerance and risky behaviour, further analysis looks at how risk tolerance predicts risky behaviour for women and men separately. 

The analysis suggests that risk tolerance and age predict men’s engagement in risky activities. Risk tolerant men are 15 percentage points more likely to engage in risky actions compared to risk-averse men. Likewise, younger men (18 to 34) are 11 percentage points more inclined to risky behaviour than men belonging to the 35 to 54 age group and 26 percentage points more likely than the group 55 and older. 

For women, risky behaviour is associated with employment status and settlement type. Importantly, risk tolerance is not associated with engaging in risky behaviour among women. Employed women are more likely to take risky actions than the unemployed (by 16 percentage points), and women outside of the active labour force (by 20 percentage points). Also, women in Tbilisi are 13 percentage points more likely to take risks than residents of other urban areas.

While popular culture valorizes risk tolerance, in the current pandemic, risk-loving men have higher levels of social contact and higher mobility, helping the virus spread.            

The data used in this blog article is available here.   

Almost everyone in Georgia believes in the supernatural

[Note: This article was co-published by CRRC Georgia and OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. It was written by Anano Kipiani, a policy analyst at CRRC Georgia, and Kristina Vacharadze, the Programs Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

Georgian folklore is filled with stories of demons and devils; yet, everyone knows children’s stories are just that. However, new opinion polling from the ISSP Survey on Religion suggests that the vast majority of Georgians believe in the supernatural.

The study, which was conducted in 2019 by CRRC Georgia, asked about whether people think the following statements are true or false:

• Good luck charms sometimes do bring good luck;
• Some fortunetellers really can foresee the future;
• Some faith healers do have God-given healing powers;
• A person’s star sign at birth or horoscope can affect the course of the future.

Overall, 91% of the public reported that at least one of the above statements was true. Belief in faith healers was most common, with 57% reporting this was true. Belief in horoscopes (37%), good luck charms (30%), and fortune-tellers (20%) were less common.

Almost half (48%) the public also said they believed that ancestors had supernatural powers. A third (35%) said they did not believe this, and the remainder (16%) were uncertain. 

Further analyses of the data shows few differences in the number of superstitious beliefs people hold in different social and demographic groups. 

People with and without a higher education reported belief in a similar number of the above superstitions. Similarly, there was no difference between people in rural and urban areas. Older and younger people also held similar views. 

The only statistically significant difference present in the data was with regard to people who are more religious, who believed in more superstitions on average while controlling for other factors. 

Even though almost everyone in Georgia believes in at least some superstition, most people also think people should put more faith in science. The study asked whether people agreed with the statement: ‘We trust too much in science and not enough in religious faith’. Only a quarter of the public (25%) agreed, 29% neither agreed nor disagreed, and almost half the population (46%) disagreed. 

That is, while most people in Georgia believe in the supernatural, a plurality also put some faith in science.

Note: The above analysis is based on an ordinary least squares regression analysis, where the dependent variable is the number of supernatural beliefs a person reported believing. The independent variables are gender, age group, ethnicity, religious affiliation, settlement type, level of education, and a religiosity index. The data used in the blog is available here. 

Political campaigning in Georgia: informing or mobilising?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia, NDI, or any related entity.

Political campaigning takes a wide range of forms, from digital advertising to door knocking. Generally, campaigning is believed to both mobilise voters to actually go out to vote as well as win over voters, but which is most relevant in Georgia? 

Data from the August CRRC Georgia and NDI public opinion poll indicate that people who wanted to be contacted by campaigners also appeared more partisan than others. This may suggest that campaigning in Georgia will be more effective at turning out partisans than persuading the undecided. 

The data also indicates that despite the pandemic, most of the voters that wanted to be contacted wanted that contact to be in person.

Respondents on the August 2020 survey were asked what the best way would be for parties to get in touch with them. The most common responses were contact through small scale public meetings close to home and large scale meetings. Approximately a third of the public (31%) did not want to be contacted.

Who wants contact?

If voters want to be contacted, they may reasonably want more information about their different choices at the ballot box. Alternatively, they may want the parties to excite them (and others) to go to the polls. The data indicates that turning out supporters is likely easier in Georgian elections than winning over undecided voters, because the less partisan voters were, the less likely they were to want contact.

On the survey, 62% of respondents said they would like to be contacted in at least one form, and 31% reported they did not want to be contacted. The remaining respondents were unsure or refused to answer the question (7%).

A regression model suggests people in urban areas outside Tbilisi were eight percentage points more likely to be interested in being contacted. Men and women, people in wealthier and poorer households, those in different age groups, and those working and not did not report significantly different rates at which they would like to be contacted.

Regressions using political preferences suggest that partisans and those actively engaged in politics wanted to be contacted at greater rates than less engaged individuals. 

With regard to party, the data indicate that UNM and Georgian Dream supporters were more likely to want to be contacted than supporters of other parties and those that support no party in particular. 

Decided voters were more likely to want to be contacted than undecided voters. 

Likely voters were substantially (31 percentage points) more likely to want to be contacted than those who did not intend to vote. 

What type of contact?

In August, the COVID-19 case count was rising, though extensive restrictions on activity were not in place. Despite the rising case count, among those that wanted to be contacted, most wanted some form of in-person contact.

Overall, 76% of those that wanted to be contacted named only in-person forms of contact, 16% only distance-based forms of contact, and 8% a mix of the two. In sum, 84% of the public that wanted politicians to reach out to them, wanted it to at least be partially in person.

A regression model suggests that people in rural areas were 18 percentage points more likely to want an in-person contact than those in urban areas including the capital. Younger people (aged 18–35) were 11 percentage points more likely to report wanting in-person contact than others, all else equal.

Demographics aside, people who supported an opposition party aside from the UNM were less likely to report they wanted to be contacted in person. Likely and unlikely voters did not vary significantly on whether they wanted in-person contact or not. Similarly undecided and decided voters had similar views, controlling for other factors.

The above data suggests that during political campaigns in Georgia, people prefer in-person contact, even in the face of the pandemic. 

The people who wanted to be contacted during political campaigns were more likely to be political partisans and engaged in politics. In turn, this suggests that campaigns likely have an easier time turning out supporters than creating them.

The data used in this article is available here.

The results of models looking at how people want to be contacted are multinomial regression models. The first contains demographic variables only. The remaining models included one of the following variables: party support, decided voter or not, and likely voter or not.

The results of models looking at who wants to be contacted are logistic regressions. The first contains demographic variables only. The remaining models included one of the following variables: party support, decided voter or not, and likely voter or not.

Georgian TV and the political framing of foreign actors

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Mariam Kobaladze, Communications Manager at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the European Union, the United Nations Development Program, or CRRC Georgia. 

No matter their political stripes, TV channels in Georgia frame association with Russia as politically condemnatory and association with Western countries as praiseworthy. 

The preliminary statement of the OSCE/ODIHR international election observation mission, published on 31 October, assessed the Georgian media environment as ‘highly polarised’. The Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics came to a similar conclusion, highlighting that polarization in television news increased as the election campaign wore on.  

CRRC Georgia’s media monitoring during the pre-electoral period shows that polarization carried through to the use and portrayal of foreign actors in Georgian media. While any affiliation with Russia was intended as damaging to the reputation of a political actor, the EU and the United States were mostly portrayed as respectful actors, whose support added credit and whose criticism cast doubt on politicians.

‘Russia’ as a dirty word

Politicians who commented on ongoing events in news stories would call their opponents ‘pro-Russian’ or acting in line with Russian interests, with the clear goal of diminishing their credibility. 

Both the opposition and the ruling party used this tactic. For example, in a news story on Rustavi 2, a pro-government leaning news outlet, a member of the ruling Georgian Dream Party said that after the Bolsheviks and Communists, the opposition United National Movement ranked next in fulfilling Russia’s tasks.

Meanwhile, TV Pirvelli, an outlet critical of the Georgian Dream government, informed their audience that Bidzina Ivanishvili’s cousin visited Moscow 177 times, while pro-UNM news channel Mtavari Arkhi aired a story on how Russia funds the ultra conservative Georgian March group and the conservative Patriots’ Alliance party, arguing that the lack of reaction from the Georgian government to these organisations demonstrates their sympathies with russia. 

An interesting example of using Russia to discredit a political actor was the coverage of the Davit Gareji cartographers’ court case. Opposition media covered it as a ‘Russian project’, suggesting the scandal was Russian commissioned in the wake of the tensions prior to the outburst of active conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In contrast, pro-government channels used the story to discredit the previous authorities, claiming they had pursued Russian interests. 

The West is best

Unlike Russia, EU and US-affiliated actors were presented as having authority and respect. Yet, while covering the same statements, comments, and issues issued from Western actors, different television channels underlined western support or criticism of the government based on their editorial stance, instead of both support and criticism. 

While government-leaning TV Channel Imedi covered stories on US and EU representatives calling on Georgia to hold free, fair, and transparent elections and presented OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, they did so in a way that highlighted western support for Georgia, its government, and positive assessments from international observation missions (e.g. of Election Code reform). In another similar instance, Pos TV covered the EU parliament’s resolution on Georgia’s fulfillment of the Association Agreement as the EU’s unprecedented support for Georgia and a success to be ascribed to the ruling party. 

Channels with critical views of the ruling party and the government also covered the statements and recommendations of western actors. However, the emphasis was on criticism of the ruling authorities. TV Pirveli for example aired a story about an EU Parliament report on Georgia which they presented as a tough pre-election warning for Georgia. ‘Five-hundred and fifty-two EU parliamentarians write that there is a politicized court in Georgia, court cases against opposition leaders were political, and the country under Ivanishvili’s rule has political prisoners’, a TV Pirveli journalist stated on air. ‘All this was written in the annual report of the EU parliament.’

CRRC Georgia’s monitoring of television news suggests that when covering foreign actors, television channels tend to express their political sympathies. Russia is used to cast doubt on parties and politicians while Western actors are presented as figures of authority whose support is advantageous and criticism disadvantageous. The meanings ascribed to Russia and the West hold whether or not the channel is for or against the government. But, the coverage of Western statements does change, either focusing on praise or criticism of the government and little of the coverage is balanced.

Georgian voters: personalities, policies, or a bit of both?

Note: This article was co-published by OC Media and CRRC Georgia on the Caucasus Data Blog. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia, the National Democratic Institute, or any related entity.

While personality in politics matters greatly for the Georgian public, data from this year shows that for Georgian Dream and United National Movement voters, policy is still important. 

A recent CRRC Georgia policy brief argued that what was really dividing Georgians politically was personalities rather than policies. Data from the August 2020 CRRC and NDI survey provides further evidence for this idea. 

However, the data also shows a difference between Georgian Dream (GD) and United National Movement (UNM) voters in terms of policy preferences and that economic policy is the most important issue for a plurality of voters. 

UNM supporters were slightly more likely to report that economic policy was most important compared to Georgian Dream supporters. Still, for a plurality of supporters of both parties, the data indicate that economic policy is the most important issue.

Note: Party preference was only asked to individuals that reported they may vote in the October 2020 elections. Therefore, overall, refers to all individuals which said they might vote in the October 2020 elections.

When it comes to professional training versus formal education, 26% of the public prefers a party prioritizing formal education, and 50% a party prioritizing professional training. A regression analysis shows no significant differences between supporters of the UNM and GD. 

Differences are present between those with different levels of education, however. People with vocational education are 10 percentage points more likely, and those with higher education eight percentage points more likely, to support investing in professional education than people with secondary education or a lower level of education. Women are six percentage points less likely than men to support vocational education as opposed to formal education.

The survey asked whether people would prefer a party that proposed lower taxes or higher pensions, with 27% preferring higher pensions and 56% preferring lower taxes. With regard to preferences for a party that would support higher pensions or lower taxes, UNM supporters are 23 percentage points more likely to prefer a candidate that supports higher pensions rather than lower taxes. The reverse is true of GD supporters. 

Aside from party support, a number of other characteristics are associated with support for higher pensions as opposed to lower taxes. People who are currently employed are nine percentage points more likely to support lower taxes than those who are not.  People over the age of 56 are 26 percentage points more likely to support higher pensions than people between the ages of 18-35. People with higher education are 11 percentage points more likely than people with secondary education alone to support lower taxes. People in rural areas are seven percentage points more likely to support higher pensions.

While the data does show a difference with attitudes on higher pensions versus lower taxes, personalities remain primary for supporters of both major parties. A slight majority of the public (55%) report that personalities matter to them more than policies. In contrast, 20% say that election promises and  political platform matter more. A further 15% agree with neither idea and the remainder have indicated that they do not know which of the two they find more important.

There are no significant differences between supporters of the UNM and GD on this question. The only difference identified in a regression analysis on the issue is that employed people are six percentage points less likely to view personalities as more important compared with those that are not presently employed.

The above data re-affirms past analyses that have shown that personality dominates policy in Georgian politics. Yet, the data does show at least one meaningful difference on economic policy between supporters of the two main parties when they are considering who to vote for.

Note: The data analysis presented in this article are based on regression models controlling for respondent age group (18-35, 36-55, 56+), employment situation (working or not), party support (Georgian Dream, United National Movement, Other party, no party/don’t know/refuse to answer), education level (secondary or less, vocational education, or tertiary education), sex (female or male), and settlement type (capital, other urban, or rural). The data used in this article are available here.

Gaps remain in mobile phone ownership in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

While mobile phone ownership is widespread in Georgia, gaps still remain among rural, elderly, and ethnic minority populations.

Owning a mobile (cell phone) is considered so important that more widespread ownership is considered a sustainable development goal (SDG 5.b) by the United Nations. 

Mobile phone ownership among households has increased significantly over the last decade. Caucasus Barometer data indicates that in 2008, two thirds of households owned a mobile phone. This has steadily increased, reaching 96% of households in 2019, the last year for which Caucasus Barometer data is available.

While the vast majority of households have a mobile phone in Georgia, not everyone is equally likely to personally own one. Caucasus Barometer in 2019 specifically asked whether the respondent owned a mobile phone, and only 86% of individuals reported that they did.

A regression analysis looking at respondents’ social, demographic, and economic characteristics suggests that ownership varies between settlement types, age groups, ethnicities, employment status, household wealth, and education level. Though, it does not vary based on sex, after taking into account other factors. 

Controlling for other factors, people in rural areas are nine percentage points less likely than people in Tbilisi to own a mobile phone. Armenians are ten percentage points and Azerbaijanis eight percentage points less likely to own a mobile phone. People aged 56 and older are ten percentage points less likely to own a mobile phone. People with jobs are ten percentage points more likely to own a mobile phone. 

The level of education also has an impact with an individual who only has secondary education being 13 percentage points less likely to own a mobile phone compared with someone with tertiary education. Individuals in households that are relatively wealthy are five percentage points more likely to own a mobile phone, compared with households that own none of the assets asked about (aside from mobile phones).

While the vast majority of households have at least one member which owns a mobile phone, individual ownership is less common. To work towards improvement on this sustainable development goal, mobile phone ownership needs to increase among ethnic minorities, people in rural areas, older people, the less educated, and those not working. 

Notably, while the indicator is listed as part of the gender sustainable development goals, after controlling for other factors, there is no significant difference between women and men in terms of mobile phone ownership.

The data presented in this article is available here. 

How Georgians perceive environmental problems

Note: This article was co-published on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article represent the views of the author alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, NDI, or any other entity.

While air pollution is dominant as the most important environmental issue for Georgians, a stark rural-urban divide exists with rural Georgians being one-third more likely to believe that there are no environmental problems in their communities.  

Georgia faces a number of environmental challenges, including air pollution, issues with invasive species such as the brown marmorated stink bug, and natural disasters. 

Data from the World Health Organization suggests that Georgia has a moderate problem with air pollution, ranking 70th in the world and, according to CRRC and NDI data from 2020, a little under half of Georgians perceive it as the biggest environmental issue in their community.  

At the same time, a quarter of the public does not think there are any environmental issues in their community, with people in rural areas particularly unlikely to think that their community faces environmental problems.

Both littering and food safety were named as the most problematic local environmental issue by 11% of respondents, while all remaining issues were named by less than 10% of the population. 

Respondents were allowed to name up to three different issues as ‘the most problematic’ in their community. Overall, 15% named three issues, 21% two issues, 31% one issue, and 32% reported that there was no issue or did not know which issues were most problematic. 

A regression analysis suggests that people with higher than secondary education named more issues than those with only a high school education. Similarly, respondents living in wealthier households named more issues than those in poorer households, controlling for other factors.  Older people named fewer issues than younger people generally. The largest difference between groups though was between settlement types. People in rural areas named half as many issues as people in Tbilisi. 

In rural areas, people were also significantly more likely to report there were no problematic environmental issues in their settlements. People in rural areas were 33 percentage points more likely, controlling for other factors, to think there are no environmental issues in their community compared to people in Tbilisi. Similarly, rural people are 17 percentage points more likely to report no environmental issue in their community than those in urban areas aside from Tbilisi.  

Not naming any environmental issue was also associated with education. People with tertiary education are seven percentage points less likely than those who completed only secondary school to say there are no issues. Similarly, people with a vocational education are five percentage points less likely to report there are no environmental issues compared with those with only secondary education, controlling for other factors. 

There were no significant differences between women and men, those in wealthier and poorer households, the employed and those not working, and people in different age groups in terms of naming at least one issue or reporting there are no issues.

How coronavirus messaging could provide a moral license to misbehave

[Note: This article was published on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

In Georgia, it would appear that informing people that others are acting responsibly in the pandemic could in fact lead to the opposite behaviour.

Communications have been critical to attempts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 globally, and it is unclear what the best strategy for doing so might be. In Georgia, it would appear that informing people that others are acting responsibly in the pandemic could in fact lead to the opposite behaviour.

A common tool to change behaviour through communications is the use of social norming. 

Social norming informs people of what other people are actually doing, and in turn, more people often start doing the same. This tool has been successfully used to encourage numerous forms of pro-social behaviour from paying taxes to lowering drinking among university students.  But sometimes, it does not work and can even backfire. 

The results of a survey experiment CRRC Georgia conducted in June 2020 suggest that had social norming been used towards the end of the COVID-19 lockdown to encourage people to stay at home, it might have backfired.

During the lockdown, stay at home was the motto of the day. Yet, over the course of the lockdown, the public increasingly began to go out to socialise.  Men in particular became more likely to socialise as time went on.

To test whether social norming could potentially change behaviour, CRRC Georgia ran a survey experiment. In the survey, one group of people were told that the majority of the public had stayed home the week prior. A second group was told that the majority of the people of their sex had stayed home the week prior. A third group was not told anything. Next, respondents were asked whether or not they planned on going out the following week. 

The experiment found statistically and substantially large effects on the provision of information. People who found out that most people stayed at home were 18 percentage points more likely to report they intended on going out to socialise the following week.  

The sex-specific information led to a 12 percentage point increase in people’s intention to go out and socialise.

The effects were uniform across different social and demographic groups. Women and men, old and young, people with and without a higher education, and those who did and did not leave the house the week prior to the survey were not affected in a significantly different manner by the treatments. The effect was similar across settlement types as well.

So what happened? One plausible hypothesis is that instead of the treatment inducing social norming, it enabled moral licensing. When people do something good, they often then feel like it is fine to do something not so good afterwards. This process is known as moral licensing.

The above experiment could have potentially led people to believe that, collectively, Georgia has done well. As a contributor to that success, they may have felt that next week, they should reward themself by going out to socialise. 

While plausible, further experimentation is needed to untangle exactly what happened.

What is clear is that, at least in some contexts, attempts at social norming can have adverse impacts. This underlines the point that communications campaigns need to test before they talk.

More Georgians than ever own phones and TVs, but inequalities remain

[Note: This article was published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. The article was written by Ian Goodrich, a Policy Analyst at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author's alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

Survey data from the last decade shows that more and more Georgians own household goods like mobile phones, TVs and washing machines, but inequalities in such material wealth still remain.

The Caucasus Barometer survey shows a steady growth in ownership of durable goods across Georgia over the last eight years. 

The percentage of survey respondents reporting ownership of each of a basket of seven household items has risen since 2011, with the increase most marked in rural areas. Whilst the rural-urban divide is seen to be closing, large gaps remain between respondents with higher education and those without. 

Virtually all households now possess a mobile phone (96% of households), colour television (93%), and a refrigerator (92%). Colour television ownership has been consistently high and has grown slightly in the last eight years. The same period has also seen large increases in ownership of refrigerators (up 22 percentage points) and cell phones (up 14 percentage points).

The largest increase, however, is seen in washing machine ownership. In 2011, washing machines could be considered a luxury item, with a minority of households (40%) owning one. In 2019, washing machine ownership is now the norm, with ownership doubling to 80% of households. 

Just over half of households now possess a personal computer. This figure fell slightly between 2017 and 2019, potentially resulting from growth in mobile phone use and increased mobile internet connectivity. 

Car ownership is also up by over ten percentage points, and the number of households owning an air conditioning unit has increased by five percentage points to 12%.

Virtually all households now possess a cell phone (96% of households), color television (93%), and a refrigerator (92%). Color television ownership has been consistently high and has grown slightly in the last eight years. The same period has also seen large increases in ownership of refrigerators (up 22 percentage points) and cell phones (up 14 percentage points).

The largest increase, however, is seen in washing machine ownership. In 2011, washing machines could be considered a luxury item, with a minority of households (40%) owning one. In 2019, washing machine ownership is now the norm, with ownership doubling to 80% of households. 

Just over half of households now possess a personal computer. This figure fell slightly between 2017 and 2019, potentially resulting from growth in mobile phone use and increased mobile internet connectivity. Car ownership is also up by over ten percentage points, and the number of households owning an air conditioning unit has increased by five percentage points to 12%.

The average number of items owned by a Georgian household from within this basket of seven goods has grown steadily since 2011. In 2011, a typical household possessed 3.6 items from the basket. This has increased to an average of 4.6 items in 2019.

Growth has been most dramatic in rural areas, which have caught up rapidly with the capital and other urban settlements. In 2011, a respondent in a rural area with a secondary or technical education could be expected to have 3.2 of the items on the eight-point index compared to 4.2 for a resident of Tbilisi: a gap of one point on the basket. Today, rural households have for the most part caught up with their urban and capital counterparts, scoring just 0.2 points lower on average holding all else equal.

Nonetheless, education remains a key predictor of household asset ownership with the analysis highlighting a continued sharp divide between respondents with higher levels of education and those without. 

Holding all else equal, those with a higher education have on average 15% (or 0.67) more basic household goods than those with a technical education, and 28% (or 1.1) more than those with an incomplete secondary education and below. 

Asset ownership is a simple proxy for household wealth and fails to account for other financial characteristics of a household, such as income or debt. But, the measure does enable analysis of the extent to which some basic material requirements are being met. 

The overall trend in the last eight years has been positive: washing machines and refrigerators are now found in the majority of Georgian homes and at a household level, mobile phone coverage is nearly complete. 

When contrasting the capital and other areas of Georgia, we see that rural areas in particular have caught up rapidly with Tbilisi. But despite greater equality across settlement types, those with higher levels of education appear to enjoy a substantially more comfortable home life than those without.

Note: The above analysis is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable is a simple additive index of positive responses to questions regarding ownership of the following seven items: cell phone, color television, refrigerator, washing machine, personal computer, car, air conditioner. A score of zero on the index represents ownership of none of these items, a score of seven corresponds to ownership of all items.

The independent variables in the regression are the respondent’s sex, age, ethnic minority status, settlement type, and education level. Independent variables were interacted with the number of years since the first wave in the dataset, where zero corresponds to 2011 and eight to 2019.

Differences between rural and capital scores on the index in 2019 were statistically significant at p <= 0.05 on a univariate OLS regression.

Replication code for the above analysis is available here.

Conservative gender mores are changing in Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Otto Saladze, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Gendered norms prevail in Georgian society, which often translates into deprecation of women for smoking, drinking alcohol, having pre-marital sex, and even living with a boyfriend. However, attitudes appear to be shifting.

CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey asked people what they thought about several such activities. The data showed that the public are least accepting of women smoking, with 80% reporting it is never acceptable at any age. Sexual relations (63%) and cohabitating with a man before marriage were also commonly thought to be never acceptable for women (60%). 

Although there are still widespread prejudices about what is acceptable for women, some attitudes are changing. While in 2010, a slight majority (56%) said they were against women living separately from their parents before marriage at any age, this number had decreased by 18 percentage points by 2019 to 38%. 

In 2019, half of the respondents reported that women aged 18–25 should be able to live separately before marriage, compared to only 31% in 2010.  

In 2010, 80% said it was unacceptable for women to have sex before marriage at any age. In 2019, this number decreased by 17 percentage points, with 63% now against it. 

In 2019, 24% said it was acceptable for women aged 18–25 to have sex outside of marriage, 16 percentage points more than a decade ago (8%).  

However, people’s attitudes do not appear to have changed over the last decade towards women smoking and drinking strong alcohol.

Note: The original question text was: ‘Sometimes people are considered too young to do or experience certain things. Could you please tell me, from what age do you think it is acceptable for a woman to…’ Respondents were then asked about multiple activities. To ensure clear data visualisation, the answer options: ‘Under 18’, ‘18-25’, ‘26+’ and ‘Don’t know/Refuse to answer’, are not shown on the chart.  

There were only slight differences in the opinions of women and men on these issues, and attitudes have changed at similar paces among both sexes.

While 52% of men said it was never acceptable for women to drink strong alcohol, 59% of women reported the same in 2019. The numbers were almost the opposite a decade ago, with 59% of men saying it was never acceptable in 2010 and 55% of women. 

Both sexes’ attitudes changed regarding pre-marital sex and co-habitation at a similar rate. The share of men thinking pre-marital sex was unacceptable for women at any age decreased from 81% to 62% between 2019 and 2010, and among women the decline is similar (80% to 64%). In 2019, 58% of men and 61% of women were against cohabitation prior to marriage at any age compared with 71% of men and 73% of women in 2010. 

A similar pattern holds among people of different ages, with changes being quite similar in most age groups. One exception is attitudes towards pre-marital sex. While in 2010, 76% of 18-35-year-olds said this was never acceptable for a woman, in 2019 only 52% of young people reported the same, a 24 percentage point decline.  By comparison, the decline in disapproval among 35-54-year-olds was 17% and by 11% among those 55+.

People still judge women for a wide range of different behaviors in society, but attitudes are changing. Over the last decade, it appears that people have become more accepting of women’s choices regarding pre-marital sex and cohabiting out of wedlock. 

Are Georgians and Armenians becoming more or less tolerant?

[Note: This article was published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. This article was written by Kristine Vacharadze, Programmes Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article represent the views of the author alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

Surveys carried out in Georgia and in Armenia in 2009 and 2019 asked respondents if they approved or disapproved of doing business with or marriages with people of 12 other ethnicities. So, are Georgians and Armenians becoming more or less tolerant?

Data from the Caucasus Barometer has consistently suggested that Georgians and Armenians are more tolerant of doing businesses with other ethnicities than they are of inter-ethnic marriages.

Data from the 2019 Caucasus Barometer showed that in both Georgia and in Armenia, a majority approved of all ethnicities asked about on the survey as business partners, except for Turks and Azerbaijanis in Armenia. 

For Georgians, business partnerships with Georgians, Ukrainians, Russians, Italians, Americans, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Jewish people, and Turks were seen as more acceptable than those with Kurds, Indians, Arabs, and Iranians. 

Armenians followed a similar pattern. However, the rates of approval of doing business with Azerbaijanis, Turks, Ukrainians, and Jewish people were much lower in regards to business relations. 

Attitudes towards doing business with people of other ethnicities are becoming more negative in both Georgia and Armenia. The biggest decreases in Georgia are towards doing business with Kurds and Turks, which decreased by 15 and 14 percentage points, respectively. There were 12 percentage point decreases in approval of doing business with Jewish people, Americans, and Armenians and of 10 percentage points for Italians. 

In Armenia, the approval rate of business partnerships with Turks, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, and Jewish people dropped by 16, 11, 9, and 8 percentage points respectively. The rest remained relatively similar. 

The marriage approval data follows a similar pattern in terms of favoured ethnicities as described above, but with much lower levels of approval. 

However, the trends are different in Georgia and Armenia. 

The data from 2019 suggest that more people look favourably at inter-ethnic marriages in Georgia compared with 2009. The biggest increase is towards Georgian women marrying Azerbaijanis, which increased by 11 percentage points. It was followed by Turks with a 10 percentage point increase and Kurds with a seven percentage point increase.  

In contrast, Armenians became less approving of Armenian women marrying men of other ethnicities. The biggest drop was toward marrying Jewish people, which decreased by 11 percentage points, and Russians, which fell by 10 percentage points. 

The trend is similar regarding all nationalities but the difference is relatively small.

The most recent wave of surveys showed that Georgians have become more tolerant of inter-ethnic marriages while becoming less approving of doing business with other ethnicities. 

However, there appears to be a more positive trend in approval of marriages with other ethnicities, while support for business partnerships has declined, albeit slightly. 

In contrast, Armenians appear to have become less tolerant of both types of relations, with the exception of business partnerships with Georgians.

The data presented in this article is available from CRRC Georgia’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Half of Georgians believe COVID-19 is man-made

[This article was co-published by CRRC Georgia and OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. It was written by Dr. Tsisana Khundadze. Tsisana is a senior researcher at CRRC Georgia.]

As COVID-19 spread across the world, it was followed by a hurricane of (mis)information about the origins and nature of the virus. The novelty and scope of the virus gave birth to many conspiracy theories, but which of those took root in Georgia? 

An NDI and CRRC survey conducted in June 2020 asked questions about people’s beliefs about the origins and spread of coronavirus. The data suggest that while a majority of the population does not believe in common disinformation messages such as a relation between 5G technology and the spread of the coronavirus, only a small portion thinks that coronavirus came about naturally. 

Most people see some kind of human footprint in the creation and spread of coronavirus. 

According to the survey, around half of the population thinks that coronavirus was developed in a lab. Specifically, 30% thinks that it was developed in a lab and was spread intentionally and 22% believes it was made in a lab and spread accidentally. 

Only 13% of Georgians say coronavirus came about naturally, and around a third (32%) of the population is uncertain about the origins of this virus. 

A small portion (3%) even think that coronavirus does not really exist.

Besides this question, respondents were asked their opinion on the relation between the spread of coronavirus and 5G internet infrastructure, one of the most widespread pieces of misinformation that spread around the world. 

While only 10% said they think that 5G internet infrastructure is linked to the spread of coronavirus, almost half said they disagreed with this notion, and around a third of Georgians don’t know whether 5G and coronavirus are related. 

This shows that even though only a small portion of people believe in a link between 5G and COVID-19, almost half are uncertain, or at least not clear, whether this is misinformation.

To better understand beliefs about the origins of coronavirus, a regression model was constructed. According to the model, men are 1.3 times more likely to say that coronavirus was developed in a lab and spread intentionally, while women are 1.4 times more likely to think that it was developed in a lab but spread accidentally. 

Moreover, the more household items a person owns (a proxy for wealth), the more likely that person is to say that coronavirus was developed in a lab and spread accidentally and less likely to say it was spread intentionally. 

Those in the worst economic situation are 1.6 times more likely to say that coronavirus was developed in a lab and spread intentionally than people who score highest on the ownership index. The latter are almost 3 (2.8) times more likely to think it was spread accidentally than the former. 

However, no differences were observed between people in different age groups, settlement types, with different levels of education, those using social networks more or less often, with different employment statuses, or attending religious services at different rates.

Note: This and the following chart was generated from a regression model. The model includes sex (male, female), age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), frequency of using social media (everyday, once a week or month, less often or never), employment status (employed, not employed), frequency of attending religious services (at least once a month, less often or never), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth. Besides demographic characteristics, social media usage was added into the regression model, because social media was named as the main source of information by 41% of the population. Religious attendance was included in the model, because, around Easter, it became clear that people who are more religious perceived the possibility of the spread of the coronavirus in a different way in Georgia.

As for the relation between the spread of coronavirus and 5G internet infrastructure, people living in rural areas are around 1.5 times more likely to think that 5G is related to the spread of coronavirus compared to people who live in Tbilisi or other urban areas. 

Similarly, people with higher than secondary education are 1.9 times less likely to think that 5G is related to spread of coronavirus, compared to people with lower levels of education. Yet, people of different genders, ages, employment statuses, and economic situations and those attending religious services and using social media more or less often hold similar views on the relation between 5G technology and coronavirus. 

Only a small portion of Georgia’s population actually believes that 5G infrastructure is related to the spread of coronavirus, though people living in rural areas and those with lower levels of education agree with this notion more. 

A solid half of the population thinks that coronavirus did not occur naturally and was developed in a lab. This part of the population is further split roughly in half in their opinion on the nature of spread. Men and people with worse economic situations are slightly more likely to think that coronavirus was developed in a lab and spread intentionally, compared to women and people with better economic situations, who in turn are more likely to think it was developed in a lab and spread accidentally.

For more data on people’s opinion and attitudes on issues around coronavirus see the dataset on CRRC’s online analysis tool.

A Rapid Gender Assessment of the Covid-19 Situation in Georgia

Last month, UN Women released the results of a Rapid Gender Assessment of Covid-19. CRRC Georgia conducted the research, which was funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Joint SDG Fund. The project was part of a broader UN Women impact assessment initiative. The study that was conducted in mid to late May, looks at how the Covid-19 outbreak affected livelihoods, domestic and care work, and the mental and physical health of women and men in Georgia. The study also provides a glimpse of how women and girls with disabilities reflected on changes the Covid-19 pandemic instigated.

The study led to a number of findings, which are summarized below. The survey showed that:

• While women were less likely to lose income, a plurality still reported receiving less money;
• Ethnic minorities were hit harder by the pandemic, being more likely to report losing jobs than ethnic Georgians;
• Women disproportionally suffered from increased unpaid domestic work. They reported spending more time on cleaning and cooking. Fewer women than men said that their partner was helping with domestic work;
• Almost half of the respondents reported difficulties in accessing medical supplies for personal protection, with more women reporting difficulties.
• The pandemic had a significant toll on mental health. Almost half of Georgians reported a decline in their mental health as a result of Covid-19 pandemic, women being disproportionally affected;

In-depth interviews with women with disabilities, female caregivers, and experts showed that:

• Many women and girls with disabilities had to postpone routine tests and checkups, due to limited availability of services and travel restrictions;
• While many service providers switched to telemedicine and online therapy, this was detrimental for children with disabilities in particular. This stems from the lack of basic infrastructure (internet access, computers, smartphones), and perceived inadequacy of services provided online compared to in-person care.
• Women and girls with disabilities are worried about the high costs of medical treatment and transport, rising costs of medicine, and basic hygiene products;
• As women and girls with disabilities are less likely to have their disability status registered, they have been deprived of state aid and services. This mainly stems from the stigmatization of disability in Georgia, especially when it comes to women and girls;
• Measures to mitigate the spread of the virus, such as curfews and lockdowns, seem to have affected the psychological and emotional well-being of women and girls with disabilities;

The full report is available in English and Georgian. Questionnaires, data tables, and complete anonymized microdata can be accessed via CRRC Georgia’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Is Georgia really polarised?

[Note: This article was written by Dustin Gilbreath and Koba Turmanidze. It was originally published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia, the National Democratic Institute, or any related entity.]

Talk about political polarisation in Georgia is easy to find. Some have suggested that the recent United National Movement (UNM) announcement that Saakashvili will be their prime ministerial candidate will only make matters worse. 

A new data analysis CRRC Georgia released on Tuesday suggests that this may in fact be the case. Data from several years of CRRC Georgia and NDI polling indicates that there are few ideological or policy issues that the supporters of Georgian Dream (GD) and the United National Movement (UNM) disagree about. Rather, attitudes towards politicians and political events are what divides, a fact the public intuitively recognises.

What is polarisation?

One of the more prominent definitions of polarisation in the academic literature suggests two defining characteristics: issue partisanship and issue alignment. 

Issue alignment means that views on different sets of issues are correlated with each other. For example, people who think that deficit spending is bad also think that raising taxes is, this would constitute an example of issue alignment. 

Issue partisanship means that attitudes towards a specific issue are correlated with the party an individual identifies with. For instance, if support for one party is correlated with support for marijuana legalisation, this would reflect issue partisanship.

When issue partisanship and issue alignment grow, polarisation results.

A third factor and pre-condition for polarisation is that partisanship, support for political parties, exists.

The pre-conditions for polarisation are not present in Georgia

To have polarisation, there needs to be two poles. Georgia’s political system has two main political parties that are supported in public opinion polls – GD and UNM. But the public is hardly divided between them. Indeed, only a minority supports either party, and the most common response to what party has almost always been no party in recent years.

Georgians are largely united on policy and ideology

The study looked at approximately 20 different policy issues varying from cannabis legalisation to banking regulations. In the majority of cases, there were no statistically significant differences in the data between supporters of the main parties in the country, the United National Movement and Georgian Dream.

Supporters of each party tend towards thinking the main issue facing the country is the economy. They also have largely similar foreign policy outlooks — pro-Western ones. There are no significant differences in terms of opinions on how the country’s economy should develop either.

On social issues and values, supporters of the main two parties also have similar outlooks for the most part — they oppose selling land to foreigners and cannabis legalisation. 

The data does indicate that supporters of the UNM are slightly more likely to support the protection of queer rights and be accepting of a son wearing an earring. Taken together, these suggest UNM supporters are slightly less conservative than GD supporters. Despite the slight difference, large majorities of both parties tend towards conservative views on both questions.

The explicitly political is divisive

While there are few policy or ideological differences between supporters of the UNM and GD, people do have different attitudes towards the explicitly political. 

UNM supporters are more positive about the Rose Revolution than GD supporters. GD supporters are more likely to think the electoral handover of power in 2012 was a good thing. Politicians from each party are more liked by the supporters of their party. 

Interestingly, the public largely recognises that it is politicians and the otherwise explicitly political which divides the country. From a list of 11 items on a 2019 survey, which included Russia, more people named politicians as dividing the public than any other institution or group asked about.

Taken together, there is an absence of evidence of polarisation in the data. Rather, it suggests personalisation is what’s at play in Georgian politics.

Replication code for the analysis presented in this article is available here.

How high? Georgia spends millions online on illegal drugs each year

[Note: This article was co-published with OC-Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. The article was written by Ian Goodrich, a policy analyst at CRRC Georgia.]

Drug users in Georgia spent over $1.5 million dollars online between February and August 2020, according to a new study into the darknet market, Matanga, conducted by CRRC Georgia. 

When compared to similar online markets in Europe, this figure is substantial, exceeding monthly dark web drug revenue for Spain and Belgium combined.

How does it work?

Transactions take place through an elaborate process, beginning with a user interface familiar to any online shopper. 

Users of Matanga can browse listings from their computer or mobile device, and make payments via the site, typically in bitcoin to maintain the anonymity of buyer and seller. 

Drugs bought online are not delivered, but hidden for collection throughout major cities of Georgia. Once payment is complete, buyers are given GPS coordinates and must find their purchases concealed in public locations. 

The study found that on an average day, substances worth approximately $35,000 are concealed throughout Tbilisi, Batumi, and Kutaisi, with around 90% of trade in the capital.

Why so much money?

The study estimates that around $250,000 is spent on drugs in Georgia via a single platform each month. 

This figure substantially exceeds estimates for most European countries and would make Georgia one of the largest dark web drug markets in Europe. 

Source: Christin and Thomas (2019). Prices are converted to USD at 1.19 USD/EUR. Excl. (†) CRRC Georgia (2020)

So why is the online market so big? The answer, in part, comes down to prices and measurement. Drugs appear to cost much more online in Georgia than in Europe. 

For example, a median gram of cocaine bought online in Georgia was sold at $200, compared to around $75 in Europe – over two and a half times the price. 

Approaches to sampling and measurement also differ between the two studies, complicating direct comparison.

Nonetheless, the size of the online drug market in Georgia is substantial by any measure and cannot be fully explained by the cost of drugs and methodological differences between studies. 

Whilst the online trade in drugs in Georgia appears to be large, the country’s drug-taking population is small by European standards. This means sites such as Matanga may be much more important in Georgia than they are in Europe, where online markets are understood to represent a small fraction of overall trade. 

This would be consistent with activity seen in Russia, where the darknet drug trade is also believed to exceed that of Europe by a large margin.

Drug policy in Georgia

Why then do so many drug users in Georgia prefer to shop online? The answer may lie in Georgia’s approach to drug policy. 

Despite recent cannabis liberalisation, Georgian law still mandates severe, long-term prison sentences for possession of small quantities of drugs. In this context, platforms which protect participants’ identities will be attractive. 

Matanga allows buyers and sellers to trade anonymously, without ever needing to meet. Sellers do not even need to hide the drugs themselves and recruit couriers to further distance themselves from transactions. 

In Europe, where markets are larger and penalties lower, online trade may be considered unnecessarily cumbersome by buyers and sellers. In Georgia, however, where both buyer and seller may face lengthy prison time for the smallest exchange, online markets may be becoming a normal part of doing business.

The views presented in this article represent the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

The full report can be found on the CRRC Georgia website with source code and data available on Github.

Georgian parents are concerned about online learning

[Note: This article was co-published with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog. This article was written by Elene Ergeshidze. Elene is a Junior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

Georgia has postponed the reopening of schools in major cities due to a new surge in the pandemic, but what are the biggest concerns Georgians have with the education system?

Georgia’s new academic year started on 15 September, but physical attendance at schools and universities in major cities has been postponed until 1 October. 

Earlier this month government officials, including the Head of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health Amiran Gamkrelidze, said schools were ready to reopen. But on 11 September the prime minister announced this would not be possible in large cities because of a record-breaking number of new coronavirus cases in the country. 

In response, parents recently started a petition saying ‘no to online schooling’, to try and push forward the shift back to face-to-face schooling.

Students in public schools in large cities have not attended education institutions physically since March, when the first COVID-19 cases were confirmed in Georgia. 

Through broadcasting live lessons for school children on the public broadcaster, distance learning became available for everyone who had access to a TV. 

Data from the period indicated that most in Georgia could access either TV or other online learning options. But, UNICEF Georgia recommended prioritising school reopening because of the negative effects of school absence on children’s health. 

In this context, what do people think are the main problems for the Georgian education system today?

The August 2020 CRRC/NDI survey asked respondents about issues that the education system is facing in Georgia. Respondents were able to name up to three answers and the most frequently mentioned issue was difficulties associated with online classes, which a quarter (27%) of respondents named. 

The next most common issues were low qualifications of teachers/lecturers (22%) and the high cost of university education (20%). 

One in ten (10%) of the population reported that there were no problems facing the education system and 19% answered ‘don’t know’.

Women were more likely to name a problem than men. A quarter of men (24%) did not know how to answer this question compared to 16% of women. Similarly, 12% of men report that there were no problems facing the education system in Georgia whereas only 8% of women reported the same. 

Who is more concerned about online education? 

A logistic regression suggests women were 15 percentage points more likely to report distance learning as an issue than men. Those living outside Tbilisi were eight percentage points more likely to report distance learning was an issue. 

Other characteristics such as age, level of education, employment status, internet usage, and wealth do not predict whether people named difficulties with online classes as a problem or not. 

These differences are perhaps unsurprising. Women are more involved in children’s upbringing and education in Georgia. Therefore, they probably have more information about issues surrounding the education system than men. 

People living in other urban or rural settlements compared to residents of Tbilisi are less likely to be able to access the internet, which is necessary for online learning.

At present, it is still an open question whether schools and universities will reopen on 1 October. Another question is how the quality of education will be affected as a result of the lack of face to face interaction, and who this will affect the most. 

What is clear is that a substantial share of the public is concerned about online education, even if they do have access to it.

Do Georgians think the Prosecutor’s Office is biased?

[This article was published on the Caucasus Data Blog in partnership with OC Media. It was written by Eto Gagunahvili, a Junior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

The impartiality and effectiveness of the Prosecutor’s Office has come into question in recent years.

The Georgian public has been in a near-perpetual state of shock in recent years over a stream of high-profile criminal cases. In many of these, the impartiality and effectiveness of the Prosecutor’s Office has come into question, but what do people really think about this vital institution?

Cases like the Khorava Street Murders, the killing by the Security Services of Temirlan Machalikashvili, and most recently, the murder of 19-year-old Giorgi Shakarashvili have captured the public attention. 

More recently, there has been widespread discussion over the death of Tamar Bachaleishvili. The authorities suggest she took her own life while the opposition and some in the media have argued that foul play was involved. 

The media has widely covered these cases, often questioning the effectiveness of the Prosecutor’s Office. 

Between 30 March and 12 April, CRRC Georgia conducted a study on people’s knowledge of and attitudes towards the Prosecutor’s Office within the PRIME project.

Data from the study suggests that people tend towards thinking there is political interference in the Prosecutors Office. Yet, they are often unaware of some basic facts about the institution.

The survey data indicates that while few think the Prosecutor’s Office is fully under the thumb of political forces, few think it is entirely free either. 

Only 6% of the public said they thought the Prosecutor’s Office was completely free of political influence. By comparison, 11% thought it was not free at all. The remainder of the public said it was mainly free (39%), mainly unfree (21%) or that they were uncertain if it was under political influence (22%). 

Analyses of the above question suggest that age, level of education, and settlement type are related to people’s opinions of how free on unfree the Prosecutor’s Office is from political influence. 

People between the ages of 35–54 were more likely to report that the Prosecutor’s Office was free from political influences compared to younger people. Those with secondary or lower education were more likely to report that the Prosecutor’s Office was not free from political influence compared to people with higher education.

When it comes to settlement type, people living in rural areas were more likely to report that the Prosecutor’s Office was free from political influences than people in Tbilisi.

In December 2018, the Prosecutor’s Office was separated from the Ministry of Justice and became a fully independent agency. The study checked whether people knew where the Prosecutor’s Office was institutionally located and asked respondents which of the following statements was true: 

The Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia is currently subordinated to the Ministry of Justice; 

The Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia is currently subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 

The Prosecutor's Office of Georgia is currently an independent structure.

The data shows that approximately a third of people (34%) did not know, and a third of people believe that the Prosecutor’s office was subordinated to the Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Internal Affairs.  People were also largely unaware of who the Prosecutor General is. 

The majority (64%) in Georgia did not know who the Prosecutor General is, and 2% reported someone aside from who the actual Prosecutor General is. 

A regression shows that people who do not know which of the above statements about the Prosecutor's Office was true were more likely to report that it was free from political influences. They were also more likely to report that they didn’t know the answer to the question. 

The public’s opinion is a mixed bag about the Prosecutor’s Office. The majority have no idea who the Prosecutor General is or whether the Prosecutor's Office is independent or a subordinated structure. 

Most people believe that the Prosecutor's Office is subject to political influence, though there is some variation between social and demographic groups.

Lockdown vs re-opening the economy in Georgia

[Note: This blog was originally published in partnership with OC Media on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media.]

As the number of new daily confirmed cases is again on the rise, we look at how people felt about the anti-coronavirus restrictions in May.

Aside from the public health situation, COVID-19 has led to rising unemployment, reduced incomes, and food insecurity in Georgia. As the number of new daily confirmed cases is again on the rise, the Caucasus Datablog takes a look at how people felt about the anti-coronavirus restrictions when they were at their height.

Despite polling from CRRC Georgia’s COVID-19 Monitor surveys showing that the public supported the vast majority of the government’s anti-coronavirus policies, the data also suggests people were eager for the economy to reopen. In fact, a majority said they favoured opening up over a more cautious approach.

CRRC asked the public about the relative importance of caution versus opening up the economy on two surveys conducted between 7–10 May and 14–17 May. Most people agreed with the idea that the economic impacts of COVID-19 were worse than the virus itself and disagreed that it was more important to wait for the virus to be under control than to open the economy.  

In addition, the share of Georgians thinking that economic consequences of the virus could be as severe as virus itself also rose from 51% during the 7–10 May period to 64% during the 14–17 May.

The data from the 14–17 May survey was further analysed to explore differences between socio-demographic groups like age, gender, settlement type, education, employment, ethnicity, and household wealth.

This logistic regression showed that people in Tbilisi were less likely to think it was important to wait for COVID-19 to subside before opening up the economy. Older people were also less likely to support waiting for the epidemiological situation to get under control. 

When it comes to the economic costs of COVID-19, there were no statistical differences between key socio-demographic variables. During the crisis, large shares were uncertain how long the COVID-19 crisis would last (35% in the 7–10 May period and 42% during the 14–17 May period). 

Uncertainty on this question was associated with the idea that the economic costs of the virus could be worse than the virus itself. Controlling for demographic variables from the previous model, those uncertain about the possible period of the crisis were less supportive of the idea that the economic costs of the virus were worse than the virus itself.  

Still, a majority of those who were certain or uncertain about the length of the crisis thought that the economic consequences were worse than COVID-19’s health implications.

Overall, the majority of Georgians were supportive of opening up the economy during the COVID-19 crisis, and this support was increasing during the period when the economy was effectively closed. 

The negative economic impacts of COVID-19 also gained more public attention during this time. 

In general, urban settlements were more supportive of re-starting normal economic activities. Older people were also more prone to agree with opening up. 

Besides socio-demographic variables, uncertainties associated with the COVID-19 timeline also shaped public opinions. Uncertain people generally tended to disagree with the idea that the economic costs were harsher than the virus itself. 

The data presented in this blog post is available here. Replication code for the above analysis is available here.

This article was written by Rati Shubladze. Rati is a policy analyst at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article represent the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia, the Embassy of the Netherlands in Georgia, or any related entity.

The rallying around the flag effect in Georgia

Note: This article was co-published with OC-Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the views of the author alone and do not represent the views of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

In times of crisis, support for governments often rises in what is known as a rallying around the flag effect. The COVID-19 crisis in Georgia has been no exception.

Data from around the world has shown rallying around the flag effects in many countries during the pandemic, with a few exceptions. Georgia has followed this broader pattern, with performance ratings tripling for many actors and institutions between November/December 2019 and May 2020. 

Yet, with parliamentary elections set for 31 October, whether this has translated into changes in party preferences is unclear.

A survey CRRC Georgia fielded between 21–23 May, which the Embassy of the Netherlands in Tbilisi financially supported, asked people to assess the institutional performance of the prime minister, parliament, police, president, and the Georgian Orthodox Church. The question was worded in the same way as the NDI and CRRC 2019 November/December survey. 

When comparing the results, approval ratings roughly tripled for parliament from 9% positive to 30%, for the president from 9% positive to 25%, and for the prime minister from 21% positive to 66%. 

Institutional performance assessments of the Church improved from 50% positive to 66%, despite the significant controversy around their policies during the crisis. The across the board increases in approval ratings suggest a clear rallying around the flag effect. 

While there has been a large rally around Georgia’s government, the data is ambivalent when it comes to whether this has resulted in increased party support for the ruling Georgian Dream Party. 

In May, 25% of the public reported that Georgian Dream was the party closest to them, roughly comparable to the 21% that reported the same in November/December 2019. The share reporting that the UNM was closest to them also declined from 14% to 4%. 

This appears to be a large shift. Yet, the share of people refusing to answer what party they supported increased from 3% to 12%. Further, the share reporting they don’t know which party is closest to them rose from 5% to 12%. The share reporting that there is no party closest to them did not shift significantly with 37% in November/December and 38% of the public reporting the same in May.

Given this data, at least two explanations are plausible. While the NDI survey was done face to face, the COVID-19 Monitor survey was done over the phone. It is possible that UNM supporters were over-represented in the ‘don’t know’ and ‘refuse to answer’ categories in May, because of discomfort in sharing political views over the phone. Alternatively, the increase in ‘don’t know’ responses could stem from genuine increases in uncertainty. Reasonably a bit of both as well as other factors may be at play.

Despite this increased level of uncertainty, Georgian Dream appears to have gained ground, at least in terms of the share of the public willing to say they support them. How this translates into electoral success remains to be seen. But, what is clear is that Georgians have rallied around their institutions during the COVID-19 crisis.