Expectations and the EU Association Agreement

Today's blog post is published in collaboration with civil.ge.  One may also read the post on civil.ge here.

On June 27, 2014 Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine signed EU Association Agreements. In Georgia, the signing has been celebrated as a step towards Euro-Atlantic integration, and a number of events were held in Tbilisi to celebrate the signing. The Association Agreement (AA) itself is wide ranging with some portions pertaining to human rights and the main focus on economic cooperation between the EU and Georgia. While the agreement has been highly anticipated by certain groups within Georgian society, there has been controversy, particularly as the association agreement relates to the protection of minority rights. A recent article on Foreign Policy Magazine’s website, and an accompanying case study by the Legatum Institute, argue that skepticism towards the EU may pop up in Georgia, in part, due to the EU’s seeming lack of engagement with the country over time. However, this trend is not new as Adrian Brisku notes in his 2013 comparative history of Georgia and Albania, Bittersweet Europe. With this background in mind, this post looks at how Georgians perceived both the EU and the Association Agreement approximately one year before the signing of the agreement. The post will review knowledge of the Association Agreement in Georgia in 2013 by settlement type and ethnic composition, expectations for the agreement by age group, and trust in the EU over time.

According to the 2013 survey,  Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia which was a part of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation European Integration program, 20% of Georgian citizens reported that they had heard of the EU Association Agreement. Awareness of the association agreement was highest in the capital with 30% of Georgians reporting they had heard about the association agreement. In urban and rural settlements 17% and 16% of Georgians respectively reported that they had heard about the Association Agreement.

As the graph below demonstrates, Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Kakheti were much less likely to be aware of the Association Agreement compared to their fellow ethnic Georgian citizens. Low levels of awareness of the Association Agreement among ethnic minorities are likely due to low levels of knowledge of Georgian language in ethnic enclaves. These groups also have less access to media which is in the Georgian language. In addition, there is a lower level of internet usage reported by minorities in the aforementioned settlements (12% daily usage, 62% never using the internet), especially compared to ethnic Georgians in the capital (51% daily usage, 29% never using the internet). This is a likely barrier to access to information.

People who said they had heard about the Association Agreement were asked what they thought the agreement could bring to Georgia. Survey respondents were asked to select one answer from a list provided on a show card. Looking at the results of this question by age group shows an interesting trend. Half of young people (18 to 35) stated that the agreement would result in political closeness and tight economic integration with the EU - the stated purpose of the agreement. In contrast, those aged 35 to 55 were more likely to report EU membership for Georgia as a result of the agreement. This outcome is not ruled out by the agreement, and in some instances, the agreement has served as a stepping stone on the path to EU membership. However, it is not an explicit or likely near-term result of the signing. Notably, a number of countries which are highly unlikely to want or be considered for EU membership have signed Association Agreements, including Algeria and Chile among other countries.

The graph below shows trust in the EU over time in Georgia. In 2008 trust in the EU was at 64%, followed by a slight decrease in trust which remained stable from 2009 to 2012. Interestingly, in 2013, a decrease in the level of trust occurred with trust responses dropping 16 percentage points, distrust increasing by seven, and neither trust nor distrust increasing by eight percentage points. Thus, a more ambivalent attitude towards the EU appears to have emerged in 2012 and 2013.

Note: Respondents were asked “Please tell me how much do you trust or distrust the European Union?” In the graph above, ‘fully trust’ and ‘somewhat trust’ are combined to form “Trust” and ‘somewhat distrust’ and ‘fully distrust’ are combined into “Distrust”.

This post has shown that awareness of the Association Agreement in Georgia is lower among ethnic minorities than ethnic Georgians in Georgia, likely due to lack of access to Georgian-language media and knowledge of Georgian. It has further discussed expectations among different age groups for the agreement, showing that young adults in Georgia expect closer ties from the agreement, while 36-55 year olds are more likely to believe that the agreement will lead to EU membership. Finally, the post looked at trust in the European Union over time. While distrust has not increased, ambivalence does seem to be spreading among Georgians, particularly in 2013. To further explore issues related to international organizations and the EU in Georgia, and the South Caucasus more generally, we recommend exploring our datasets here or using our Online Data Analysis Tool here. Readers may also be interested in the blog, Can’t get no satisfaction. Who doesn’t want to join the EU? published in March 2014 on the CRRC blog.

When is a war not a war?

When is a war not a war? While it may seem commonsensical that a country cannot simultaneously be at war and at peace, the prevalence of several ‘frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space defies simple categorization. If we take the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia or South Ossetia as an example, a quick internet search shows that there was a five-day war in 2008 that ended on the 12th of August with a preliminary ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, according to CRRC’s most recent Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey in 2013, almost no Georgians think that the conflict in Abkhazia had been resolved. Alternatively, Armenians and Azerbaijanis tend to support the idea that resolution has been achieved in Abkhazia (with 27% and 13%, respectively selecting this option), while differing significantly on their opinions about the status of their own territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh (with 38% of the Azerbaijani population placing this as their highest national concern, compared to only 3% of Armenians). This raises the possibility that conflict is as much about perceptions as it is about actual military confrontation, and that national, regional and international conflict narratives can diverge significantly.

This disparity in narratives underlines a definitional problem in the political sciences when it comes to conflict resolution, war and peace. The Correlates of War project uses the annual number of casualties to track the duration of wars and conflicts on both an inter- and intrastate level. According to this project, a war is deemed over once the annual death toll drops below 1,000. The problem is that while open armed conflict might cease, a conflict can be far from resolved.

Thus, the conclusion that Georgia’s own territorial disputes can be condensed into five days underestimates the enduring negative impact of the status quo on all sides. Trade and travel are prohibited for inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. De-isolation tops Abkhaz policy priorities, while the government in Tbilisi faces the ongoing challenge of settling and providing for internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In addition to the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia conflicts, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is also called ‘frozen’, although experts like Thomas de Waal have suggested that the term ‘simmering’ might be a more appropriate designation. CRRC data is also instructive in this regard. When asked about the top two issues facing their respective countries, 38% of Azerbaijanis named unresolved territorial disputes as the number one problem in Azerbaijan, while 3% of Armenians and 10% of Georgians said the same. The figures in Azerbaijan and Georgia strongly suggest that these issues are not ‘frozen’ (or resolved) in the minds of the local population, although economic concerns also dominate throughout the region.

This blog has shown that national perceptions of conflict can contradict both regional and international narratives. This suggests that our current measures of war and peace are missing an important dimension. The CB provides a starting point for exploring the subject of war narratives. You can find comments about past perceptions of conflict resolution for the Azerbaijani-Armenian case here and for the Georgian case here. You can also access a report on Russian public opinion towards the future of these disputes here. Annual survey data for the South Caucasus region is also available for analysis on the online CB platform.

Facebook usage in Azerbaijan

On February 3rd, 2014, Facebook celebrated its 10th anniversary. According to the World Map of Social Networks December, 2013 statistics, Facebook is the world’s most popular social network with more than one billion users. It is followed by QZone with 552 million users, Vkontakte (190 million users), Odnoklassniki (45 million users), and Cloob (1 million users). However, it is important to note that social network usage is not distributed evenly geographically. In some countries different social networks have more usage than Facebook: for example, QZone in China, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki in Russia, and Cloob in Iran. This blog post examines the usage of Facebook and its popularity among different age and gender groups in Azerbaijan.

In Azerbaijan, according to the annual Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey, 57% of the respondents reported using the Internet in 2013. Use of social networking sites was reported as the most popular activity on the Internet. Other activities, such as searching for information (49%), downloading/listening/watching music/videos (36%), and using Skype (33%) were also mentioned.

Facebook is the most popular social network in Azerbaijan, and it is used quite frequently.According to the CB, 16% of all respondents in Azerbaijan actively use Facebook. Moreover, 49% of Internet using respondents in Azerbaijan use Facebook at least once a week. Most Facebook users are males (65% according to Socialbakers statistics from 2014, 68% according to the CB), and the majority are young people aged 18-35 years old (72.8% according to the Socialbakers from 2014, and 85% according to the CB).

Among the respondents of the CB, almost 1/3rd of active Facebook users are posting news, personal observations or photos (30%). Other frequent Facebook activities mentioned by CB respondents in Azerbaijan included: commenting on other people’s posts and photos (26%), chatting (20%), and reading or viewing news-feeds (18%).

Besides connecting people as a tool for communicating with friends and family, Facebook has also made it easier to share opinions about information. Most CB respondents in Azerbaijan (88%) did not find it hard to express their opinion on Facebook. However, 5% of respondents expressed difficulty. Notably, posting opinions on FB is harder for women than men (10% of female respondents consider it hard to express their opinions on Facebook, while only 3% of male respondents express similar difficulty).

According to Statistics Brain Facebook data from 2014, the average number of friends per person on Facebook is 130. In Azerbaijan, 39% of CB respondents said they had 51-100 friends, whereas 37% of respondents had less than 50 friends on Facebook. Only 18% of respondents had more than 100 friends. The evidence suggests that for most Facebook users in Azerbaijan, the social network is a platform for connecting with their relatives and close friends; preferring a more selective form of communication, rather than communicating their thoughts, ideas and personal information to a larger audience.

To get more information about the Caucasus Barometer data and others activities by CRRC, we recommend following us on our Facebook page here. To learn more about Facebook usage in Azerbaijan and other South Caucasus republics, we recommend accessing Caucasus Barometer data here with our Online Data Analysis (ODA) tool.

By Aynur Ramazanova

CRRC Methodological Conference on Measuring Social Inequality in the South Caucasus and its Neighborhood

The second annual CRRC methodological conference took place on the 25th of June at Tbilisi State University. With over fifty attendees and a packed program of presentations, the conference drew together policy practitioners and researchers from the South Caucasus and beyond.

This year, for the first time, there was also a number of pre-conference workshops on the 24th of June at the CRRC-Georgia offices. Michael Robbins of the Arab Barometer presented on the matching techniques he has used to examine the Arab Spring, and Mihail Peleah from UNDP Europe and CIS presented an introduction to the methodology behind the UNDP’s Social Exclusion Index.

These provided an excellent introduction to the themes of social inequality in the South Caucasus and its wider neighborhood, also giving participants an opportunity to reflect on the implications of the methodological choices that we make on the results that we generate. There was a lively discussion about how to define and work with broad topics like social exclusion and inequality, and participants showed a keen interest in how these concepts had been applied in the Arab world, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

During the main conference, the geographic scope was expanded further to include in-depth studies on access to higher education, water subsidies and migration push factors in Armenia, inequality in educational achievement, local government performance, and domestic violence in Georgia, access to the benefits of a more technologically connected world in Azerbaijan, visual sociology in the post-soviet space, and data collection and visualization across the South Caucasus.

The broad geographic and methodological scope of the studies, as well as the high standard of papers received made this an excellent second edition to the CRRC series of methodological conferences in the South Caucasus. For more information, the full program and papers presented at the conference can be accessed here.

Trust in local government in Georgia

On June 15th Georgian voters headed to the polls in local elections. There were problems leading up to the elections as detailed in last week's electoral notes. At present, results show a significant portion of positions in local government going to Georgian Dream Coalition (GD) candidates, though a number of races will go into second rounds. With the recent elections, one may be interested to know how Georgian citizens view their local government. This blog looks at levels of trust in local government from 2009-2013 and by settlement type (Rural, Urban, and Capital) in 2013.

In Georgia, the trend towards trust in local government over the last two years seems to be an increase in ambivalence from previous years. Between 2009 and 2013, distrust in local government has been relatively consistent, fluctuating between 16-21%, within the 5% margin of error of the Caucasus Barometer survey (CB), thus reflecting a relative stability in levels of distrust. In contrast, responses of neither trust nor distrust have increased and responses expressing trust have decreased compared with 2011. This could reflect the GD-UNM “cohabitation” in which many local government positions were still held by members of the UNM which is the current opposition while the GD holds the majority in national government institutions.

Note: In this graph and the graph below, a five-point scale has been recoded to a three-point scale with responses ‘1’ and ‘2’ coded as distrust, responses ‘3’ being coded as neither trust nor distrust, and responses ‘4’ and ‘5’ coded as trust. During the CB, respondents were read out a list of institutions and asked to “assess [their] level of trust toward each [institution] on a 5-point scale, where ‘1’ means ‘Fully distrust’, and ‘5’ means ‘Fully trust.”

Interestingly, trust in local government is much lower in Tbilisi and urban areas compared to rural areas. In rural areas, Georgians trust their local government (40%) more than twice as much as in Tbilisi (17%). Residents of the capital are more than twice as likely to express distrust in the local government with 28% reporting distrust in Tbilisi versus 12% in rural areas. Urban areas, not including Tbilisi, are more likely to express trust than Tbilisians, but interestingly express a similar level of distrust in local government as capital residents.

This blog post has reviewed levels of trust in local government over time. It shows that Georgians seem to have become ambivalent with regard to their view of local government. The blog further demonstrates that levels of trust in local government are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. If you would like to further explore issues of trust in Georgia and the South Caucasus more generally, view the blog post here, or explore the data further using our Online Data Analysis tool.

Electoral Notes- Municipal Elections, 2014

Dustin Gilbreath, a Research Consultant at CRRC-Georgia, has written electoral notes on yesterday's municipal elections which were published on the web-magazine Liberali.The notes discuss the results of the elections, background and significance, changes to electoral legislation, the pre-electoral environment, capital candidates and campaigns, and outlook for the Georgian Dream Coalition and United National Movement. To read the electoral notes, please click here.

Divorce rates in Azerbaijan

In the Principles and Recommendations for a Vital Statistics System, Revision 2 (by the United Nations), divorce is defined as “a final legal dissolution of a marriage, that is, that separation of husband and wife which confers on the parties the right to remarriage under civil, religious and/or other provisions, according to the laws of each country.” This blog post examines divorce in Azerbaijan over the years, by age group, gender and by duration of marriage. The post also explores perceptions of happiness among divorced Azerbaijanis and those who are not divorced.

Attitudes towards divorce in Azerbaijan are predominantly negative. According to the Caucasus Barometer 2013 (CB), almost half of Azerbaijanis feel that divorce can never be justified (48%).

When compared to many other countries in the world, the divorce rate in Azerbaijan is relatively low. According to the United Nations' Demographic Yearbook, the highest number of divorces in the world can be observed in Russia (4.7 per 1,000 people in 2011), Belarus (4.1 in 2012), Latvia (3.6 in 2012), Lithuania (3.3 in 2012), Moldova (3.0 in 2012), Denmark (2.8 in 2012), and the United States (2.8 in 2011). In comparison, that rate in Azerbiajan is 1.2 per 1,000 people (in 2012).

Data provided by the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (AzStat) shows that the number of divorces has decreased in Azerbaijan overall from 1990 to 2008, followed by a gradual increase from 2008.

Statistics provided by AzStat show that the first five years are the most difficult period for a marriage. This is the time during which the highest number of divorces occur in Azerbaijan. The longer the marriage, the lower the chance of divorce. Moreover, according to AzStat, the peak age for divorce among females is 25-29 years old, whereas it is 30-34 years old among men.

The 2013 Caucasus Barometer (CB) shows that women who are divorced or widowed tend to say they are less happy than men who are divorced or widowed. In Azerbaijani society, divorced females and widows suffer from a great deal of insecurity and instability, especially since the stigma about divorce is large.

If you are interested in further exploring these issues or would like more information, see the Caucasus Barometer website here.

By Aynur Ramazanova

Finding a good job in Georgia

Data on employment and perceptions about work present an interesting lens on Georgia. This is especially true since the official unemployment rate is 15% according to Geostat in 2012, and 31% of the population is unemployed and seeking work in Georgia as of September 2013, according to the National Democratic Institute. Connections, education, and professional abilities/work experience are the most common reasons cited for being able to get a good job in Georgia. However, are Georgians more likely to think that having connections is important for getting a good job if they don’t actually have many connections? What does the data tell us about perceptions of important factors for finding a good job?

One indicator of the strength of an individual’s social network is whether they feel they have people close to them who would help them in certain situations. In the 2013 Caucasus Barometer survey, participants were asked, “How likely or how unlikely is it for you to receive some help from your close relatives, friends, and neighbors” to “repair your house/apartment” or to “lend money for a month to cover your usual expenses?” The following graph shows a notable difference between those who think that it is not at all likely (10% more) that someone would help them with living expenses for a month, compared to those who think it very likely.

Note: Each column on the 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (very likely) scale originally summed to 100%. Additional factors, such as professional abilities/work experience, luck, hard work, talent, age, appearance, doing favors for the ‘right’ people, and other were also included as potential answer options. Together, these composed over a third of responses and have thus not been included in this chart for simplicity. Respondents were shown a card with possible answer options to choose from (including a don’t know, other and refuse to answer option). See this blog post for further information on other factors related to finding a good job in the South Caucasus.

Furthermore, those who felt they could not depend on someone close to them to help repair their living accommodations were more likely to report connections as the most important factor in getting a job-9% more often than those who said that it was very likely that they could expect someone to help them.

Note: Factors other than education and connections were not included in this chart.

Trust in institutions is another interesting factor related to perceptions of the most important factor for getting a job. The following graph shows that of those who fully distrust the police, 50% perceive connections to be the most important factor for finding a good job. This compares to 23% of those who fully trust the police and think having connections is the most important factor for finding a good job. This trend is most pronounced when looking at trust towards the police. Yet, a similar pattern is found when looking at trust in the health care system, education system, court system, NGOs, parliament, executive government, political parties, media, local government, the religious institution one belongs to, the ombudsman, the EU, and UN.

Note: Factors other than education and connections were not included in the chart.

Another notable, but slightly weaker trend in the graph is that education is the most important factor for those who fully trust the institution of the police. This trend is also present when one looks at the cross-tabs between most important factor for getting a job and trust in the following institutions: healthcare system, education system, court system, NGOs, parliament, political parties, media, local government, the EU, and the UN. Interestingly, trust in banks does not show the same kind of relationship.

Is it possible that Georgians without connections are more likely to emphasize and perceive that connections are the most important factor in getting a job? What role does trust in institutions play when it comes to how one perceives finding work? How do the trends presented in this blog relate to social capital? The data-set used for this post is available online here, and you too can explore it to further understand what Georgians consider important for finding a good job. Also, take a look at our previous post on the CRRC blog.

Smoking in the South Caucasus and tobacco policy in Azerbaijan

May 31st is World No Tobacco Day as declared by the United Nations. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), tobacco usage is the primary reason for chronic diseases including “cancer, lung diseases, cardiovascular diseases” among other diseases. According to WHO, as of July 2013, “nearly 80% of the more than one billion smokers worldwide live in low- and middle-income countries, where the burden of tobacco-related illness and death is heaviest.” Moreover, the general consumption of tobacco products has increased, although a tendency towards decreased consumption is observed in high-income and upper middle-income countries. In Azerbaijan, along with economic development, there is a tendency of declining consumption of tobacco products. This fact might also be associated with rising social awareness about the harm that tobacco causes to overall health.

The 2001 law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on tobacco and tobacco products covers several issues such as the prohibition of sales of tobacco products to individuals younger than 18 years old, restrictions on promoting the sale of tobacco products, and prohibition of smoking in health-care facilities, workplaces in public buildings, in all types of public transport, and in educational facilities except universities. Yet, the issue of banning smoking in public places in Azerbaijan has been consistently raised during sessions of the government’s legislative body (the Milli Majlis). However, the adoption of the law has been consistently postponed. Azerbaijan joined the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) in 2005 which implies that the signatories should apply six main tobacco control measures to reduce the demand for tobacco and its use.

These measures are known as “MPOWER” - “Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies, Protect people from tobacco smoke, Offer help to quit tobacco use, Warn people about the dangers of tobacco, Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and Raise taxes on tobacco.” Unfortunately, the legal basis for enforcing these measures in Azerbaijan remains unsettled and unimplemented even though a national strategy on tobacco control was developed in 2010.

In Azerbaijan, according to Caucasus Barometer data, the number of smokers has decreased from 31% of the population in 2008 to 25% in 2013. 75% of Azerbaijanis say they don’t smoke which is similar to results in Armenia (70%) and Georgia (73%). Notably, Azerbaijan and Georgia have a lower number of hard smokers (those who smoke more than 251 cigarettes per week) which is 3% and 2%, respectively, compared to Armenia where 8% say the same.

In general, smoking is not popular among women in the South Caucasus; 98% of women in Armenia, 99% in Azerbaijan, and 95% in Georgia say they do not smoke at all. There are negative perceptions associated with women who smoke in the South Caucasus, and this attitude might affect the number of women who claim to smoke in the countries of the region. The situation among males is different; 48% of men in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and 37% of men in Armenia say they do not smoke. Additionally, the number of hard smokers in Armenia is several times larger than in the other two countries.

Smoking is most popular among middle-aged men (36-55 years old), and they also report smoking more cigarettes than younger (18-35 years old) and older (56+ years old) men.

Overall, there is a positive trend in the decreasing number of Azerbaijanis who say they smoke. This is particularly notable among young males. According to the CB, the number of non-smokers among men aged 18-35 has increased from 46% in 2008 to 54% in 2013. The situation with other age groups has not changed significantly. One reason for this may be that young people are usually more socially active, and the media and other pro-health organizations can easily communicate anti-tobacco messages to them. If you are interested in more data on smoking in the South Caucasus, please visit the Caucasus Barometer data here as well as the WHO website’s page devoted to tobacco issues here.

 By Aynur Ramazanova

Paternalism in Georgia

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, paternalism is “the interference of a state or an individual with another person against their will motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm” (from the Latin pater for father). Simply put, paternalism refers to treating people as if they were children. The Caucasus Barometer (CB) assesses attitudes toward governance among Georgians. Who thinks citizens should be treated like children by the government (i.e. the paternalistic view) rather than as employers? Using data from the CB 2013, this blog post focuses on the following qualities of citizens: education level, economic condition and source of household income in order to better understand this paternalistic view in Georgia.

According to the data, from 2009 to 2012 a plurality of Georgian citizens reported that people are like children and the government should take care of them like a parent. This trend changed in 2013 when slightly more Georgians felt that the government should behave like an employee (53%) rather than a parent (47%) – although this difference is just outside of the margin of error.

What role does education play in these attitudes? In Georgia, the negative connection between education and the paternalistic view is well evidenced; 58% of people with a secondary education or below say that the government should be like a parent, whereas 37% of Georgians with more than a secondary education share the same view.

The economic conditions of Georgians also plays a role. 53% of Georgians who say they do “not [have] enough money for food” think the government should be like a parent. A much smaller fraction (23%) of Georgians who say they have “enough money for everything needed” share the same belief. 

Additionally, there is an interesting link between a paternalistic attitude toward the role of government and the source of household monetary income in the last 12 months. A paternalistic attitude is less common (41%) when a salary is mentioned as a source of income for a household. The distribution of paternalistic and non-paternalistic attitudes splits into two equal parts if the household had monetary income from pensions and government benefits in the last 12 months.

This blog examines qualities related to support for the Georgian government behaving as a parent or as an employee. According to data from the CB 2013, education level, economic condition and sources of monetary income for a household are related to approval for a paternalistic view of government in Georgia.

More information about Georgian citizens’ paternalistic attitudes toward government can be found by reading this blog post or by exploring our data here.  

By Tamuna Chkhaidze

Common Challenges Facing the Elderly in Georgia

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “Multiple social, psychological, and biological factors determine the level of mental health of a person at any point in time. In addition to the typical life stressors common to all people, older people are more likely to experience events such as bereavement, a drop in socioeconomic status with retirement, or a disability.” According to the WHO, these factors, among others, can result in isolation, loss of independence, loneliness and psychological distress in older people. D. Srinivasan, psychiatrist, at Kovai Medical Center and Hospital in Tamil Nadu, India has highlighted some common social and psychological problems faced by the elderly including, loss of confidence and sensitivity to minor symptoms of illness, a chronic state of depression when losing financial independence or mobility, emptiness syndrome when children no longer live with parents, and a sense of worthlessness and hopelessness. This blog looks at whether these factors affect the elderly population’s health in Georgia. For this reason, the blog examines the extent to which elderly (56+) people in Georgia are influenced by a sense of emptiness and loneliness, as well as the types of economic conditions in which they live.

According to survey results from the Caucasus Barometer (CB) 2011, 20% of Georgians 56 and older experienced a general sense of emptiness. By comparison, the proportion of younger age groups (18-35 and 36-55) who reported experiencing emptiness was half of that (9% and 11%, respectively).

The following chart shows that 40% of Georgians, 56 and older felt that there were enough people to whom they felt close, and 49% who more or less thought that there were enough people close to them. Only 12% rejected the idea of having a sufficient amount of close people around. However, it is also worth mentioning that exactly the same percentage (12% for each) of individuals was present in the other two younger age groups (18-35 and 36-55) who also turned down the idea (‘there are enough people to whom I feel close’).

According to survey results, a sense of emptiness (20%) and loneliness (12%) among Georgia’s elderly population is not high. One of the explanations of this tendency could be that in Georgia it is common for elderly people to continue living with their children and grandchildren. This likely gives them the opportunity to stay actively engaged in family life through taking care of grandchildren, helping other family members with running the household, as well as being taken care of whenever necessary.

This way of living gives a smaller place to thoughts of being unwanted or useless, lonely or depressed and can be considered as an alternative to some common recommendations doctors give in scope of organizing manner of living for aged people according to Amutha Kannan.

If problems are not very visible for the aged population in Georgia (from a social perspective), their economic state gives a significantly different picture. According to the CB 2011 survey results, 40% of elderly people (56+) in Georgia reported living in poor economic conditions not having enough money for food in the household. Younger Georgians, by comparison, attested to living in similar poor economic conditions and not having enough money for food in the household (24% of the 36- 55 age group and 15% of the 18 – 35 age group).

This blog post reviewed factors that negatively affect the elderly’s mental health in Georgia. Hence, in comparison to social settings for older people in Georgia, their economic conditions can be considered a serious challenge to remain physically and mentally healthy. To further explore this subject and other issues influencing aging people’s health in Georgia, we recommend exploring our data using the ODA tool here.

Abortion Rates in Azerbaijan

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines abortion as a “termination of a pregnancy after, accompanied by, resulting in, or closely followed by the death of the embryo or fetus.” According to the United Nations' publication, World Abortion Policies, 2011, by 2009 roughly 97% of countries in the world had made abortion legal to save a woman’s life. The legal grounds and regulations on the issue of abortion vary from country to country. World Abortion Policies data from 2011 distinguishes seven main grounds for the permission of abortion: (1) to save a woman’s life, (2) to preserve a woman’s physical health, (3) to preserve a woman’s mental health, (4) in case of rape or incest, (5) because of fetal impairment, (6) for economic or social reasons, and (7) upon request.

The issue of abortion is complicated in Azerbaijan. Results from the Caucasus Barometer 2013 (CB) show that 36% of Azerbaijanis think that having an abortion can never be justified. This is lower than 62% of Georgians and 46% of Armenians who say the same. Notably, 20% of the population of Azerbaijan in 2013 did not know whether having an abortion should be justified or not, and 10% refused to answer – much higher number than in the other two countries.

According to the UN World Abortion Policies data from 2013, Azerbaijan has the lowest rate of abortion among the three South Caucasus Republics. The rate is 11.4 per thousand women aged 15-44, whereas it is 16.9 per thousand in Armenia and 26.5 per thousand in Georgia. The State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan's (AzStat) data shows similar results – 11.5 per thousand women aged 15-49 (in 2012). However, according to AzStat the abortion rate in Azerbaijan has been steadily rising from 7.8 per thousand in 2000 to 11.5 per thousand in 2012 (this increase can be partially attributed to better reporting procedures introduced in the 2000s, however, the anecdotal evidence still suggests that not all cases are registered and reported). Moreover, the highest percentage of women having an abortion is among those who are 25-29 years old and 30-34 years old (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Percentage of abortions among different age groups in Azerbaijan (2012).

Source: http://www.stat.gov.az/source/healthcare/indexen.php

Azerbaijan has the lowest abortion rate among the three South Caucasus Republics and it has the highest fertility rate. According to the World Abortion Policies 2013, Azerbaijan has 2.1 births per woman, followed by 1.7 births per woman in Armenia and 1.5 births per woman in Georgia.

When asked about the ideal number of children per family, about 22% of Azerbaijanis said “whatever number God will give us”, whereas in Armenia and Georgia 1% and 9%, respectively, said the same. Moreover, Azerbaijanis are more likely to desire more children than in Armenia and Georgia. In Azerbaijan, fewer people say they want one or two children, and 36% consider four or more children to be ideal.

If you are interested in reproductive health and family planning, we encourage you to access more Caucasus Barometer data here. You might also find statistics from the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan and the United Nations World Abortion Policies data useful.

By Aynur Ramazanova

Trust in Institutions in the South Caucasus

Trust in institutions has often been thought of as negatively related to perceptions of corruption in political institutions. Every year, Transparency International publishes a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which ranks countries from highly corrupt to very clean. Perceptions of corruption in the three South Caucasus countries have shifted over the years. The level of corruption in Georgia has been perceived as lower than the level of corruption in Armenia since 2007. Trust in institutions is lower in Armenia than in Azerbaijan which has the lowest ranking out of the three countries on the CPI. Azerbaijan shares similar levels of trust in institutions as Georgia which is the highest ranked South Caucasus country on the CPI. This blog post examines trust in institutions across the South Caucasus, as well as trust in international institutions.

According to the Caucasus Barometer (CB), in general, Azerbaijanis are more trusting of several institutions than Georgians or Armenians. Armenians are most likely to distrust institutions, and Georgians are most likely to respond with neither trust nor distrust. The following graph shows levels of trust in the media, court system, and parliament as three examples of trust in institutions that follow this pattern.

Note: In the graphs used in this blog post, trust is a combination of the responses ‘somewhat trust’ and ‘fully trust‘, and distrust is a combination of responses ‘somewhat distrust’ and ‘fully distrust’.

This pattern holds for nine of seventeen institutions asked about in the 2013 CB. Yet, some notable exceptions exist. Religious institutions garner a higher level of trust in Armenia and Georgia than in Azerbaijan. In contrast, trust in the president is much higher in Azerbaijan than in the other two countries. The following graph shows these trends and it is worth noting that these trends have been relatively stable over time, especially since 2009.

A third interesting trend related to trust in institutions in the South Caucasus is that Georgia shows the highest level of trust towards international institutions, such as the UN and EU. This may be due to the consistent discourse from Georgian politicians about Georgia being a part of Europe, as well as attempts by the government to further Euro-Atlantic integration.

This blog post has looked at levels of trust in institutions in the three countries of the South Caucasus. It has examined general patterns in trust, as well as exceptions to the standard pattern observed for most institutions. Finally, the blog shows that Georgians are more likely to trust international institutions.

For more information on trust in the South Caucasus, you can explore the data using our ODA tool. To gain a better understanding of why Azerbaijanis might show higher levels of trust, and why this does not present a contradiction with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, take a look at this blog post.

Knowledge of Russian in Azerbaijan

Although over 20 years have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian remains the most commonly spoken language in Azerbaijan after the official language (Azerbaijani). In addition to being considered by many as a native language and used in daily life in Azerbaijan, Russian appears to be a lingua franca for communication between different ethnic groups and with other post-Soviet countries. 

According to research conducted under the supervision and request of the International Department of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation in 2012, the number of people who speak Russian in the post-Soviet space has significantly decreased since 1991 (from 119.5 million people in 1990 to 93.7 million in 2010). There are 330 schools and more than 20 higher education institutions with Russian as a language of instruction in Azerbaijan. The number of schoolchildren studying in Russian has more than halved in Azerbaijan since 1990 (from 250 thousand students to 94.7 thousand). However, this decrease was moderate in the second decade of Azerbaijan’s independence (from 107.5 thousand to 94.7 thousand). Another interesting fact is that in Azerbaijan, the decrease in the number of schoolchildren studying in Russian was slight compared to other South Caucasus Republics (Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Number of schoolchildren studying in Russian in South Caucasus Republics in 1990/1991, 2000/2001, and 2010/2011; thousand persons. 

Source: http://voprosik.net/pozicii-russkogo-yazyka-v-mire/

According to the Caucasus Barometer 2013 (CB), today 72% of people in Azerbaijan say they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of Russian. Results from the CB also show that approximately a fourth of the population has at least a beginner’s level in English, and about a tenth claims to speak another language besides Azerbaijani, Russian or English. These results corroborate with the 2009 census, where people had to indicate their native and spoken language, and assess their language skills. The CB shows that 7% of the population say they are advanced Russian speakers, and AzStat indicates that this percentage is 7.6%. In addition, according to AzStat, English is fluently spoken by 0.8% of people in Azerbaijan. 

According to self-assessments in the CB, Russian is mostly spoken in the capital and in urban areas (81% and 75%, respectively); 11% of people in Baku say they have an advanced level of Russian, whereas only 3% of those living in rural areas say they fluently speak Russian.

In addition, Azerbaijanis older than 56 years old are more likely to say they have a more advanced level of Russian (11%) than those who are younger. Better Russian skills among those older than 35 can be explained due to the Soviet heritage and need for a good knowledge of Russian to get a good job. 

Although predictably, but still notably, people who perceive their knowledge of Russian as higher also tend to have higher levels of education. Similarly, people with a higher education (even if incomplete) are more likely to say they have advanced English skills (12%). Most of them are students currently pursuing their education and actively learning and practicing English.

Another notable fact about the English language is that over half of people in Azerbaijan (64%) think that English should be mandatory in schools, whereas there are fewer supporters of Russian (16%) in 2013. Moreover, according to the CB, the number of supporters for English has increased (from 55% in 2011 and 2012 to 64% in 2013). The fact that English is preferred over Russian is directly related to the circumstances dictated by international economic society. Azerbaijan’s economic growth attracts more foreign companies and English is a requirement for employment in most of them. In its turn, Russian in Azerbaijan is mostly used on a daily basis.   

Interestingly, for many years Azerbaijan has had the lowest percentage of Russian speakers among the South Caucasus republics, although, in total, the number of people speaking Russian is high and the country has the largest Russian community in the South Caucasus (119.3 thousand Russian people in Azerbaijan, 7.5 thousand in Armenia, and 45 thousand in Georgia). Nevertheless, despite the decreasing number of people who speak Russian, the language remains the major foreign language of communication.

To further explore these issues, we recommend accessing Caucasus Barometer data here. To get more information about the status of the Russian language in the post-Soviet space, see this article with results of the research conducted for the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. 

By Aynur Ramazanova

Second Languages in the South Caucasus and Georgian Education Policy

In his widely read 1983 book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson wrote that English now serves “as a kind of global-hegemonic, post-clerical Latin.” In Georgia, knowledge of the English language is often important for educational opportunities as well as employment. In 2010, the Georgian government began an English teaching program called Teach and Learn with Georgia (TLG) which brought English teachers to Georgia in order to improve the level of English in the country. TLG continued with fewer teachers after the change in government in 2012. Additionally, only native English speaking teachers are now accepted for TLG, whereas non-native speakers of English had previously been accepted as teachers. With this background in mind, this blog examines which languages Georgians think should be mandatory in schools, as well as the perceived level of Russian and English knowledge in the South Caucasus, and how age relates to knowledge of Russian and English.

Survey data from the Caucasus Barometer (CB) shows that when the English language teaching program began in 2010, the majority of Georgians (75%) thought that English should be mandatory in school. The level of support for English and Russian as mandatory languages remained similar until 2011 to 2012 when support for Russian increased and support for English decreased. During this time period, a deal for Russia to join the WTO, which Georgia had been blocking, was worked out. This implied that the Russian embargo that had existed on Georgian products would be lifted in the future, as it slowly has been over the course of the last year. Furthermore, a change in government occurred in 2012, which was perceived by some international observers and Georgians as a vote to ameliorate ties with Russia. Moreover, TLG was in its second year, and though the program had experienced successes, many Georgians criticized the program for not having certified teachers, and the actions of some volunteers proved irksome to many Georgians. Between 2012 and 2013, no dramatic change occurred despite what appears to be a slight uptick in English and down-tick in Russian for 2013.

A common language can facilitate business and relationships between people. It can also facilitate the effective management of relations and communication between neighboring countries. Thus, it is important to look at which languages Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan share. In the CB, respondents were asked to assess whether their level of English and Russian language was no basic knowledge (1), beginner (2), intermediate (3) or advanced (4). Throughout this blog, “knowledge” of Russian and English refers to people who felt they had at least a beginner’s level of knowledge (i.e. beginner, intermediate or advanced) of the language. The survey shows that at least a quarter of people believe they have some knowledge of English in each country, and a majority say they have knowledge of Russian—especially in Armenia and Georgia.

As the graph demonstrates, knowledge of Russian continues to be far more common than English in the South Caucasus, with more than twice as many South Caucasians reporting some knowledge of Russian in all three countries compared to English. Yet, this trend may change as knowledge of English increases, especially among young people. The percentage of 18 to 35 year olds who believe they have at least some knowledge of English is at least twice as high as older age groups in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, knowledge of Russian is lowest in the youngest age group.

What does the language that Georgians want their children to learn say about how Georgia positions itself internationally? Does it tell us anything about whether or not closer ties with its neighbors are desired? For more information, please visit the following blog post about the Georgian education system and Timothy Blauvelt’s 2013 article on language in Georgia.

Happiness in Georgia

Happiness is an issue that has been the subject of philosophical and social science reflection at least since the ancient Greek philosopher Democratis (460 BC -370 BC) said, “Happiness resides not in possessions, and not in gold, happiness dwells in the soul.” This oft cited sentiment frequently comes with the suggestion that home and family are more important than material wealth. This blog post will take a look at these sentiments and examine how happiness relates to personal income, settlement type, and marital status in Georgia.

Economists have been debating whether money can “buy” happiness for decades, if not centuries. Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Ramussen in their 2010 article have argued that Adam Smith, author of the famed book, The Wealth of Nations “was the first ‘happiness’ theorist in economics.”  Interestingly, the 2013 Caucasus Barometer shows that in Georgia, individuals with higher incomes are also more likely to say they are happy.

Note: The question, “Overall, how happy would you say you are,” was asked using a 10-point scale which was recoded to a 3-point scale (Unhappy, Neither Happy nor Unhappy, and Happy).

Although self perceptions of happiness in Georgia appear to increase with personal income, the Easterlin Paradox holds that happiness will increase with income, but only up to the point where needs and wants are met, and where having more money becomes superfluous. Judging whether the Easterlin Paradox applies in Georgia is not possible from an examination of data from the Caucasus Barometer. However, Lia Tsuladze, Marine Chitashvili , Nani Bendeliani , and Luiza Arutinovi write more about  income, economics and happiness in their 2013 article.

Settlement type also seems to be related to how happy Georgians consider themselves to be. Georgians living in urban areas (66%), including Tbilisi (67%), are more likely to consider themselves to be happy than those living in rural areas (56%).

Marital status is a third factor related to happiness in Georgia. Alfred Lord Tennyson's 1850 poem, In Memoriam: 27, states, “Tis better to have loved and lost/ Than never to have loved at all.” Despite these lines’ continued prominence today, at least in Georgia, it appears that it is better to have loved and not lost, or to have never loved at all. Georgian widows, widowers, the separated and divorced report being unhappy more than twice as much as Georgians who are married, cohabiting or who were never married.

Personal income, where one lives, and marital status appear to be related to perceptions of happiness in Georgia.  We encourage you to explore the data further using our ODA tool. We also recommend reading this blog post which examines happiness in Azerbaijan.

Alternating Pasts, Changing Futures

Note: This blog is re-posted from the MYPLACE project's blog. The original MYPLACE blog can be found here.

Claims to 2000 or even 3000 years of nationhood are not difficult to find in Georgia as has been amply documented (see Pelkmans 2006, Suny 1994, Rayfield 2013). The former president Mikheil Saakashvili was even fond of using the earliest human skulls found outside of Africa, in Dmansi in Southern Georgia, as proof that Georgians were “ancient Europeans.” The pride in Georgia over ancient aspects of history is palpable.  Yet, the events of more recent Georgian history often have pain and trauma attached to them.  In this historical context, the CRRC-Georgia conducted focus groups, semi-structured interviews, and observation in Telavi, focusing on YMCA Telavi’s work with IDP youth. Research data was gathered as a part of a European Union funded project, MYPLACE. Fieldwork in Telavi was conducted in order to better understand the role of historical memory in the civic engagement of young people (aged 16 to 25), and the inter-generational transition of memory in both IDP and non-IDP families.

Beginning shortly before and stopping shortly after the end of fieldwork, the historic city center of Telavi was being ‘rehabilitated’ by the government. Discussion of the rehabilitation with respondents proved an interesting lens on how history effects and produces affect in the everyday lives of young people in Telavi. Furthermore, the rehabilitation can be seen as a metonym for the government’s larger efforts at rehabilitating many sites in the country, and more importantly how these ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘development’ projects shaped citizens’ relationships with the state through the use of history and its relation to time.
As mentioned above, Georgia’s ancient history is often glorified in both every day and political discourses.  The palace of King Erekle II, a celebrated 18th century king of Eastern Georgia, is located in Telavi’s historic center. The historic center with King Erekle’s palace had functioned as a site of memory, which elicited memories of the glorious past. The process of rehabilitation, however, began not only to evoke memory of the glorious past, but also to serve as a reminder of the rule of the Mikheil Saakashvili and the United National Movement (UNM), which were responsible for initiating the rehabilitation project in Telavi.    
Participants in the MYPLACE project’s research in Telavi unanimously agreed on three things in regards to the ’rehabilitation’ of the city: the quality of works and materials used in rehabilitation were sub-standard; historical monuments were not well preserved; coordination with the local population was less than adequate. These complaints in many ways illuminate the political situation at the time of fieldwork and do so as if a light containing the political problems of the day were being projected through a prism, with the complaints emitted as rays.

The fact that, in the eyes of informants, the quality of works and materials used in rehabilitation was less than standard and the fact that the historical monuments were not well preserved points to the felt defamation of memories of the glorious past. One should remember that the sites being rehabilitated had previously evoked affects of pride in the celebrated and memorialized glorious past and served as sites of memory for this past. As one respondent stated:

I think that generally what’s happening here is the eradication of the old, and the newly made will no longer be able to preserve the history. After 50 or 100 years they [Telavians] will no longer be able to remember [the past], because it [will] no longer exists, [i.e.] that is the face [of the town] which had been preserving the history until now.

With the perceived (and actual) debasement in quality in rehabilitating the sites, the government had effectively defamed the past which they had previously tried so hard to be symbolically associated with.

This symbolic association took a variety of forms of meddling with the past, but one notable example comes from former-President Mikheil Saakashvili’s first presidential inauguration in 2004. Saakashvili, before his official inauguration came to Gelati Cathedral in the Imereti region in order to take an oath on the grave of 11th-12th century Georgian King, David the Builder. King David is accredited with the inauguration of the Georgian ‘golden age’ of the 11th-13th centuries and is known, as his name implies, for the geographic expansion and architectural development of the country. The intended symbolism that Saakashvili’s action was supposed to project was clear. Despite this symbolic gesture, complaints about construction quality, not only in Telavi but elsewhere in the country, imply that maybe Misha, as he was commonly known, will not be remembered for what he helped to build.

Moreover, the complaints of the population of Telavi regarding rehabilitation works in the town point to another inadequacy in the country at the time – an apparent lack of democracy. After 2007, the government had been sliding towards authoritarian rule (Slade and Tangiashvili 2013). Telavi respondents, in mentioning which events were important in recent history mentioned the “terror tactics” of former President Saakashvili’s party, the United National Movement (UNM), in 2007-2012. In complaining that the government had not adequately consulted with the local population about the rehabilitation works, in microcosm, a country wide issue was on display in fieldwork discussions.

Further enunciating the democratic deficit, consultations with the local population in almost all respects were non-existent.  Adding to the dismay, no contracts were signed with residents whose homes were being ’rehabilitated’ regarding when works would be finished or whether the structural integrity of homes would be taken care of. After the end of ’rehabilitation’ works, families often came home to devastated interiors, destroyed furniture, and structurally questionable domiciles.

Window frame inside of a home in Telavi center after rehabilitation of building façade. Photo by Tinatin Zurabishvili

In looking at these larger issues in microcosm, the past was obviously present in relation to the ‘rehabilitation’ of historic sites, but at the same time, the future was also being meddled in.

Ongoing construction works in and of themselves can inherently be seen as a projection into the future – a building being built today may be in response to the needs of the day but they are also for a projected future use. In looking at construction as a projection into the future, coming along with it comes a projection of what that future will be like. Thomas De Waal, in a pamphlet published by the Carnegie Foundation, characterized the rhetoric of the UNM as speaking in the “future perfect” (De Waal, 2011). Speaking in the future perfect meant that the government made statements about what the country would be and would have. The government not only projected into the future through its rhetoric, but also through construction. Construction was further accompanied by glossy brochures which were widely distributed with computer generated images of what finished buildings would be like. Works in progress were not left to the imagination alone, but an actual image was delivered along with the grounds broken for construction.

Source: Georgia Today

In Telavi, as it was elsewhere in Georgia, the projected future muddied memories of the glorious past. One young woman who was interviewed during MYPLACE fieldwork stated that she tried not to look at what was happening in the historic center and tried not to notice what was new while walking through it.  Her desire not to know is at least twofold in its avoidance. In not looking around it seems reasonable to say this informant was avoiding both the defamation of the old as was shown previously to be felt, but also the creeping reminder of the present ’terror’ and the then present government’s projected vision of the future. Sites of memory had been transformed into sites of reminder.

This future though was not to last. During fieldwork a viable opposition led and financially backed by Georgian billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili emerged.  Its emergence and eventual victory in parliamentary elections ruptured the future that had been projected. With the loss of positions of authority as well as moral authority, the UNM had lost its ability to project the future it saw on Georgia – their future had become part of the past. ’Rehabilitation’ works along with a number of other projects in the country were halted shortly after Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream came to office. The halting of works in some way has preserved the sites of memory in the historic center of Telavi; their preservation though is not the kind which a preservationist would hope for, but rather, the preservation of the alteration of the sites. This preservation has thus, in turn, made sites of memory in Telavi polysemous. In preserving the alteration of the sites, now for those in Telavi, the sites are linked to both the distant past and the less than democratic recent past.

For how long the ‘rehabilitated’ buildings will serve as sites of memory of the recent past is unclear, but what is clear is present and future governments in Georgia will continue to meddle in the past and project their visions into the future thus impacting Georgians, young and old alike.