Freedom of Press in the South Caucasus

Freedom of press is one of the indicators of a free society (e.g., immunity of communications media from censorship or governmental control). Freedom House’s 2012 analysis of Freedom of Press found that only 14.5% of the world’s population live in countries with a free press, while 45% have a partly free press, and 40.5% live in an environment without a free press. As for the South Caucasus region, Georgia was classified as having a partly free press ranking 111 out of 197 countries, similar to Bangladesh, Kenya and Mauritania which were among countries classified as partly free. Both Armenia (rank 149) and Azerbaijan (rank 172) were classified as having a “not free” press. This blog discusses the changing situation with regard to media freedom in the South Caucasus, as well as perceptions of trust in the media. It also highlights a gap between media freedom and trust in media in the region.

The Freedom of Press survey was first conducted in 1980 and has annually assessed the level of media freedom and editorial independence worldwide ever since. Freedom House provides analytical reports for 197 countries and territories and assigns them with a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). The score is composed of 23 methodological questions that are divided into three categories: legal, political and economic environment. Primary attention is given to the political environment for press circulation, referring to the ability to operate freely and without fear of persecution. The degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information determines the classification of its media as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having a “Free” media, while scores of 31 to 60 indicate “Partly Free”, and 61 to 100 represents “Not Free”.

In 2012 Georgia was the only country to make significant improvement in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia – it moved from 55 to 52 points (out of 100). This was primarily due to the establishment of new publications, the issue of a broadcast license to a media group critical to the government (TV9), and enforced provisions for media ownership. However, a few deficiencies have remained. For instance, the Georgian National Communications Commission has been broadly reported to have limitations, delays in the access to information, and a lack of independence from political parties.

The report also identified Azerbaijan, Russia and Kazakhstan as countries of special concern in the region (i.e. not free). Freedom House’s country overview of Azerbaijan explains that journalists continue to be persecuted and imprisoned, authorities use economic and political pressure to maintain control over major media outlets, and the 2000 Law on Mass Media remains inoperative.

In Armenia, press freedom also remains restricted. The media environment remains controlled despite several amendments and legal protections that have been in place since the 2008 presidential election. In addition, close ties between government authorities and media owners encourage journalist self-censorship, particularly in the broadcast sector.

Freedom House data also allows us to follow its Freedom of Press index over time. According to the index, freedom of press has worsened (again, 0=best and 100=worst) in Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994. Furthermore, while press freedom in Armenia has worsened from 1994 to 2009, there was a slight improvement from 2009 to 2012. The freedom of press index has fluctuated more in Azerbaijan, although it steadily deteriorated from 2004 to 2012. Georgia’s index sharply improved from 1994 to 2000, after which it worsened from 2000 to 2009, and began improving again from 2009 to 2012.

It is also difficult to find a direct link between changing freedom of press since 1994 and trust in the media. According to the Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey, the level of trust in the media has also varied in these countries from 2008 to 2012. The overall picture that emerges after combining results from the CB and the freedom of press index is interesting. Although the Freedom of Press index has slightly worsened from 2011 to 2011 in Azerbaijan, trust in the media during that period sharply increased. On the contrary, Georgian trust in the media has decreased since 2009 although the index of freedom of press improved. Thus, the freedom of press index does not directly tell us much about how much societies trust media. 

The South Caucasus has not yet achieved a completely free press. However, according to Freedom House, freedom of the press index is improving in Georgia, whereas the index is stable in Armenia and worsening in Azerbaijan. This blog discussed major criticisms about the press environment by Freedom House, as well as the interchanging level of trust in the media in the South Caucasus.

You are invited to see the full 2012 Freedom House report and to find out more about trust in institutions using the CRRC Caucasus Barometer.

A Contradiction Between Civil Liberties and Democracy in Azerbaijan

Many conversations about civil liberties focus on the freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. According to Freedom House, these civil liberties play an essential role in measuring the robustness of democracies worldwide. CRRC data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) shows a disjoint between perceptions of democracy and civil liberties in Azerbaijan. Specifically, the data suggest that in Azerbaijan, which is categorized as a Not-Free country according to the Freedom House 2012 rankings, people perceive that their country is either a full democracy or one with minor problems more than the other two South Caucasus countries. This blog reveals the ambiguity of the relationship between civil liberties and perceptions of democracy in Azerbaijan and provides comparisons with Georgia and Armenia.

Democracy means something different to different people. The perception of democracy is different in three countries of the South Caucasus. For instance, even though the Economist Intelligence Unit rankings show Azerbaijan as an authoritarian regime, Azerbaijanis themselves perceive their country to be more democratic than citizens in Armenia and Georgia. Despite the fact that Azerbaijanis recognize a number of weaknesses of civil liberties in their country (e.g., an unfair court system and controlled freedom of expression), the 2012 CB shows that about half of the population assess Azerbaijan as a full democracy or democracy with minor problems.

Less than a half of Azerbaijanis identified the most recent national election (2010 parliamentary election) as fair, compared to 54% of Armenians (2012 parliamentary election) and 87% of Georgians (2012 parliamentary election). Azerbaijanis are also more skeptical about their participation in elections and its importance for citizens although voting in fair elections is an essential feature of a functioning democracy. Two thirds (68%) of Azerbaijanis say they would participate in a presidential election the following Sunday, and approximately one fourth (24%) doubt that voting is important for citizens. While these results focus specifically on electoral process, they are also major indicators of civil liberties.

Freedom of assembly and expression are additional indicators of democracy. Over half of Armenians (66%) and Georgians (55%) agreed that people should take part in protest actions against the government to show the government that the people are in charge, whereas only 29% of Azerbaijanis said the same. There is a similar tendency regarding freedom of expression. Just under half of the Azerbaijan population (47%) think people have the right to openly say what they think (in comparison with two thirds in other two countries). Additionally, 19% of Azerbaijanis agreed that it is important for a good citizen to be critical towards the government, compared to more than half of Georgian and Armenian populations (55% and 53% respectively).

CB data also suggest a strong feeling of inequality before the law and government in all three countries. Only half of the populations in Azerbaijan and Georgia believe that people are treated fairly by the government, whereas one fifth of Armenians agreed. Additionally, the results are even more controversial regarding the legal system; only around one tenth (approximately 13%) of each population believes their court system treats everyone equally. This means that laws, policies, and practices do not guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population. However, one third of Azerbaijanis trust in their court system although the majority does not believe that it is equal for everyone.

Despite problems with certain civil liberties in the South Caucasus, many people still believe that their country is a democracy or a democracy with minor problems. This is most recognizable in Azerbaijan where many people distrust court system, question the fairness of elections, and remain concerned about the right to criticize the government or participate in protest actions. Moreover, the Economist Intelligence Unit named Azerbaijan a strong authoritarian regime although half of the population believes it is represented by a democratic government or a democracy with minor problems. This seeming contradiction in perceptions of democracy as measured by subjective and objective measures would be an excellent topic for further research.

If you want to explore more about these questions, visit the 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset. 

Nostalgia for Stalin in Georgia: Between Respect and Unjustifiable Actions

A recent assessment of attitudes towards Stalin in Georgia has been broadly discussed within the country, as well as abroad. Many have considered Georgia to be a “Stalin-favorable country” since Stalin himself was an ethnic Georgian. However, using data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB), this post shows that while there remains widespread respect for Stalin, the methods of his rule are far from desirable in today’s Georgia. Also, attitudes towards Stalin in Georgia are compared to those in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Overall, the CB data reveals that Georgians have more positive views towards Stalin than Armenians and Azerbaijanis. However, only a very small proportion in each country admires Stalin. Respect and sympathy are the prevailing characteristics that Georgians use to describe Stalin, whereas it is indifference in Armenia and disgust in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis were also most likely to say they don’t know who Stalin is (22%), compared to 9% in Armenia and 5% in Georgia. 

Survey respondents were provided with a list of 7 attributes and asked to select only one word that best described their attitude towards Stalin. “I don’t know who Stalin is”, “don’t know” and “refuse to answer” were not listed as answer options, but were recorded if mentioned by respondents. 

According to the CB, only a small percentage in each country believes that the sacrifice of the Soviet people was definitely justified because of the results achieved (5%-7%). The data also shows that around half of each of the populations think the sacrifice was definitely not justified. Therefore, the positive features attributed to Stalin in Georgia do not overshadow the sacrifices made by the Soviet people during his rule.

Moreover, very few people in the South Caucasus see themselves living in a country ruled by a person like Stalin. This includes Georgians who attributed more respect and sympathy towards Stalin than Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Over half of the population in each country says they would probably or definitely not like to live and work in such a country.

Although many people in the South Caucasus believe the sacrifices made under Stalin cannot be justified and they would not want to live in a country ruled by a leader like Stalin, more than two fifths of adults (55% in Armenia, 44% in Azerbaijan, and 68% in Georgia) believe Stalin was a wise leader who brought power and prosperity to the Soviet Union.  It is interesting to note that even in Georgia, where well over half of the population thinks Stalin was a wise leader who brought prosperity, this positive attitude is not related to a desire for a non-democratic style of leadership. 69% of Georgians who strongly consider Stalin to have been a wise leader prefer democracy to any other kind of government, whereas only 7% prefer a non-democratic government under certain circumstances (another 7% is indifferent). Thus, the majority of Georgians consider democracy to be the best form of government for today’s Georgia even though many feel respect for Stalin as a leader. In addition, 69% of Georgians who completely agree that Stalin was a wise leader support NATO membership and 73% support joining the EU. Thus, respect for Stalin does not indicate support for non-democracy or a turn away from Western institutions.

Finally, CB data shows that Armenians feel that they will always have need for a leader like Stalin to a larger extent than Georgians or Azerbaijanis. 38% of Armenians say they will always feel the need for a leader like him who would come and restore order, compared to 28% of Georgians and 19% of Azerbaijanis who say the same.

This blog has shown that over half of the populations in the South Caucasus feel the sacrifices of the Soviet people under Stalin were not justified and they do not desire to live in a country with a ruler like him. Yet, many people in all three countries view him as a wise leader who brought prosperity to the Soviet Union. Although Georgians have far more respect and sympathy for Stalin than Armenians and Azerbaijanis, most Georgians continue to be oriented towards membership in Western organizations such as NATO and the EU. Thus, the data agrees with the assessment in Carnegie Endowment’s 2013 report entitled “The Stalin Puzzle” that “for Georgians, Stalin is much more a national icon than a political model.” 

For more data on the attitudes towards Stalin in the South Caucasus, please visit the new 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset. 

Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE): ‘Interpreting the Past’ work package in Telavi

“The historical events that happen in people’s formative years leave a permanent imprint on people’s memories” concluded one of the founding fathers of classical sociology, Karl Mannheim, in 1952. Georgian teenagers today remember living in a country where electricity failures and lack of money for basic needs were common everyday issues. Their perceptions are as dramatic as the perceptions of adults, especially for IDPs from the separatist region of Abkhazia. The experiences of young IDPs represent one of the most salient topics in Georgia’s post-Soviet history – an unexpected and often tragic reality the country has had to face since the 1990s. Since the issue is, to date, largely understudied by historians and social scientists, all we can rely on to learn more about these experiences are the narratives of IDP youth themselves. These narratives are closely connected with various aspects of post-Soviet transformation.

One of the aims of the recent Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement (MYPLACE) project’s work package ‘Interpreting the Past: The construction and transmission of historical memory’ in Telavi was to reveal how IDP youth view the history of Georgia and, specifically, the period of the war in Abkhazia. Some questions examined were how young IDPs and their lives are viewed by their non-IDP peers, and how close or how distant these two groups are from each other. Through participant observation in a non-academic partner institution (YMCA-Telavi), expert interviews, and focus group discussions with young people, CRRC researchers tried to shape outlines of history and self-identification that prevail among youth. Young respondents, however, often needed additional explanations when questions about ‘official’ vs. ‘unofficial’ interpretations of history were asked.

At the beginning of the 1990s, people in Georgia had to deal with separatist movements for autonomy, the rise of militarized criminal groups and the outbreak of strife between supporters and opponents of the newly elected president. Although most of the young people that were questioned by MYPLACE did not remember life in Abkhazia (many of those born in Telavi had never been to Abkhazia), they admitted to having a very strong self-identification with the IDP group and often did not see themselves and their families staying in Telavi forever. Rather, they saw themselves returning to Abkhazia at some point after the conflict is resolved.

Young respondents also did not expect the ongoing IDP situation to last for such a long time. There was an overwhelming and long-lasting hope that IDPs would spend a much shorter time away from their homes, and that they would be able to return home relatively soon. Even today this myth of a quick return plays a very important role in the self-identification of the respondents and members of their families. Very young respondents who have spent their entire lives in Telavi are also reluctant to consider Telavi to be their true home. This shows that this group of IDPs is not fully integrated into Telavi society, in spite of having lived there for two decades.

According to official rhetoric, they should eventually be given the possibility to return to their homes in Abkhazia once the conflict is resolved and their security is guaranteed. However, there is no realistic estimate of when (and if) this could actually happen (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2012).

Discussing this experience with teenagers enables us to see the process of transmission of memory (mostly within families) regarding important and painful historical events. At the same time, we are able to observe the attitudes of young people (both IDP and non-IDP) towards the processes which have occurred in Telavi during recent years.

A schoolteacher from Telavi mentioned that many of the tragic events that she has read about in her world history books (e.g., territorial conflict, civil war, IDPs, political terror) have all happened in Georgia within the past 20 years. One of the difficult challenges for today’s Georgia is to encourage IDP youth to redefine themselves in the new environment, give them opportunities and encourage them to find their place in current Georgian history.

The full report from this project is available at the CRRC-Georgia website.

High Abortion Rates vs. Conservative Views against Abortion in the South Caucasus

There is a tension in the South Caucasus between high rates of abortion (and sex-selective abortion) and overwhelmingly conservative attitudes against it. Abortion rates in Georgia and Armenia are higher than the EU average and the rate in Azerbaijan is below. A 2010 article by the Economist placed Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th, respectively, on a list of countries worldwide where the numbers of girls are off balance at birth - China ranks first. This blog aims to explore attitudes towards abortion and gender in the South Caucasus, and shows that while there are widespread conservative attitudes against abortion, it remains frequently carried out.

Data from 2010 World Health Organization (WHO) report on abortion rates show that there are more abortions among women of reproductive age (15-44 years) in Georgia and Armenia relative to the average in the European Union (See chart below). The abortion rates in the South Caucasus region also vary considerably; the number of abortions per 1,000 live births is lower than the EU average (222) in Azerbaijan (162), whereas it stands at 274 in Armenia, and 408 in Georgia.

The high rate of abortion in the South Caucasus is also linked to sex-selective abortion, whereby pregnancies are terminated if the fetus is female. Male newborns outnumber females by more than 10% in the South Caucasus. For every 100 girls, there are 112 boys in Armenia, 114 boys in Azerbaijan, and 111 in Georgia according to the 2011 CIA World Factbook. Additionally, in 2011 the European Commission declared that “Prenatal sex selection is to be condemned as a phenomenon which finds its roots in a culture of gender inequality”. Thus, the sex-selective abortion problem in the South Caucasus may be a consequence of a greater cultural issue. Another considerable factor is the lower number of children that families in the South Caucasus have over time. For example, in the mid-sixties each family had 3 children on average in Georgia, 4 in Armenia and 5 in Azerbaijan, whereas, according to the 2012 World Factbook, the average number of children per family is now 1.46 in Georgia, 1.38 in Armenia, and 1.92 in Azerbaijan. With a choice of 1 to 2 children, many families in the South Caucasus prefer to have a boy instead.

Data from the 2010 CB also shows that people of both genders are more likely to say they prefer a son. Men in Georgia and Armenia indicate the greatest preference to have a male child (approximately 60%), whereas one third (33%) of Azerbaijani men agree. CB data also indicates that the gender of a child matters least in Azerbaijan and most in Armenia, whereas in all three countries men are more likely than women to say that they want a boy.

Yet, despite the high rate of abortions, and specifically sex-selective abortions, the CB 2011 shows that attitudes towards abortion in these countries remain very conservative. Well over half of the Georgian (76%) and Armenian (61%) populations believe that abortion can “never be justified” (This question was measured on a 1-5 scale where 1 =”never justified”, 5=”always justified”. The question was not asked in Azerbaijan). 

Moreover, the high rates of abortion are puzzling in these countries where the majority of the population says religion is important in daily life (92% in Georgia, 92% in Armenia and 80% in Azerbaijan according to the CB 2012), and where trusted religious authoritative bodies (i.e. Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgia, Armenian Apostolic Church in Armenia, and both Shia and Sunni Islamic Organizations in Azerbaijan) consistently advocate against abortion.

How can we explain these conservative attitudes against abortion along with the high rate of abortion in the South Caucasus? Is it a familiarity with abortion as a method of contraception from the Soviet Union, the availability of sex-selective technology, cultural attitudes, or something else? What do you think?

International Day of Happiness

This year an International Day of Happiness will be celebrated for the first time on March 20th. In 2012, the United Nations (UN) declared this day to be an official holiday to highlight the importance of happiness as a fundamental human aim and to call upon countries to approach public policy in ways that improve the well-being of their citizens. This aim was inspired by the Gross National Happiness Index which was developed in Bhutan to measure prosperity by gauging its citizens' happiness. The index measures the average economic, environmental, physical, political and social wellness of Bhutanese society based on survey data. Although this specific index does not exist in other countries, several surveys worldwide have asked how happy people consider themselves to be.

The annual Caucasus Barometer (CB) asks people in all three countries of the South Caucasus, “How happy would you say you are?” The results reveal that Azerbaijanis have consistently evaluated their level of happiness lower than Armenians and Georgians within the past 3 years, although it has increased from 2010 to 2012. The level of happiness in Armenia has also slightly increased from 2010 to 2012, whereas in Georgia it has remained higher than in the other 2 countries. 

 This question was asked on a 1 to 10 scale where 1=Not happy at all and 10=Very happy. 

The results shown here combine the responses for items 8, 9 and 10 on this scale.

Some think happiness is a result of high economic performance. Yet, this is easily refuted by looking at the Gallup’s 2012 list of “happiest nations” in the world which is topped by several relatively poor countries in South America and South Asia. Additionally, this analysis gives insight into people’s expectations about their well-being and finances in the coming year. This measure is called “Net Hope on Economy”. In 2012, Gallup asked 1,000 people in 54 countries if they feel that the next year will be a year of economic prosperity, economic difficulty or remain the same. Net Hope on Economy was calculated by deducting the percent optimistic (hopeful about economic prospects in 2013) from the percent pessimistic (those who see greater economic difficulty in 2013). The results show that Georgians rank #1 and Azerbaijanis rank #2 on this list of 54 countries, with the highest hopes of economic prosperity for 2013. Armenians ranked #22 with slightly more pessimists than optimists.  

Source: WIN-Gallup International Association,

Global Barometer of Hope and Happiness, December 30, 2012

The CB 2012 also asks about future economic expectations, but specifically regarding children. Georgians, Armenia and Azerbaijanis were asked, “Do you think your children will be better off or worse off financially than you are when they are your age?” The results reveal that between two fifths to two thirds of people in the South Caucasus are optimistic. Georgians are the most positive, followed by Azerbaijanis and Armenians whose results are closer to each other.  

In this blog we aimed to show the pursuit of new measures of well-being and happiness. Some movements have embraced new ways of measuring prosperity through happiness or future expectations, thus showing that economic indices are not solely important. 

On the occasion of the first International Day of Happiness, we wish everybody to live up to their expectations and to achieve the underlying meaning of this day. 

Access the full Gallup report here and the CB 2012 here for more information on this data. 

Gender Attitudes toward Education in Azerbaijan

Girls outperform boys in science in Azerbaijan, according to data from a recent article in the New York Times entitled, “Girls Lead in Science Exam, but Not in the United States”. This article discusses results from a worldwide test conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) among 15-year-olds in 65 developed countries 2009. As indicated by the test, Azerbaijan’s scores were on the lower end of the surveyed countries. Female participants, however, had an average score of 377, while males scored an average of 370, a difference of slightly less than 2%. Though this difference is arguably inconsequential, CRRC data suggest that there are slight variations in Azerbaijani males’ and females’ attitudes toward the value of education in general.

According to the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB), Azerbaijani women place greater value on education than do their male counterparts. The CB 2012 survey showed that 22% of Azerbaijani women indicated education as the most important factor for finding a good job, as compared to 19% of male respondents—although the difference between these two figures is small and barely within the margin of error.

Similarly, data from CRRC’s 2012 Social Capital, Media andGender Survey (commissioned by SIDA) indicate higher levels of education-related activism among Azerbaijani women. Whereas nearly 30% of Azerbaijani women indicated at least some involvement in education, school, or parents’ committees in the last twelve months, only 22% of Azerbaijani men indicated involvement in similar education-related organizations.

Azerbaijani women's proclivity for reading was also higher. According to 2012 SIDA data, 40% of women respondents indicated they had read a book in the last six months, while the number for men stood at 33%

Though CRRC data suggest that Azerbaijani women might be involved in more educational activities and place greater value on education for getting a good job than men, CB 2012 indicated that Azerbaijani women actually have lower levels of post-secondary education than their male counterparts. For example, 18% of Azerbaijani men indicated that they had achieved post-secondary education, while the figure for women was slightly lower at 13%.

Though the variations in the above cases are generally quite small, CRRC data are consistent with the OECD's test and indicate that women may be slightly more attuned to the value of education than men in Azerbaijan. Although women's educational value and performance in science exceed men's, Azerbaijani women still appear to be less represented in terms of post-secondary education. 

For more data on education and attitudes in Azerbaijan visit the new 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset.

Inequality of Job Opportunities Across the South Caucasus

The World Development Report 2013, which was newly released and presented in Tbilisi a couple of weeks  ago states that, “The concept of equality of opportunity, which can be traced back to John Rawls and Robert Nozick, stems from the idea that an individual’s chances of success in life should not be caused by circumstances that are beyond the individual’s control, such as gender, ethnicity, location of birth, or family background.” The report is mainly devoted to investigating jobs challenges and problems of employment, including unequal opportunities to find a job due to specific circumstances. This report included a chart from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LTS) that identifies the level of inequality of job opportunities based on circumstances, age and education across countries (i.e. the “Dissimilarity Index” or D index). Differences in the results among countries can be observed in the table below, yet data from the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) show shifting priorities for obtaining a good job in the South Caucasus countries.

The LTS chart from 2006 indicates that education is a major source of inequality of job opportunities in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the inequality D-index for Armenia was approximately 11 times higher than in Georgia and 3 times higher than in Azerbaijan. For Georgia and Azerbaijan, circumstances such as gender, ethnicity, parental education and political affiliation influenced the inequality of job opportunities. In contrast, these circumstances constituted the least share of the D-index in Armenia. Age was found to be least influential in all three countries, yet, it was about 3 times larger in Armenia and Azerbaijan than in Georgia. 

The more recent 2012 CB asked about factors that Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis consider most important for getting a good job in their countries. CB data show that connections is considered to be the most important factor for getting a job in Armenia and Azerbaijan, whereas education is considered to be the most important factor in Georgia. Education is also deemed to be the second most important factor in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, doing favors for the ‘right’ people stands as the third most important factor in Azerbaijan, while professional abilities is third for Georgia and Armenia. Appearance and age are considered to be more important factors for getting a good job in Armenia than in other two countries, whereas hard work, luck and talent are perceived to hold more weight in Georgia.

This blog has shown that there are different perceptions about how different factors relate to job opportunities in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Whereas education, circumstances and age are shown to be the most basic reasons for job inequality in the LTS survey, connections and education are the dominant factors for getting a good job in all 3 countries according to the CB. 

If you are interested in issues regarding attitudes towards getting a good job please visit CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Internet and Computer Usage in Azerbaijan

The level of computer and Internet usage has become a salient issue in Azerbaijan in recent years, particularly in light of efforts to diversify the country's hydrocarbon-rich economy through the development of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. Taking into consideration a number of bold ICT development initiatives, what do levels of computer and Internet usage actually look like in Azerbaijan? This blog underlines various contradictory statistics and seeks to provide a realistic measure of Internet and computer penetration among Azerbaijanis.

In March 2012, the State Fund for the Development of IT under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (MCIT) was created by presidential decree. An additional presidential decree in November 2012 called for the establishment of a High Technology Park in Azerbaijan for the “preparation of new and high technologies, research in the field of energy efficiency, space and telecommunications, information technology and communications.” Concurrently, MCIT indicates that broadband Internet access has grown significantly since its inception in 2006, while also claiming that Internet access is, at least theoretically, available to all of Azerbaijan’s population given “the fact that mobile penetration in Azerbaijan exceeded 100%”.

Accordingly, MCIT’s Internet penetration statistics for 2011 are quite high. The number of computer users in Azerbaijan stood at 48%, while the figure for Internet users was 65%. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, likewise indicated a high Internet penetration rate for 2011 with a reported 50% of Azerbaijanis using the Internet. ITU’s statistics come from administrative data sources that compile various data from telecommunications operators, and they indicate that Internet penetration has grown by over 80% since 2009 and by nearly 200% since 2008.

Data from CRRC’s 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB) suggest lower levels of Internet penetration in Azerbaijan. 59% of Azerbaijanis claimed to “never” use the Internet in 2012, while 12% indicated they did not know what the Internet was. In contrast, 19% of Azerbaijanis stated they used Internet once a week or more, with 7% indicating they used Internet at least once a month or less often. Despite the overall low frequency of Internet usage in 2012, there has been an increase in Internet usage since 2011.

As a whole, CB data from 2011 and 2012 suggest significantly lower levels of Internet penetration in comparison to ITU and MCIT figures.

Regarding computer ownership, data from CRRC’s 2012 SocialCapital, Media, and Gender Survey (commissioned by SIDA) indicated that 25% of Azerbaijani households owned a personal computer. Out of those individuals who indicated household PC ownership, 73% claimed to have Internet access through a personal computer—roughly 18% of the population. These data are relatively consistent with recent Gallup data on home Internet access. According to Gallup’s 2011 Worldwide Tracking, 15% of Azerbaijanis had access to Internet at home, while 2012 polling indicated that the number had increased to 22%.

Data on Internet penetration and computer usage in Azerbaijan are obviously quite varied. Given that ITU and MCIT data come from similar sources, however, it seems reasonable that actual levels of Internet and computer usage are lower than statistics from official and UN sources.

It is apparent that Azerbaijan would like to develop its ICT sector through the implementation of high-profile, “supply-side” development initiatives. In addition to the State Fund for the Development of IT and the planned High Technology Park, the MCIT could possibly support its goals by encouraging increased computer and Internet penetration at the grassroots level. If more Azerbaijanis were made aware of the benefits of the Internet, it is conceivable that Azerbaijan may be able to develop a more Internet savvy population and in turn create the necessary human capital to support its ICT initiatives.

For more information on Internet and technology in Azerbaijan visit the new 2012 Caucasus Barometer dataset.

Visa Liberalization Prospects in Georgia – the Way Open for Temporary Emigrants?

Last week the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, presented the Georgian government with a Visa Liberalization Plan between Georgia and the EU. This is significant progress from the previous Visa Facilitation Agreement from 2010 which eased the visa application process for Georgian citizens wanting to go to the EU. Under this previous agreement, the cost of an EU visa was reduced from €60 to €35 for Georgian citizens, and a maximum wait time of 10 days was established for a decision regarding the visa. However, in general the process of receiving an EU visa has remained rather complicated. Now, further reforms in document security, border control, migration, public order and human rights are required for a final agreement over an eventual visa-free regime. The final visa liberalization rules are expected to be implemented before the upcoming Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit on November 28-29, 2013.

Yet, there may be economic and social consequences from the EU an eventual visa-free regime. As the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reveals in its country overview for Georgia, development of the country’s migration management system and a lack of economic opportunities at home are two major migration challenges facing Georgia. According to the 2012 Caucasus Barometer (CB), while only 6% of Georgians would want to permanently live elsewhere, 42% of Georgians would like to temporarily live elsewhere. 

Georgians who are unemployed and looking for a job (59%) are more interested in temporarily going abroad than those who are not interested in a job.

Additionally, students are the more interested in temporary migration than other groups.  87% of students said they would leave Georgia for a certain period of time to live somewhere else if they had a chance. Also, just over half of unemployed and less than half of those who currently have a job, are self-employed or are homemakers would like to temporarily emigrate. 

The results of the CB 2012 also show that younger Georgians are more interested in temporary emigration than those in older age groups. 67% of Georgians aged 18-35 said they would like to live outside Georgia if there was an opportunity, whereas less than half of Georgians 36-55 years old and a one-fifth of those 56 years or older said the same.

A final visa-free agreement could trigger immigration flows from Georgia to EU countries, especially as particular subsets of Georgians (e.g., younger, students, unemployed, and job-seekers) desire to leave the country for a certain period of time. Therefore, migration flows due to unemployment and difficulties while searching for a job might be controlled by promoting job counseling and placement centers, increasing employment prospects within Georgia and creating flexibility to adapt to changing labor market needs. 

To explore more about job and employment related questions in Georgia, we welcome you to download the new 2012 CB dataset here.

Before and After the Elections: Shifting Public Opinion in Georgia

The Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2012 attracted much international interest and ushered in an important turn in Georgian politics. In 2012 CRRC conducted four waves of a Survey on Political Attitudes in Georgia for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (funded by the Swedish International development Cooperation Agency-SIDA) in order to track changes in public opinion associated with these major political events. The fieldwork for these surveys took place in February, June, August and November and covered economic and political perceptions, attitudes toward democracy and on-going reforms, as well as various domestic and international affairs. Each wave surveyed about 2,000 people in Georgia. The data from NDI surveys allow comparative analysis of public opinion before and after the elections and reveal some interesting trends. This blog post aims to show two of many changes in public opinion that occurred in Georgia in 2012.

The first change discussed in this blog post concerns the perception of democracy in Georgia. Respondents in all waves of NDI survey were asked about their perceptions of democracy in Georgia before and after the elections. The percentage of people who think that Georgia is not a democracy yet, but it is developing in that direction significantly increased after the elections (34%). In line with that, the percentage of people who think that Georgia might become a democracy in the future, but it is not developing in that direction now decreased from 14% in August to 5% in November. To sum up, public opinion follows the opinion of some analysts (see Cory Welt in CAD) and after the elections more people in Georgia think that Georgia has a better chance to become a democracy in the future.

Source: NDI survey on political attitudes in Georgia, Wave 9 (February, 2012), Wave 10 (June, 2012), Wave 11 (August, 2012), Wave 12 (November, 2012)

 

In order to shed more light on this picture it is useful to consider what Georgians mean by democracy. The question, “What does democracy mean to you?” was asked in all waves of survey. The result is more or less unchangeable throughout all four waves and thus only the latest data is shown. For just over half of the population, democracy means freedom of speech/hearing different views (55%), followed by equality before the low (43%) and protection of human rights (33%).

Source: NDI Survey on Political Attitudes in Georgia, Wave 12 (November, 2012)

A second change relates to perceptions of Russia. As a recent article in the New York Times states, it was one of the campaign promises of Georgia’s new Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili “to repair the country’s badly frayed relationship with its huge neighbor”. The data shown on the chart indicate how public opinion reflects political changes and that the process of repairing the relationship between Georgia and Russia has already started in people’s minds.

In February and November 2012 CRRC, on behalf of NDI asked Georgians about their perceptions of Russia. The results show that the percentage of Georgians who think that Russia is no threat to Georgia at all increased significantly over the short period of time. In February only 8% of Georgians thought that Russia is no threat to Georgia at all, while this share increased to 22% in November. Respectively, there is a slight decrease in the number of people who think that Russia is a real and existing threat to Georgia (49% to 40%).

Source: NDI survey on political attitudes in Georgia, Wave 9 (February, 2012), Wave 12 (November, 2012)

To sum up, this blog has shown that political events which took place in 2012 are associated with some important changes in public opinion in Georgia. A question which could be worth further exploration is if political events influence public opinion or if public opinion allows political changes to happen? What do you think is the case in Georgia? We would like to hear your thoughts on that.

If you are interested in exploring further data from NDI surveys, you can download power point presentations from here.

Georgia’s Workforce Development Study

By Ana Diakonidze

In August 2012 CRRC launched the study of Georgia’s Workforce Development system, commissioned by the World Bank. Document review and key informant interviews have been used as main research methods in this study. On 19th of December, the World Bank office in Tbilisi hosted a workshop which aimed at presenting and validating the preliminary findings of the study. The workshop was attended by government representatives, training providers, industry and international donor community.

Workforce Development (WfD) is one of the several policy domains under Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative of the World Bank’s Human Development Network. The objective of the program is to create tools and resources for benchmarking the performance of the education and training system in generating the skills demanded by employers. Under this initiative, worldwide data covering various policy dimensions are being collected. This initiative involves assessment of strategic decisions for WfD, coordination of state and non-state actors, involvement of training providers and employers in WfD policy making, funding and other relevant topics.

Currently, the study report is being finalized. It will outline and explain reasoning behind assigning particular scores to each dimension assessed during the study. The scores are assigned to each policy goal and determine the level of development of the system. According to SABER there are four levels of workforce system development: latent, emerging, established and advanced. The scores help to identify where a particular country stands on this continuum. The figure above explains the four different levels of WfD for policy in terms of policy goal 1. The end goal of this exercise is to support Georgian policy makers in their search for promising options and approaches to achieve better results in WfD.

Comparing Societal Values in the South Caucasus

Values and traditions can shape the ways in which people behave and perceive themselves and others within and across societies. Drawing on data from the 2012 Survey on Social Capital, Media, and Gender in Azerbaijan and the 2011 Survey on Social Cohesion in Armenia, this blog explores different values that, according to Azerbaijanis and Armenians, characterize contemporary Azerbaijani and Armenian societies, respectively. Based on CRRC’s surveys, people in Azerbaijan and Armenia reveal many similar values that define their societies today. In addition, the blog addresses the importance of family in Georgia, using the 2008 World Values Survey (WVS).

Ihe majority of Azerbaijanis think that having children (92%) and a family (89%) is very important in Azerbaijani society. Azerbaijanis also named respect for the Republic of Azerbaijan (84%), the elderly (83%), traditions (81%), and for the Azerbaijani language (77%) as building blocks of the society. 74% of the population places importance on education. Finally, according to the CRRC survey, respect for the history of Azerbaijan (74%) and respect for religious institutions (71%) also characterize contemporary Azerbaijani society.

Similar to Azerbaijanis, the overwhelming majority of Armenians think that having children (96%) and a family (92%) are important in Armenian society. The majority of Armenians also regard education (85%) and respect of traditions (82%) as rather important. Respect for the history of Armenia (78%), for religious institutions (77%), the Armenian language (76%), the Republic of Armenia (74%), and respect for elderly (66%) are also said to define Armenian society today.

The CRRC data show that the majority of Azerbaijanis and Armenians share similar values that they believe characterize their respective societies.  While CRRC did not conduct these particular surveys in Georgia, the 2008 WVS did ask Georgians about the importance of family in their lives. In this regard, 89% of Azerbaijanis, 92% of Armenians, and 99% of Georgians said that family plays an important role in their respective societies.

More information can be found by visiting http://www.crrc.ge/oda/ and http://www.crrccenters.org/activities/research/?id=52.

Exploring Emotions and Life Satisfaction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

From 2009 to 2011, Gallup conducted surveys in over 150 countries to compare how people feel about their lives and what emotions they experience during the day. Based on these surveys, Singapore was considered as the least emotional society (ranked 1st) out of 151 countries surveyed, while the Philippines was named as the most emotional nation (ranked 151st) out of all countries surveyed. Georgia ranked as the 2nd least emotional society after Singapore. Azerbaijan ranked the 15th and Armenia ranked the 38th least emotional nations. This blog explores these findings in comparison to CRRC’s 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey questions on feelings and life satisfaction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

In each country, Gallup focused on peoples’ experiences of five positive and five negative emotions. Positive emotions were feeling well-rested, being treated with respect, experiencing enjoyment, smiling and laughing a lot, as well as learning or doing something interesting. Negative emotions included feeling angry, being sad, stressed, or worried, and experiencing physical pain. Gallup then averaged the percentage of people in each country who said they experienced each of the 10 positive and negative emotions. The results show Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan ranking relatively low on emotionality.

Emotional Countries, ChartsBin.com, viewed 6th December, 2012, <http://chartsbin.com/view/9263>

CRRC’s 2011 CB also asked people in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to describe their feelings, but for specific questions rather than a set of positive and negative emotions that were averaged. 26% of Armenians, 8% of Azerbaijanis, and 13% of Georgians said they experience a general sense of emptiness. In comparison, 48% in Armenia, 66% in Azerbaijan, and 60% in Georgia said that this statement did not describe their feelings.

About half of the population in Armenia (51%) and Georgia (55%) said that they felt happy, followed by just under half of the Azerbaijani population (40%) who also said that they were happy. In turn, 15% of Armenians, 19% of Azerbaijanis, and 12% of Georgians reported feeling unhappy.   

About a third of the population in Armenia (30%), a quarter in Azerbaijan (24%), and over a third in Georgia (36%) said that, all things considered, they were generally satisfied with lives. Somewhat similar percentages indicate that people were unsatisfied in each country. 

In conclusion, Gallup and CRRC reveal somewhat different results in terms of emotional experiences and overall life satisfaction in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. While Gallup measured the average percentage of respondents who reported experiencing any of the 10 negative or positive emotions daily, CRRC took a different approach by focusing on Armenians’, Azerbaijanis’, and Georgians’ general experiences of feeling happy, general life satisfaction, and a general sense of emptiness. 

The Modalities of Azerbaijan's Islamic Revival

Islamic revival on the societal level has become a much-touted subject in Azerbaijan in recent years. Ongoing controversy over an informal state ban on hijabs in the country's public education institutions, along with a number of recent government-sponsored research projects and conferences on religion, attest to the increasing salience of Islam as a social and political issue, even as the Azerbaijani state remains staunchly secular and instrumentalizes Islam primarily for legitimization purposes.

Yet, if Azerbaijani society is indeed experiencing an Islamic revival, what are the manifestations of its increasing religiosity? According to data from the Caucasus Barometer (CB) and CRRC's 2012 Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey (SIDA), religious indicators such as overt religious practices and trust in religious institutions have actually shown negative trends in the last five years. Nevertheless, other indicators suggest that Azerbaijanis' private religious practices and conceptions of personal religiosity may be gaining greater currency.

According to the CB 2008, 10% of people in Azerbaijan claimed to attend religious services on at least a weekly basis, while 7% and 36% attended at least once a month or on special holidays, respectively. Around 20% of Azerbaijanis attended services "less often" and nearly 30% "never" attended.

Religious service attendance has changed little in the last five years. According to the 2012 survey, only 6% of Azerbaijanis said they attended services at least once a week, with 11% indicating they attended at least once a month and 40% claiming only on religious holidays. Almost 25% and 20% of Azerbaijanis claimed they attended services "less often" and "never", respectively.

Azerbaijanis' trust in religious institutions likewise decreased between 2008 and 2011. In addition to local mosques, the institutions in question could refer to the Caucasus Muslim Board - a state-affiliated organization including Shia and Sunni leadership due to Azerbaijan's approximate 60/30% Shia-Sunni population - and the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations - likewise a state-affiliated entity, tasked with regulating religious organizations operating in the country.

The institutional trust factor is especially significant, as research suggests that a country's level of religiosity depends on the authority of its religious institutions (Chaves 1994). In turn, this authority is measured by the degree of individuals' confidence in religious institutions (Kleiman, Ramsey, & Palazzo 1996). According to the CB from 2008 to 2011, there was a 17% decrease in the number of Azerbaijanis who "fully trust" religious institutions, with a slight decrease for those who trust religious institutions "a lot" and no change for those who "somewhat" trust said institutions.

Despite decreases in active religiosity, CRRC data suggest that personal conceptions of religiosity and private religious practices are becoming more important for Azerbaijanis. Between 2010 and 2012, the combined total of Azerbaijanis who claimed they were "quite" or "very" religious increased from 16% to 27%. During the same period, those claiming they were "somewhat religious" jumped from 23% to 32%.

Perhaps even more telling are 2012 data measuring the frequency of praying at home. Despite low mosque attendance, a sizeable 30% of Azerbaijanis claimed to pray at home at least once a day, while 27% said they prayed at home at least once a week and 12% once a month.

Other sources of data suggest similar trends. A 2011 poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Research indicated that 21% of Azerbaijanis were interested in religious questions "to a large extent", while 46% expressed interest "to a certain extent" and 24% to a "lesser extent." Only 9% of Azerbaijanis claimed they had "virtually no interest" in religious questions.

Even if overt religious indicators such as mosque attendance and trust remain quite low, the fact that Azerbaijanis increasingly think of themselves as more religious indicates that religiosity may be growing on a more personal, passive level. That over 50% of Azerbaijanis pray at home on at least a weekly basis is likewise an indication that private religious practices may be serving as the primary modalities of Azerbaijan's Islamic revitalization.