Baku's Urban Change | Commentary and Photography

Interested in urban development? Want to know how outsiders describe the urban experience of Baku? Two young researchers from Germany have set up a blog to follow their project in tracking changes in Baku. Oriana Kraemer and Sebastian Burger take photographs, attend lectures, and comment on what they observe. Given the inflow of sudden wealth, Baku witnesses comprehensive change. A great project, therefore. 

In photos and blog entries they chart the rhythm of the city, how old buildings yield to new ambition, the beautification of façades, and their own encounters. They bring a particularly good eye, and the slideshows add context with the subtitles (see below).

Among other things, the researchers also summarize a recent lecture by Anar Valiyev at CRRC Baku, who compared differences between urban development in Azerbaijan and America. It's a short post, but it's a good entry towards exploring their blog, and the fascinating issue of urban development in Baku.

Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) 2008 Conference

As last year, we again went to the annual conference of the Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS). This year, it was held at Georgetown University. CESS conference focuses on issues that pertain to Central Eurasia (from the Kurds to the Mongols). What makes this conference attractive, then, is its geographical focus, and that it brings scholars together from a broad array of disciplines: demographers, sociologists, political scientists, ethnographers, linguists, historians, as well as a scattering of other niche groups.

The Caucasus usually has a slightly tenuous position within this conception of Eurasia, perched almost out of sight. This year, because of current events, it had more prominence (although the grand hall seen in the image below was only used for the keynote address on Afghanistan, otherwise we were in fairly grotty underground rooms).

One paper by Reid Hamel, a Ph.D. student in Demography at UC Berkeley and our former Summer Fellow, was based on CRRC data. Separately, we presented results from various opinion surveys at a Georgia-focused roundtable (with Julie George, Stephen Jones, Svante Cornell).

Striking, in many of the debates on ongoing issues, how, as one prominent Caucasus scholar put it, everyone is "so eager to confess others' sins". Indeed, one of the main impediments to scholarly debate was the repeated intrusion of standpoint statements ("what you said is an insult to all the victims..."), and the search for moral acclamation.

An urgent need, then, to move beyond the exchange of accusations, and for all sides to examine how they contributed to current events, and what they will need to do better. As Percy Cradock, a former British diplomat once put it: it's never the other side you have to worry about, it's your own. That change of approach would go some way towards the statesmanship that the Caucasus now needs: recognizing your own limitations and from such a precise understanding, forge new possibilities. Unrealistic ambitions can hold you hostage, sometimes more than an external power.

But in between, constructive debates, a variety of viewpoints, and a very rich list of topics. If you want to see who is working on what types of issues, take a look at the conference program. Kevin Tuite, Paul Crego, Julie George, Babken Babajanian and various other Caucasus scholars were present, and you may be interested in checking out what they are up to.

What do Russians think about the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? -- Data Snapshot

How do urban Russians view the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia? From September, 5th-8th, 2008 the Analytical Center of Yuri Levada conducted a survey in ten big cities of the Russian Federation, interviewing 1000 Russian respondents. We have translated the results into English here, as they are only available in the original Russian on the Levada website.

Indeed, the results are slightly unintuitive and several different and overlapping interpretations could be kept in mind when reading the results.

• The results demonstrate that Russians still hold a deeply imperial mentality, which rues the loss of influence over both territory and people, despite the fact they are not co-ethnics.
• Respondents are afraid to share their opinion and are just towing the party line.
• Media coverage has swayed the Russian population's view to be more in line with the government.

Without further adieu, the results:

The overwhelming majority of respondents (80%) said Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was the right decision, demonstrating their support of their government's decision -- unpopular in the West -- to recognize these territories.

When asked about timing, most thought it was either well-timed (34%) or overdue (30%) and only 4% thought is was incorrect. A further 8% believed that the territories should have been immediately absorbed into Russia.

On the question whether the Russian army should stay on the territory of South Ossetia, should Russia keep only its peacekeepers for separating conflicting parties, or should the Russian regular army withdraw and be completely replaced by an international peacekeeping force led by the UN and the EU, again the majority supported a Russian solution to the problem.

While the respondents answers to these questions apparently point towards support of maintaining Russia's sphere of influence and backing of the Russian government's positions, the majority of respondents do not appear to be comfortable creating ethnic homelands for either the Abkhaz or the Ossetians. Of respondents, 64% believe that Russia should support the return Georgian refugees (and ostensibly IDPs as well) to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and protect them from oppression from the Abkhaz and Ossetians, while only 25% do not. Logically, this also means that they would support Georgians becoming Abkhaz and Ossetian (and most likely also Russian) citizens.

Russian public opinion, then, on the issue of return will most likely signifigantly differ from the opinions Abkhaz and Ossetians living in the conflict regions, though measuring this would of course be fascinating (but currently undoable).

You can read more here (note that the survey is in Russian, for our English translation send us an email).

Of course, it would also be great to have data on Georgians’ attitude toward the August crisis.

Credit Crisis in the Caucasus?

Over the past year questionable lending practices by major banks and lack of consumer education about credit risk in the United States among “sub-prime” borrowers caused a credit crunch that in turn erupted into a major financial crisis that threatens to lead to a recession and an international economic downturn.

Although little attention is paid to the issue of credit and debt, analogous risky practices are taking place in the banking sectors of the countries of the South Caucasus. A similar financial crisis in these countries could have a far more devastating effect, since one of the population groups most exposed to consumer debt is the small but consolidating middle class in the urban centers. This issue becomes particularly important in the wake of the August war in Georgia, as the region attempts to maintain economic stability in the face of infrastructural damage and reduced foreign investment.

The emerging middle class has been both a cause and a result of high levels of growth in the economies of all three South Caucasus countries over the past several years, and the banking sectors in these countries has been an area of particularly high growth because of structural reforms, increasing government regulation, and high demand for investment capital.

Banks have become more eager than in the past to extend consumer credit, but for a number of reasons interests rates in the region are extremely high: because of perceived risk of investment in the region and the risk of devaluation of local currencies (the highest interest rates for deposits are for accounts held in local currencies), and because of physical shortages of currencies as governments reduce outputs to combat inflation. Rates for consumer loans in the region average 15-20 percent, which are significantly higher than the 7-9 percent rates for sub-prime mortgages that precipitated the crisis in the United States.

Banks in the region have also been eager to introduce credit card services, offering the convenience of credit lines to their clients for purchases along the model long familiar in developed countries, with no interest if payments are made on time, but stiff penalties for missed payments. Advertising for loans and credit cards are ubiquitous in the capital cities, and credit booths are common in computer and furniture stores.

Yet although micro-credit programs have been functioning in the region for a number of years, particularly in rural areas, the whole phenomenon of commercial consumer credit is largely a new concept for the urban middle class. New borrowers have neither credit histories upon which banks can determine levels of risk, nor experience or deep understanding of the potential hazards involved in taking loans.

According to data from the Caucasus Research Resource Centers’ Data Initiative Project, while the number of households in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia that take loans overall is not large (and real mortgages are practically nonexistent), the number is substantial enough to merit concern: 4% in Azerbaijan, 15% in Armenia and 9% in Georgia. The majority of those loans are for more than 100 USD (78% in the case of Georgia), and in Armenia and Georgia more than half of those who use credit have taken two or more loans. And while a portion of these loans in all three countries are taken for essential expenses such as medical care, utilities or food (demonstrating extreme poverty), approximately half of loans in all three countries are taken for consumption, investment or business purposes, or to repay previous loans.

While many consumers in the region may be making careful strategic choices in using credit, it seems that a significant amount of loans are being used for highly speculative investments, such as in real estate or in businesses that have been profitable in the past but are now close to saturation (e.g. restaurants and cafes and importing automobiles). The real estate markets in particular seem to be highly inflated in the urban centers (again, fueled by speculative trading financed by very high interest loans) and the resulting bubble is likely to burst if perception of a slowdown or reversal in rates of price increases were to appear.

For their part, banks in the region seem to take little interest in the types of projects that loans are being requested to finance, have set only the most minimal requirements for the extension of loans and credit cards (usually a letter from an employer stating a minimal average salary is sufficient), and have taken little initiative in providing consumer education for their clients.

High interest loans and risky investment decisions thus create a very real possibility of overextension by clients of consumer credit who owe more money than they currently earn, which in turn presents a very serious risk of a financial crisis that could threaten to undermine the banking and real estate sectors, particularly given the shocks to the system that resulted from the Georgian-Russian war in August. Such a financial crisis would most likely have far more serious consequences for the fragile economies of the South Caucasus countries than in more developed countries. It would threaten most directly the nascent middle class, which is such an important constituency for the further development of stability, rule of law and democracy in the region, and could therefore have serious consequences as well for the political stability of the region. It is in the interests of both governments and commercial banks and loaning organizations in the region to forestall such a crisis by implementing more rigorous requirements before extending credit and devoting resources to consumer education.

Doing business in Azerbaijan: easy in theory

Results of the World Bank’s Doing Business 2009 project, claims to present "objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 181 economies and selected cities at the sub-national and regional level", were made public today.

According to the report, Azerbaijan made the biggest progress in reforming business regulations among all surveyed countries and rose from last year’s 96th place to the 33rd in 2008. Azerbaijan came ahead of most CIS countries, excluding Georgia with its 15th rank in the report.
The Bank ranks countries according to the following 10 sets of indicators: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a business.

Azerbaijan has improved its ranking in all of these indicators, with the exception of closing a business. The biggest positive changes were achieved in protecting investors, registering property, starting a business, and employing workers through several steps such as substantial amendments to the labor code simplifying hiring and dismissal, creation of a second commercial court in Baku, a new unified property registry, and a one-stop shop for company registration.

Local experts do not agree with the overly optimistic results of the report. Just yesterday the Entrepreneurship Development Foundation, a local NGO, presented results of a survey conducted among businessmen in Baku and regions in May-July 2008. According to the survey, that included 41 questions on entrepreneurship, about 52% of small entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan consider it impossible to conduct business without violating laws and regulations. Sabit Bagirov, the chairman of the Foundation, added that the fear of being persecuted led to a quite high non-response rate.

Another local economic expert, Gubad Ibadoglu, told Radio Liberty that since the World Bank partners mainly with the Government, the ranking resulted from long and intensive negotiations between the Government and the Bank officials.

The Doing Business methodology relies on surveys among “local experts, including lawyers, business consultants, accountants, freight forwarders, government officials and other professionals routinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements”. As noted by a 2008 independent evaluation of the Doing Business project (available here) , the report is based on the assumption that improved regulatory environment leads to the improved firm performance and economic outcomes. It does not capture how the regulations are actually applied, or whether they work in the reality. Among other things, the evaluation recommended to expand the informant base and to make the selection of informants more transparent.

Beyond a doubt, the report succeeded in influencing policy makers and giving an impulse to a number of policy changes in Azerbaijan, but one must use caution when interpreting its rankings.

Surveying Corruption | Details Matter!

Corruption remains an endemic feature in the region, outside Georgia. No wonder, then, that it continues to receive considerable attention from organizations and donors. Currently, we are being asked to run a survey (we will publish details on that later). How do you do this? Not all of this research is intuitive. Here are a couple of examples of what can go wrong, taken from the draft questionnaire we were given.

One obvious way of getting at the issue is to measure experience, to ask whether people themselves have paid bribes in the last 12 months. Is that a good way of measuring levels of corruption? Well, there are limitations. One limitation is that you simply don't know how much people have actually interacted with institutions that may demand a bribe. If you don't have a car, if you don't need any official document, are not enrolled at a university, and don't visit a hospital you simply may not become a target. In fact, one likely result of corruption is that you minimize contacts with official institutions in order to reduce your exposure to corruption. So you definitely need to measure the extent of contact, in addition to asking people's experiences.

What actually is NOT a big problem is whether everyone will tell you the truth. The survey questionnaires typically are set up to get people talking, and ask the more sensitive questions half way through, so that the respondent already feels comfortable. Sure, quite a few people will still be reluctant to admit that they paid a bribe, so what you measure is only the number of respondents that tell you that they paid a bribe. But this in itself is valuable: the honesty typically stays pretty constant, making responses from 2007 well comparable with those from 2008.

But the questionnaire is also tricky in other ways. Let's say you want to get a sense of peoples attitudes towards paying a bribe. The following may strike you as a useful question, at face value.



But there is something wrong with asking this speculative question, since corruption is contextual. Let's look at three very different cases:

1. You may be subsidizing an underpaid doctor so that she looks after your grandmother. Without these payments, the doctor couldn't survive. Would you refuse to pay the doctor? Probably not. Such private additional payments in exchange for a real service contrast sharply with the next case, which is...
2. ...the public official who uses an artificially constructed bureaucratic hurdle to extract a bribe from you. Do you want to pay a bribe here? In this case, you begin to weigh short-term advantages against long-term effects.
3. Next case: the civil servant who breaks the law and betrays public trust in return for payment. In this case, corruption could consist of granting exclusive monopolies, unwarranted certificates or permits, or desisting from prosecution when it is called for. Would you approve of paying here? Hopefully not.

Three very different cases, but all of these can be projected into the question above. The way to fix the question is to actually create various scenarios, to measure what people consider acceptable.

Note, also, that the responses are problematic. Yes, No, make sense. But how would we make the verbatim responses useful? This question needs to be closed, offering exhaustive options. After all, a survey is not a focus group.

Other useful features? Ask respondents whether they have relatives that work in the public sector, or for local police. Likely, this will have an impact on their views. Check whether they are on the Internet. Those that are again will have access to more information, be better informed, and likely that's a group that will look at things differently. English-speakers are different as well. Are respondents pro- or against the government? Do they have a car? Enriched in this way, this survey can yield powerful information. And, and, and...

Corruption remains important issue, but capturing what actually goes on is not entirely easy. We will keep you updated.

Georgia Post-Conflict Phone Survey | may be a first glance?

Georgian IPResearch (first time we heard of them, actually) conducted a phone poll between Aug.25 and Sept.2. 450 respondents were questioned countrywide. While we have our strong reservations about these telephone polls (they are biased towards people with phones, picking up calls from strangers, and bored enough to chat), they may serve as a preliminary indication. Here are the results:

1. Was the international community active in stopping the Russian aggression?

Yes 73.3%
No 24%
NA 2.7%


2. Which state was the most active in stopping Russian aggression?

USA 64,2%
France 20,9%
Poland 4,9%
Baltic states 2,2%
Germany 1,6%
UK 1,1%
Ukraine 0,7%
None 1,3%
NA 3,1%

3. Which organization was the most active in stopping Russian aggression?
EU 26,7%
UN 17,6%
NATO 14%
CoE 3%
OSCE 3.1%
All 5.1%
None 4.0%
NA 26.2%

4. Which is the most positive politician in stopping Russian aggression?
Nicolas Sarkozy 35.6%
George W. Bush 17.8%
Condy Rice 12.0%
Angela Merkel 7.8%
John McCain 5.6%
Lech Kaczynski 4.2%
Bernanrd Kouchner 3.3%
Mat Bryza 1.8%
David Miliband 1.6%
Barack Obama 0.9%
Other 2.8%
None 1.3%
NA 5.3%


5. Which is the most friendly country for Georgia?
USA 72.0%
France 42.9%
Ukraine 20.9%
Germany 13.6%
Poland 12.0%
Baltic states 11.6%
UK 7.8%
Turkey 2.2%
Israel 0.7%
Azerbaijan 0.4%
Other 0.6%
None 1.6%
NA 8.9%

(Respondents were asked to name max. 2 states, therefore the total number exceeds 100%)

6. Do you think that the Georgian government could have avoided Russian aggression?

Yes 42.4%
No 46.7%
NA 10.9%

7. Will Georgia receive NATO MAP in the near future?
Yes 80.9%
No 6.9%
NA 12.2%


Perhaps the most interesting part is that more than 40% of respondents think that the Georgian government could have avoided the confrontation. This means that the country might very well be split, with a lot of people thinking that what happened was a big mistake. But as mentioned, we cannot vouch for the quality of this survey.

It will be interesting to examine whether indeed so many people are critical, and who precisely they are. We are planning to conduct our own survey in the next few weeks. If you want to suggest questions that you think should be asked, let us know as soon as possible.

Housing IDPs | Lessons Learnt

In the current situation, one issue facing Georgia is what to do with and for the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) that are now coming from South Ossetia and the Kodori Gorge, in Upper Abkhazia. A friend with significant experience in development work posted a candid analysis in an e-mail group. We thought that the analysis is worth sharing since this issue affects the region.

So here is what he had to say:

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"I was speaking about this issue with some Georgian friends just yesterday. They have been involved in IDP shelter work with people from Abkhazia since the mid-1990s. I've done a bit of work with those shelters myself, and would STRONGLY encourage anybody getting involved with shelter issues now to visit some of these old shelters if they have not already done so, and not just in Tbilisi. Some of the shelters I saw in Kutaisi and Samegrelo were horrific. Families have been vegetating in them for fifteen years now, with every politician promising them return next year.

In our discussion, we came up with two big lessons learnt:

1. LESSON ONE: Don't pretend it's temporary

Yes, thankfully, most new IDPs - especially from Gori town - will go home soon. However, many IDPs in Georgia will not. It's not going to happen. Live with it. They weren't ethnically cleansed (houses burnt etc) to pave the way for their return, and Georgia lost the war. The Palestinians aren't returning any time soon, either. No idea how many people this is - let's say Kodori and South Ossetia. [...] We're prob talking 20,000 people minimum.

We should seek to identify those IDPs who will probably not go home soon, and seek durable, humane living conditions for them. Most of Georgia's old IDP shelters are a patchwork of small interventions - an NGO puts in windows, a year later, another puts in floors, two years later there's a new door. Look for yourself - this approach leads to crap results, not only in human terms, but also in terms of value for money. (Repeat assessments are one example - IDPs from Abkhazia have told me how sick they are of assessments by now.)

The key point to remember is that there will be loads of money coming in soon. After that, funds will dry up. By 2006, there was hardly any funding to be had for shelter work. Let's spend it well NOW, while there is money to be spent.

The main prob is that the GoG will probably not look favourably on this approach. IDPs in misery desperate to go home bolster Georgia's claim to these territories. One way to get round this would be to point out that should the IDPs return, the municipalities would get buildings in good shape, ready for privatization or social housing needs. Be diplomatic.

Urban Institute's voucher project was good, but the Georgian housing market was a lot less elastic than they thought. Handing out vouchers to buy flats worth 5000 dollars each to a few hundred families sent housing prices rocketing in Kutaisi (it wasn't enough to money to buy in Tbilisi or Batumi). Vouchers are not feasible on a large scale.

Privatization doesn't solve anything either. One day, your family lives in a crap shelter. The next day, it lives in a crap shelter you own. Without money to renovate, it improves security of residence, but living conditions are exactly the same. How will 50 broke families ever be able to repair their communal roof?

The way I see it, the only humane option is to (1) do large-scale thorough rehabilitation of existing buildings, or (2) to build new housing from scratch (NRC has done the latter on a small scale). A nice side effect is that such large-scale, donor-funded construction efforts will generate a lot of employment in a sector that will be badly affected by the probable fall in investment after this war.

2. LESSON TWO: Don't dump IDPs in depressed or remote areas

Placing people in "no future zones" like the town of Vani, where there is zero employment even for locals, is a bad idea. Also, some shelters in Samegrelo are in the middle of nowhere. Those IDPs who cannot escape get stuck there with nothing to do except to cry, to drink, or to do both. Some have been doing just that for over a decade now. Think poverty trap, think psychosocial problems, think domestic abuse. Also, microcredit or employment generation will not work in the back of beyond.

Maybe they should all be housed in Tbilisi?

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That's just my take, and that of some friends of mine. The history of sheltering IDPs from Abkhazia has created lots of "lessons learnt". Ask your more experienced Georgian colleagues and LNGO partners what they think, and please do visit a few shelters from the 1990s outside Tbilisi before you start knocking out funky proposals. Let's use the money that's gonna pour in now wisely, because we are not going to get a second shot at this.

I would be extremely grateful if we could hear the thoughts of more people on this."

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This, then, the comment of said person (who works in this field and therefore, for now, preferred not to be named). Any views?

Russian-Georgian Relations | Alex Rondeli on July 29

On July 29, just before the tensions in around South Ossetia began to escalate, Alexander Rondeli gave a talk at the Tbilisi Summer Seminars, a weekly lecture series which we were organizing with GFSIS and American Councils. Alexander Rondeli runs the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (which he also set up), has the rank of an ambassador, works closely with the Georgian government, and teaches International Relations.

Rondeli talked about the Georgian Russian relationship, and suggested that ultimately this relationship puts Georgia in the near-impossible situation. For a small state like Georgia, Rondeli suggested, it is the greatest tragedy to have an old-fashioned great power next to it. In this position, a small state has no luxury to make any mistake. Americans are far, and Europe ultimately doesn't care ("they look at us the way we look at Mongolia").

Escaping Russia under those circumstances may appear like going against nature, against geography. But becoming part of Russia's orbit offers a bleak future: according to Rondeli, Georgia could never become democratic and a viable modern nation if it accepted Russia's domination. Russia had several key interests in keeping Georgia under control. First, it was a linchpin for security in the broader region, and thus part of the global competition with the United States. Georgia is the gate to Central Asia, but also for Russians the gate to the Middle East, and the path to their main ally, Armenia. Second, there was a distinct interest in keeping Turkey away from the South and North Caucasus. And then, thirdly, controlling Georgia meant asserting one's credibility with all other states. Losing Georgia, conversely, would greatly damage Russia's bullying power. Given these interests, Russia had little incentive to let Georgia thrive, and to let Georgians determine their own political orientation.

Moreover, Russia had regularly shown spite, with Putin belittling Saakashvili, asking him whether he really thought anyone would come and fight for the Georgians in the South Caucasus. Having dealt with the Russians themselves, the young government had gained a new appreciation of what Shevardnadze had had to go through in dealing with Moscow.

In this way, Rondeli argued that Georgia had little choice: while running up against Russia may appear suicidal, submitting to it entails a certain demise. Without taking some risks, there is no opportunity. Internally, the country's elite had intense and frank debates, weighing the options and ultimately coming to the conclusion that it faced either complete defeat or complete victory.

Yet Rondeli pointed out that there are several challenges to the pursuit of a successful policy: Much of the country's elite had emigrated, and Tbilisi had undergone a 'red-neckization' as a result. The current foreign policy elite ultimately remained inexperienced, unable to articulate a multivectoral policy that balances Russia with the West -- although Rondeli was doubtful whether such a policy would be feasible in the first place. Moreover, Socialism had left deep scars: "Stalin and Lenin still are deep inside of us", which in turn radicalized the government, giving it the sense that it needs to revolutionize the people, doing it fast, and not just build institutions. But even existing institutions remain weak, pushing people to turn towards a church that carries somewhat problematic political notions. All in all, this meant that there was little cohesion: in battling Russia, "we don't have the same qualities as the Finns".

In the lecture, there was no sense of an immediately impending conflagration. But Rondeli made it clear that there were sizable risks: "Misha has learned to provoke the Russians, so that they show themselves for what they are. That's quite an achievement, but we're playing with fire."

Georgia: Women's Participation in Politics

Women’s participation at all levels of elections in Georgia is diminishing. As the Caucasus Women’s Network (CWN) reports, women in Georgia were less represented in terms of candidates in the last parliamentary elections than in any previous parliamentary elections in Georgia’s democratic history. On the other hand, women’s low political participation in elected bodies belies women’s activeness in civil society institutions, where females appear to be very active.

Let’s dig deeper: during the last parliamentary elections women composed 28% of all parties’ election lists (485 out of 1757); no woman in any party was listed as the number one candidate; only three parties had women within their first five candidates.

The inequality of both women and men standing in election led to an even smaller percentage of women getting a seat in the Georgian parliament: eight from the party list and only one as a majoritarian candidate. Currently only 6% of MPs are women.

Recently CRRC conducted a survey for Transparency International-Georgia on public attitudes to see what Georgians think of their Parliament. According to the TI data, 64% of those polled agree with the statement that women should have strong representation in parliament. But about 23% of women and 26% of men think that parliament is not the place for women. These misogynists can tip the scale for majoritarian candidates, but what is the answer to the diminishing number of candidates from the party lists? Anti women sentiment in the parties, a party culture? What do you think?

CWN came up with the number of suggestions in order to achieve equal representation of both genders in the legislative body. According to CWN, it is crucial to reach balance not only in the nominated lists but in the taken seats as well. CWN believes the best way to influence and motivate political parties to respect and implement principles of equality is setting sanctions on public funding: when a difference between the number of representatives of each gender goes beyond 2% (yes, two) of the total number of representatives, their political party will be penalized. For more details about CWN finding and policy recommendations visit their website.

If you want to know more about TI Survey, let us know. Some initial data snapshots and results are already available here.

Cuil for the Caucasus? A quick test!

As many of you may have heard, this week saw the launch of a competitor to Google. Cuil, which apparently is an old Irish word for knowledge, has been set up by several former Googlists and promises a search that's more oriented on content, and says it can do a more comprehensive job in the ever-expanding worldwide web.

So if it's supposed to find rare and out of the way things, how does it do for the Caucasus? We did a quick self test. For Caucasus and data, it does indeed return us on the very top, or at least in the first line, and it's a nice interface, as you can see. However, it also shows choices that are at least somewhat eccentric.


We get a somewhat similar picture for caucasus research, but again it seems to favor our Armenian website. The Georgian or Azerbaijani office are not immediately in sight.


The preference for Armenia is a little odd, since our English language websites in the three countries are practically identical (and similar to the regional site, too).

What does it do for Caucasus and social science? Note we did not put the words in quotation marks, so it's a free search term.

There is some irony in this conclusion, but we don't think it's entirely fair.

And can it help with more specialized requests? We queried CRRC's own Survey Director, Tina(tin) Zurabishvili. Here you see a comparison of Google and Cuil.


Cuil gets it, but again takes us to Armenia. It also throws in a lot of chaff on Salome Zurabishvili, or Tinatin Khidasheli, two Georgian opposition figures. So Google still seems ahead here. As far as we're concerned, Cuil is an interesting additional tool if Google doesn't find what you're looking for, but not yet a serious alternative for internet research on the Caucasus.

Caucasus Data: Tolerance towards Others

The CRRC Data Initiative (DI) gives people an opportunity to do interesting cross-country comparisons of the South Caucasus (SC) people’s attitude toward their neighbors. This subject is quite sensitive and complex when thinking of the fact that the SC stands out for its sequence of ethnic conflicts.

According to the DI, Armenians prioritize doing business with other nations, which is followed by being friends with other nations and the last point is getting married to foreigner. As the chart shows below, 34% of Armenians approve of doing business with Azerbaijanis, 43% - with Turks, 94% - with Russians. As for friendship, Armenians show particular willingness in being friends with Russians (almost 94%), and also, with Americans (84%) and Greeks (83%). You can check the data for Armenians’ attitude toward other nations like Georgians and Iranians as well.

In contrast to Armenians, Georgians’ attitudes differ – they place friendship the highest, 94% of Georgians supports friendship with Russians, 87% supports friendship with Abkhazians; it would be very interesting to know Abkhazians' attitude towards Georgians. Georgians’ attitude toward Ossetians is the same as with Abkhazians (Friendship - 87%, Business - 82%, and Marriage – 42%).

Attitudes are less mercantile than in Armenia: business comes after friendship, but also with high percentages. Marriage outside one's people generally is not so popular, although still more than half of the population in Georgia and Armenia support marriage between Georgians and Russians and Armenians and Russians; a fourth of Azerbaijanis support marriage with Russians as well. Despite Georgia’s spats with Russia, Georgians appears to maintain strong positive feelings to the people. Marrying Americans is less popular, by comparison.

For Azerbaijanis, there is no clear difference in preferences for friendship and business. Mostly approval rates tally closely, although they obviously vary between nations. Overall, Azerbaijanis are reluctant to engage with Armenians (1% for all three variables), which cannot be said about Armenians’ attitude towards Azerbaijanis. That may be the logic of grievance, but note that the same cannot be said for Georgians’ attitude toward Abkhazians: Georgians lost the war but approval of friendship, business, marriage remain high. We would like to hear what you think might explain the stark contrasts.

Moreover, Azerbaijanis, similarly to Armenians and Georgians, are positively disposed toward Russians. In order to see whether religion variable controls Azerbaijanis’ attitude toward marrying Russians, we cross tabbed both variables: the data showed that only 6% of Muslim Azerbaijanis who attend religious services ‘every day’ support marring Russians. You might be interested to come up with your own hypothesis on Georgians marring Abkhaz or Turks.

For more details on the topic and/or for other interesting data, check out the DI dataset here. (Also with special thanks to Katy Pearce for suggesting us to look into this.)

PFA Report on “Armenia’s 2008 Presidential Election”

For those who have been far from Armenia or who have not actively followed the plethora of developments that have occurred in the country for the past six months, the report encompassing a nearly full picture of the current situation in Armenia has finally become available. “Armenia’s 2008 Presidential Election: Select Issue an Analysis” is a report recently released by Policy Forum Armenia (PFA), a newly founded association.

The report is the first of its kind following the February 19, 2008 Presidential Election of Armenia since it provides a full description of the pre-election and post-election events. The report includes both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The information provided in the qualitative sections of this report is mainly based on Armenian local and international newspaper articles, reports released by international organization as well as blogs on the internet. Unlike the primarily technical reports by OSCE/ODIHR, the report does not just limit itself to describing the 2008 presidential elections, but also presents it in the larger context of political and social developments of post-Soviet Armenia.

For those who have closely followed the political developments in Armenia, a particularly interesting section of the report may be the section on the “Statistical Analysis of the Official Election Outcome”. In this section the authors utilize a number of tests developed in the 1990s by Sobianin and Sukhovolskiy, and later revised by other scholars such as Gelman, Kaiunov, Michael Myagkov (University of Oregon), Peter Ordeshook (California Institute of Technology), and their co-authors. The analysis of the election results through this methodology indicates inconsistencies in the 2008 Presidential Election. For example, the report reveals that there was much higher voter turnout in the regions outside of the capital city-Yerevan. This is unlikely, as generally considerably more civic activism is observed in Yerevan as opposed to the rural areas. Out of the 1,923 polling stations in Armenia more than 129 polling stations had higher than 90 percent voter turnout (p. 21, see figure below). Such turnout levels are highly unlikely, especially given the high migration levels. The other tests reveal inconsistencies within the distribution of individual candidates’ votes, in the relationship between the candidates’ votes and voter turnout, and within the distribution of invalid ballots. The report is careful to specify that the statistical findings do not provide definitive proof of election fraud, but only an (albeit powerful) indication.

Finally, the report concludes with a full section devoted to the civil society awakening in Armenia in connection with the 2008 Presidential Election. More specifically, the final section discusses the increase in the activism especially among women and the youth, as well as the rise in information sharing and networking through the internet. While the report does not provide any innovative recommendations to mediate the post-election discontent in Armenia, it provides a solid ground for policy makers to put the events of the past six months into perspective, assess what the available tools are and put the February 19, 2008 elections into the wider political context of Armenia’s newly independent history.

On a side note, similar studies of election fraud and perception were conducted by CRRC fellows in 2005 by Dr. Masis Poghosyan and Sergey Harutyunyan.

For more detail, check out the report itself at http://www.pf-armenia.org/

Diaspora Armenians in Armenian Society: the Problem of Adaptation

Difficulties with socio-economic integration – unemployment and a feeling of being “a society within a society,” are some of the examples from the list of problems Diaspora Armenians face when immigrating to Armenia. CRRC-Armenia fellow, Anahit Mkrtchyan, researched why these issues are problematic for the Diaspora Armenians and made policy recommendations.

As the researcher finds, integration of immigrant Armenians into the Armenian society is rather weak, because of a number of essential differences in values, lifestyle, dialect, moral principles and ideology peculiar to both immigrant and local Armenians. Furthermore, Diaspora Armenians lack information on their homeland and have high expectation before moving to Armenia, which also causes difficulties for their full adaptation to the Armenian reality.

According to Mkrtchyan (pictured above presenting at CRRC Armenia), attitudes of different groups toward creating integration policy vary. Local authorities avoid having repatriation and integration policies because immigrants can become competitive at the top levels in government and in business, also fear increased real estate costs. Many experts do understand the serious need of repatriation and integration policy, as repatriates will help to cultivate culture, legitimacy and civic attitudes in Armenian society. A group of representatives of Diaspora structures is sure that this policy is important, as the Diaspora faces assimilation, and there is a lack of patriotism among the younger generation.

Based on the local and Diaspora experts’ suggestions and findings, Anahit made the following policy recommendations:

• Consolidation of Armenian structures around two parallel missions and joint involvement in their realization.
• A nation wide integration program directed at better coordination of integration measures, offered on national and local levels. Involvement of trade unions, welfare structures, voluntary and social advocacy organizations and neighborhoods in drafting the adaptation and integration program. (Read more)

Mkrtchyan's work was published in the Turkish daily "Agos" in May 2008. The paper (PDF) in English is also available on the CRRC-Armenia website.

(Note that this, and other Fellows' work is on the CRRC Armenia blog, which we strongly encourage you to explore.)

Caucasus Data | Language: Russian versus English?

Recently, we happened upon an article that talks about the use of Russian across the Caucasus. Is Russian becoming obsolete? According to the article, some Georgian politicians suggest this is the case. At the same time, the article points out that the uptake of English is too slow to replace Russian as a lingua franca.

As usual, we were a little disappointed that the article relied on many assertions, without actually checking for data. As it happens, the Data Initiative provides some insights on the question.

With English-language use, this is what respondents told us about their language ability:


One of the explanations for the different levels may be that diaspora contacts have traditionally brought more English to Armenia. Conversely, economic growth in Baku has attracted people more recently to begin learning English (as you will notice in many hotels and restaurants).

But then, where do people see language going in the next few years? Interestingly, there's overwhelming approval for English as the first mandatory foreign language in secondary schools. Almost 70% in Azerbaijan and Georgia would prefer English, with 57% favoring English in Armenia. In Armenia, 37% suggest Russian should be mandatory in secondary schools. Only 27% of Georgians, and, surprisingly, only 18% Azerbaijani respondents prefer Russian. In Azerbaijan, 9% think that no foreign language should be mandatory, while 4% suggest that Turkish should be the first foreign language.

It is at this point, that we're curious to explore how the respondents break down into different groups. When looking at the data, Nana stumbled upon an interesting dimension: the more intelligent the respondent is rated to be (by the interviewer, and it's a very crude measure, but returns interesting results), the more they favor English.


Want to know more? Compare women and men? The old and the young? Citydwellers' English versus rural folk? Let us know, or, better, explore the data set yourself.

CRRC Publication Research Fellowship 2008 Available

Explore issues - handle data - satisfy your curiosity - get published - generate opportunities
CRRC is offering a round of research fellowships. Are you curious about a social issue? Do you have some ideas or hypotheses that you want to explore further? This fellowship could be the perfect opportunity for you!

What issues are we looking to address?
We're looking for social science research that addresses pressing issues your country faces. The Millennium Development Goals (click here) constitute one such urgent research agenda. Other likely issues include child poverty, youth, social capital, migration and democratization. Pretty much any advanced analysis based on our Data Initiative is of interest to us. We can also help you develop your topic if you are unsure about it, but are committed to undertaking professional research. Check "CRRC Fellowship" in the label cloud on the left.

What results?
We want you to produce international quality research. You should aim to publish your research in a peer-reviewed journal (we will help you find one). This will give your research international recognition. We also expect your work to contain prescriptive richness and ask you to present your findings to relevant interested groups (international, organizations, NGOs, government agencies) in your home country. We definitely want you to use some of our great data from the Data initiative 2007.

Who is the fellowship for?
You are smart, committed, curious and want to apply all your abilities. Typically you will have at least a Master's Degree. You are committed to develop your research ability and have a track record of excellence. You may work in fields other than research, but you are interested in getting back into research because you realize there are excellent long-term opportunities there. We require a working knowledge of English, since you want to publish internationally. Exceptions can be made for those doing quantitative and survey work. (Sorry, no funding for stipends abroad, or for those who live outside the Caucasus.)

What do you get?
Primarily you get the satisfaction of doing excellent work and of being part of a small but vibrant community of internationally recognized research scholars in the South Caucasus. Moreover, if you get published internationally, many opportunities follow. The fellowship provides an opportunity to prove your professionalism, which you can use for many other applications (jobs, consultancy work, joint research projects, conference participation, international research stipends such as CRRC's Carnegie Fellowship, to name the most obvious). Depending on your research project, you can also get between USD 2000 and 4000 for pursuing your research interest (surveys, for example, may have higher costs).

Is it easy?
Yes and no. We will help at every step. But it certainly is not easy money. In research you confront new challenges and difficult decisions all the time. That is why we are doing it, after all. It requires determination and persistence -- we hope you will join us in the thrill of discovery.

How to prepare?
Our online application procedure is specifically designed to help you develop your research proposal. Write us a short email now (latest by July 18, 2008) to Melissa at melissa@crrccenters.org to find out more, telling us about your field or interest, and, if you have it, your provisional research topic. We will end you an email to let you know about the next step and to invite you to discuss your ideas at our open houses.

Maths in Armenia | comparing through TIMSS

What is the average Armenian secondary school student’s competence in Maths and Science? Is Armenia doing fine, or is it time for the education policy makers to review the secondary school curricula. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) proposes an answer to these questions. TIMSS is an international evaluation of the mathematics and science knowledge of fourth and eighth grade students around the world. It was first conducted in 1995, and is administered once in every four years since then. In 2003, alongside with over 60 countries from around the world, Armenia also participated in the study.

Singapore (605), Hong Kong (586), Chinese Taipei (585), Japan (570) lead the TIMSS charts both in Maths and Science. The good news is that Armenia is among the countries that have high scores in Maths among the eight graders. Armenia is the 23rd in the chart, with an average score of 478 and is ahead of Serbia (477), Bulgaria (476), Romania (475) - countries that are above the international average score (467). The picture is different when it comes to the Maths scores of the fourth graders. Armenia’s indicators (456) are significantly lower than international average (495), leaving behind only Norway (451), Iran (389), Philippines (358), Morocco (341) and Tunisia (339).

Science scores among both the eight and fourth graders in Armenia are disappointing: 461 for the eight graders vs. 574 international average score and 437 vs. 489.

Interestingly, girls in Armenia show better results both in Maths and Science than boys (that's not the typical story). Look at the average grades below.

Subject	4th grade		8th grade
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Mathematics	450	462	473	483
Science	432	441	455	468

Some alternative studies conducted in Armenia suggest that TIMSS sample may not be representative of the overall population. If we understand the argument correctly, the authors of this study argue that students included in the sample in Armenia are from middle-upper classes. Effectively this could mean that the poorest remain underrepresented. This may be an interesting topic for research (any potential fellows out there?).

TIMSS methodology, datasets and the questionnaires are available for further analysis here. The study is not conducted in other countries yet, although Georgia looks poised to join TIMSS.