How do Georgians perceive women’s sexual freedom?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Katharine Khamhaengwong, an International Fellow at CRRC Georgia, and Makhare Atchaidze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the Europe Foundation, or any related entity.

Data CRRC has collected shows that there have been significant changes in the attitudes of Georgians towards women’s sexual freedoms since 2013, especially among Muslims, who have seen a large decrease in rates of disapproval, although this has not translated to a significant increase in approval.

The data was collected as part of  the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia survey, carried out for the Europe Foundation between 2013 and 2023.

According to the resulting statistics, the share of Georgians reporting it is always or sometimes justified for a woman to have premarital sex increased from 22% in 2013 to 36% in 2023. Similarly, in 2013, only 32% of Georgians said it was always or sometimes justified for a woman to have a baby outside of marriage, compared with 51% in 2023.These numbers show that attitudes towards sex are loosening, particularly with regard to women. But whose attitudes are changing?

In 2013, 87% of Muslims said that it was never justified for a woman to have sex before marriage, compared to 67% of Armenian Apostolic Christians and 66% of Orthodox Christians. Ten years later, only 58% of Muslims said it was never justified, compared to 68% of Armenian Apostolic Christians and 50% of Orthodox Christians.

However, while the number of Muslims saying that pre-marital sex was never justified fell dramatically, this was not accompanied by a proportionate increase in Muslims saying pre-marital sex was justified. Indeed, there was only an increase from 6% of Muslims reporting that pre-marital sex was sometimes or always justified in 2013 to 15% in 2023. During this same period, the number of Muslims who refused to answer the question went up from only 1% in 2013 to 18% in 2023.

In contrast, the decrease in opposition to pre-marital sex by Orthodox Christians came with a notable increase in the percentage that believed pre-marital sex was always justified — in 2013, only 3% of Orthodox Christians agreed that pre-marital sex was always justified, compared to 13% in 2023. The numbers for pre-marital sex being sometimes justified also went up, from 21% to 26%. The answer refusal rate for this group did not change significantly.This pattern is repeated with attitudes toward having children outside of marriage.

In 2013, 84% of Muslims said this was never justified, while in 2023 only 55% reported the same. In this case, the number of Muslims who said a child outside of marriage was always justified did move from 0% in 2013 to 5% ten years later, but again the biggest change was in those who refused to answer, going from 2% in 2013 to 16% in 2023.The percentage of Muslims who said pre-marital sex was never acceptable decreased by 29 points, as did the percentage of those who said children outside of marriage was never acceptable. The numbers for Orthodox Christians were similarly consistent, both declining by 16 points.

The Armenian Apostolic community differed, however — while their views of pre-marital sex for women were quite consistent, the percent who said having a child outside of marriage was always unjustified went from 80% in 2013 to 60% in 2023. Unlike the case with changing Muslim views, this decrease largely came from Armenian Apostolic Christians saying that children outside of marriage were sometimes (17% to 30%) or always (0% to 5%) justified. The share of refusals did not change significantly.

Meanwhile, Orthodox Christians showed the biggest changes in full approval of pre-marital sex, as well as full approval of having children out of wedlock.Opposition to women having children outside of marriage and to women having premarital sex decreased in Georgia from 2013 to 2023.

Some of the biggest decreases came from Georgian Muslims, who are among the religious groups most disapproving of these behaviours. However, this decrease in opposition does not coincide with an increase solely in approval — instead, in addition to a degree of greater acceptance, Muslims increasingly refused to answer questions about sex.

The data used in this article is available here.

Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic politics than foreign affairs

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Kristine Jintchveleishvili, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic rather than international politics, and Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

Understanding political interest enables an understanding of how informed and engaged individuals are in civic life. Scholars have long argued that political interest is a key predictor of democratic participation — from voting to protesting. In the South Caucasus, where democratic institutions are far from consolidated, understanding who is engaged in politics and how offers insight into both opportunities and barriers to deeper democratic engagement.

When it comes to interest in international politics, 2024 Caucasus Barometer data shows that 45% of Armenians expressed interest compared to 30% in Georgia. By comparison, in Armenia, 63% of the public said they were interested in domestic politics compared to 54% in Georgia.

In Armenia, regression analysis shows that several factors are associated with interest in international politics. For one, women are less likely to be interested compared to men. Separately, older individuals (Aged 55 and older) are about twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to people aged 18–34. Education is another important factor — people with less than a tertiary education are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to those with higher levels of educational attainment.

For interest in domestic politics, regression analysis in Armenia shows that older individuals are significantly more interested than younger people. Those aged 55 and older are 27 percentage points more likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to the youngest age group (18–34). Education also plays a role, with individuals lacking tertiary education showing less interest. Wealth is also correlated with interest. People who live in relatively wealthy households are more likely to be interested in Armenia’s domestic politics compared to those who own less.

Settlement type, ethnicity, and employment status are not statistically significant predictors of interest in international or domestic politics in Armenia.

The pattern for interest in international politics is somewhat similar in Georgia. Women in Georgia are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to men, and older individuals are more interested compared to younger ones — people aged 55 and older are twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to those aged 18–34.

In turn, people living outside of Tbilisi, whether in urban or rural areas, are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to people living in the capital. Additionally, ethnic minorities show lower levels of interest compared to ethnic Georgians.

Finally, wealth is positively associated with interest in international politics — those with the highest wealth levels are more likely to be interested compared to those with less.

Regarding domestic politics in Georgia, regression results demonstrate that rural residents are less likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to people living in the capital. Older individuals and relatively well-off people show greater interest in domestic politics as well.

Education level and employment status were not associated with interest in either international or domestic political affairs in Georgia.

Despite the differences between the two countries, the trend is consistent across both Armenia and Georgia — more people are interested in domestic politics than international politics. The data also shows that Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the 2024 Caucasus Barometer  dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (tertiary or less than tertiary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Georgians don’t want to be ruled by church, despite confidence in religious institutions

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Teimuraz Kobakhidze and Katharine Khamhaengwong, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or its affiliates.

Data from the ISSP 2018 religion survey shows that while Georgians have more confidence in churches and religious organisations than in schools, the business world, the legal system, and parliament, they also largely believe that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote. In total, very few believe that churches and religious institutions in Georgia should have more power.

The relationship between the state and the Georgian Orthodox Church is complicated and contested. While the Georgian government has provided the church with an annual budgetary allocation of millions of dollars, the government has also proposed and passed various measures the church has opposed, ranging from making Orthodoxy the state religion to protections for various minority groups.

Within the general populace, two thirds (67%) of Georgians have a great deal of confidence in churches and religious organisations, and 88% have at least some confidence in them. As other CRRC research has consistently shown, people’s own religious organisations and the army are the most trusted institutions in Georgia. This pattern appears within the ISSP survey as well, with churches and religious organisations being the most trusted institutions asked about on the survey. As the vast majority of Georgians are Orthodox Christians, the religious institution in question will typically be the Georgian Orthodox Church.

However, despite this confidence, 71% of Georgians agree that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote, compared to 15% who disagree, 9% who neither agree nor disagree, and 4% who were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Additionally, a plurality of Georgians, 42%, think churches and religious institutions have too much power in the country, while only 14% think they have too little power. Slightly over a third (36%) think religious organisations have the right amount, and 8% refused to answer or were uncertain over how to respond to the question.

Regression analyses looking at settlement type, sex, age group, education, having a partner or not, and frequency of religious service attendance shows that attitudes vary among different groups towards religious institutions’ role in society.

For confidence in churches and religious groups, sex, age group, and relationship status were not predictors of attitudes, while settlement type, education level, and religious service attendance were.

The groups most likely to express a great deal of confidence in churches and religious institutions were people in rural areas, weekly church attendees, and people with a secondary or lower education.

Education level similarly predicted responses to whether people believe religious leaders should try to influence voters — people with a higher education were less likely to agree that religious leaders should try to influence votes. Sex and relationship status were also correlated: women and those without partners were more likely to say that religious leaders should not influence voting.

Settlement type, age group, and frequency of religious service attendance did not predict attitudes.

Unlike the previous two questions, education level was not predictive of views on whether or not churches and religious organisations had too much or too little power in society. Settlement type, sex, and relationship status were likewise uncorrelated.

Age and frequency of religious service attendance, on the other hand, were predictive.

People who never or very rarely attended religious services were most likely to say that churches and religious institutions had too much power. Similarly, young people (18–34) were more likely to believe religious institutions have too much power. Notably, people who attended religious services monthly were actually more likely than those who attended weekly to think churches and religious institutions should have more power — 20% compared to 15%.

Despite their general favourability toward the church and religious institutions, Georgians do not think these institutions should have more power or that their leaders should try to influence voters.

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables: settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), age (18-34, 35-55, 55+), sex (male or female), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, or higher than secondary), employment status (employed or unemployed), relationship status (has a spouse or partner, does not have a spouse or partner), and frequency of attendance of religious services (never or less than once per year, at least once per year, at least once per month, at least once per week).