Do Georgians worry about fake news online?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Salome Dolidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Caucasus Barometer 2021, an annual household survey run by CRRC, investigated a range of attitudes and behaviours related to social media in Georgia. 27% of those surveyed felt that social media had a negative effect on the country, 18% a positive effect, and 42% a neutral or mixed effect.

Of those that thought it had a negative effect, 40% reported that the main reason for the negative effect was misinformation. This answer was by far the most common response to the question.

Similarly, more than half (59%) of those who use the internet worry about false information on the Georgian internet. Regression analysis suggests that some groups are particularly worried about false information. People over the age of 35 were more likely to report that they worry about false information online.  People living in rural areas were less likely to worry about this issue.

Other social and demographic variables such as sex, education, ethnicity, employment status, wealth, and having children in the household were not associated with attitudes towards false information on Georgia’s internet.

More than half of the internet-using population said that lately, they had noticed misleading or false information online about the COVID-19 pandemic (67%), elections (64%), and Georgia’s domestic politics in general (59%), while 43% say the same regarding global politics.

When it comes to reasons for disseminating misleading or fake news, 43% of Georgians think that the reason is to confuse people and distract them from real problems. The next most common reasons were advancing a political agenda or position (15%) or getting more engagement with their content (14%).

While Georgians recognise that misinformation is an issue, few do much to check the information that they receive online. One in five does not check if the information they are reading online is accurate and reliable. 

Around half (53%) of the internet-using population believe what they are reading on the internet but verify it in some manner. Some report using approaches like looking for the writer’s name and/or a publisher (36%), or looking at a URL address (4%).  A further 12% ask someone they trust, and 1% post on social media looking for clarification. 

Another 14% report they believe just about everything online, with 8% saying that they believe what they read on the internet because it is published, and 6% thinking that everything on the internet is accurate. 

Few are highly sceptical about everything they read on the internet. In total, 8% ignore most things they see, because they feel most information is questionable. A further 4% question all the information they access because they are sceptical about everything on the internet. 

The analysis shows that most people in Georgia who use the internet worry about the spread of fake news on the internet and social media. However, a large proportion of people do not check whether the information they receive on the internet is reliable or not. 

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables:  Age (18-34, 35-54, 55+); Sex (male or female); Settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); Education level (tertiary or not); Ethnicity (Ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); Employment status (employed or not working); Child dependency ratio (share of household 18 or under); Wealth index (A simple additive index of ownership of a number of durable goods within a household).

How do Georgians feel about drug users?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dr. Tinatin Bandzeladze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Drugs have been slowly but surely finding their way into the everyday lives of Georgians for years now; in 2020 alone, CRRC Data suggested that drug users in Georgia, at a very minimum, spent $1.5 million on drugs through the dark web between February and August.

And yet, data from CRRC Georgia’s Caucasus Barometer suggests that drug users are still widely stigmatised in Georgia, creating a barrier to harm reduction and prevention programming and possibly standing in the way of reducing the harm of illicit drugs in Georgia through prevention-oriented policies.

Data from 2017, 2019, and 2021 Caucasus Barometer surveys suggest that the only group which people would least like to have as neighbours are criminals. Drug users take second place in the most recent wave of the survey, previously being tied in this position with homosexual people.  In 2021, 27% of the public reported they would least like to have a drug user as a neighbour. This share has not changed significantly, with movement remaining within the margin of error since 2017.  

Whether or not a respondent named a drug user varied with age, ethnicity, and settlement type.

Controlling for other factors, people over 55 are 15 percentage points more likely than people aged 18-34 to mention drug users as unwanted neighbours. 

Ethnic Azerbaijanis are 36 percentage points more likely than ethnic Georgians to name drug users as undesirable neighbours.

Settlement type is also associated with negative attitudes toward drug users. People in Tbilisi are 17 percentage points more likely than residents of other urban areas and 12 percentage points more likely than rural residents to rule out drug users from a list of potentially undesirable neighbours.

Employment, marital status, educational attainment, and religion are not associated with attitudes towards drug users in Georgia — at least not as measured by this variable.

The above data suggests that drug users are stigmatised in Georgia, with many implicitly preferring to have a criminal as a neighbour rather than a drug user. In turn, this suggests that the stigma drug users face may be a barrier to the effective implementation of harm reduction policies and programming in the country.

Note: The data used in the blog can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The analysis of which groups had different attitudes towards drug users was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male, female), age group (18-35, 35-55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian, ethnic Armenian and ethnic Azerbaijani), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), educational attainment (primary, secondary, technical or higher education), employment situation (working or not), marital status (married or single) and religion (Orthodox Church, other Christian groups, or Islam). The outcome variable was whether or not a respondent mentioned drug users.

What makes a good Georgian citizen?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Julia-Maria Xavier, an International Fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

A CRRC survey shows that Georgians tend to agree that social values factor more into the making of a good citizen than political engagement.

Respondents were asked six questions relating to good citizenship. Of these markers of good citizenship, the importance of helping those worse off, following traditions, and volunteering were the most supported behaviours.

When asked about the importance of a good citizen to support people who are worse off, 97% thought it was very or rather important. When asked about the importance of following traditions, 92% thought it was very or rather important. Volunteering had the lowest consensus rate within this group, with 90% agreeing that it was very or rather important.

Behaviours generally associated with good citizenship included the importance of being critical towards the government, the opposition, and partaking in protests. Respondents who thought it very or rather important to be critical of the government and opposition did so at 70% and 68%, respectively. The least supported marker of good citizenship was protesting, at 56%.

Factoring in demographic characteristics offers the ability to see which of these markers of good citizenship has broad support across society and which are more divisive.

For the first group of questions in which there is 90% or higher agreement, models only explored whether a respondent reported that behaviour was very important or not. For the second set of attitudes, models looked at whether people felt a behaviour was important or not.

The data shows uniform support across social and demographic groups regarding supporting people who are worse off.

When it comes to following traditions, there are differences between a number of groups. Young people (18-34) were 11 percentage points less likely than those 55+ to think that it is very important for good citizens to follow traditions. Ethnic minorities were 19 percentage points more likely than ethnic Georgians to believe it very important. Those living in the capital were 15 percentage points less likely than those in urban and rural communities to think that following traditions is very important for good citizenship. Gender and employment were not associated with attitudes on this question.

Attitudes toward volunteering also vary by ethnicity and settlement type. Ethnic Georgians were 13 percentage points less likely to view volunteering as very important to being a good citizen than ethnic minorities would.

In Tbilisi, volunteering was five percentage points less likely to be considered very important compared to other urban areas and 11 points less likely to be considered very important compared to rural areas. Age, gender, and employment did not have a significant association when controlling for other factors.

The data shows much more significant variation in terms of the importance of political behaviour for good citizenship.

With regard to being critical of the government, ethnic Georgians were 39 percentage points more likely to think that it was important compared to ethnic minorities. Those in the capital were 14 percentage points more likely than those in rural areas to think it important. Age, gender, and employment were insignificant when controlling for other factors.

When asked about the importance of being critical towards the opposition, ethnic minorities were 30 percentage points less likely to think it was important than ethnic Georgians. Those in the capital were 11 points more likely to think it important than those in rural areas. Gender, and employment, when controlling for other factors, are not associated with attitudes on this question.

The last marker of good citizenship is participation in protests. Young people (18-34) were 13 and 10 percentage points more likely than those aged 35-54 and 55+ to view this as an important aspect of good citizenship. Ethnic Georgians were 27 percentage points more likely to think protests were important for good citizenship than ethnic minorities. There was no meaningful difference between settlements, genders, or employment statuses when controlling for other factors.

The above data shows that Georgians tend to emphasize supporting fellow citizens and following traditions rather than engaging in politics when they think about what it means to be a good citizen.

The data used in this article is available here. Charts only display statistically significant associations between variables.

The views expressed in this post are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Europe Foundation, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Georgians are becoming wearier of economic ties to Russia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Elene Ergeshidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, NDI Georgia, or any related entity.

Imports to Georgia from Russia have been on the rise since 2011, and exports since 2013. As of 2021, 14% of Georgia’s exports went to Russia and 10% of Georgia’s imports came from Russia. But when looking at the recent past, there are clear indications that such economic reliance on Russia can be problematic.  The ban on trade in 2006 and suspension of flights in 2019 after the Gavrilov night clearly demonstrated this. 

Data from the CRRC Georgia and NDI surveys conducted before and after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine show that the Georgian public increasingly thinks the country should limit its economic interactions with Russia. 

Before the invasion, about half of Georgia (53%) believed that the country should deepen economic ties with Russia. Following the invasion, only one in four (25%) reported the same. 

The share of people who believe economic relations with Russia should remain as they are also increased after the invasion moving from 16% in February to 27% in March.

 

The data suggest that changes in attitudes are largest among young people, ethnic Georgians, people that do not support the ruling Georgian Dream party, and those who are better off. 

Young people (aged 18-34) became 21 points more likely to think that economic relations with Russia should be limited, compared with a 13-point change among older people (55+), controlling for other factors.

Ethnic Georgians became 19 points more likely to hold this view, compared to no significant change among ethnic minorities. 

Supporters of Georgian Dream became five percentage points more likely to think that Georgia should limit economic ties with Russia, compared with a 24 percentage point change among opposition supporters and a 19 percentage point change among those that did not report a party they support. 

Views also shifted particularly among the relatively well off. People living in households with the highest score on a wealth index shifted their views by 27 percentage points. People living in households with a median amount of wealth had a 20 percentage point increase while there was no significant change among those in the poorest households.

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model from the merged data. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth, and a variable for when the survey was conducted.

Although the share of people who think Georgia should deepen its economic relations with Russia halved after the invasion, a regression analysis of the March data shows that men, people who are 35 and above, and Georgian Dream supporters were more likely to say that Georgia should deepen economic relations with Russia than women, young people (18-34), opposition supporters and people who did not name a party.

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

While half the public felt that Georgia should deepen economic relations with Russia before the war, after the invasion, a plurality think Georgia should limit economic ties with their northern neighbour. These changes in views are particularly prominent among wealthier Georgians, ethnic Georgians, younger people, and those that do not support Georgian Dream.

Note: The data used in this article is available here.

Georgia’s uneven post-pandemic economic recovery

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Saying that COVID-19 changed the world is perhaps an understatement. Although a health catastrophe first and foremost, economies also plunged with the emergence of wide-ranging restrictions on activity. World Bank data suggests the global economy shrank between 2019 and 2020 by approximately 3.3%. In Georgia, the corresponding figures were a 6.7% decline in the size of the economy. 

As COVID-19 restrictions have been largely removed, the world has witnessed an economic recovery, albeit combined with the highest rate of inflation seen in recent memory. Despite wide-ranging rhetoric around building back better, data from a newly released World Bank study, which CRRC Georgia conducted, suggests that while the economy is recovering, many groups are facing greater barriers to re-entering the workforce.

Since December 2020, CRRC Georgia has been conducting a series of telephone surveys for the World Bank. The results of the survey show a clear rise in the share of the public that is engaged in employment. While 32% of the public (over the age of 18) reported having a job in December 2020, 43% did in March of 2022.

Still, this data indicates that employment has yet to recover to pre-pandemic levels, with 51% of the public reporting that they had been employed prior to the pandemic.

 

While the economy is clearly recovering, the data also show that recovery in employment is unequal.

Regression analysis comparing people who lost a job during the pandemic and have not returned to employment to people who lost a job during the pandemic and did return to work suggests that a number of traditionally economically disadvantaged groups face larger challenges in re-entering the workforce.

Women who lost a job during the pandemic are 12 percentage points more likely not to be working at present than men, while people in poor households are substantially less likely to have re-entered the workforce.

In addition, the more elderly people there are in a household, the less likely someone who lost a job during the pandemic is to have returned. 

Similarly, in households with relatively large shares of children, people who lost a job during the pandemic are significantly less likely to be working today than in households with fewer children. 

People who did not get vaccinated are 14 percentage points less likely to have returned to the workforce than people who did get vaccinated.

In the one bright point in the analysis, people in families that receive targeted social assistance were more likely to return to work than in families that do not receive social assistance.

In contrast, there are no significant differences between age groups, settlement types, households with more and fewer members, people of different education levels, ethnic groups, and people who did and did not catch COVID-19 after controlling for the factors shown in the chart above.

Women, people with greater numbers of elderly people, and greater numbers of children in them all remain less likely to be employed at present than men and people without children or elderly people in the household.

This suggests that domestic work and care work burdens related to the pandemic may be at play in people’s lack of return to the workforce. However, this would require further research to confirm.

In the above context, actors working on Georgia’s economic recovery should look into policies which can support a more equal recovery.

Note: The data this article is based on is available here. The analysis of which groups have and have not returned to the workforce was conducted using a logistic regression which controlled for the following variables: Age (18-34, 35-54, 55+); Sex; Settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); Household member count; Education level (tertiary or not); Child dependency ratio (share of household 18 or under); Elderly dependency ratio (share of household over the age of 64); Received targeted social assistance aside from an old age pension; Caught COVID 19/ had a family member with COVID 19 or not; Vaccinated against COVID 19 or not; Ethnicity (Ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); Wealth index (A simple additive index of ownership of a number of durable goods within a household).