The Gakharia Effect

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Siligadze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia, and Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of NDI, CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

In February, then Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia resigned in response to a disagreement within the ruling party regarding the detention of Nika Melia, the leader of the United National Movement. But how did his resignation affect people’s political views?

Gakharia was among the most popular leaders from the ruling party and led Georgian Dream during the 2020 Parliamentary elections.  

Analysis of a February 2021 NDI survey, which was ongoing at the time of Gakharia’s resignation, suggests the immediate effect of Gakharia’s resignation was a nine percentage point decline in support for Georgian Dream.

The CRRC and NDI telephone survey was conducted between 17–24 February 2021. On 17 February, a day before Gakharia’s resignation, every third (32%) Georgian considered Georgian Dream as the political party closest to them, 12% named an opposition party, and more than half (56%) did not specify any party (responding no party, don’t know, or refuse to answer). 

After Gakharia resigned on 18 February, Georgian Dream numbers dropped to around every fifth person (22%) naming it as the party closest to them. One in seven Georgians (15%) named an opposition party, and almost two thirds (63%) did not name a party. 

A regression analysis, controlling for a wide range of factors, suggests that after taking into account differences between people interviewed before and after Gakharia’s resignation, there was a nine percentage point drop in support for Georgian Dream as a result of the resignation.  

Further analysis showed that Gakharia’s resignation did not affect support for opposition parties. Rather, support shifted to other response options generally.  Thus, the PM leaving the party contributed to Georgian Dream supporters becoming disillusioned, though the opposition did not gain much from the resignation either. 

Different groups of the public were affected differently. 

People living in Tbilisi, people with higher education levels, and employed people were significantly less likely to name the ruling Georgian Dream party as being closest to them after Gakharia’s resignation. 

In contrast, the resignation did not affect party identification for people who were not working, people with secondary or a lower levels of education, or people living outside the capital. 

While the changes in party support are logical, the circumstances of the resignation could also reasonably be expected to change people’s views of the government. This is particularly true given Gakharia’s popularity and contribution to the perception that the government was effectively handling the pandemic. 

Yet, regression analyses suggest no changes in terms of people’s attitudes towards the direction the country was headed, the performance of parliament, assessments of the government’s economic COVID mitigation measures, or vaccination intention. 

The above analysis shows that while Gakharia was critical to Georgian Dream support, his departure did not significantly affect how people thought about other issues in the country.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models which included the following variables: age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), gender (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower, secondary technical, or incomplete higher education/higher), employment situation (working or not), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), party identification (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK/RA), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban areas, or rural areas) and interview date (before Gakharia's resignation or after Gakharia's resignation).

Do Georgians differentiate between the Russian people and Russian state?

Note: This article originally appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint publication of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dr. Tamuna Khostaria, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia, and Nino Mzavanadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article reflect the views of the authors alone, and do not neccesarily reflect the views of GFSIS, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Given the hostile relations between Russia and Georgia over the last 30 years, Georgian public opinion towards their northern neighbour could be expected to be less than positive. But do Georgians differentiate between the Russian state and the Russian people?

A study CRRC-Georgia conducted for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) South Caucasus Office in 2021 shows that people have conflicting attitudes towards Russia and Russians. 

The data suggest that the Georgian public’s attitudes towards Russian people and the Russian state differ significantly. Half of people living in Georgia (52%) report having a positive attitude towards Russian people, with only 7% reporting negative attitudes. 

At the same time, half of the population (54%) reported having a negative attitude towards the Russian Federation, while only 18% held positive views. 

A quote from one 29-year-old ethnic Georgian woman from Tbilisi who holds a higher education and who participated in a focus group reflects these sentiments:

‘For me, Russia is an occupier, but my [negative] attitude is not towards ordinary Russian people, because if my government did horrible things that would not mean that I am like that too. I adore Russian literature, but I dislike Russia with its ruler. But again, that does not mean that I despise the people’.

Overall, 17% of people reported having a positive attitude towards Russia and Russian people, 21% a positive attitude towards Russian people and a negative attitude towards the state, 7% a negative attitude towards both, 22% neutral attitudes towards both, and 33% a mixture of attitudes. Less than 1% had a positive attitude towards Russia and a negative attitude towards Russians; as a result, this category is not included in subsequent analysis.

Which set of attitudes people position themselves in was associated with a number of factors, according to a set of regression analyses. 

Men were significantly more likely to have positive attitudes towards Russian people but not the state than women. Women were significantly more likely to report neutral or uncertain attitudes towards both. 

Attitudes also vary by education level.  People with secondary education or lower were significantly more likely to report positive attitudes towards Russia and Russians. In contrast, people with tertiary education reported more positive views towards Russians but not Russia.

People in Tbilisi were more likely to hold positive attitudes towards Russians but not Russia than in other settlement types, while people in rural areas were less likely to fall into this grouping and more likely to hold neutral views. 

Older people were more likely to have positive views of Russians but not Russia.  This finding might be explained by the closer relations which older people had with Russians during the Soviet Union. 

Indeed, this view was often expressed in focus groups, with participants noting that friendships are less common among young people. One 50-year-old ethnic Georgian woman with a higher education from Samagrelo stated:

‘Considering we are neighbours, we should deepen relationships and make them better. People can make anything happen. Politics is one thing, but people’s power is boundless. My generation feels that way, but the younger generation feels differently. They don’t speak Russian either, and can’t imagine any kind of relationship with Russians. We, the older generation, have more nostalgic sentiments [and can] set politics aside.’

Attitudes also vary with foreign policy preferences. People with negative attitudes towards Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration also tended to be more likely to have positive views of both Russia and Russians. In contrast, those who were positive about Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration held a broader mix of views. 

People who had a negative attitude towards Georgia joining NATO were roughly 2.5 times more likely (32%) to have a positive attitude towards Russian people and the state compared with people who held a positive attitude towards Georgia’s integration into NATO (13%). 

The data showed a similar pattern with attitudes towards Georgia’s integration with the European Union.

The findings suggest that attitudes towards the Russian people and the Russian state differ in Georgia. 

Men, those living in the capital, people with tertiary education, and older people held a more positive attitude towards the people, but not the state.  

As younger people have relatively weak links with Russians, it is reasonable to assume that what goodwill exists towards Russians is likely to wane in the future. How dynamics play out given these findings though, remains an open question. What is clear though is that people with negative attitudes towards Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration also have more positive attitudes towards both Russia and Russians.

Note: The above quantitative analysis is based on two multinomial logistic regression models, where the dependent variable is attitudes towards the Russian state and Russian people with the following categories: Positive attitudes towards Russian people and state, positive attitudes towards Russian people but not state, negative attitude towards Russian people and state, Neutral attitude towards Russian people and state, any other attitude towards Russian people and/or state, excluding people who had positive attitudes towards the Russian state but negative attitudes towards Russians. This variable was generated using two survey questions, with one question about people's attitudes towards the state and the other about attitudes towards Russian people. The independent variables include (a) demographic variables (gender, age, settlement type, and education) and attitudes towards joining the EU; and (b) demographic variables and attitudes towards joining the NATO.   

Georgians are still conservative, but attitudes are slowly changing

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Kristina Vacharadze, Programs Director at CRRC Georgia, and Anano Kipiani, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia, the Europe Foundation, or any related entity.

Newly released data from the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia survey, which CRRC Georgia carried out for the Europe Foundation, suggests that the public’s attitudes are changing about women having pre-marital sex and children out of wedlock. 

While in 2015, 69% of Georgians thought that it was never justified for a woman to have pre-marital sex, 55% did in 2021, a 14 percentage point decline. During this same period, there was a 10 percentage point increase in the share of people reporting that it is sometimes or always justified. A large amount of these changes took place between 2019 and 2021, with an 11 percentage point decline in thinking pre-marital sex was never justified for women, while there was a six percentage point increase in thinking it is justified at least some of the time.

Similarly, attitudes towards women having children out of wedlock have changed. In 2015, 57% said it was never justified. In 2021, 42% did. The share reporting that it is sometimes or always justified increased from 37% to 47% in the same period. 

Young people aged 18-34 are generally more liberal than older people regarding women having sexual relationships before marriage and having children without being married.  Comparing the most recent wave to the 2019 data suggests that people under the age of 55 are becoming more liberal about women having children outside wedlock, while older people’s attitudes did not shift significantly. With regard to having pre-marital sex, the data suggest that younger people (18-34) and older people (55+) became more liberal, while the age group in between did not change their views. 

Generally speaking, people living in Tbilisi are less conservative than people living in other areas. While this remains true in the 2021 data, the changes described above stem from people in rural areas becoming more liberal on pre-marital sex and women having children outside of marriage.  In contrast, views in urban areas did not change significantly between 2019 and 2021.

The data shows that people with higher than secondary education are more tolerant about both issues than people with a lower level of education. The change in views observed between 2019 and 2021 primarily stems from changing views among those with tertiary education. 

Generally, ethnic Georgians are more tolerant towards women having sexual relations before marriage and having children outside of it. The gap between ethnic Georgians and ethnic minorities expanded in 2021, as compared with 2019. Ethnic minorities’ views have shifted little in recent years on either issue. 

Analyses by gender did not show any difference with regard to women having pre-marital sex. Although gender plays a role in attitudes towards women having a child without being married, women more often say that it is acceptable than men. Attitudes among men and women moved in a similar manner between 2019 and 2021.

People became less conservative towards pre-marital sex and women having children outside of wedlock in 2021. The data tends to suggest that rural people, young people, and those with higher education became more liberal during this period. 

The data presented in the above article is available here.