Leaders or promises: What the Georgian public cares about when voting

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of OC Media and CRRC Georgia. It was written by Dr. Tsisana Khundadze, a senior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article reflect those of the author alone, and do not reflect the views of ISFED, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Researchers often talk about the importance of policies and political leaders, with the importance of each dependent on the political culture of an electorate. So what are the most important factors for people in Georgia when deciding who to vote for? 

This issue came to the forefront with the arrival of Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia ahead of the first round of the 2021 local government elections. Whether this ultimately affected the election results is actively discussed. 

While the impact of Saakashvili’s arrival will likely remain unclear, data from an August 2021 ISFED survey, which CRRC Georgia carried out, shows that while policy matters to voters, political leaders are the most important factors in voters’ minds when deciding who to vote for.

The August 2021 ISFED survey on election-related processes shows that around a third of the population see a party’s electoral platform and promises as the most important factor when deciding who to vote for. A similar share reported the same about trust in the leaders of political parties. Every fourth person mentioned trust in specific members of the party as important. Fewer people mentioned the parties’ past performance or the political opinion of other people.

A regression analysis shows that the only factor that predicts whether trust in party leaders is the most important factor for someone is which party they support. 

People who support the Georgian Dream or an opposition party are 1.3 and 1.4 times more likely to say that trust in the leaders of a political party is an important factor when choosing who to vote for compared with people who do not report that they support a party. 

People of different genders, ages, settlement types, ethnicities, education levels, employment types, and economic situations have similar attitudes, controlling for other factors.

Note: This and the following charts were generated from a regression model. The model includes sex (male, female), age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), employment status (public sector, private sector employee, private sector self-employed, not working), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

Whether someone names a party’s electoral platform and promises varies by a number of characteristics as well. 

People with higher than secondary education were 1.2 times more likely to mention a party’s electoral platform and promises as important than people with secondary or lower education. 

People who are not working and people who are employed in the public or private sectors were 1.2 times and 1.4 times, respectively, more likely to mention platforms and promises than self-employed people. 

Georgian Dream supporters were 1.2 times more likely to name a party’s platform and promises as important when deciding who to vote for compared to people who do not name any party. 

There were no significant differences in terms of gender, age, settlement type, ethnicity, or economic situation, controlling for other factors.

While trust towards the party leaders and a party’s promises were the most important factors, when faced with a choice between the two, people leaned towards trust in leaders. 

About half (48%) of the Georgian public reported that it was more important who the party leaders are. In contrast, a third (31%) said what the party promised was more important.

A number of variables predict which direction people lean in. A regression analysis showed that ethnic Georgians were 1.5 times more likely to choose leaders over promises compared to ethnic minorities. 

Opposition supporters were 1.2 times more likely to consider party leaders as more important compared to Georgian Dream supporters. 

Lastly, the wealthier a person’s household, the more likely that person was to agree that who the party leaders are is more important. 

There were no significant differences between people of different genders, ages, settlement types, education levels, or employment statuses, controlling for other factors.

People deem a party’s programme and promises as well as  party leaders important. However, people tend to place more emphasis on leaders. Georgian Dream supporters were more likely to name a party’s electoral platform and less likely to choose leaders over promises. Opposition supporters are most likely to name trust in leaders as most important. Ethnic minorities seem to care less about the leaders compared to ethnic Georgians.

Who reported seeing dzveli bitchebi engaged in the elections?

This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia.

The views presented in this article do not represent the views of the ISFED, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity. 

Opposition parties and some observers reported the engagement of dzveli bitchi, a term roughly equivalent to wise guys or hoods in English, in election-related activities prior to the October 2021 local elections. Data from an ISFED and CRRC Georgia survey suggests that a substantial share of the public also reported seeing the same.

While the survey on the pre-electoral environment saw a large share reporting seeing dzveli bitchebi near election precincts in the year prior to the elections, reported sightings varied significantly based on which political party people support. Even so, some Georgian Dream supporters still reported seeing dzveli bitchebi around election precincts.

One in nine (11%) of Georgia’s adult population reported seeing a dzveli bitchi near a voting precinct in the past year, 83% reported they had not, and 6% either did not know or refused to answer. 

The public was also asked if they thought the participation of dzveli bitchebi in elections was acceptable. Most of the public thought their participation was completely unacceptable (48%) or unacceptable (39%). Only 4% of the public viewed this as acceptable. A further 8% reported they did not know whether it was acceptable or not and 1% refused to answer the question. 

Those that had seen a dzveli bichi around the polling station felt more strongly that this was unacceptable.

A regression analysis suggests that a number of variables predict whether or not someone reported seeing dzveli bitchebi around the election precinct. 

Wealthier households were more likely to report seeing so than people in poorer households.

People in Tbilisi were more likely to report seeing dzveli bitchebi around the election precinct than people in other urban areas, controlling for other factors. 

By far the strongest predictor of whether or not someone reported that they saw dzveli bitchebi near the voting precinct was the party someone supports. Controlling for other factors, a Georgian Dream supporter had a 3% chance of reporting so while an opposition supporter had a 23% chance of reporting the same, a 20 percentage point gap.

The large partisan gap on this issue may suggest that opposition supporters were reporting they saw dzveli bitchebi around election precincts in order to discredit Georgian Dream, knowing that the survey would eventually be public. This could be the case. But, the fact that some Georgian Dream supporters reported the same thing suggests that there were at least some dzveli bitchebi around election precincts in the pre-electoral period.

Dzveli bitchebi tend to be an urban phenomenon. In this regard, one might suggest that the people in rural areas are reporting what they saw on television. This again may be the case. 

A model comparing people who do and do not watch TV in different settlements suggests that people outside Tbilisi that do not watch TV were less likely to claim they saw dzveli bitchebi around polling stations. However, the rates of reporting seeing dzveli bitchebi in Tbilisi are not significantly different for those that do and do not watch TV.

While one in nine in Georgia reported seeing dzveli bitchebi around the electoral precinct prior to the elections this year, the vast majority did not approve of their engagement in elections. 

The data indicates that whether or not all of these reports are true, some of them likely are, given that even Georgian Dream supporters occasionally reported seeing dzveli bitchebi around the election precincts and that the reporting rates are consistent in Tbilisi, where dzveli bitchebi would most likely be, whether or not someone was reporting what they saw on TV on the survey.

Note: The above analysis is based on a logistic regression. The independent variables include gender, age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), settlement type, education level, an index of durable goods (proxying wealth), ethnicity (ethnic minority or ethnic Georgian), employment status (not working, working in the private sector, working in the public sector) and partisanship. 

What issues are important for Tbilisi residents?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of OC Media and CRRC Georgia. It was written by Givi Silagadze and Dustin Gilbreath. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of NED, CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The first round of the 2021 municipal elections were short on substantive discussions of local issues. But with the second round coming, what does the Tbilisi public want from their local government? 

Following the 30 October elections, the US Embassy in Tbilisi pointed out that a ‘lack of focus on local issues was a missed opportunity’. The OSCE, meanwhile, lamented that national political framing of the elections ‘overshadowed local issues’. 

A new survey of nearly 3,000 Tbilisians which CRRC Georgia conducted with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy suggests that the local issues that the population of Tbilisi is most worried about are jobs, traffic, air pollution, and public transport. 

Most people were satisfied with their utility infrastructure and unsatisfied with parking, their building’s appearance, and yards. 

When it comes to public transport, the public thinks things have been getting better in recent years. In this regard, they continue to prioritise the development of public transportation over car infrastructure. The public also wants to see green spaces prioritised over private development.

Most important issues

Even though unemployment is a national rather than a local issue, Tbilisi residents were most worried about the lack of jobs in the city. 

A quarter (24%) of people living in Tbilisi named unemployment as the most important problem in their community. Aside from employment, the public named traffic, air pollution, and public transport most frequently. One in seven (13%) Tbilisi residents named traffic as the top problem, 11% reported air pollution, while 10% thinks public transport is the most important issue in the city. 

Regression analysis suggests that men, people with lower education levels, those without jobs, and people living in poorer households were significantly more likely to name unemployment than women, people with higher education levels, the employed, and people from richer households.

As for traffic, supporters of the ruling party, younger people, men, and people living in wealthier households were significantly more likely to report traffic than supporters of the opposition or unaffiliated voters, older people, women, and people living in poorer households. 

IDPs were significantly less likely to name air pollution as a key concern than non-IDPs. No other differences were identified on these issues between different groups.

Housing infrastructure

Respondents were asked about issues in and surrounding their buildings. Tbilisi residents seemed to be most satisfied with utilities infrastructure, such as gas and electricity infrastructure, and light fittings. More than 80% of the public was satisfied with the above communal infrastructure. 

On the other hand, people were most unsatisfied with parking, the condition of yards, and their building’s appearance.

A simple additive index was created with the above 12 housing items, and regression analysis was conducted. The analysis suggests that men, people without jobs, supporters of the Georgian Dream Party, and people living in wealthier households were most satisfied, while women, employed people, supporters of the opposition or unaffiliated voters, and people living in poorer households were least satisfied with their communal infrastructure.

Cars VS public transport

A plurality (45%) of Tbilisi residents said the situation regarding car traffic had improved over the last four years. A third believed it had gotten worse (34%), and roughly a fifth said it had not changed (18%). 

This issue seems particularly partisan with party affiliation being the only statistically significant predictor. More specifically, Georgian Dream supporters were 40 percentage points more likely than opposition supporters and 32 percentage points more likely than unaffiliated voters to think that the situation had improved. 

Attitudes towards public transportation were more positive. Three in five Tbilisi residents (63%) said the situation regarding public transport had improved over the last four years. One in seven (16%) believed it had gotten worse, while 13% thought it had not changed. 

Attitudes towards public transport were a partisan issue as well, with supporters of the ruling party being 33 percentage points more likely to say it had gotten better than opposition supporters. Aside from partisanship, people living in wealthier households had significantly more positive views than people living in poorer households.

As for bus lanes, the public tended to approve of more bus lanes, even at the expense of slowing car traffic. Roughly four in five Tbilisi residents (79%) were in favour of constructing new bus lanes, even if that would make transportation by private cars slower. Only 11% of Tbilisi residents said new bus lanes should not be constructed and that unrestricted car traffic was more important. Regression analysis suggests that men and car owners were less supportive of constructing bus lanes.

In general, the public tended to prioritise improving public transport over building new roads and parking spaces. A majority (63%) of Tbilisi’s population thought improving public transport should be a higher priority for the city. 

Construction and recreational spaces

The survey asked about the government’s role in the construction business. Four in five people living in Tbilisi (82%) thought that the government rather than the construction business should decide where, what, and how something should be built. Regression analysis suggests that, all else equal, opposition supporters and employed people were less supportive of government regulations.

Overall, the survey showed that Tbilisi’s population was most concerned with jobs, traffic, public transportation, and air pollution. 

As for communal infrastructure, people tended to be unsatisfied with their building’s appearance, the state of their yards, and parking. 

Most people were satisfied with gas and electricity infrastructure and light fittings. 

The public generally supports the construction of bus lanes and tends to think that the situation regarding car traffic as well as public transportation has improved over the last four years. However, there is a stark partisan divide with supporters of the Georgian Dream party significantly more likely than other groups of society to think the situation had become better in this regard. 

Finally, Tbilisi residents would like their city government to play an active role in regulating the construction business.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic and multinomial regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), and party identification (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK/RA).

How widespread is vote-buying perceived to be in Georgia?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this blog do not reflect the views of ISFED, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

In their preliminary findings on the 2 October local election in Georgia, the OSCE-led observation mission cited ‘widespread and consistent allegations of vote-buying’ as having marred the vote. Survey data from earlier in the summer sheds further light on the problem, suggesting that 16% of people know someone who has been offered a bribe for their vote.

In recent years, there have been increasing concerns over the conduct of elections in Georgia. Such concerns are well documented in international reports and academic projects that advocate for democracy. 

The Freedom House 2021 report underlined democratic backsliding over recent years, and said the 2020 Parliamentary elections were ‘marred by vote-buying’. 

According to the Varieties of Democracy project, which relies on expert surveys, Georgia’s scores on free and fair elections have been declining since 2017. This decline is largely driven by deteriorating scores in the vote-buying component. 

A recent ISFED/CRRC survey offers a snapshot of people’s attitudes towards and experiences of vote-buying in Georgia. 

How many people know someone that sold their vote?

In total, 12% of the public reported that they knew someone whom a political party had promised personal gain in exchange for their vote. Regression analysis suggests that Georgian Dream supporters were 17 percentage points less likely to do so than opposition supporters. 

One in ten voters said they knew someone whom a political party or candidate had actually given money or a gift to in exchange for their vote over the past year. Regression analysis suggests people living in rural areas and opposition supporters were significantly more likely to report that they know such people than people living in urban areas and supporters of the ruling party. 

Regarding vote-buying practices on election day specifically, 10% of the public said they knew someone whom a party representative or coordinator asked to vote for a specific party in exchange for money on the day of an election. According to a regression analysis, Georgian Dream supporters, people living in poorer households, and older people were less likely to say so than opposition supporters, people living in rich households, and younger people. 

In total, 16% of the public said that they personally knew someone in one of the three categories noted above. 

Regression analysis suggests people living in urban areas, supporters of the ruling party, and people living in poorer households were less likely to report acquaintance with someone who has experienced vote-buying than people living in villages, opposition supporters, or unaffiliated voters, and people living in richer households. 

Are Georgians concerned?

One in five people named vote-buying as the main barrier to free and fair elections in the country. 

Supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party were less likely than other groups to name vote-buying as an issue. 

Half of the public (54%) named one or multiple obstacles to free and fair elections in Georgia, while 27% reported that they did not know what barriers there were and 16% said there were no obstacles to free and fair elections.

One in five (19%) said vote-buying was one of the most important barriers to proper electoral conduct, while 12% named harassment of voters. Smaller portions of the public named other obstacles. 

Vote-buying was named by a number of different groups as one of the main barriers to free and fair elections more often than others. 

All else equal, ethnic Georgians, opposition supporters, and people who mostly get information about elections via the internet or social media were more likely to think that vote-buying impairs Georgian elections than ethnic minorities, Georgian Dream supporters, and people who watch TV.

That 20% of people believe vote-buying is the main barrier to free and fair elections in Georgia and 16% personally know someone who has been subject to vote-buying portrays a gloomy picture for Georgia’s democratic prospects. 

All this, coupled with recent international concerns regarding Georgia’s commitment to a democratic path should be troubling for Georgians. 

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), primary source of information (TV, internet/social media, other sources), and party identification (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK, refuse to answer).

The data used in this analysis is available here.