Past wars have taught Georgians both to fear and be tolerant of minorities

Note: This post first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

Public polling shows how Georgia’s ethnic conflicts have shaped attitudes towards ethnic and linguistic minorities. But how are fear and tolerance linked to ethno-nationalist sentiments in the country?

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Georgia has gone through a number of ethnic conflicts that have not been resolved to this day. Given that Georgia has always been a multi-ethnic country, and the traumatic experience of unresolved conflicts, attitudes towards ethnic minorities matter. Recently released data from the Future of Georgia Survey looks at links between Georgia’s conflicts and the Georgian public’s attitudes towards ethnic minorities. 

The data suggests that although the wars have led many in Georgia to see a potential threat of ethnic minorities to the country’s security, people are also conscious of the need for tolerance.

Around half of the public agrees that the wars that Georgia has been involved in since independence show that ethnic and linguistic minorities are a potential security threat for Georgia. But even more, 69%, think that the wars show that the country and population needs to be more tolerant of ethnic minorities. 

Thus, these two statements on fear and tolerance are not mutually exclusive, and indeed, 76% of those thinking ethnic and linguistic minorities are a potential threat also see the importance of tolerance. If transposed, 55% of those that see the importance of tolerance, also agree that ethnic and linguistic minorities are a potential security threat for Georgia. 

While some studies in pre-and-post-conflict settings argue that ethnic intolerance can be the product rather than a cause of war, the data seemingly suggests past wars in Georgia have shown society that ethnic minorities can be a threat but tolerance can work against that threat. Although needing further research, acceptance of the need for tolerance might be an acknowledgement that ethnic minorities are only a threat if society is intolerant.

Who thinks tolerance matters?

Further analysis suggests that some groups in Georgian society are more likely than others to see the need to be tolerant of ethnic minorities. Controlling for other factors, men are slightly more likely to see the need for tolerance compared to women. So are younger people compared to other age groups, and employed people compared to those not working. 

Ethnicity, settlement type, educational attainment, and IDP status are not statistically associated, all else equal. 

Those favouring the integration of ethnic minorities into the country’s public and political life are more likely to see the need for tolerance. More specifically, those willing to vote for someone who is a different ethnicity than oneself, those thinking that more ethnic minority MPs in parliament would have a positive rather than negative impact on the country, and those that approve of court cases between ethnic minorities being carried out in minority languages are more likely to see the need for tolerance.

Quite surprisingly, those that think Georgian citizens should be Orthodox Christians are slightly more likely to see the need for tolerance compared to those who disagree. 

Social identification seems to be an important factor. Those for whom being a citizen of Georgia is more important than their ethnic identity are 18 percentage points more likely to see the need for tolerance towards ethnic minorities.

Who thinks minorities are a potential threat?

The factors associated with the belief that ethnic and linguistic minorities are a potential security threat for Georgia are largely similar, with several exceptions. Threat perception increases with age. 

Ethnic Georgians are three times more likely to see minorities as a potential security threat compared to ethnic minorities. People living in rural areas are ten percentage points more likely to think minorities pose a threat compared to those living in the capital. 

Gender, employment status, educational attainment, and being displaced due to previous conflicts in the region are not associated with threat perceptions.

Those thinking that Georgian citizens should be Orthodox Christians are 23 percentage points more likely to see ethnic minorities as a potential threat, and those thinking that only ethnic Georgians should be allowed to be Georgian citizens 26 percentage points more likely. 

People willing to vote for someone of a different ethnicity or religion are less likely to see ethnic minorities as a security threat. Those thinking that an increase in the number of ethnic minority MPs would have a negative impact on Georgia are 14 percentage points more likely to see ethnic minorities as a potential threat compared to those thinking that increasing ethnic minority MPs would have a positive impact.

More than half of the Georgian public think that the wars Georgia has gone through show that ethnic and linguistic minorities might be a security threat for Georgia, although even more believe the wars also show a need for tolerance. 

Although not self-explanatory in terms of what this says about the Georgian public’s attitudes towards ethnic minorities, these statements are, to a certain extent, associated with ethno-nationalist attitudes. 

Identification with one’s ethnic group more than to one’s country is associated with a weaker demand for tolerance. Similarly, those that ascribe ethnicity and religion to citizenship are more likely to view ethnic minorities as a threat. Perspectives on ethnic minorities’ participation in Georgian politics are associated with both perceptions of tolerance and threat.

Note: The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool.  The analysis of which groups had different attitudes towards the war was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables in all cases: sex (male or female), age group (18–35, 35–55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or other ethnicity), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), and IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not).  Attitudinal variables tested as part of the analysis included, whether or not one agrees that Georgian citizens should be Orthodox Christians, whether or not one agrees that only ethnic Georgians should be allowed to be Georgian citizens, whether or not one would vote for someone who is different religion than oneself, whether or not one would vote for someone who is different ethnicity than oneself, whether or not one would vote for someone who does not speak Georgian, the impact the increasing number of ethnic minority MPs would have on Georgia (does not matter, positive impact, negative impact, or none), the most important identity (citizenship, ethnicity, or both), whether one approves or not of providing government services in ethnic minority languages as well as Georgian, whether one approves or not of having street signs in minority languages, whether one approves or not of allowing court cases involving civil disputes between ethnic minorities to be carries out in minority languages. These variables were tested independently in separate regression analyses that controlled for the previously mentioned non-attitudinal variables.

Do Georgians harbour Ethnonationalist sentiments?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The social and political integration of ethnic minorities remains a challenge for the long-term democratic development of Georgia. But could ethnonationalist sentiments be hindering such integration?

Considering that one in seven Georgian citizens is of non-Georgian ethnic descent, ethnonationalism has the potential to estrange significant sections of society, presenting barriers to social cohesion and stability. 

Although the failure to address this problem can be partially attributed to government and political institutions, the public’s attitudes and beliefs also likely serve as an impediment. 

Data from the 2020 Future of Georgia survey suggest that about a third of the electorate exhibit some form of ethnonationalist sentiment.

The survey found that around a third of the adult population (30%) think only ethnic Georgians should be allowed to be Georgian citizens, while around two-thirds disagree (61%). 

A regression analysis suggests that some groups are more prone to equate nationality with ethnicity than the others. 

Ethnic Georgians, people with lower levels of formal education, people without jobs, and those living outside of Tbilisi were found to be significantly more likely to report that only ethnic Georgians should be allowed to be Georgian citizens compared to ethnic minorities, people with tertiary education, employed people, and residents of Tbilisi. 

Other socio-demographic variables, including age, sex, and IDP status were not associated with the above statement.

Respondents were also asked whether they would vote for someone of another ethnic group, with 46% reporting they would. 

A regression model examining who would vote for someone of different ethnic descent suggests a similar pattern.

Ethnicity, formal education level, and settlement type appear to be associated with readiness to vote for someone of a different ethnicity than themselves. 

Ethnic minorities were 33 percentage points more likely to report that they would vote for someone of a different ethnicity than themselves. 

People with a higher education, residents of Tbilisi, and poorer individuals were also more willing to vote for someone who is a different ethnicity than people with lower levels of education and people living outside of the capital. 

Willingness to vote for someone of a different ethnicity was not associated with other socio-demographic variables, including age, sex, employment situation, or IDP status. 

In terms of the perceived impact of the increased political presence of ethnic minorities in parliament, ethnic Georgians and people with lower education levels seem to differ from ethnic minorities and people with tertiary education.

More specifically, ethnic minorities were found to be four times more likely than ethnic Georgians to report that an increasing number of ethnic minority MPs would have a positive impact on Georgia. 

Controlling for other factors, ethnic Georgians have a  14% chance of saying that having more ethnic minority MPs would have a positive impact on the country compared with a 32% chance of saying the impact would be negative.

People with tertiary education were more likely to see a positive impact of more ethnic minorities in the legislature and less likely to see a negative impact than people with less years of formal education.

Even though the majority of the adult population of Georgia do not seem to harbour explicitly ethnonationalist sentiments, a substantial section of the public do say that Georgian citizenship should be equated with Georgian ethnicity, that they would not vote for someone with a different ethnic background, and that increased presence of ethnic minorities in Parliament would negatively affect Georgia. 

Considering that approximately every seventh Georgian citizen is not an ethnic Georgian, these ethnonationalist and ethnocentric sentiments pose a serious challenge to the long-term democratisation and state-building prospects of the country.

Furthermore, some groups tend to exhibit ethnonationalist sentiments more than others. 

People with lower levels of formal education and people living outside of Tbilisi were less favourably inclined towards increased participation of ethnic minorities in politics compared to those with a higher education and residents of the capital.   

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic and multinomial regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-35, 35-55, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not) and ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority). 

The data used in this analysis is available here. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

 

What’s a last name from Tbilisi?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

While regional identities and stereotypes are a prominent part of Georgian culture, what share of people identify with each regional heritage?

Regional identities (and stereotypes) are a prominent part of Georgian culture; Rachans are ‘slow’, and Gurians ‘talk fast’. While these stereotypes are just that, one question which is very much underexplored is what share of people identify with each regional heritage. 

Tbilisi is a melting pot of Georgia’s regional identities, with no clear understanding of which regional identity predominates. As one colleague regularly asks his students —  ‘what’s a Tbilisian last name?’

New data from CRRC Georgia’s omnibus survey demonstrates the point that while there are indeed many Megrelians in Tbilisi, there are more Imeretians. It also suggests that though a third of the country lives in Tbilisi, only a small minority consider themselves to be from Tbilisi. 

The survey asked respondents: ‘From which region of Georgia do you trace your origins?’ Responses to the question show the diversity of Georgia. 

In addition to naming foreign countries, respondents named 25 different locales, as shown on the chart below. A number of patterns stand out. 

For Mtskheta-Mtianeti in particular, the data is interesting in that people identify with their specific mountain region (Pshavi, Khevi, Khevsureti, or Tusheti) rather than the contemporary territory. Similarly, some identify with Hereti (a historical region of modern-day eastern Georgia and northern Azerbaijan) rather than Kakheti.

Note: The data on the above chart is not accurate down to the second decimal place. It is shown for the purposes of demonstrating the diversity of Georgian identities.

Aside from the above, it is abundantly clear that only a small share of Tbilisians identify their roots in Tbilisi. While 6% of the public identifies as a Tbilisian, 29% of the country’s adult population lives in the capital according to the 2014 census, which the data is weighted to. 

When the survey data is broken down to look at Tbilisi alone, it suggests that one in five (21%) in Tbilisi consider themselves Tbilisians. Imeretians are the next most common at 17%, followed by Shida Kartlians, Kakhetians, and Megrelians. 

If people from Abkhazia, many of whom are also Megrelians, are taken together, then Megrelians would make up 13% of the capital’s population. This would make Megrelian the third most common regional identity in the capital. 

Similarly, Kakhetians would make up 12% of the capital’s population if Kakhetian were combined with Heretian.

The above data demonstrates the internal diversity of Georgia’s regional identities, which often do not fully correspond to Georgia’s contemporary regional boundaries. Perhaps most notably, even though a plurality of the country lives in Tbilisi, few identify with the city itself. 

The data used in the above post are available here. 

How different are people who trust different TV channels in Georgia?

[Note: This post first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of OC Media and CRRC Georgia. The post was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia.  The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.]

The Georgian media landscape is often described as pluralistic but ‘extremely polarised’. But does the media merely reflect the prevailing political polarisation or cause it? 

The majority of sizeable TV channels in Georgia are politically biased. At the same time, for seven in ten Georgians, TV remains the main source of information.

While this is a classic chicken and egg problem, arguably, causation flows both ways. Nonetheless, it has been documented that partisan media can polarise consumers and radicalise partisan voters. 

While it is not possible to untangle cause and effect through the available data, it is possible to describe the differences between viewers who trust different stations. Data from Caucasus Barometer 2020 suggests that party preferences go hand in hand with media preferences. 

Moreover, after controlling for social and demographic factors, TV trust seems to be strongly associated with views on some current domestic political issues, but less so when it comes to foreign policy positions.

Overall, 66% of the adult population of Georgia named a TV channel that they trusted for news and politics in Georgia on the 2020 Caucasus Barometer survey. One in four Georgians reported that they trust pro-government station Imedi TV. In contrast, 14% named Mtavari as the TV station they trust. Mtavari is regarded as the station most critical of the government and pro-opposition.

Partisanship and media

Public trust in different channels reflects party lines to a great extent. A majority (57%) of Georgian Dream supporters said they trusted Imedi, while only 8% of the opposition-minded electorate and 15% of nonpartisans said they trusted the channel. 

Similarly, 47% of opposition supporters said they trusted either Mtavari or TV Pirveli, while only 5% of Georgian Dream supporters and 20% of nonpartisans trust either of those stations.

A regression analysis suggests that, after controlling for other factors, people who trust Imedi were 10 times more likely to support the Georgian Dream party compared to people that trust Mtavari or TV Pirveli. 

People who trust Rustavi 2 were 20 percentage points more likely to support Georgian Dream than people who trust Mtavari or TV Pirveli, but 35 percentage points less likely to sympathise with the ruling party compared to voters who trust Imedi. 

Current issues

Views on the direction the country is headed, views of whether people should protest, and views of the country’s handling of the pandemic were also associated with which TV station they watch. 

A regression analysis suggested that people who trust Imedi were sharply different from other groups in their assessments of the country’s direction. People who reported trust towards Imedi were 59 percentage points more likely to say that Georgia is moving in the right direction compared to people that trust Mtavari. 

TV trust was also associated with views on protesting. People who said they trusted Mtavari and TV Pirveli were significantly more likely to report that people should participate in protests against the government than people who said they trusted Imedi, Rustavi 2, and other channels, as well as those who do not watch TV or trust no station. 

People who said they trusted the opposition-leaning Mtavari and TV Pirveli were less prone to praise Georgia’s handling of the pandemic than people who trusted other TV channels, people who did not trust any channel, or those who did not watch TV at all. 

While there are some differences between the audiences of different channels, media consumption was not correlated with many factors. 

For instance, there was no difference between TV audiences in terms of whether or not they believed that areas of neighbouring countries where artefacts of the Georgian culture are located should be included in the borders of Georgia. The public largely reports that such territories should be part of Georgia. 

The question has implications for the Davit Gareja case, which attracted significant public attention during the pre-election and post-election period. The issue has been politically instrumentalised with pro-government channel Imedi adopting the slogan ‘Davit Gareja is Georgia’. 

Still, the formulation of the question in the Caucasus Barometer 2020 dataset is in general terms and therefore proxies attitudes rather than providing direct evidence of what the public thinks regarding the Davit Gareja case. 

As with the question on territory, there are limited differences between groups on foreign policy priorities. Even though a regression analysis suggests there are some statistically significant associations, these differences do not carry huge substantive importance as all the groups, ultimately, tend to support Georgia’s membership in the EU as well as NATO.

Another regression model was constructed to test associations between TV trust and support for Georgia’s membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Union. Some groups tended to sympathise more with Georgia becoming a member of the Eurasian Union than others, however, overall, the public disapproves of Georgia joining the Russian-led project. 

All else equal, the TV media environment seems to be at the core of the country’s polarised political discourse. 

TV is strongly associated with party preferences and assessments of many current domestic issues and developments, but less so with a foreign policy orientation. 

To what extent TV channels in Georgia persuade voters or make them more extreme, remains an open question.  However, what the above analyses suggest is that the socio-political landscape in Georgia is being increasingly divided into two camps. This divide revolves around contrasting perceptions of reality, and TV seems to be exacerbating rather than bridging the chasm.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic and multinomial regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-35, 35-55, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower or incomplete higher education/higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 12 different items, a proxy variable), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), frequency of internet usage (every day or less often), and frequency of attendance at religious services (regularly/on special religious holidays/less often). 

The data used in this analysis is available here.