Georgia among worst in the world for vaccine hesitancy

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint OC Media and CRRC Georgia effort. The article was written by Dr. David Sichinava, Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article represent the views of the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

Scientists agree that global mass immunisation against COVID-19 is the only pathway to putting the virus under control. Yet, the World Health Organisation has argued that actually getting people to take vaccines is ‘an unprecedented challenge’, which might undermine mass immunisation efforts. 

New data suggests that the Georgian public is among the least interested in getting a vaccine globally, given available data. 

On the January 2021 Omnibus survey, CRRC Georgia asked respondents whether they wanted to be vaccinated against COVID-19 if a safe and effective vaccine was available tomorrow. While half the public (48%) said yes, half were against being vaccinated (40%) or uncertain (12%). 

Since this poll was conducted, the government has expanded those eligible to be vaccinated to include the general public over the age of 65, after take-up among medical workers was low. 

Vaccination efforts encountered a significant challenge when a nurse who was promoting vaccination passed away as a result of an allergic reaction to the vaccine itself. 

More recent polling from February, which was collected prior to the above described events, has shown an even lower share of the public wants to be vaccinated (35%). 

With this context in mind, how does Georgia fare globally in terms of vaccine acceptance? CRRC data puts the country near the bottom in the global league table of countries where polling data on vaccine hesitancy is available. 

Georgians are on par with the populations of the Philippines, France, and Russia regarding openness to getting vaccinated.

How do different groups of Georgians compare in terms of vaccine hesitancy? 

More women than men are hesitant about getting a COVID-19 jab. About half of Georgian men (52%) said that they would get vaccinated compared to 45% of women. Forty-three percent of women said they would not get inoculated, with only 37% of men saying they would not. 

Georgians with a higher education (53%) are eight percentage points more likely to want a vaccine than those without (46%). 

There is a notable partisan split when it comes to openness to vaccination. While most supporters of both the Georgian Dream and opposition parties want a vaccine, more Georgian Dream supporters (62%) said that they will vaccinate than opposition supporters (52%). Georgian Dream supporters were less likely to say that they would not vaccinate (27%) than supporters of other political parties (41%). Importantly, non-partisans were more likely to say that they would not vaccinate (46%) than vaccinate (41%).

Further analysis of the data shows that vaccine hesitancy is also related to other attitudes. For instance, more than half (54%) of those who believe that COVID-19 is a real threat (three-quarters of Georgians) would vaccinate. Those that think the danger of COVID-19 is exaggerated (19% of the total population) are more likely to refuse a vaccine. Only about 25% of such respondents would get a COVID-19 jab, while 66% would refuse to be inoculated.

How do those who refuse to be vaccinated or are uncertain explain their attitudes? Most (55%) respondents said that they do not trust vaccines. Seventeen percent said that they do not need a vaccine. About 10% were afraid of vaccination, and 5% said they are anxious about the vaccines’ potential side effects. Two percent named other reasons, while 11% were unsure. 

Notably, opposition supporters are almost twice as likely to say that they do not trust vaccines (72%) than those that identify with Georgian Dream (38%). While this finding should be taken with caution due to the small sample size, the differences are still suggestive.

Georgia’s vaccine hesitancy problem might partially stem from misinformation. An earlier analysis showed that almost the entire population believed in false facts about vaccines, such as jabs causing autism, that they negatively affect children’s development, or harm the human immune system.

Another reason for such hesitancy could be political. As vaccine reluctance in Georgia correlates to political feelings, further calls for division along partisan lines might well undermine the public’s trust in the process of mass immunisation. 

Instead, politicians should bear in mind an acute public health emergency, set aside political differences, and endorse a consensus about vaccination.

The data used in this article is available here. Replication code for the above analysis is available here.

The analysis above is based on series of multinomial regression models predicting vaccine hesitancy. Demographic controls include gender, age, settlement type, employment status, ethnicity, education, assets index, internet usage, experience of been infected by COVID-19, attendance of religious services and presence of children in the household. Attitudinal predictors control for party affiliation, trust in the government’s ability to deal with the COVID-19 situation, perception whether COVID-19 is a real threat, and optimism regarding COVID-19 situation.

How do Georgians assess the parties involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh war?

This article first appeared at the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of OC Media and CRRC Georgia. This article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.  

While polling suggests that 26% of Georgia’s population had not heard of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh last autumn, for those who had, opinions were difficult to gage. So how did Georgians view the roles of the belligerents, outside actors, and indeed their own country?

In December 2020, shortly after the end of military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, 74% of Georgians reported they had heard of the conflict that had raged there only a month prior. Among those that were aware of the conflict, the data indicate that assessing the parties directly or indirectly involved in the conflict was quite difficult. 

While Georgia’s role is assessed most positively, the roles Russia and Armenia played in the conflict seem to be viewed most negatively. In this regard, the data might reflect Georgian society’s views of its own unresolved conflicts.

Besides the belligerents to the conflict, a number of states and multilateral organisations were involved in the conflict and its resolution, including Turkey, Russia, France, the US, and the EU, among others. 

During the war, both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces were reported to have violated international humanitarian laws and the laws of war, resulting in civilian casualties and abuses of prisoners of war. 

Turkey was an open and strong supporter of Azerbaijan, while Russia, France, and the United States were involved in the ceasefire negotiations. Russia has since deployed peacekeepers in the post-conflict area to oversee the ceasefire. A joint Russian-Turkish ceasefire monitoring centre based in Azerbaijan, outside of the zone of conflict, has also been opened.  

Although Georgia remained officially neutral throughout the war and offered to facilitate dialogue, there was a great deal of disinformation regarding Georgia’s position in both Armenian and Azerbaijani media. Meanwhile, the EU expressed concern over the fighting and allocated millions in emergency aid for civilians affected by conflict, but did not play a significant diplomatic role.

While this is the backdrop in which Georgians were asked their views of the different parties involved in the conflict, it does not mean that respondents were aware of it when surveyed. Indeed, a large share of those that were aware of the conflict found it difficult to positively or negatively assess the roles of each group asked about, with between 41% and 69% unable to assess each of the actors they were asked about either positively or negatively. 

People were particularly uncertain about how to evaluate France, the US, and the EU.

Those aware of the conflict were most positive about Georgia (44%). A regression model suggests that the assessment of Georgia’s role in the conflict does not vary significantly across different groups in society. 

The next most positively assessed party was the Azerbaijani authorities (33%). While there were no significant differences across different demographic groups here either, those who distrust the media were least likely to positively assess Azerbaijan’s role. Those neutral in their trust of the media were 15 points more likely (57%), and those who trust the media were 24 points more likely (66%) to report a positive view of Azerbaijan’s role.

A quarter of those aware of the conflict assessed the role of the EU positively, and around a fifth assessed the role of Turkey, the US, and France positively.

The roles of Russia and the Armenian authorities were assessed most negatively, followed by Turkey and the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities. 

While no differences were found in the assessment of the Armenian authorities across different groups in society, the assessment of Russia was associated with respondents’ ethnicity. Ethnic Georgians were 25 percentage points less likely to assess Russia’s role positively compared to ethnic minorities, including both ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Although the reasons behind people’s views of the parties to the conflict require further research, more positive assessments of Azerbaijan might be linked to the territorial integrity issues that Georgia itself faces. 

Back in 2013, when asked about a possible solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, slightly less than half of Georgians who reported they had heard about the conflict either could not answer the questions about the future status of the territory or refused to answer the questions. Of those who did answer, more were in favor of having it as a formal part of Azerbaijan rather than of Armenia.

The data shows that although the assessment of parties involved in the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh varies, an important share of the public is unable to make any assessment. 

For those who could make assessments, Georgia’s role was seen most positively, while Russia’s role was seen negatively. Azerbaijani authorities were assessed around three times more positively than the authorities of Armenia. 

The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

The analysis of whether the roles of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia were assessed positively or negatively was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–35, 35–55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or other ethnicity: Armenian, Azerbaijani, or other), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), frequency of internet use (every day, less often, never), trust in media (distrust, neither trust nor distrust, trust).

War in Nagorno-Karabakh went unnoticed for a quarter of Georgians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

The recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands. Yet despite there being a brutal war near its borders, many in Georgia were unaware of the conflict.

Data from the Caucasus Barometer survey indicate that awareness of the conflict’s existence increased shortly after the war in 2020 compared to 2013, but only slightly. In 2013, when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was ‘frozen’, 66% of Georgians reported they had heard of it. Around a third of the population was not aware of it. In December of 2020, shortly after the 44-day long war, 74% of Georgians reported they had heard of it.  A whole quarter (26%) of the population, meanwhile, was not aware of military operations between the country’s two direct neighbours. 

A regression model suggests that some groups in Georgian society were more likely to be aware of the conflict than others. Considering Georgia has a large population of ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, among others, it does not come as a surprise that ethnic minorities are 18 percentage points more likely than ethnic Georgians to be aware of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, all else being equal.

Controlling for other factors, men were 13 percentage points more likely to have heard about the war compared to women. 

Older people were more likely to be aware of the conflict than younger people. People aged 18-35 were 10 percentage points less likely to have heard of the conflict compared to those aged 35-54, and 13 percentage points less likely compared to older people (55+). 

Access to information is presumably also associated with awareness. Those living in Tbilisi, where access to information is better, were significantly more likely to be aware of the conflict compared to people in other cities and settlements, while no notable differences are found between those living in other cities and rural areas. Similarly, people with higher education were more likely to be aware of the conflict than those with secondary or lower education. Regular internet users were six percentage points more likely to have heard of the conflict, all else equal, compared to irregular users. 

Employment status, being displaced due to previous conflicts in the region, and general trust in the media were also analysed, but do not show statistically significant differences. 

Despite a war raging near its borders, a quarter of the Georgian public was unaware of it. An indirect link of awareness with access to information appears to be present in the data and a number of other variables were also significant predictors of awareness, but the reasons behind their significance require further research.

The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The analysis of which groups were aware or not aware of the war was carried out using logistic regression. The regression included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–35, 35–55, 55+), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or other ethnicity), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), frequency of internet use (every day, less often, never), trust in media (distrust, neither trust nor distrust, trust).

What predicts job satisfaction in Georgia?

This article was published on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Makhare Atchaidze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article do not represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity. 

Unemployment remains one of the most frequently cited concerns among Georgians. But how satisfied with their jobs are those who are employed?

Public opinion polling consistently shows that the most important issue facing the country is unemployment. While official data suggests an unemployment rate of around 17%, Caucasus barometer survey data suggests that only 40% consider themselves employed. 

While unemployment is clearly an issue, a secondary point is the quality of jobs available: a third of the unemployed (36%) reported that they do not work because available jobs do not pay enough, and 61% reported that suitable work is hard to find on a 2018 survey.

The results of the 2019 Caucasus Barometer survey suggest that people who are working tend to be moderately satisfied. Half (47%) of those who considered themselves employed or self-employed (37%) reported they were moderately satisfied with their work. By comparison, 37% of people expressed a positive attitude towards their job and 16% a negative attitude.

Women were nine percentage points more likely than men to report being satisfied with their job. 

People with tertiary education were 17 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with their job than those that have vocational education and 11 points more satisfied than those that have a high school degree or less. 

There were no significant differences between people of different ages, marital status and ethnicities or between settlement types in terms of satisfaction. 

Aside from demographics, job satisfaction is also correlated with income, employment sector, and knowledge of English. 

People with lower incomes tend to be less satisfied. Those whose personal monthly incomes were between $51–$100 were less likely to be satisfied with their jobs than those whose income was more than $101. The data shows that dissatisfaction is almost three times less likely when income exceeds $101. 

People who work in the public sector (including international organisations and NGOs) tend to be more satisfied with their jobs (58%), than those who work in the private sector (34%). 

The data indicated that people who likely have higher skill jobs tend to be more satisfied with their work. 

Having a higher level of knowledge of English was associated with greater job satisfaction, while higher-level computer skills were not. This is despite a strong correlation of around 50% between computer skills and English language knowledge.

Note: In some cases in the above, figures may not sum to 100%. This is due to rounding error.

The above data suggests that women and people with more education were more likely to report being satisfied with their jobs. This was also true of people working in the public sector and those with higher levels of English language knowledge. 

This suggests that those in higher-skilled jobs were more satisfied though not always, as the data on computer skills shows. 

The data used in this article is available here. Replication code for the above analysis is available here.

UNM supporters are especially pessimistic about their economic future

With the pandemic still raging and accompanying economic restrictions still in force, Georgians are unsurprisingly pessimistic about their economic future. This holds true especially for supporters of the opposition United National Movement Party, above all other party supporters.

COVID-19 restrictions have impacted people’s economic activity heavily. This is reflected in key economic indicators such as GDP, which declined by 5.9% year on year between January and November 2020. 

It is also reflected in employment, with fewer people reporting starting new jobs and more people reporting having lost one, according to the 2020 Caucasus Barometer.

The survey, conducted in December 2020, shows that people’s expectations of their financial futures tend towards pessimism and uncertainty. Only around 1 in 10 Georgians said they expected their family to be better off financially in one year’s time; 29% said they would be in the same situation financially and 37% said that they would be worse off. 

Around a quarter of people said they were uncertain of what their financial situation will be like in one year’s time. 

Analysis of the data showed differences in people’s attitudes depending on their age, and party affiliation. There were no significant differences between people of different sexes, settlement types, education levels, employment statuses, or economic situations.

Unsurprisingly, people who had a household member start a new job during the last 12 months were more optimistic, while those who reported a household member losing a job were pessimistic. 

People aged 35–54 were 1.3 times more likely to say that their household would be worse off in a year’s time compared to younger people and those over 55. 

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The model includes sex (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), party support (No party, Georgian Dream, refuse to answer, don’t know, UNM and other), employment status (employed, not employed), household member starting a job in the last 12 months (yes, no), household member losing a job in the last 12 months (yes, no), and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

The data showed that supporters of the United National Movement (UNM) were significantly more pessimistic about their future financial situation than supporters of other parties. 

People who named the UNM as the party closest to them were 1.9 times more likely to have negative expectations than those who preferred Georgian Dream. 

In general, UNM supporters were also more likely to report losing a job than people who supported other parties. 

Nevertheless, the link between party support and financial expectations holds whether or not someone in the household lost a job or not. 

For all other party supporters, people whose household member lost a job were more pessimistic, than those who did not lose a job. UNM supporters were pessimistic regardless of whether a family member lost a job or not.

Note: The chart shows those who answered ‘worse off’ only. 

The data showed that more than a third of Georgians were expecting their financial situation to be worse in one years’ time. Around a quarter were uncertain of the near future. 

Expectations were worse for people aged 35–54 years old, those whose family members had lost a job during the last 12 months, and UNM supporters.

For more data on people’s attitudes towards various issues see the Caucasus Barometer 2020 dataset on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone, and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the National Democratic Institute, or any related entity.