Armenia and Azerbaijan: Language, Ethnicity, Religion, and National Values

This blog looks at public attitudes on whether or not speaking the titular language, belonging to the predominant religion or sharing national values are perceived as necessary to be a member of Armenian or Azerbaijani society. Data from the 2012 survey on Social Capital, Media and Gender conducted in Azerbaijan and the 2011 survey on Social Cohesion conducted in Armenia show that sharing national values, belonging to the predominant religious group, and speaking the titular language are important for being considered members of Armenian or Azerbaijani society by much of these populations.  

74% of Armenians think it is not possible to belong to Armenian society without sharing the national values, while a minority of Armenians (21%) think it is possible to belong to Armenian society if one does not share Armenian national values. Less than half of the Azerbaijani population (44%) believes that it is possible to belong to the Azerbaijani society without sharing national values. 

                                              Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Language can play a functional role by bringing together or dividing social groups. In Armenia, 65% of the population believes it is not possible to belong to Armenian society if one does not speak the Armenian language. Similar to sharing national values, just under half (48%) of Azerbaijanis think it is not possible to belong to Azerbaijani society if one does not speak the Azerbaijani language. 

                                              Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Public attitudes on ethnicity and belonging are similar in the two countries. In Armenia, which is the most ethnically homogenous country of the former Soviet Union (98% ethnic Armenian), more than half of the population (53%) thinks it is possible to belong to Armenian society as well as belong to an ethnic group other than the titular majority. Similarly, the 2012 survey in Azerbaijan shows that 54% agree that it is possible to belong to Azerbaijani society and to a different ethnic group at the same time.  

                                               Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

While attitudes on ethnicity and belonging are similar in both countries, there is a striking difference in whether or not the populations believe a person can belong to their respective society if they do not belong to the predominant religion. Over half of Armenians (66%) say it is not possible to belong to Armenian society if a person does not belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. In contrast, about one third of the Azerbaijani population (34%) says the same with respect to Azerbaijani society and being Muslim.   

                                          Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

These CRRC surveys show that there are strong opinions on the relationship between holding national values, speaking the titular language, belonging to the predominant religion, having a non-titular ethnicity, and belonging to Armenian or Azerbaijani society. To explore about these and related questions, please visit  http://www.crrc.ge/oda/ and http://www.crrccenters.org/activities/research/?id=52.

Trust and Agency in Azerbaijan: Personal Relationships versus Civic Institutions

Civic engagement in the former Soviet Union has been - with some exceptions - quite low since the breakup of the USSR. Data from the 2012 Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey suggest that Azerbaijanis' trust and membership in civic groups and social organizations remain low, while efficacy in personal and local relationships is generally high. Consequently, this discrepancy in trust has ramifications for how Azerbaijanis address personal and community problems.

Civic engagement in Azerbaijan is low across the board. CRRC data show that participation in political unions/parties stands at 14%, while participation in religious groups and justice/human rights organizations measures at 6% and 12%, respectively.

Politically less sensitive organizations also garner low levels of participation. Only 22% of Azerbaijanis claimed they were involved in neighborhood and community organizations, while 10% were involved in groups dedicated to healthy and disability.

If low levels of membership in civic groups entail a fundamental lack of trust in such groups, alternative measures show more accurately where Azerbaijanis place their trust. When asked about other groups, 97% of respondents claimed to trust family members “a lot.” Neighbors also scored high on the trust scale, with 84% of Azerbaijanis indicating at least a fair amount of trust.

Accordingly, Azerbaijanis spend considerable amounts of free time with family members and neighbors. Almost 90% of Azerbaijanis said they spend time with family at least a few times a week, while 64% indicated the same for neighbors. Moreover, 40% claimed to spend time with friends at least a few times a week.

Levels of trust and association diminish, however, in relation to more distant, non-familial social networks (refer to chart 2). Exactly 70% of Azerbaijanis claimed to have little or no trust toward other Azerbaijanis. Similarly, nearly 60% indicated little or no trust toward residents in their surrounding village/town/region. Unsurprisingly, 80% of people in Azerbaijan indicated little or no trust toward people they did not know.

Thus, Azerbaijanis’ trust in family members, friends, and immediate neighbors is generally high, while their involvement in civic groups remains low. Minimal civic engagement may be a function of Azerbaijanis’ lack of efficacy in civic groups, as well as the fact that participation in such groups entails association with more distant social actors in whom Azerbaijanis have lower levels of trust.

Levels of trust and civic engagement also impact on how Azerbaijanis address personal and local problems. Over 15% of Azerbaijanis indicated they “always” talk about personal problems with relatives; 32% “often” discuss such problems, while 29% “sometimes” discuss personal problems with family members. Furthermore, respondents expressed the highest levels of confidence in friends and family members in matters of financial and job support.

Azerbaijanis likewise address certain community issues through personal/local relationships. Nearly 50% of Azerbaijanis stated they discuss communal problems with neighbors at least “sometimes”. Similarly, 41% of respondents indicated that neighbors clean common spaces communally, while 45% indicated that neighbors clean such spaces alternately.

Given traditionally low levels of membership in civic groups and trust in distant social networks, it seems unlikely that civic engagement in Azerbaijan will increase in the near future. However, as long as familial and immediate personal connections remain vibrant, it is plausible that Azerbaijanis will be able to leverage social capital in order to deal with personal and community issues. To examine this issue in greater detail, readers can explore the Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey dataset using CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Roads and Safety in the South Caucasus

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), every year about 1.3 million people die as a result of road accidents worldwide. In 2011, the UN launched the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020. A year later, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/66/L.43 to improve road safety conditions worldwide. This blog addresses satisfaction with road conditions and road safety in the former Soviet Union, specifically in the South Caucasus region.

GALLUP surveys conducted in 2011 show that only 36% of the adult population in the former Soviet Union is satisfied with the roads and highways in areas where they live.  In part, the surveys focused on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, Moldova, the Ukraine, and Belarus. Satisfaction with roads is highest in Georgia (69%) and lowest in Moldova (17%). In the South Caucasus, Georgia is followed by Azerbaijan (51%) and Armenia (37%). 

In general, unsafe vehicles, poor road infrastructure, careless driving habits, drunk-driving, and speeding are major causes of traffic accidents in the region.  Based on the WHO European Status Report on Road Safety, mortality rates from traffic injuries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have increased since the late 1980s compared to the EU. However, it is also important to note that there are differences within the EU region as well.
  

From the late 2000s, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia have adopted road safety legislature and promoted safety campaigns, such as the 2010 Road Safety Program Project in Azerbaijan, the 2009 National Road Safety Strategy for Armenia and Yerevan and Five Year Action Plan, and road safety enforcement measures and traffic policing in Georgia. These campaigns can have a positive impact on society. Improving roads and highways in the region might contribute to the fact that, according to the WHO European Health for All Database (HFA-DB), death rates for road traffic accidents have been generally decreasing since the late 90s in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Compared to the 1990s, the standard of roads has improved in the South Caucasus. However, careless driving practices are still common, and it takes much longer to change driving culture. Overall, traffic injuries can continue to be prevented by improving road infrastructure, enforcing speed limits, preventing driving while intoxicated, and promoting more road safety campaigns in the region.