Georgians are feeling the effects of climate change

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

The effects of climate change are increasingly being felt acutely in Georgia. A CRRC poll investigated Georgian people’s perception of climate change, and found that 90% of respondents considered it to be an important issue, and 75% had experienced changes in local weather patterns. 

Climate change is increasingly having catastrophic impacts around the world, from an increase in insect-borne infectious disease to a rise in deadly heatwaves, flooding, and storms. 

These impacts are also being felt in Georgia, with unpredictable weather severely impacting agriculture and winemaking, glacial melting causing an increase in natural disasters, and deadly weather events like the Black Sea storm Bettina increasing in frequency. 

However, climate change had only infrequently appeared in mainstream Georgian discourse prior to the tragic Shovi landslides. 

In this context, what does the Georgian public think about climate change? 

Data from a newly released CRRC Georgia poll suggest that an overwhelming majority of Georgians consider climate change important, and most believe that they have personal experience of climate changing in their area.

While few considered climate change one of the primary issues that Georgia faced, almost all believed that climate change was happening. 

To assess the relative importance of climate change, the surveyed public was asked to identify the top issues the country faced, and allowed to name two. As in most surveys, economic concerns prevailed, with 21% naming the economy and 18% naming poverty as Georgia’s top issues. In contrast, 2% named climate change and 5% named environmental protection. In total, 6% named one or the other, as some respondents named both climate change and environmental protection. 

While the data suggests that climate change is not seen as a high priority issue, it also shows that the public does nonetheless consider it to be significant. 

When asked how important or unimportant the issue was, 90% considered it to be important (31%) or very important (59%). The data paints a similar picture for how concerned the public is about climate change — 80% of the public is worried (42%) or very worried (38%) about climate change. 

While there is a high degree of sympathy towards the issue, the public is relatively unclear about the root causes of climate change. Only a third of Georgians (32%) believe that climate change is primarily driven by human action, while 42% believe it is partially natural and partially human driven. One in five (21%) believe that climate change is primarily driven by natural causes. 

While the primary cause of climate change is less than clear to the public, there is consensus on climate change being real: only 1% of respondents reported the belief that climate change is not happening at all.

The strong belief in climate change may be connected to a high prevalence of people reporting seeing the effects of climate change in their communities, and that they have experienced weather events that they take as proof of climate change. 

Three quarters (75%) of the surveyed public reported that there have been changes in their local weather patterns, and 74% agreed with the statement that ‘I have personally experienced unusual weather that I feel is clear proof of climate change’.

Regarding the specific weather events that people had noticed, unusually warm weather for the time of year, heavy rains and flooding, and sudden changes in weather topped the list. In contrast, less than 10% of respondents named heavy snowfall, large storms, and unusually cold weather.

The above data shows that while climate is not a primary concern to the Georgian public it does matter to them, with people aware of the changing climate in their communities. 

This article was written by Dustin Gilbreath, a non-resident senior fellow at CRRC Georgia. It is based on a new report, available here.

Dustin works as a polling consultant for climate change-related organisations, as disclosed on his LinkedIn profile. The views within this article reflect the views of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, any related entity, or any entity which Dustin works for.

Georgians are split on economic relations with Russia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Zachary Fabos, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia and Milorsh Shengelia, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Despite significant negative public sentiment towards Russia’s relations to Georgia, a 2023 CRRC survey found that there were mixed opinions on Georgia’s economic ties to Russia. 

In CRRC Georgia’s 2021 Caucasus Barometer Survey, 66% of Georgians surveyed identified Russia as the country’s main enemy. However, NDI and CRRC Georgia’s October 2023 survey data found that those surveyed had a variety of opinions on Georgia’s economic relations with Russia. 

Georgian support for deepening economic relations with Russia reached a peak of 53% in February 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A month later, in March 2022, support for the opposite — limiting economic relations — was at its highest at 39%. Since then, support for deepening relations has remained steady, while support for limiting relations has declined, with each position supported by a quarter of the surveyed public as of October 2023. At the same time, there has been an uptick in support for leaving relations as they stand, at 34%. 

Opinions on how to manage Georgia’s economic relations with Russia vary with settlement type, ethnicity, and gender. 

Tbilisi residents were 20 percentage points more likely to support the idea of limiting economic relations with Russia than those living in other urban settlements, and 28 points more likely than those in rural communities.

Ethnic minorities are 15 percentage points more likely to report the country should deepen economic relations with Russia, while men are 10 points more likely to support deepening economic relations with Russia than women. 

The share in favour of maintaining relations as they stand tends to be stable amongst social and demographic groups, with 35-39% of the different demographic groups holding this view, controlling for other factors. The two exceptions to this pattern are Tbilisi residents, who as noted previously tend to believe that relations should be limited, and ethnic minorities, who are more likely to believe relations should deepen.

Aside from demographic factors, partisanship predicts attitudes towards Georgia’s economic ties with Russia. 

The largest difference of opinions along party lines is between supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and the United National Movement (UNM). After controlling for other factors, supporters of the ruling party are twice (33%) as likely as UNM supporters (15%) to favour deeper economic relations with Russia. UNM supporters are also nearly four times as likely (52%) to think relations should be limited compared with Georgian Dream supporters (14%), controlling for other factors.

Georgian society is split on how the country’s economy should interact with Russia’s, and these differences of opinion vary substantially along social, demographic, and partisan lines. 

Note: The analysis in this article makes use of multinomial regression analysis. The analysis included gender (male, female), age group (18-34, 35-54, and 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary/ secondary technical/ lower, and tertiary), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian, ethnic minority), employment (not employed, employed), a wealth index (0-10), and political party support (No party/don’t know/Georgian Dream, UNM, other party, and refuse to answer), as predictor variables. 

This article was written by Milord Shengelia and Zachary Fabos, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Young, in the city, and online: most Georgians use more than one social media platform

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Zachary Fabos, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A CRRC Georgia survey found most Georgian respondents use more than one social media platform, with younger people and people living in cities using a greater variety of platforms. 

According to Georgia’s National Statistics Office, 96% of Georgia’s internet users use social media. While social media’s popularity in Georgia is clear, which platforms are most used and who uses the most platforms? 

According to the 2021 Caucasus Barometer survey, 68% of Georgians use the internet daily. The most frequently mentioned destinations for those online are Facebook, with 69% of survey participants using the site, followed by YouTube, with 61% of respondents using the platform. Use of other sites such as Instagram (26%), TikTok (19%), Odnoklassniki (6%), Twitter (5%), and Vkontakte (5%) trails in comparison. 

An analysis found the number of different platforms respondents reported using, with the data suggesting that the average number is two.

When this data is broken down, it shows that among demographic factors, the strongest predictor of using a diversity of platforms is age. On average, people aged 18-34 use three platforms while those 55+ use only one, controlling for other factors. Those aged 35-54 use two platforms, controlling for other factors. 

Aside from age, the number of platforms someone uses is also associated with settlement type. People living in rural settlements use one platform, while those in Tbilisi and other urban settlements use two on average, controlling for other factors.

Employment status, ethnicity, education level, and sex are not correlated with the number of platforms a person uses.

The above pattern holds across the different platforms asked about on the survey — young people (18-34) are more likely than people in older age groups to use each platform asked about on the survey, controlling for other factors.

The above data shows that young people both use a more diverse set of social media platforms than older people, while also using each and every social media platform asked about more often than people 35 and older.

This article was written by Zachary Fabos, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Note: The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis included gender (male, female), age group (18-34, 35-54, and 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary/ secondary technical/ lower, and tertiary), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian, ethnic minority), employment (not employed, employed), and a wealth index (0-10), as predictor variables. 

The data used in this article is available here.

Does Georgia’s public want gender-balanced politics?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Elene Ergeshidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

CRRC Georgia surveyed the Georgian public on attitudes towards gender equality in politics and obstacles faced by women in politics in Georgia. 

Gender equality in politics is an important issue globally, and Georgian policy on the issue has been developing in recent years. Georgia introduced mandatory gender quotas for proportional party lists in 2020, extending this provision until 2032. The legislation stipulates that at least one out of four candidates submitted to the Central Election Commission, and provides financial support to parties that nominate more women. 

Despite these policy changes, much remains to be done to ensure gender equality in practice. In the 2020 parliamentary elections, only three political parties and one electoral bloc benefited from the financial incentive mechanism for nominating more female candidates than the mandatory gender quotas required. A study on mandatory gender quotas in Georgia found that in 2022, women still made up only 19% of Georgia’s parliament. 

Harassment directed at politicians is also a significant barrier. A CRRC study found that female politicians in Georgia more frequently faced online violence (abusive and harassing comments) related to their personal life than male candidates and politicians, in the two months before the 2020 parliamentary elections. 

Despite those challenges, data from the NDI and CRRC October 2023 survey suggest that the public’s attitudes are becoming more approving of gender equality in politics.

Two thirds of those surveyed believed that female and male politicians represented their interests equally. This marked a 10 percentage point increase compared to March 2023, and an 18 point increase compared with October 2014, when CRRC first asked the survey question. 

The survey also asked respondents what they believed were the largest obstacles preventing women in Georgia from engaging in politics. Respondents were allowed to name up to three issues. 

The most frequently named obstacles were family responsibilities (19%), a lack of self-confidence (13%), and women having no interest in politics (11%). One in ten (10%) reported the perception in the public that there was no place for women in politics was an obstacle, and 9% believed women were hindered by a lack of family support. 

However, these attitudes have also changed in the past decade. There was a nine percentage point drop in the share of those who named family responsibilities as an obstacle compared to 2014. The share reporting that women had a lack of interest in politics also decreased by seven percentage points. The percentage of respondents who named a lack of relevant experience and education halved, moving from 16% to 7% and 18% to 9%, respectively. 

However, there was also a seven percentage point increase in the share of respondents who stated that women face no barriers to engagement in politics since 2014. 

The above data shows substantial progress toward greater acceptance of gender equality in politics. 

Despite the belief that some issues, such as family responsibilities and a lack of self-confidence, remain barriers preventing women from entering politics, the decreasing percentage of respondents citing these as obstacles suggests a changing landscape in the country.  

Trust and political independence in Georgia’s interior ministry

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Tinatin Bandzeladze, a senior Researcher at CRRC-Georgia and Mariam Kobaladze, a senior Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A CRRC survey found that trust in Georgia’s Interior Ministry and the police is closely tied to perception of the ministry’s political independence, or lack thereof. 

In summer 2022, CRRC Georgia and the Social Justice Center partnered on a nationwide public opinion survey on state and personal security. It found that while the Interior Ministry was one of the most trusted institutions in the country, many respondents were concerned that the ministry lacks transparency and political impartiality.

Georgia’s Interior Ministry is largely made up of and closely associated with the country’s police, with police officers often seen as representatives of the ministry. Previous research has demonstrated that police need public trust to effectively carry out their mandate to fight crime and maintain public safety. 

According to the 2022 survey, a majority of the Georgian public trust the Interior Ministry. About two thirds (65%) of the public has full or partial trust in the ministry. This is lower than that of the Defence Ministry (68%), but outperforms the Prime Minister (58%), the State Security Service (59%), the President (51%), and the Parliament (46%). 

Trust in the Interior Ministry varies with a number of social and demographic characteristics.

Residents of Tbilisi are less likely to fully trust the Interior Ministry than residents of other cities and people in rural areas. 

Trust in the ministry is also associated with party preferences. People who support the ruling Georgian Dream party are more inclined to fully trust the ministry than supporters of opposition parties and those who support no party. Almost half of ruling party supporters fully trust the Interior Ministry. 

Ethnic minorities fully trust the Interior Ministry at nearly twice the rate of ethnic Georgians. 

Other demographic characteristics do not predict trust in the ministry.

Research by others suggests that trust in the police is connected more to perceptions of police fairness than with perceptions of police effectiveness in dealing with crime. 

In relation to that, the study also asked about whether the public perceived the Interior Ministry as patriotic, professional, impartial, and transparent. The surveyed respondents viewed the ministry as patriotic (23%) and professional (23%) more frequently than they perceived it to be impartial (15%) and transparent (14%). 

The above opinions are associated with trust in the Interior Ministry. Those that think these characteristics fully describe the ministry, also nearly unanimously trust it. In contrast, majorities of those that do not think each characteristic describes the ministry also mistrust it. 

Respondents were also asked if they believed the Interior Ministry was independent from politics. Only 9% of those surveyed felt that the Interior Ministry was fully independent from political influence, while 23% believed it was more independent than dependent. On the other hand, 47% reported believing that the ministry had no political independence or it was more politically ‘dependent’ than independent. The remaining 21% did not know or refused to answer the question. 

The data indicate that opinions regarding political independence strongly predicted trust in the ministry. While there was a 62% chance an individual would fully or partially distrust the Interior Ministry if they believed it was not independent at all, the likelihood dropped to 2% among those who believed it was fully independent. 

While a majority of Georgians reported trusting the Interior Ministry, and thereby the police, in 2022, relatively few reported they were transparent and impartial, with only a third of respondents viewing them as politically independent. A belief that the ministry lacks independence as well as a lack of belief that it is transparent, accountable, professional, patriotic, impartial, and respects human rights are strong predictors of whether people trust the institution.

Note: This blog makes use of ordinal logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable was trust in the MIA, with don’t know and refuse to answer responses removed. The independent variables included:  sex, age, employment status, level of education, a wealth index, settlement type, political sympathy and ethnic identity. 

Obstacles to accessing Georgia’s courts

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Salome Dolidze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A CRRC Georgia survey investigated who considers and who pursues litigation in Georgia, and the obstacles people face in doing so. 

Georgia’s court system faces significant issues, with reports suggesting that long delays, access to the legal system, and overloaded caseloads are among the barriers that prevent citizens from using the courts. 

A 2021 Social Justice Center report noted that geography, the physical accessibility of buildings, a lack of legal awareness and empowerment, and other physical, financial, cultural, and social barriers presented challenges for large segments of Georgian society. A recent CRRC Georgia survey looks specifically at who goes to court and who considers it, but ultimately doesn’t, and the challenges both groups face in their pursuit of justice. 

Overall, 4% of those surveyed reported they went to the courts over the six years prior to the survey, and a further 4% reported that they considered starting litigation but decided not to. Among those who went to court, 71% were there for civil litigation, 17% for criminal cases, and 12% for administrative legal disputes.

The data suggest there are a number of differences between social and demographic groups in terms of who goes to court.

Those who had tertiary education were more likely to have started litigation than those without.  People living in urban areas outside of Tbilisi were more likely to have considered starting litigation, but ultimately refrained from doing so, than those living in the capital. 

Other social and demographic variables such as sex, ethnicity, employment status and wealth were not associated with whether or not someone considered starting litigation or actually did so. 

The data also provided insight into the main challenges people faced in Georgia’s court system, as well as the reasons why people ultimately decided not to use the courts.

When people who had actually engaged in litigation were asked about difficulties they had encountered during that process, a majority of respondents (52%) stated that the litigation process takes too long. Another significant concern was the cost associated with litigation, which was cited by 34% of respondents that went to court. In addition, 20% highlighted the difficulty of finding an affordable lawyer, with another 12% stating that finding a qualified lawyer was a challenge. Legal expertise can, of course, be critical to navigate the complexities of the legal system, and ensuring a fair and just outcome. 

The lack of legal expertise amongst ordinary citizens (7%) was highlighted infrequently. Approximately one fifth of respondents (21%) mentioned that they encountered no difficulties in the litigation process.

When respondents who had considered starting litigation, but not done so were asked why they had chosen not to go to court, a number of key factors stood out. 

A lack of trust in the judicial system was the most commonly given reason, with 56% of respondents identifying this as a significant deterrent. Another prominent concern for those who refrained from legal action was the cost of litigation, mentioned by 33% of respondents. The length of court trials was also cited by 27% of those who ultimately chose not to pursue litigation. Other significant concerns included lacking knowledge or awareness of legal matters (17%).

One in twenty Georgians have considered going to court in the last six years, and a further one in twenty went to court. Among those who went to court, prolonged court procedures, financial constraints, and a lack of trust in the judicial system were cited as significant barriers to accessing justice in Georgia.

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables:  Age (18-34, 35-54, 55+); Sex (male or female); Settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban, rural); Education level (tertiary or not); Ethnicity (Ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority); Employment status (employed or not working); Wealth index (A simple additive index of ownership of a number of durable goods within a household).

Can political parties in Georgia survive abandonment by their leaders?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The study was financially supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of NED, CRRC-Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

A year before Georgia’s general elections, a CRRC survey found that less than half of surveyed Georgian partisans would remain loyal to their favoured party if its leader were to establish a new party, with supporters of the ruling party more likely to stick with their party than supporters of the opposition. 

In recent years, political experts and analysts have argued that parties in Georgia function more on the basis of their political leaders’ popularity, rather than as genuine political organisations. 

This would suggest that if political leaders left their party and established a new one, a substantial portion of their voters would go with them. 

To test this hypothesis, CRRC Georgia conducted a public opinion poll in October 2023, a year before Georgia’s next general elections. 

The data suggests that only four out of ten partisans would stay with their party if its leader left. However, supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party are more likely to stay with their party, while opposition supporters more likely to be unsure or follow their party’s leader.

Respondents were asked to identify the political party with which they identified most closely. 

Those respondents who named a political party (35% of respondents to the survey) were then asked to imagine a scenario in which a leader of their favoured party decided to cut ties with the party and establish a new party. Respondents were then asked to report how they would vote—would they still vote for their favoured party, or for the one that had been newly established?

Leader	Party
Bidzina Ivanishvili	Georgian Dream
Mikheil Saakashvili	United National Movement
Giorgi Gakharia	For Georgia
Zurab Girchi Japaridze	Girchi More Freedom
Mamuka Khazaradze	Lelo
Irma Inashvili	Alliance of Patriots
Shalva Natelashvili	Labour Party
Zurab Makharadze	Conservative Movement - Alt Info
Giorgi Vashadze	Strategy Aghmashenebeli
Giga Bokeria	European Georgia
Aleko Elisashvili	Citizens
Elene Khoshtaria	Droa
Iago Khvichia	Girchi
Anna Dolidze	For the People
Nino Burjanadze	Democratic Movement
Zviad Dzidziguri	Conservative Party
Fridon Injia	European Socialists
Levan Vasadze	ERI

Four out of ten partisans (39%) said they would still vote for their favoured party. Approximately every fifth partisan voter (18%) said they would change their partisan preference and would vote for the new party. A plurality of partisans (43%) said they did not know which party they would vote for or refused to answer.    

Further statistical analysis shows that some groups are more likely to stick with their favoured party even when its leader launches a new political venture. People with vocational education are less likely to stick with their favoured party than people who have a lower or higher level of formal education.

Party affiliation is also associated with whether or not voters are willing to stick with their current preferred party. Supporters of the ruling party are 27 percentage points more likely to say they would still vote for Georgian Dream if the party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, established a new party than opposition supporters when asked the same question regarding their parties’ leaders.

Regarding whether voters are willing to follow their party’s leaders, similar trends emerge. 

Opposition supporters were 16 percentage points more likely to report they would vote for a party newly founded by their party’s leaders than Georgian Dream supporters.

People with lower levels of formal education were more likely to follow their party’s leader than people with higher levels of formal education. 

Men were also more likely to follow a leader to a new party than women.

However, opposition supporters were also 17 percentage points more likely to be unsure of how they would vote if the leader of their favoured party established a new party compared with ruling party supporters.

People with higher education and vocational education are more likely to be unsure than people with lower levels of formal education. 

The above data supports the idea that Georgian political parties are at least partially driven by their leaders, with only four out of ten partisans reporting they would stick with their favoured party if its leader launched a new political venture. Moreover, one in eight ruling party supporters and one in three opposition supporters reported they would follow their leader to a new party. 

However, multiple other possible explanations for the data likely explain the differences between ruling party and opposition supporters. 

First, the line between the ruling party and the state is often blurred, meaning that Georgian Dream’s supporters might continue to support the party on the basis of it remaining in power. Second, at the time of the survey, Bidzina Ivanishvili had formally distanced himself from politics. As a result, some Georgian Dream supporters might have supported other leaders within the party and the party’s policies, rather than its founder. Finally, many of the opposition parties which the public reported supporting were founded by former members of the UNM who left or are otherwise dominated by a single personality. In turn, many of their voters are likely already voting for the party based on its leader.

Despite the above, ties appear to be stronger to the party itself for Georgian Dream supporters than for opposition supporters.  

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models, which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower, vocational, higher), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), employment status (not working, working in the private sector, working in the public sector), religious attendance (regularly, on special occasions, rarely or never), and party identification (Georgian Dream, Opposition).