Public Opinion about Women in Parliament in Georgia

Since Georgia’s independence in 1991, the participation of women in Georgian politics has been very low. The number of women in government has diminished since 2004 and currently women comprise only 6% of the Georgian parliament. The reasons behind such statistics can vary from cultural to institutional factors. Cultural factors including gender stereotypes are more fundamental and difficult to change while institutional factors can be constructed through a variety of mechanisms (e.g., introducing quota systems, changing the electoral system, nomination methods within political parties, or increasing political funds for women). This blog looks at public opinion in Georgia on one aspect of women’s participation in Georgian politics--women in parliament. CRRC data from a 2011 survey on Voting and Political Attitudes in Georgia indicates that while just over half of the Georgian population would vote for a woman candidate (all things being equal) and think that men and women perform equally on elected positions, 31% of Georgians still find the number of women in parliament about right. 

The 2011 (September) survey conducted by CRRC on behalf of NDI asked Georgians whether or not women perform better than men. Just over half (56%) of Georgians answered that women and men perform equally and 21% said men perform better than women. Examining the data by gender does not change the general picture much, but it still provides some additional information regarding attitudes.

As the chart above shows, over half of both men and women think that men and women perform equally. However compared to men, women are slightly more likely do so. On the other hand, compared to women, men are more likely to think that men perform better than women. This data indicates that women in Georgia are more likely to think that women and men perform equally in politics while men remain more sceptical towards women in parliament. This trend is supported by answers to the next question.

The general picture is that 68% of Georgians say they would vote for a woman candidate in the next parliamentary elections all things being equal, 15% say no and 17% do not know. However, as the chart shows, women are again more likely to vote for a women candidate (all things being equal) than men.

Even though over half of Georgians (irrespective of their gender) are positive that men and women perform equally and would vote for a woman candidate in the next parliamentary elections, their attitude regarding the current number of women in parliament is confusing. Evidence from CRRC data indicates that 31% of Georgians find the current number of women members of parliament (9 out of 150) about right and 23% do not know whether this is too few, too many or about right. 

Examining the data by gender revealed only one difference in the “too few” category. Compared to men (34%), more women (43%) think that the number of women members of parliament is too few. This fits well into the general trend that compared to men, women are more likely to view men’s and women’s political performance as equal. 

This data shows Georgian attitudes towards women in parliament to be a bit ambiguous. Over half of Georgians think women and men perform equally and they would vote for a women candidate (all things being equal), yet only 31% think that 9 women out of 150 members of parliament are too few. Why do you think this is the case? Is the low level of women’s participation in Georgian politics a matter of institutions or is it culture that determines such numbers? We would like to hear your thoughts.

Interested in finding out more about gender attitudes in the South Caucasus? CRRC has got lots of data on gender related issues and it is available and free for you on our Online Data Analysis tool. Try it out!

Getting information from the internet – how does it affect Georgians’ views?

Many characteristics of the Georgian population are changing, but perhaps none as drastically as internet usage. Looking at data from the Caucasus Barometer, in only three years the estimated proportion of the adult population using the internet at least once a week has grown from an estimated 23% to an estimated 41%: 

Since having access to the internet drastically increases the amount and varies the type of information available to people, the question of political implications naturally follows. As Georgians begin accessing information from online sources, how are their assessments of their governments and others changing?

In order to address this question, we can separate the population into two groups. One group is those people who access the internet at least once per week and report utilizing it for the purpose of searching for information, consuming news, writing or reading blogs, or engaging in forum discussions. The second group is those people who either don’t regularly access the internet, or who use it for purely recreational activities such as online gaming.

Let’s compare the two groups’ views on their government in the 2011 Caucasus Barometer. Here are five questions asked in the survey that measure respondents’ perception of the level of fairness and freedom of information in Georgia:

• Under the present government in Georgia do you completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or completely disagree that people like yourself are treated fairly by the government?
• To what degree does the court system in Georgia treat all citizens equally or to what degree does it favor some over others?
• Would you say that the most recent election was conducted completely fairly, to some extent fairly, or not at all fairly?
• In Georgia today, do you think or not that people like yourself have the right to openly say what they think?
• How well do you think TV journalists in Georgia inform the population about what is actually going on in Georgia?

Interestingly, not a single one of these five questions were answered significantly differently by the two groups! This suggests that consuming information from online sources does not paint a substantially different picture of Georgia than that painted by sources available via TV and newspaper. One area where we do find significant differences between those who collect information online and those who don’t, is in their perceptions of Europe. Looking at the most extreme views on EU integration, those who either don’t support integration at all or fully support it, the proportion of the population that gets information online has significantly greater support for integration. 

The same pattern holds with support for NATO integration, but does this trend hold outside of politics? Interestingly, it does. On the subject of inter-ethnic marriages, CB respondents are asked whether or not they approve of women of their ethnic group marrying members of other specific groups. When asked about domestic ethnic minorities such as Azerbaijanis living in Georgia and Armenians living in Georgia, the opinions of those who get information from the internet are not significantly different from those who do not. However, when asked about inter-ethnic marriages with members of European nations, opinions differ significantly. 

 The fact that the approval of interethnic marriages by those who get information from the internet is significantly higher with respect to Europeans but not with respect to domestic ethnic minorities suggests that the issue is not simply one of internet users being less socially conservative. In fact, respondents who got information from the internet were actually slightly more likely to say that both abortion and homosexuality were never justifiable, although the differences were not statistically significant. So, rather than simply being more liberal, it seems that people who get information from the internet are more open specifically to Europeans. 

In summary, the data suggest that while people who get information from the internet do not perceive their own country differently, they do perceive Europe more positively. Why might this be? Could it simply be because they have access to more information about Europe and thus feel more comfortable with Europe as a partner? Or could it be that they are actually receiving more positive messages about Europe via the internet? Or, could it be due to another factor or combination of factors altogether?

One way to look into this question in more detail may be by examining the Media Survey, which CRRC conducted in 2009 and 2011. Both data sets are for download at http://crrc.ge/data/, and for online data analysis at http://crrc.ge/oda/. The survey includes many questions regarding the channels through which respondents receive information, and also includes questions assessing the accuracy of media sources and measuring levels of trust in various governmental and international bodies. 

Readers are invited to respond with their own theories and data analysis to support them, and we’ll publish a blog post on one of the responses. Please send your ideas and preliminary analyses to lucy.flynn@crrccenters.org by Monday, May 21^st, and feel free to contact me sooner if you have any questions.

Political Participation and Democracy in Azerbaijan

For a functioning democracy, democratic attitudes are important as well as basic political rights. Attitudes toward democracy and participation in political life show the extent of a population’s support to and the legitimacy of a democratic system. The 2011 Caucasus Barometer provides insight to what people think about democratic principles and the democratic process in Azerbaijan. The data shows that voting in elections and democracy (as a political regime) both receive approval by over half of the population. However, particular political actions such as participation in protests receive only little affirmation. Furthermore, the current political system in Azerbaijan is not perceived to be an effective democracy by most Azerbaijanis.

The survey shows that institutional forms of participation such as voting in elections are perceived to be important by 64% of Azerbaijanis. In addition to considering voting very important, 62% said they voted in the last national election and 74% said they certainly or most probably would participate if presidential elections were held that following Sunday.

However, less institutional forms of political participation such as protests receive little support. Only 7% of the adult Azerbaijani population strongly agrees and another 21% agree to the statement that, “People should participate in protest actions, as this shows the government that the people are in charge”. In contrast, 16% very strongly agree and another 32% agree that, “People should not participate in protest actions against the government, as it threatens stability in the country”. The data indicates that support for this type of political involvement is rather low in Azerbaijan.

Regarding general attitudes towards democracy, the data reveals that the majority of Azerbaijanis do not perceive their country to be a full democracy. As the chart shows, 14% do not consider Azerbaijan to be a democracy. 30% think that their country is a democracy but with major problems, and 31% believe the country is a democracy but with minor problems. Only 10% think the country is a full democracy.

Even though the general public opinion is that Azerbaijan is not a full democracy today, just over half of the population supports a democratic system. According to the data, 52% of the Azerbaijanis prefer democracy to any other kind of government. In contrast, 14% say there are some circumstances in which a non-democratic government can be preferable, and another 18% say it does not matter what kind of government they have.

Thus, the results indicate that institutional forms of political participation such as voting have more approval than less institutional forms such as attending protest actions. Furthermore, people in Azerbaijan seem to support the idea of democracy although the majority holds that their country is not a full democracy yet.

Ethnic versus European Identity: The Case of Georgia

As Georgia seeks a course of European integration and eventual membership in the European Union (EU), it is important to examine the Georgian population’s understanding of its own identity. CRRC data from a 2011 survey entitled Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia shows that a majority of Georgians (88%) think Georgia should be in the EU. But do Georgians share a European identity in addition to strongly supporting EU membership? The data shows that ethnic Georgian identity remains the prevalent sentiment in Georgia despite strong support for EU membership and the fact that just over half of the population agrees with former Georgian prime minister Zurab Zhvania’s famous phrase -“I am Georgian, and therefore I am European”. 

59% of Georgians in 2011 say they agree with Zhvania’s statement, but the picture changes dramatically when Georgians are asked about how they identify themselves more specifically. Only 16% of Georgians identify themselves as both Georgian and European, whereas over half (60%) identify as their own ethnicity only—a result more or less unchanged since 2009. Moreover, the number of people who identify as both Georgian and European comes quite close to the number of people who identify as their own ethnicity and as generally Caucasian. 

Even though identity is considered to be a relatively static variable, examining the data by age groups offers interesting insights about identity change in Georgia. The analysis shows that compared to older age groups, younger people in Georgia are more likely to both agree with Zhvania’s famous phrase and identify themselves as European. 

Moreover, the proportion of those who identify as both their own ethnicity and European is greater in the age group 18-35 than in older age groups. Even though just over half (58%) of Georgian people aged 18-35 identify only as Georgian, they are more likely to identify as both Georgian and European (25%) and are less likely to identify as both their own ethnicity and as Caucasian. These results indicate that the incidence of Caucasian identity decreases with age among Georgians, while the frequency of claiming European identity increases in younger generation. In other words, a general Caucasian identity is gradually changing along with European identity among Georgians, however ethnic identity still prevails. 

Note: “Don’t know” and “Other” answers have been excluded from the analysis.

CRRC data indicates that over half of the Georgian population identify as their own ethnicity only. Even though many Georgians agree with Zhvania’s phrase, few Georgians actually identify themselves as both their own ethnicity and European. This demonstrates that they may consider these identities to be compatible. Further analysis also indicates that young people in Georgia are the forerunners in adopting European identity. Perhaps the younger generation is more affected by strong socialization agents such as media, advertisements and consumption models that reinforce European identity. What do you think?

Interested in finding out more about Georgian attitudes towards the EU and related issues? You can access the survey’s associated report here. Both datasets are free and available online at the link above. You are also invited to explore the dataset on CRRC’s fun Online Data Analysis tool.

Georgian get-togethers: Private Problems versus Politics

In September 2011, CRRC on behalf of Eurasia Partnership Foundation and EWMI G-PAC conducted a nationally representative survey on Volunteerism and Civic Participation in Georgia. Georgians were asked how often they get together and discuss private problems and politics with their friends and relatives (who do not live in their houses). The results show that while Georgians meet their relatives and friends quite often, the frequency of political discussions among them–one of the indicators of political motivation and involvement—is rather low.

Note: The question “How often do you get together with your close friends?” was only asked to respondents who said they have close friends (92%).

As the chart shows, Georgians meet their close friends more frequently than their close relatives; just over half get together with their close friends at least once a week and 46% meet their close relatives at least once a month. Even though the frequency of get-togethers with close relatives is lower than the frequency of meeting close friends, many Georgians are comfortable sharing their own private problems with their close relatives. 45% of the adult Georgian population always discuss their personal problems with their close relatives when they get together. 

Note: (1) This question was only asked to respondents who get together with their close relatives at all (98%). 

(2) The original ten-point scale is collapsed to a five-point scale.

However, the picture changes dramatically when the question concerns politics. Over half of the adult Georgian population never discuss politics with their close friends or relatives. People in Georgia seem to prefer discussing their own private problems with their close relatives rather than politics–an issue that concerns everyone. The picture remains the same when Georgians are asked about how often they discuss politics with their friends when they get together. Georgians are equally reluctant to discuss politics with their close relatives and friends. This indicates that this aspect of political involvement is rather low in Georgia.

Note: (1) The question “How often do you discuss politics with your close relatives?” was asked to respondents who get together with their close relatives at all (98%). (2)The question “How often do you discuss politics with your close friends?” was asked to those who say they have close friends and get together with them (90%). (3) The original ten-point scale is collapsed to a five-point scale.

To explore this issue farther CRRC asked Georgians: When you get together with your close relatives, who discusses politics more – men or women? 40% said that men discuss politics more often than women. 36% said that men and women equally discuss politics when they get together with their close relatives, and 17% said that women discuss politics more often than men. Survey respondents were also asked to indicate an age range of their close relatives who discuss politics more frequently. 45% said middle aged (those in their 40s and 50s), 27% said elderly people (over 60) and only 6% said youngsters (those in their 20s and 30s). 23% said people of any age equally discuss politics with their close relatives when they get together. These results indicate that there is a perception that middle aged men are most likely to discuss politics with their close relatives when they get together, while youngsters are less eager to do so.

Discussing politics with friends and relatives is only one, yet very important indicator of political involvement that plays a crucial role in the democratization process. CRRC survey data indicate that the frequency of political discussions among Georgian relatives and friends is rather low. What are the reasons behind this result? Why people in Georgia are so reluctant to discuss politics with their friends and relatives then they freely discuss their private problems? How does such reluctance to discuss political issues affect democratization process in the country? We would like to hear your thoughts.

CB 2011 Preview | Attitudes towards IDPs in Georgia

The presence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Georgia is testimony to its internal and cross-border conflicts. IDPs often face a life in limbo, unable to return to their homes and reliant on friends, family and the generosity of strangers to get by. To address this issue, and also in fulfillment of obligations to the Council of Europe, Georgia has developed policies on the integration and rehabilitation of IDPs.

As of January 2011, UNHCR-Georgia estimates that approximately 359,716 IDPs continue to live in Georgia proper. Preliminary survey results from the 2011 Caucasus Barometer show that Georgian attitudes towards IDPs are generally positive. More than half of Georgians support government assistance for IDPs, and view IDPs as part of Georgian society.

Results indicate that Georgians would like to see an increase in government assistance. 57% of Georgians say that the current level of assistance is not enough, while 18% claim it is. 22% of Georgians do not know if the current level of government assistance is meeting the needs of IDPs and only 2% consider the current policy of assistance to be excessive.

The survey refers to all IDPs in Georgia, not only those from Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia.

Over half of Georgians (61%) consider IDPs to be part of Georgian society. In addition 53% of Georgians disagree with the statement that, “IDPs are different from Georgia’s society”.

Data was recoded from a 5 to 3 point scale and the scale was reversed.The original scale comprised of strongly disagree=1, somewhat disagree=2, neutral=3, somewhat agree=4 and strongly agree=5.

On the whole, results indicate that Georgian attitudes towards IDPs are supportive. For those with further interest in the question, various crosstabulations should be of interest once the dataset is released. Also, click here for previous research CRRC has done on this topic.

This is only a quick preview of the results from the 2011 Caucasus Barometer, keep checking back for more information and the upcoming release of our results on ODA!

Blood Donation in Georgia: Obstacles and Opportunities

According to a report by the World Health Organization, blood donations in Georgia fall below the estimated need for patients. Approximately 60,000 donations are necessary per year to cover Georgian patients’ needs, while the number of actual blood donation does not exceed 37,000. Moreover, 95% of blood donations come from paid donors. The main obstacle in advocating volunteer blood donation is due in part to the fact that being paid to donate blood is deeply rooted in public perceptions and volunteer blood donors get little support from Georgian society. This blog looks at the obstacles and opportunities for fostering volunteer blood donation and shows that over half of the Georgian population disagrees with the statement that “people donating blood should be paid”, and that lack of awareness remains a deterrent.

Source: World Health Organization

According to the Caucasus Barometer 2011, about 80% of Georgians have never donated blood and 61% have not seen or heard anything about donating blood during the last two years. 57% do not personally know anyone who has donated blood in the last 10 years. Yet according to the same data, 61% of Georgians disagree with the statement that “people donating blood should be paid” (only 22% agree). If, as the data shows, over half of the Georgian population is against paid blood donations, what obstacles prevent the establishment a good practice of blood donation in Georgia? To explore the potential reasons behind this finding, CRRC asked Georgians why they have never donated blood.

Source: Caucasus Barometer, 2011

The data shows that 20% of Georgians cannot state an exact reason for not donating blood. A promising 9% say they do not know where to go and only 4% say that they do not like the idea of donating blood. 20% think that not being in good health or doctors’ advice against blood donation is the main reason why they have never donated blood, while 8% are afraid of possible infection, and 7% of Georgians indicate a fear of needles.

In another survey on Volunteerism and Civic Participation in 2011, CRRC asked Georgians what they thought were the main reasons why people do not donate blood. The answer options are different here, but still reflect the difference between what people mention as their own reason for not donating blood and their perceptions of others’ reasons for the same behaviour. Namely, 17% say people are preoccupied with their own problems. While talking about themselves only, 6% say they do not have time to donate blood. Similarly, 10% of Georgians think that being indifferent towards the problems of others is the main reason for people not donating blood – an answer which is less likely to be mentioned when people talk about themselves.

Source: Survey on Volunteerism and Civic Participation, 2011

As the chart shows, 30% of Georgians are unsure about the reasons why people do not donate blood in Georgia. 15% mention being afraid of infections as a reason for not donating blood, reflecting a concern related to blood safety standards that exists in Georgian society and prevents some people from donating blood.

Lack of awareness seems to be another factor explaining the low level of volunteer blood donors in Georgia. 6% of Georgians think people find donating blood as unnecessary. 5% say people do not know where to go in order to donate blood and 4% think people do not know that they can donate blood at all. In total 15% of Georgians think having no information is the main reason why people do not donate blood. These results indicate that there is room for awareness-raising campaigns. Filling the information gap can be an important step to promoting volunteer blood donation in the country.

Finally, Georgians were asked how possible it is that they donate blood in the next 12 months. 38% of Georgians are unsure, 21% think it will never happen and a promising 11% say it is highly expected. CRRC data indicates that this 11% can be increased by improving blood safety standards and raising public awareness about the importance of blood donation, as well as about blood banks already operating in Georgia.

Brookings Event - Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities: The Limits of Hospitality?

...all of this straight from the Brookings website, an event that one of our colleagues, Yulia Aliyeva, will contribute to this week:

Most of the world's 27 million people who have been internally displaced by conflict do not live in camps; rather they live with family members or friends or are dispersed within communities. One frequently overlooked aspect of displacement is the impact of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the communities which host them—communities which are often poor and marginalized themselves. 

On March 22, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) will host a discussion of two recent reports on IDP and host community relations: "Can You Be an IDP for Twenty Years? A Comparative Field Study on the Protection Needs and Attitudes Toward Displacement Among IDPs and Host Communities in Azerbaijan" and "The Effects of Internal Displacement on Host Communities: A Case Study of Suba and Ciudad Bolívar Localities in Bogotá, Colombia." 

Here a program snapshot: 

 
The event is at The Brookings Institution, Saul/Zilkha Rooms, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC: Thursday, March 22, 2012, 12:00 — 1:30 pm.

Here is the link to the event. And here, as previously posted in our e-bulletin, is the link to the report.

Perceptions of Good Citizenship in Georgia

What do Georgians consider good citizenship to mean? The issue of good citizenship is important, especially because of Georgia’s expressed democratic aspirations. This blog looks at how Georgians perceive their responsibilities as citizens and how their attitudes towards good citizenship have changed in the past two years. The results indicate that mass attitudes and beliefs are gradually changing and that now, compared to 2009, Georgians take a more active view of citizens’ responsibilities.

Modern theories of democracy put a special emphasis on mass values and beliefs as a main force for achieving democracy (See Inglehart and Welzel, 2010 for a summary of modern theories on democracy). Several scholars (Lipset 1959, Deutsch 1961) have argued that citizens and their attitudes play a crucial role in bringing about and sustaining democracy. 

In 2009 and 2011 CRRC conducted a survey in Georgia entitled, “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia”. Georgians were asked to consider the level of importance of certain activities or values in order to be a good citizen. The data shows that a majority of Georgians think supporting people who are worse off than themselves is one of the most important responsibilities of a good citizen. Paying taxes, protecting traditions, and obeying laws are also considered to be important by the vast majority of Georgians. Moreover, the importance of supporting the poor, protecting traditions and obeying laws has remained almost unchanged in the past two years. 

Note: Respondents were asked, “To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to...?” The answer options shown in this figure were collapsed into two categories (important and not important) from “not important at all, rather not important than important, rather important than unimportant and very important”.

In contrast, the importance of civic and political participation has notably increased from 2009 to 2011. Voting in elections—an issue closely related to democratization—gained more importance for Georgians in 2011 (92%) than in 2009 (86%). The shift from a passive to more active view of citizens’ responsibilities is further confirmed by the following results.

Since 2009, there has been an increase in the percentage of Georgians who think that forming their own opinions independently of others, being critical towards the government, and working as a volunteer are important for good citizenship. In addition, the number of people who think that participation in protests is important for a good citizen nearly doubled in 2011. These results indicate that mass values and beliefs are gradually changing in Georgia. 

There is a difference between the first and second group of activities in terms of the effort they require from citizens. Protecting traditions and obeying laws are consistently considered important to be a good citizen by the majority of Georgians; however, attitudes towards certain forms of political participation and criticism are changing over time. Yet, helping the poor, obeying rules and protecting traditions are not sufficient to sustain democracy, especially without a certain level of political participation and criticism. Thus, it will be interesting to see how values and attitudes towards the characteristics of good citizenship continue to change, and if they influence democratization in Georgia—a country which has also been influenced by its Soviet past. 

If you are interested in finding out more about Georgians’ attitudes towards EU Institutions or democratic values, you can access the survey’s associated report here. Moreover, both datasets are free and available online at the link above. You are also invited to explore the dataset on CRRC’s fun Online Data Analysis tool.

Georgia and the EU’s Economic Woes

Why hasn’t the economic crisis in Europe deterred Georgia’s desire to join the European Union? The majority of Georgians (and the Georgian government) want to join the EU despite crisis in the Eurozone. Yet, the continued crisis, including the Eurogroup’s recent (and second) rescue of Greece’s economy and Hungary’s harsh austerity measures, illustrates that the crisis is not isolated to the Eurozone. Thus, for EU-aspiring states such as Georgia--which also operates under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) framework--the crisis presents a growing concern over the security of the Eurozone, as well as the overall health of EU integration. Despite these economic problems, Georgians remain overwhelmingly positive about the future of EU integration. This is because not only do Georgians have high expectations that economic conditions would improve in the country, but that territorial integrity and national security would significantly increase upon joining the union.

Map courtesy of europa.edu

A 2011 CRRC survey (and its associated report) entitled “Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia” show that support for EU membership has increased from 81% in 2009 to 88% in 2011. The report also presents an analysis of Georgians’ perceptions towards EU integration and shows that the desire for EU membership is partially tied to a desire for strengthened national security, territorial integrity and economic improvement. According to the survey, the top three most important issues facing Georgia are unemployment/jobs (58%), territorial integrity (42%) and poverty (31%).

Respondents were asked to indicate what they considered to be the three most important issues facing Georgia at the moment. The 2011 survey on Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia also had a target population of adult speakers of the Georgian language. See the report for information on the methodology used for this survey.

When asked, “How will the following issues change if Georgia becomes an EU member?” 59% of Georgians say national security would increase and 58% feel territorial integrity would improve. Just over half (56%) of Georgians anticipate that the number of available jobs would increase, and 48% of Georgians think poverty would decrease.

The data also shows that 40% of Georgians think the EU currently provides Georgia with financial support, while 15% say that the union provides solutions to social problems, and 10% believe the union helps Georgia to develop relations with Russia. 35% of Georgians think that the EU will help restore territorial integrity, thereby addressing one of the issues that many Georgians consider most important.

Many EU candidate (or potential candidate) countries see the current economic crisis as a warning of the risks associated with full European economic integration. Indeed, economic stability (e.g., jobs) is also a concern for many Georgians. However, Georgian motivations for membership are somewhat sated with the knowledge that EU membership could strengthen national security and territorial integrity even if membership may not provide a solution to the current economic woes facing the country.

Georgia Corruption Data | Now Available

Recently, a nuanced article in an Indian magazine discussed "How Georgia Did It" to get rid of corruption. This has, of course, been a topic of extensive debate in India. It's good to see that lessons are being drawn from the Georgian case, and that they travel beyond the immediate neighborhood.

The article cites a broad number of participants in the reforms, quotes Transparency International, and also refers to CRRC's research on Judicial Independence. Find the link to the article here.

On the theme of battling corruption, CRRC recently contributed some data analysis to a World Bank report that summarizes the Georgian lessons in the following way:

"From the case studies, 10 factors emerge that help explain Georgia's achievements to date: exercising strong political will; establishing credibility early; launching a frontal assault; attracting new staff; limiting the state's role; adopting unconventional methods; coordinating closely; tailoring international experience to local conditions; harnessing technology; and using communications strategically. While many of these factors may seem obvious, the comprehensiveness, boldness, pace, and sequencing of the reforms make Georgia's story unique."

Comparatively little data was cited in the report (link is here), but our Caucasus Barometer data certainly corroborates that there are huge regional differences.

To give good access to our data, we have now made a collection available on our website – more than 80 pages of tables, that offer a comprehensive overview over the years. This includes data from CRRC and other organizations, and thus should be a useful resource. To access this data collection, please click here. 

Comments? Let us know.

ETF Migration Survey in Armenia | Update

For the last few months, CRRC Armenia has been doing a survey for the European Training Foundation (ETF).  This is a major undertaking, with 4.000 respondents, and a specialized sampling procedure (basic details here). We are looking forward to getting the results. Now, the effort has been covered by the ETF website, in an article that shows some of the human dimensions of migration, and its various dimensions.

Within that article, there is a short reference to our ongoing work.

In early March 2012, Heghine Manasyan, the Country Director at CRRC Armenia, will be presenting the preliminary results of that survey at a conference in Turin (program). Keep following the blog, we will let you know once the survey results are available. (Of course, much additional CRRC migration research materials is also available, most of it linked through this blog.)

You find the ETF article here.

Tracking "CRRC" on the Web | Google Alerts

In the spirit of being data-driven, we try to track when and how people refer to our work on the Internet. The simplest tool for this is Google Alerts, from which we receive the weekly update on some of the main terms that are associated with our work.

One term that has NOT proven useful in this is "CRRC". As it turns out, a number of organizations use this acronym. There is, for example, the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University, which itself is the center for professional military education in the United States. That CRRC says that its "mission is to facilitate the use of captured records to support research, both within and outside the government."

Next to keeping Saddam Hussein's records, CRRC also serves more basic tasks, such as keeping your roof from getting too hot.

This CRRC says that it "maintains a third-party rating system for radiative properties of roof surfacing materials." It's based in California, and has been rating roofs since 1998. We would like to think that this CRRC also is about numbers. Similarly in California is a CRRC that at first sounds as if it's dedicated to recycling. Actually, it's an association of companies in the waste industry, and, as such associations do, both serves their members with services, and lobbies on their behalf. Started in 1958, it's been around for a while.

And then there's another American association. Austere in its Internet design and logo, it also holds the www.crrc.org address. Since they had that .org domain, we had to get a much longer Web address way back when. Based in New Jersey, the Citizen's Rifle and Revolver Club is the oldest CRRC we could identify, and was started in 1938.

Between centers, councils, clubs and industry associations, we also found a more cuddly version of CRRC, this one in the United Kingdom.

If you are a lost rabbit, that is where you most likely would want to find yourself. As the website says:

"Our long term Rabbit residents enjoy the freedom of quiet, purpose built, predator proof enclosures to roam as they wish. [...] They have the chance to wash each other, and play, and spend a lot of time in rows next to each other just watching the world go by."

That doesn't sound like what we do everyday, but it's a nice group to share the search term "CRRC" with.

Any search terms you try to keep track off? Try Google Alerts by clicking here.

ODA Keyword Search

Most CRRC users know about our Online Data Analysis tool, ODA. It is easy to use, continues to be popular, and in less than a year we have had nearly 70.000 charts generated.

What is less well known, as we realized from questions we received, is that ODA also has a useful keyword search, in case you want to find particular pieces of data. Let's say you are interested in Georgian attitudes to the Chinese:

Select the dataset (1), go to Codebook and Keywords (2), and then enter your word (3). In the screenshot here, you already see the results. Note, as highlighted in pink, that we still have occasional typos (marring). These constitute less than 1% of the questions, but yep, the tool is not perfect yet, and you may want to try out different keywords. If you notice a spelling mistake, please leave a comment below.

At any rate, keyword search should further expand the usability of our Online Data Analysis for you, which is why we wanted to let you know about it. Try it out by clicking here on ODA.

Social Capital in Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)

We have previously worked on social capital, and this issue recently was taken up by the Caucasus Anylatical Digest. The issue discusses the concept of social capital and its relevance to the societies of the South Caucasus.

The author of the first article, Leslie Hough, argues that in contrast to previous perceptions that Georgia is a country with high "bonding" social capital and low "bridging" social capital, in-group solidarity and out-group mistrust, there are in fact vibrant forms of bridging social capital in Georgia; the challenge is the institutionalization of these informal forms of social capital and the alignment of the civil society sector with population's existing priorities and habits. The second article, by Jenny Paturyan, formerly with CRRC, focuses on the low level of social trust in Armenia and its effects on voting behavior and emigration, while the last article, by Anar Valiyev, analyses social capital in Azerbaijan, with the author positing that there is a relatively high level of bonding social capital and correspondingly little bridging social capital in the country, which hinders the development of grass-roots democracy and decreases voter turnout in elections.

All three articles draw on CRRC data, and there are a number of tables highlighting the main aspects of social capital. While we know the authors well, and thus almost feel a bit sheepish in recommending their work, the articles do summarize broad research in accessible style, thus well worth reading. Find the articles here.

Leaving Thoughts by British Political Officer in Georgia

David Gale, who had served as Political Officer at the British Embassy since 2007, recently wrote down some of his thoughts upon leaving Georgia, after covering a turbulent time. It was refreshing to read a direct and evenhanded take on a number of issues, from a diplomat who has been following events very closely.

One aspect we especially liked in David's reflections is that he repeatedly highlights polling, as a way of understanding the preferences of the Georgian electorate. To read David's thoughts click here.

Fatalism and Political Perceptions in Georgia

Widespread apathy and a general disbelief that good can come from joint effort is a major factor hindering social capital in Georgia. One indicator of apathy can be fatalism, meaning the belief that all events are predetermined and therefore inevitable. This blog explores the level of political fatalism in Georgia and how it is connected to Georgians’ perceptions of the country’s current political course and democracy. Many Georgians have fatalistic attitudes about their ability to influence political decisions (or are unsure), and this type of political fatalism is associated with perceptions of democracy and political course.

In March 2011 CRRC, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), conducted the sixth wave of a survey on voting and public attitudes in Georgia. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they felt they could influence political decisions affecting their lives on a five-point scale. The results show that most Georgians are either unsure or do not feel they can influence political decisions that affect their lives.

How does this fatalistic attitude affect the way Georgians think about politics? The answer may not be straightforward, but as further analysis suggests there are some trends worth exploring. For example, people who do not feel they can influence political decisions that affect their lives tend to believe Georgian politics is going in the wrong direction. 

Note: The original five-point scale is collapsed to a three-point scale by merging strongly agree and agree, and strongly disagree and disagree responses.

There are slight, yet consistent differences between these groups. 35% of Georgians who think that they cannot influence political decisions that affect their lives also believe that Georgia is going in the right direction. However, 48% of those who think they can influence political decisions that affect their lives believe Georgia is going in the right direction. The latter are also less likely to believe that Georgia is going in the wrong direction compared to political fatalists. 

Georgians who demonstrate fatalism with respect to the political sphere are also more likely to believe that Georgia is not a democracy.

The data shows that 47% of Georgians who think that they can influence political decisions consider Georgia to be a democracy. In contrast, 37% of those who think they cannot influence political decisions consider Georgia to be a democracy (50% say it is not a democracy).

Thus, the results indicate that many people in Georgia have fatalistic attitudes towards their ability to influence political decisions (or are unsure), and that this type of political fatalism is associated with perceptions of democracy and political course. Whether this type of political fatalism affects Georgians’ political perceptions or Georgians’ perceptions of political situations encourage fatalism is a topic for further discussion.

BBC on Gender Roles in the Caucasus | CRRC Data

BBC's Damien McGuinness recently did a short report on gender roles in Georgia. The report used some CRRC data. Click here for the audio piece. The segment on Georgia starts at about 4:30, and our data is cited at 5:45.

You find the link to the report, written by Mariam Naskidashvili, itself here.

The French Senate Bill and Armenian Perceptions on Turkey

As the New York Times reports, on January 23, 2012 the French Senate “approved a bill […] criminalizing the denial of officially recognized genocides, including the Armenian genocide begun in 1915.” The bill has fanned tensions between Turkey and France, emphasizing the complexities of politics and perceptions. Turkish immigrants and French citizens of Turkish origin in Paris, as well as Turks in Ankara and in Istanbul have protested against the bill. Publicity has emphasized Turkey’s objections to the bill as well as the country’s perspective on the events of 1915.

Less attention has been given to the country and population of Armenia itself, leaving many questions unanswered. What does this mean for the future of Armenia-Turkey relations, as well as popular perceptions in these countries? And what are these perceptions to start out with? The 2010 CB asked Armenians how they think the population of Turkey perceives both the country of Armenia and its population. These set of questions were exclusively asked in Armenia and pertain to the population and country of Armenia, rather than the perceptions of Armenians throughout the world or in Turkey. When asked, “Please tell me, in your opinion, how negative or how positive is the population of Turkey's general attitude towards Armenians?” 62% of Armenians felt Turkey’s population had a negative attitude towards Armenians. 17% of Armenians felt Turkey’s population had a generally positive attitude towards Armenians.

Similarly, people were asked, “In your opinion, how negative or how positive is the population of Turkey's general attitude towards the country of Armenia?” More than half of the population (69%) of Armenia felt that Turkey’s population had a negative attitude towards Armenia and 9% thought Turkey’s population had a positive view of Armenia.

Recent politics has highlighted the historical events, while perceptions guide interactions. However, the data has shown that in some instances economic factors overshadow politics and perceptions. This is emphasized by 2010 CB data that shows a willingness on the part of Armenians to conduct business with Turks despite what they perceive to be Turkish discontent towards Armenians and Armenia. In response to the question, ‘Would you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with Turks?’ 45% of Armenians said they approved of conducting business with Turks while 53% said they did not approve.

The data indicates more negative perceptions of Turkish attitudes towards Armenia and Armenians than positive. Yet, almost half of the adult population of Armenia is willing to conduct business with Turks. This could prove to be a mediating factor between the two countries. The economic benefits of trade with Turkey as perceived by Armenians are presented in a previous blog, “Armenian attitudes towards opening the border with Turkey”. But what impact will the new bill have on the future of political, social and economic relationships between Turkey and Armenia? Will it alter Armenian-Turkish public perceptions?