How many votes were bought in Georgia’s local elections?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia, and Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the views of the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the National Endowment for Democracy, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

According to research carried out by CRRC Georgia, 20% of Tbilisi’s population appeared to be willing to sell their vote prior to elections. However, this research also discovered that the popularisation of certain messages may also discourage vote-buying among the population. 

Recent elections in Georgia have featured widespread allegations of electoral fraud. Indeed, the OSCE’s ODIHR, the main election watchdog internationally, said that ‘contestants were able to campaign freely in a competitive environment that was, however, marred by wide-spread and consistent allegations of intimidation, vote-buying, pressure on candidates and voters, and an unlevel playing field.” 

Knowing this type of problem could arise, given that past elections had featured similar allegations, CRRC Georgia attempted to measure and discourage vote-buying in the 2021 municipal elections. To do so, the organisation:

• Conducted a pre-electoral experiment testing what messages might discourage vote-buying in Tbilisi prior to the elections; 
• Delivered the most effective message identified in the pre-electoral experiment on posters to 18,000 households, prior to the elections as part of a randomized control trial and; 
• Measured how effective the messages were at discouraging vote-buying. 

The results point in a positive direction, but are less than conclusive, requiring further research in future elections.

Measuring vote-buying 

Imagine that a stranger came to your home or called you on the phone, and asked you if you use illegal drugs. It is easy to imagine that few people would give an honest response.

To estimate the prevalence of illicit activities, researchers use a method called a list experiment. In list experiments, respondents are shown a list of different activities and asked how many they intend on doing or have done in the past. Half of the respondents are shown a list without a sensitive item and half are shown the same list plus the sensitive activity. By asking respondents how many activities they have engaged in, respondents do not have to tell the interviewer that they have engaged in an illicit activity. 

Researchers can then estimate how many people have engaged in an illicit activity by comparing the average number of activities that the people in the short list group reported versus the number of activities reported by the long list group. 

Willingness to sell a vote

In the lead up to the elections, approximately 3000 Tbilisi residents participated in a survey with the above-described type of experiment. The results suggest that approximately 20% of Tbilisi’s population was willing to sell their vote prior to the election, defined as voting, ‘for a certain candidate in exchange for a gift or money’.

While measuring vote buying can have important implications, discouraging it is arguably better. Indeed, ideally, there would be no vote-buying. In support of this goal, the pre-electoral survey also contained a randomised messaging experiment testing which of five different messages might discourage people from selling their vote most effectively.

The first message attempted to induce embarrassment about Georgia’s declining electoral integrity by comparing the country to positive examples internationally. The second message worked on the same premise, but placed Georgia alongside other countries doing poorly internationally. The third message highlighted the threat that vote-buying presents to Georgia’s western integration prospects. The fourth message reminded the public of the much-maligned ‘dark’ 1990s, which included widespread electoral fraud. The fifth message highlighted the incompatibility of vote-buying with democratic norms. 

The results suggest that the most effective message was the negative international embarrassment message. However, the other messages were also effective, with the exception of the message on democracy. The chart below shows the marginal effect of each message on people’s intentions to sell their votes right after hearing the messages.

Aside from discouraging people from selling their votes, the above messages also changed people’s responses to a set of six questions on attitudes towards vote-buying. The chart below shows the magnitude of the change on a scale varying from 0 to 18 points, with 0 meaning no acceptance of vote-buying and 18 meaning full acceptance of vote-buying. Again, the most effective message on this scale was the message that aimed to embarrass respondents about Georgia’s declining electoral quality, placing it in the ranks of countries that have recently had issues with electoral integrity.

Did the messages work in the real world?

Based on the above results, CRRC conducted a cluster randomized control trial in Tbilisi to test the efficacy of the negative international embarrassment message in the real world. To do so, the organisation designed the poster below, printed 18,000 copies, and delivered these to households that would be interviewed following elections.

After the first round of elections, over 1,200 interviews were conducted with households that did and did not get a copy of the above poster. 

Analyzing these interviews points in a positive direction for the posters, but is far from conclusive. The results point in the direction of vote-buying taking place, and also towards a decline in vote-buying as a result of the posters. However, the results are not definitive, failing to meet standards for statistical significance.

With regard to attitudes, the data indicates some minimal impacts on a few of the survey questions about attitudes towards vote-buying. However, there is no evidence that the poster uniformly shifted attitudes towards less tolerance of vote-buying on the attitude index depicted above. 

What does all of this mean?

The results of the experiment CRRC Georgia conducted are promising, but also definitively inconclusive. They point towards the existence of vote-buying, and they point towards the anti-vote-buying message being effective, but they do not demonstrate this beyond a shadow of a reasonable doubt. 

This conclusion calls for future research. Notably, the pre-electoral survey found statistically and substantively significant effects. However, this survey measured results immediately after respondents heard the message. In contrast, the posters were placed on people’s doorsteps in the weeks leading up to the elections. It is plausible that the effect of the message dissipated over time. In this regard, future research should consider attempts to deliver the message in multiple mediums, multiple times.

The data from the pre-electoral survey also clearly shows that multiple messages were effective, even though the negative international embarrassment message was most effective. In this regard, future research should test out whether delivery of multiple messages and combinations of the above, as well as different messages, is effective at sustaining anti-vote buying attitudes.

Above all, one would hope that this research would be unnecessary in the first place. That it was even conducted points towards a need for the authorities to ensure that vote-buying does not take place.

Georgians are becoming increasingly tolerant

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia, and Otto Saldadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented within the article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the Council of Europe, or any related entity.

Data from surveys done over several years have shown significant increases in tolerance among the Georgian population for diversity in the country, among a wide range of criteria, as well as increased recognition of the importance of minority rights.

It is easy to remember instances of hate-motivated violence in Georgia — one only has to look to last July to see a hate-motivated riot and an attempted murder of someone based on the fact that they looked, to the attacker, like they might be queer. Despite this, new data from the CRRC and Council of Europe survey on hate crime, hate speech, and discrimination in Georgia released today suggests increased levels of tolerance in Georgia compared to 2018 along a wide range of measures.

The data indicates that Georgians are increasingly appreciative of diversity in the country. Between 2018 and 2021, there was a 14 percentage point increase in the share of the public reporting that diversity, in general, is positive. Similarly, there was a 12 percentage point and 14 percentage point increase in the share of the public reporting that ethnic diversity and religious diversity, respectively, are positive.

The data also shows large increases in the share of the public that would approve of someone like them doing business with a wide range of different groups. On this measure, people had the most negative attitudes towards homosexuals and Jehovah’s Witnesses, just as they did in 2018. However, the data shows a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the public that would approve of someone like them doing business with a homosexual and a 13 percentage point rise in the share of the public who reports the same about Jehovah’s Witnesses. In total, there were 10 point or greater shifts for 11 groups asked about on the survey.

Georgians also increasingly think that protecting the rights of different minority groups is important for the country’s development. While most people thought this was the case in 2018 for most groups, there is a marked rise in the share reporting that protecting the rights of LGBT people is important. In 2018, only a third of the public thought this was important, while in 2021, roughly half of the public (47%) reported the same.

The data tends to paint a positive picture more broadly. People became more willing to recognise the problems that different minority groups face. The public reports increased recognition of a wide range of minority rights. Georgians increasingly think that hate crime and hate speech are problems in the country.

The data points towards positive attitude changes in Georgia around tolerance, despite prominent instances of hate crime as well as the everyday discrimination that different groups face in Georgia. 

The data this article is based on is available here.

Georgians remain hesitant about vaccinating kids

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. was written by Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia, and Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this blog post reflect the views of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI or CRRC Georgia. 

Data from the CRRC Georgia and NDI December 2021 survey suggest that even fewer people in Georgia are willing to vaccinate their children than those who are willing to get vaccinated themselves.

A 9 November decision by Georgian authorities enabled children aged 12 or older to be vaccinated against COVID-19, so long as there was parental consent. 

In the December 2021 survey, 29% of Georgians reported already being vaccinated while 25% said they plan to get vaccinated, equivalent to 44% of the adult population in total. In contrast, 42% of Georgians said they would not get vaccinated against the coronavirus.  Two-thirds of those who are already vaccinated or willing to be said they would get a booster or already had. 

In contrast, only a quarter of people reported they would be willing to vaccinate, or had already had vaccinated, their children. The majority (59%) says they would not vaccinate their children.

The data indicates that there are a number of differences between those willing to and those not willing to vaccinate their children. 

Notably, people who do not have children under 12 in the household are 1.3 times more likely to say they would vaccinate them compared to people who have children under 12 in the household. 

People who say they are planning to get the vaccine or are already vaccinated themselves are 5 times more likely to say they would vaccinate their children.

People with higher education are 1.3 times more likely to report they would vaccinate their children than people with secondary or lower education. 

People who trust the healthcare system in Georgia are 1.2 times more likely to report the same compared with those who do not trust the healthcare system. 

Georgian Dream and opposition supporters are 1.2 times more likely to say they would vaccinate their children compared to people who did not name any party as closest to them. 

The wealthier a household is, the more likely a person is to say they would vaccinate their child. 

Older people are 1.5 times more likely to express willingness in vaccinating children than young people. 

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The additive index of ownership of different items is a common proxy for wealth.

With this data in mind, together with the late rollout of vaccines for children, perhaps it is unsurprising that as of 16 January, only 15,841 children were vaccinated with at least one dose in Georgia.

The data used in this article is available here.

Who should solve Georgia’s political crises?

This article first appeared in the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author's alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Georgian politics often appears to be in a near-constant crisis — marked by protests, boycotts, and acrimony. But who do Georgians think should solve their political problems?

Since the 2020 parliamentary elections, Georgia has experienced political deadlock. The EU and US both supported attempts to mediate between the government and opposition, ultimately leading to the Charles Michel Agreement. This agreement, though, was eventually abandoned. 

Just this week, the opposition United National Movement (UNM) announced they would stop boycotting parliament, though it is unclear whether this will be a lasting agreement. 

But who can help move things forward? New data from the December 2021 CRRC and NDI survey suggests that the public wants parties to work together and a plurality wants them to resolve their problems themselves.

According to the CRRC and NDI December 2021 survey, 4 out of 5 people in Georgia agree that their favoured political party (if they had one) should cooperate with all other political parties in the parliament, even if the actions/views of some parties might be unacceptable to them. 

Respondents were asked who they thought could best mediate and facilitate through the difficulties that parties are having. 

A third said that parties themselves would make the best mediator and facilitator in this process. Almost one in five said that Western partners would fulfil the role best.

Fewer people said that the president of Georgia, speaker of parliament, or others would be the best facilitators. Notably, roughly one in five do not know who could fulfil this role.

At the same time, more than half of the population does not identify with any political party and every second person in Georgia disagrees that the opposition parties or the ruling party serve the interests of the country and the Georgian people.

A regression analysis shows that attitudes towards who would be the best mediator vary among different groups. 

Compared to men, women were slightly more likely to say that parties themselves would make the best mediator. People with a higher education were 1.2 times more likely to name political parties than people with secondary or lower education. 

Ethnic Georgians were also 1.2 times more likely to do so compared to ethnic minorities and Georgian Dream supporters were 1.3 times more likely to do so than people who did not name a party.

The regression analysis shows that young people are slightly more likely to name Western partners as their preferred mediators compared to older people. 

People who live in the capital were around 1.4 times more likely to name Western partners compared to other urban and rural areas. 

Ethnic Georgians were 7 times more likely to do so compared to ethnic minorities, and opposition supporters were around 3 times more likely to think of Western partners as the best for mediation compared to Georgian Dream supporters. 

Additionally, people who approve of Georgia’s membership in NATO were 2.6 times more likely to prefer Western partners as facilitators compared to people who do not approve of Georgia’s membership in NATO.

As for the president of Georgia, people with secondary technical education were slightly more likely to name the president as the best mediator compared to people with lower or higher levels of education. Ethnic Georgians were also slightly more likely to think the same compared to ethnic minorities.

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), support for NATO membership (approve, disapprove) and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

Georgians want their political parties to cooperate and generally are more likely to think that the ruling and opposition parties do not serve the interests of the country and the people. 

Though the public’s opinion differs when it comes to who could best facilitate dialogue between parties, a plurality think the parties themselves should do it.  

Opposition supporters, people living in the capital, and people who support Georgia’s membership in NATO were more likely to think of Western partners as the best facilitators, while Georgian Dream supporters were more likely to think that parties themselves should lead and facilitate dialogue.