Armenia and Azerbaijan: Language, Ethnicity, Religion, and National Values

This blog looks at public attitudes on whether or not speaking the titular language, belonging to the predominant religion or sharing national values are perceived as necessary to be a member of Armenian or Azerbaijani society. Data from the 2012 survey on Social Capital, Media and Gender conducted in Azerbaijan and the 2011 survey on Social Cohesion conducted in Armenia show that sharing national values, belonging to the predominant religious group, and speaking the titular language are important for being considered members of Armenian or Azerbaijani society by much of these populations.  

74% of Armenians think it is not possible to belong to Armenian society without sharing the national values, while a minority of Armenians (21%) think it is possible to belong to Armenian society if one does not share Armenian national values. Less than half of the Azerbaijani population (44%) believes that it is possible to belong to the Azerbaijani society without sharing national values. 

                                              Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Language can play a functional role by bringing together or dividing social groups. In Armenia, 65% of the population believes it is not possible to belong to Armenian society if one does not speak the Armenian language. Similar to sharing national values, just under half (48%) of Azerbaijanis think it is not possible to belong to Azerbaijani society if one does not speak the Azerbaijani language. 

                                              Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Public attitudes on ethnicity and belonging are similar in the two countries. In Armenia, which is the most ethnically homogenous country of the former Soviet Union (98% ethnic Armenian), more than half of the population (53%) thinks it is possible to belong to Armenian society as well as belong to an ethnic group other than the titular majority. Similarly, the 2012 survey in Azerbaijan shows that 54% agree that it is possible to belong to Azerbaijani society and to a different ethnic group at the same time.  

                                               Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

While attitudes on ethnicity and belonging are similar in both countries, there is a striking difference in whether or not the populations believe a person can belong to their respective society if they do not belong to the predominant religion. Over half of Armenians (66%) say it is not possible to belong to Armenian society if a person does not belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. In contrast, about one third of the Azerbaijani population (34%) says the same with respect to Azerbaijani society and being Muslim.   

                                          Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

These CRRC surveys show that there are strong opinions on the relationship between holding national values, speaking the titular language, belonging to the predominant religion, having a non-titular ethnicity, and belonging to Armenian or Azerbaijani society. To explore about these and related questions, please visit  http://www.crrc.ge/oda/ and http://www.crrccenters.org/activities/research/?id=52.

Trust and Agency in Azerbaijan: Personal Relationships versus Civic Institutions

Civic engagement in the former Soviet Union has been - with some exceptions - quite low since the breakup of the USSR. Data from the 2012 Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey suggest that Azerbaijanis' trust and membership in civic groups and social organizations remain low, while efficacy in personal and local relationships is generally high. Consequently, this discrepancy in trust has ramifications for how Azerbaijanis address personal and community problems.

Civic engagement in Azerbaijan is low across the board. CRRC data show that participation in political unions/parties stands at 14%, while participation in religious groups and justice/human rights organizations measures at 6% and 12%, respectively.

Politically less sensitive organizations also garner low levels of participation. Only 22% of Azerbaijanis claimed they were involved in neighborhood and community organizations, while 10% were involved in groups dedicated to healthy and disability.

If low levels of membership in civic groups entail a fundamental lack of trust in such groups, alternative measures show more accurately where Azerbaijanis place their trust. When asked about other groups, 97% of respondents claimed to trust family members “a lot.” Neighbors also scored high on the trust scale, with 84% of Azerbaijanis indicating at least a fair amount of trust.

Accordingly, Azerbaijanis spend considerable amounts of free time with family members and neighbors. Almost 90% of Azerbaijanis said they spend time with family at least a few times a week, while 64% indicated the same for neighbors. Moreover, 40% claimed to spend time with friends at least a few times a week.

Levels of trust and association diminish, however, in relation to more distant, non-familial social networks (refer to chart 2). Exactly 70% of Azerbaijanis claimed to have little or no trust toward other Azerbaijanis. Similarly, nearly 60% indicated little or no trust toward residents in their surrounding village/town/region. Unsurprisingly, 80% of people in Azerbaijan indicated little or no trust toward people they did not know.

Thus, Azerbaijanis’ trust in family members, friends, and immediate neighbors is generally high, while their involvement in civic groups remains low. Minimal civic engagement may be a function of Azerbaijanis’ lack of efficacy in civic groups, as well as the fact that participation in such groups entails association with more distant social actors in whom Azerbaijanis have lower levels of trust.

Levels of trust and civic engagement also impact on how Azerbaijanis address personal and local problems. Over 15% of Azerbaijanis indicated they “always” talk about personal problems with relatives; 32% “often” discuss such problems, while 29% “sometimes” discuss personal problems with family members. Furthermore, respondents expressed the highest levels of confidence in friends and family members in matters of financial and job support.

Azerbaijanis likewise address certain community issues through personal/local relationships. Nearly 50% of Azerbaijanis stated they discuss communal problems with neighbors at least “sometimes”. Similarly, 41% of respondents indicated that neighbors clean common spaces communally, while 45% indicated that neighbors clean such spaces alternately.

Given traditionally low levels of membership in civic groups and trust in distant social networks, it seems unlikely that civic engagement in Azerbaijan will increase in the near future. However, as long as familial and immediate personal connections remain vibrant, it is plausible that Azerbaijanis will be able to leverage social capital in order to deal with personal and community issues. To examine this issue in greater detail, readers can explore the Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey dataset using CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool.

Roads and Safety in the South Caucasus

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), every year about 1.3 million people die as a result of road accidents worldwide. In 2011, the UN launched the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020. A year later, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/66/L.43 to improve road safety conditions worldwide. This blog addresses satisfaction with road conditions and road safety in the former Soviet Union, specifically in the South Caucasus region.

GALLUP surveys conducted in 2011 show that only 36% of the adult population in the former Soviet Union is satisfied with the roads and highways in areas where they live.  In part, the surveys focused on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, Moldova, the Ukraine, and Belarus. Satisfaction with roads is highest in Georgia (69%) and lowest in Moldova (17%). In the South Caucasus, Georgia is followed by Azerbaijan (51%) and Armenia (37%). 

In general, unsafe vehicles, poor road infrastructure, careless driving habits, drunk-driving, and speeding are major causes of traffic accidents in the region.  Based on the WHO European Status Report on Road Safety, mortality rates from traffic injuries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have increased since the late 1980s compared to the EU. However, it is also important to note that there are differences within the EU region as well.
  

From the late 2000s, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia have adopted road safety legislature and promoted safety campaigns, such as the 2010 Road Safety Program Project in Azerbaijan, the 2009 National Road Safety Strategy for Armenia and Yerevan and Five Year Action Plan, and road safety enforcement measures and traffic policing in Georgia. These campaigns can have a positive impact on society. Improving roads and highways in the region might contribute to the fact that, according to the WHO European Health for All Database (HFA-DB), death rates for road traffic accidents have been generally decreasing since the late 90s in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

Compared to the 1990s, the standard of roads has improved in the South Caucasus. However, careless driving practices are still common, and it takes much longer to change driving culture. Overall, traffic injuries can continue to be prevented by improving road infrastructure, enforcing speed limits, preventing driving while intoxicated, and promoting more road safety campaigns in the region.

Corruption in the South Caucasus

Corruption and paying a bribe was not uncommon in the former Soviet Union. However, following the collapse of the USSR, rampant corruption began to permeate virtually every aspect of daily life in newly independent Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005). Reports by international organizations, such as Transparency International and International Alert, have revealed perceptions about the high level of corruption that has affected political, social, and economic live throughout the South Caucasus. Since the late 1990s, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have engaged in several anti-corruption campaigns (e.g., the Anti-Corruption Strategy and Implementation Action Plans in Georgia and Armenia, USAID Mobilizing Action Against Corruption (MAAC) in Armenia, and the 2012-2015 National Action Plan to Combat Corruption in Azerbaijan) that have yielded varying results. Bribing is one form of corruption that CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer has addressed. Since 2007, CRRC has been conducting the Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey on social, political, economic, and cultural processes in the South Caucasus region, and has asked several questions on bribing over the years. This blog explores data on these questions in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia based on the 2008, 2010 and 2011 surveys. The 2009 CB did not include any questions on bribes.

According to the 2008 CB survey data, 34% of the Azerbaijani population said that they, or members of their household, had been in a situation during the last 12 months when they had to pay a bribe in order to get a service or preferential treatment. In Armenia, 9% of the adult population said that they or their relatives had to pay a bribe during the last 12 months, and 4% of Georgians said the same.    

Figures may not sum to 100% due to “Don’t Know” and “Refuse to Answer” responses.

Data from the 2010 CB survey show some change in corruption rates for Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 2010, 30% of Azerbaijanis said they had paid a bribe during the last 12 months.  The rate for Armenia remained unchanged (9%), while only 1% in Georgia reported paying a bribe within the previous year.    

The 2011 CB reveals decreasing rates for all South Caucasian states. Based on the most recent CB survey, 27% of the Azerbaijani population said they paid a bribe during the last 12 months, followed by 6% of people in Armenia. Georgia seems to have been the most successful in fighting corruption with no person saying they had paid a bribe during the last 12 months.  

Even though corruption persists in many forms in the South Caucasus, the CB data show that between 2008 and 2011 the percentage of people who reported paying bribes decreased in the South Caucasus. With such a sensitive question, it is important to pay attention to the proportion of responses between the countries. What factors do you think have contributed to such differences in the region?

You can further explore the CB data sets by visiting CRRC’s interactive Online Data Analysis tool at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/.

Georgian Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change?

The results of the October parliamentary elections in Georgia have raised questions regarding the future trajectory of Georgian foreign policy. One of the priorities of Georgian foreign policy has been European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Will the new Georgian government initiate major changes and redirect Georgia’s foreign policy that has been supported by the National United Movement? Will Georgia promote closer cooperation with Russia? What do Georgians think about the direction of the country’s foreign relations in general? This blog specifically explores Georgians' attitudes toward the importance of strengthening ties with the EU, NATO, Russia, and the US using data from CRRC’s 2011 survey on Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia. As the CRRC data show, half of Georgia’s population is interested in the country’s foreign policy. Moreover, Georgians support closer cooperation with the EU, NATO, CIS, the US, and Russia.   

The EU survey reveals that 51% of Georgians show an interest in the country’s foreign policy. Similarly, half of the Georgian population is interested in Georgian domestic policy.

  

When split by age groups, about 31% of Georgians aged 18 to 35 show interest in Georgian foreign affairs. Up to 54% of the Georgian population between 36 and 55 years old tend to be interested in these matters. Finally, Georgians aged 56 or more seem to be most interested (56%) in Georgian foreign policy.

When asked about the importance of strengthening ties between Georgia and a number of political, economic, and intergovernmental organizations, 95% of Georgians believe that it is important to promote closer cooperation with the EU. The majority of Georgians (90%) also think that Georgia should strengthen ties with NATO, and although Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 2008, over half of the population (78%) thinks that Georgia should strengthen ties with the CIS.   

Georgian attitudes about political and economic cooperation between Georgia, the EU, the US, and Russia is also noteworthy. Over half of the adult population thinks Georgia should have closest political cooperation with the US (58%) and the EU (54%). In addition, 50% believe Georgia should have closest political cooperation with Russia.    

With respect to economic relations, a high percentage of the population thinks that the country should establish closest economic cooperation with the US (71%), the EU (66%), and Russia (47%). Many Georgians are also open to the prospect of having business relations with Russians. In this regard, 81% of the Georgians note that they would approve of people of their ethnicity doing business with Russians. 

In sum, data from the 2011 EU survey reveals that many Georgians show an interest in the country’s foreign policy, and consider the US, Russia, EU, NATO, and the CIS to be important to Georgia’s political and economic development. 

To learn more about the 2011 EU Survey, click here. 

Youth and Politics in Georgia

Since 2011, CRRC has been involved in the Memory, Youth, Political Legacy, and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE), a four-year project funded by the European Commission. The project aims at exploring young people’s social participation in Georgia influenced by historical contexts of totalitarianism and populism in Europe. Among others, the objectives of the MYPLACE project include (1) conceptualization of youth civic engagement and youth activism in national, regional, and European frameworks; (2) understanding and measuring cross-regional political participation of the young generation based on ethnicity, class, and gender differences; and (3) studying populist and radical youth activism in order to contribute to policymaking and the management of youth political extremism across Europe. 

This project research is based on a mixed method approach consisting of survey data, including the CRRC data, interviews, and ethnographic research instruments. This methodology aims at not only generating fresh data within the pan-European context but also measuring different levels of participation as well as understanding the meanings that young people attach to it.        

      

MYPLACE team members from CRRC have recently published a blog about youth political participation and interest in the upcoming October parliamentary elections in Georgia. To access the blog, click here. 

To Vote or Not to Vote? Civic Participation in Georgia

By Milena Oganesyan

As Georgians prepare for parliamentary elections set for October 1, 2012, political parties have entered the final stage of the pre-elections race. One of the important attributes of active citizenship and civic engagement is voting in elections. This blog explores Georgians’ attitudes toward voting in elections based on age group and gender differences. In this regard, CRRC conducted a countrywide survey in 2011 on Georgians’ attitudes about volunteerism and civic participation in Georgia. The survey revealed that 75% of Georgians living in the capital think that voting in elections is a very important characteristic of a good citizen. Over half of those living in urban (68%) and rural (57%) areas also believe that a good citizen should participate in voting. However, Georgians in the capital seem to be more engaged in political processes in the country than those in urban and rural areas.

When survey respondents were asked whether they would vote if the parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, up to 64% said they would participate. At the same time, about 12% of Georgian citizens did not intend to cast their votes.

When split by age groups, the data show that Georgians aged 36 or older are more willing to participate in parliamentary elections (up to 66%) than the younger age group. Thus, the older generation seems to be more actively engaged in voting.

However, there are no significant differences in Georgians’ decisions to vote in parliamentary elections, when split by gender. In conclusion, based on the 2011 Volunteerism and Civic Participation survey, more than half of those surveyed in Georgia said that they would vote if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and most Georgians agree that voting is an important element of civic participation.

You can explore these and related questions regarding Georgia and the wider South Caucasus region by visiting CRRC’s interactive Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for a Difficult Reconciliation (Armenia)

This blog focuses on public opinion in Armenia regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict using data from the 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB). This follows a similar blog on the same set of questions asked in Azerbaijan. The results show some interesting similarities and dissimilarities between the two neighboring countries. Both populations show a great deal of uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved. Over half of the Armenian population believes that a resolution can be found by peaceful negotiations. Also, most of the population thinks Russia, rather than Turkey, should be involved in the conflict resolution process. Finally, over half of the Armenian population favors recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia, and over half say they would also accept Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country.

Source: CB 2009, 2010, 2011

The figure above shows that unemployment continues to be the most important issue in the country (44% in 2011)—compared to Azerbaijan in which unemployment is the second most important issue (after territorial integrity). With respect to perspectives on conflict resolution, 38% of Armenians have no idea about when the conflict will be resolved and 24% think Armenia and Azerbaijan will never be able to find a solution. 4% think that the territorial conflict has already been resolved, and 3% believe there will be a resolution within the next year. Finally, 18% are confident that a solution will be found within 10 years, and 12% say this will occur in more than 10 years.

Source: CB 2011

Despite this widespread uncertainty, Armenians are more confident about there being a possible peaceful resolution to the conflict rather than a resolution by force. Just about 61% believe that a solution can be found within the next 5 years by peaceful negotiations. About 21% consider the recourse to force very and rather likely (taken together) within the next 5 years.

With regard to favored solutions to the conflict, 60% of Armenians favor recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia. Just over half of the population (58%) says they would also accept Nagorno Karabakh as an independent country. As in the results from Azerbaijan, very few Armenians think joint governance of the region by Armenia and Azerbaijan is a good idea (76% of Armenians say they would not accept this). Finally, the majority say they would never accept Nagorno Karabakh being within Azerbaijani boundaries without autonomy (74%), even if the region were granted a certain degree of autonomy (77%).

Source: CB 2011

 Finally, when asked which countries or groups should be involved as a third party in the peace dialogue, 72% of Armenians favor Russia, followed by 49% who favor France, and similar figures as found in Azerbaijan for the European Union (43% compared to 40% in Azerbaijan) and the United States (36% compared to 35% in Azerbaijan). Only 8% of Armenians favor Turkey being involved in finding a solution. However, it is worth noting that a large number of respondents from both Armenia (72%) and Azerbaijan (53%) would welcome greater involvement from Russia.

Source: CB 2011

Taken together, Armenian and Azerbaijani populations both display uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved. In Armenia more than half of the population believes that a solution can be found within the next 5 years by peaceful negotiations. More Armenians prefer Russia to Turkey as the main third party to be involved in the conflict resolution process. Finally, with regard to possible solutions, over half of the Armenian population would welcome formal recognition of Nagorno Karabakh as a formal part of their country and 58% say they are ready to accept it as an independent country.

Interested in knowing more about these survey questions and how they differ with respect to socio-demographic groups in Armenia? Visit CRRC’s fun and easy Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/

Nagorno-Karabakh: Prospects for a Difficult Reconciliation (Azerbaijan)

Many domestic and international observers consider the territorial dispute over Nagorno Karabakh to be one of the most significant issues in Azerbaijan. Gibler and Miller (2012) argue that "states must often settle territorial issues with their neighbors in order to democratize" ("Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies and Their Disputes"). The 2011 Caucasus Barometer (CB) covered several questions in Azerbaijan and Armenia about Nagorno Karabakh. This blog will cover the results in Azerbaijan and the next blog will cover the results in Armenia. The results show that the territorial problem is considered one of the most important issues in Azerbaijan. There is also a great deal of uncertainty about when the conflict will be resolved, and whether a solution would be achieved by peaceful negotiations or by force. Additionally, most of the population in Azerbaijan thinks Turkey should be involved in the conflict resolution process, and a majority of Azerbaijanis favor the integration of the area within the national boundaries of Azerbaijan.

 Source: CB 2011, 2010, 2009

About one third (31%) of Azerbaijanis in 2011 consider territorial integrity to be the most important issue in the country—followed by unemployment (28%). This is a substantial drop from 2010 when just over half of the population found territorial integrity to be the most important issue in the country. There is no notable variation in opinion across age groups, gender or level of education. For example, men are as concerned about this issue (32%) as women (30%). 

In general, uncertainty and pessimism are the most widespread feelings about finding a solution to the conflict. About 34% of Azerbaijanis have no idea when the conflict will be resolved. 10% think Azerbaijan and Armenia will never be able to find a solution. 5% believe the problem will be resolved within the next year, 24% say in 2-5 years, 12% in 6-10 years and 12% in more than 10 years. The remaining 3% believe that the conflict has already been resolved. 

Public opinion is also split about whether a potential solution would most likely be achieved by peaceful negotiations or by force. Just about 51% in Azerbaijan think a solution will come about by peaceful negotiations and 42% think a forceful solution would be expected. In addition, survey respondents were asked to indicate their level of acceptance over separately listed potential outcomes to the conflict. The majority (90%) favor the integration of Nagorno Karabakh within the national boundaries of Azerbaijan (without any kind of regional autonomy). 23% definitely favor granting the region some degree of autonomy (28% would accept autonomy under some circumstances and 40% would never accept it). Other provided options such as joint governance of the region by Armenia and Azerbaijan, the establishment of an independent state of Nagorno Karabakh, or making the territory a formal part of Armenia are not favored by the majority of the population (84%, 82% and 95%, respectively). 

Source: CB 2011

 

The 2011 CB also asked Azerbaijanis about which countries or groups they think should be involved in helping to solve the conflict. The majority of Azerbaijanis welcome heavier involvement by Turkey (86%). Russia is preferred as the second option, consistently with the recent development of dialogue promoted by Moscow ("Russia to continue to push for Nagorny Karabakh Dialogue"). This is followed by the European Union (40%), United States (35%), and France’s involvement is the least favored at 15%. 

Source: CB 2011

Thus, the survey results show that there is a large interest in the Nagorno Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan. Many are unsure about when the conflict will be resolved, and whether a solution would be achieved by peaceful negotiations or by force. Most of the population favors the integration of the area within the national boundaries of Azerbaijan and see a large role for Turkey in the conflict resolution process.

Interested in knowing more about these survey questions and how they differ with respect to socio-demographic groups in Azerbaijan? Visit CRRC’s fun and easy Online Data Analysis tool online at http://www.crrc.ge/oda/