Georgia’s partisan division in support for Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a researcher at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Georgia’s political landscape has often been described as polarised, though data suggests polarisation in Georgia has little to do with contrasting ideological propositions or public policy.

Despite this, the main political parties on the Georgian political landscape do differ in terms of policy. The ruling party and the major opposition parties have argued for differing foreign policies towards Russia, while the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party attempts not to antagonise Russia. The previously ruling United National Movement is uncompromisingly critical of Georgia’s northern neighbour, on the other hand.

In line with this rhetoric, the recent CRRC Georgia Survey on the War in Ukraine shows that supporters of the different parties often support different policies with regard to Ukraine.

The survey shows that supporters of the ruling party are significantly less likely to think that the government of Georgia should offer more support to Ukraine. Controlling for other factors, Georgian Dream supporters were 34 percentage points less likely than opposition supporters and 21 percentage points less likely than unaffiliated voters to think that the support of the Georgian government should increase.

The survey included several questions regarding different ways to support Ukraine, ranging from temporarily receiving Ukrainian refugees to supplying Ukraine with weapons or allowing volunteers to go to Ukraine to fight. These questions were combined into a simple additive index ranging from 0, implying no support for Ukraine, to 15, meaning maximum support for Ukraine. The mean score on the index was 11.5, meaning that the public tended to be in favor of supporting Ukraine. 

Controlling for social and demographic factors, a regression analysis suggests that opposition supporters tend to be more in favour of supporting Ukraine in various ways than GD supporters, as well as non-partisan voters.

Disparities can be found across party lines when it comes to sanctions against Russia; opposition supporters tend to favour the intensification of international sanctions relative to supporters of GD or respondents that did not select a party they support. Regression analysis suggests opposition supporters were 17 percentage points more likely to think that international sanctions should be more severe against Russia than supporters of the ruling party.

CRRC also asked respondents whether Georgia should take part in sanctions against Russia, and if so, whether the country should join in on all sanctions, take part only in some of them, or not take part in them at all. A regression analysis suggests that GD supporters differ from other groups in their attitudes towards Georgia taking part in the international sanctions.

Supporters of the ruling party are 33 percentage points less likely than opposition supporters and 14 percentage points less likely than voters that did not report which party they support to say that Georgia should take part in all sanctions. However, GD supporters are also more likely than other groups to say that either Georgia should take part in only some of the sanctions or the country should not participate in any sanctions at all. 

Although the public as a whole is quite supportive of Ukraine, condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and approves of a variety of ways to support the government of Ukraine, there are substantial partisan divisions in views of where Georgia’s foreign policy should be.

Georgia Dream supporters diverge from not only opposition supporters, but from individuals that do not support any particular party. They tend to be less supportive of Georgia joining sanctions or the government being more vocal in supporting the government of Ukraine.  

At the same time, opposition supporters diverge from supporters of the ruling party as well as other citizens that do not identify with any party in being more supportive of various ways to support Ukraine and intensification of international sanctions against Russia.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic and multinomial regression models which included the following variables: age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), sex (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower, technical or incomplete higher education/higher), wealth (an additive index of ownership of 10 different items, a proxy variable), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban areas, or rural areas), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), and party affiliation (Georgia Dream, opposition, and unaffiliated voters).

Georgians are becoming less satisfied with the government’s COVID response

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Natia Liluashvili, a junior fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

In the two years since the first coronavirus case was detected in Georgia, roughly 1.6 million people have caught COVID-19 in the country, and more than 1 in 235 people have died due to the virus.

The most recent wave caused by the Omicron variant resulted in over 5% of the country having an active case of COVID-19 at the same time.

During this wave, the government abolished the green passport requirement and lifted most restrictions on businesses. This approach stands in contrast to the government’s approach at the start of the pandemic, which included lockdown policies. But what does the public think of how the government has handled the pandemic?

In December 2020, Georgia was in partial lockdown. According to data from the 2020 NDI/CRRC survey, 61% of the public thought the government handled the pandemic well or very well, while 33% rated the government’s handling of the pandemic negatively.

In February 2021, the number of people who positively assessed the management of the pandemic increased to 68%, while only 28% thought that they did a bad job. Notably, this survey took place during the period in which Giorgi Gakharia, Georgia’s former prime minister, withdrew from politics.

Unlike his predecessor, Irakli Garibashvili began to open up the country. At the same time, Georgia started to provide vaccines. Against this background, in July 2021, positive attitudes towards the government’s handling of the pandemic declined to 52%.

In December 2021, the number of daily confirmed cases increased dramatically, which was also reflected in the mortality rate. According to the latest NDI data, half the population (50%) think that the government was handling the pandemic well, with negative attitudes towards the government’s handling of the pandemic increasing from 36% to 43%.

A regression analysis of the December 2021 data shows that the attitudes towards government policies differ significantly by party preference, ethnicity, age group, and settlement type.

People in rural areas have more positive attitudes towards the government’s handling of the pandemic than people in urban areas. Compared to the elderly, young people are more likely to think that the government is handling the COVID-19 pandemic well. Ethnic Georgians also hold less favourable attitudes than ethnic minorities, while Georgian Dream supporters are substantially more positive about the government’s policy than those who support the opposition or no party at all.

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), household composition in terms of having children under 12 (have children under 12, do not have children under 12), household composition in terms of having members over 60 (have members over 60, do not have members over 60),  household composition in terms of having members with severe chronic disease (have member with serious chronic disease, do not have member with serious chronic disease), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (don’t know, refuse to answer, or no party affiliation)).

Even though the number of people who think that the Government is handling the pandemic well is slowly declining, it is high, especially in rural areas, among older people, and among ethnic minorities.

The data this article is based on is available here.

Georgians are becoming more accepting of premarital sex

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Anano Kipiani, a policy analyst, and Kristina Vacharadze, programs director at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

New data shows people increasingly think that both women and men having pre-marital sex is acceptable, at least some of the time. The results come from the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia survey, funded by the Europe Foundation and carried out by CRRC Georgia, 

According to the data, the public is significantly more likely to accept men having sex before marriage than to think it is acceptable for women to do the same. 

However, the gap is narrowing.

In 2013, there was a 28 percentage point gap in acceptance of men and women having pre-marital sex. In 2021, 53% of people said it is sometimes or always justified for men to have sex before marriage and 33% for women, a gap of 20 percentage points.

This stems from an increase in the share of people saying that women having pre-marital sex is acceptable, with the share saying it is acceptable for men changing little over the years. 

Note: Sometimes justified and always justified are combined in the chart above.

While attitudes remain conservative, the share of the public that thinks premarital sex is justified for both sexes has increased over the years. While 23% reported so in 2015, this figure went up to 37% by 2021. 

There was an 11 percentage point decline between 2015 and 2021 in the share of the public that thinks premarital sex is never justified for either men or women. Similarly, between 2019 and 2021, there was a decline of seven percentage points in the share that felt it was justified for men only.

Further analyses show that attitudes varied between a number of groups. 

Women were less likely to say that it is sometimes or always justified for only men to have pre-marital sex. In contrast, they were more likely to report that premarital sex is acceptable for both men and women. 

People older than 35 were less likely to say that premarital sex was justified for both men and women, and more likely to report that it is acceptable for men only or neither sex. 

People 55 and older were more likely to say that having sexual relations before marriage is never justified for either men or women and more likely to say it was justified for men only. 

People living in Tbilisi were significantly more likely to report that it is acceptable for men and women, and less likely to report neither or men only. Similarly, people in other urban areas were more likely to report that premarital sex was acceptable than people in rural areas, controlling for other factors. 

Ethnic minorities were significantly more likely to say that having sex before marriage was not acceptable for both men and women, and were less likely to report that it is sometimes or always justified. 

People without a higher education were less likely to report premarital sex was acceptable for both men and women.

While Georgian society remains conservative in regards to premarital sex for women and more liberal in regards to men, attitudes are changing, and more people are becoming accepting of women having premarital sex.

Who is informed about COVID-19 vaccination in Georgia?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Eka Jikidze, a junior fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Democratic Institute, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Roughly half the population felt they had sufficient information about the vaccination process in July 2021. Data from the December 2021 CRRC and NDI survey suggests this share has increased, with the gains primarily stemming from people outside the capital, those without higher education, ethnic minorities, and people who do not support Georgian Dream.

The July 2021 CRRC and NDI survey suggested that 54% of Georgians felt they had enough information about the vaccination process. In December 2021, this share increased to 64%.

The data show that this increase is concentrated among people outside the capital, with lower levels of education, and among ethnic minorities. Specifically, there was an 11 percentage point increase in the share of people with enough information in urban areas aside from Tbilisi and a 14 percentage point increase in rural areas. By comparison, the change in Tbilisi is within the margin of error. 

There was also an increase in the share of people with secondary technical and secondary or lower education who said they had enough information about the vaccination process. There was a 10 percentage point increase in the share of people with enough information who have vocational education and a 15 percentage point increase among those that have a lower level of education. There was no significant change in how informed people felt they were among those with higher education.

Ethnic minorities also became more likely to be aware of the vaccination process, with an 18 percentage point increase in awareness among ethnic minorities compared with a nine percentage point increase among ethnic Georgians.

The data shows more Georgian Dream supporters said they have enough information about the vaccination process compared to opposition party supporters. That said, there was a 12 percentage point increase in the share of people with enough information among those who support opposition parties and those who refused to answer which party they support.  There was a nine percentage point increase among those who do not know which party they support.

In contrast to the above, there were no significant differences in terms of how access to information increased between men and women or among people of different ages.

The data this article is based on is available here.

Georgians split on whether country is democratic

Note: Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Silagadze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views of NDI, CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

There have been contrasting assertions from Georgian political parties regarding the state of democracy in the country and increasing international concerns about democratic backsliding in recent years. This stands in contrast to past years, when former US President George W. Bush famously described Georgia as a ‘beacon of liberty’, and the praise Georgia received when it had its first peaceful electoral handover of power in 2012. 

The newly released December 2021 NDI and CRRC Georgia survey suggests that public opinion mirrors general international and elite trends, with increasingly few citizens believing Georgia is a democracy, and a substantial partisan divide between the supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposition. The data also show that few believe that Georgia ever was an example of democracy in the region.

At present, half of the Georgian public believes Georgia is not a democratic country, with only 39% believing it is. Additionally, one in 10 Georgians does not know whether Georgia is democracy at present. The public was more critical towards Georgia’s democratic standing only once during the past decade: in November 2019. This more critical assessment was measured in the aftermath of large-scale protests, and the failure to follow through on promised electoral reforms.

Regression analysis suggests men, young adults, people living in rural areas, ethnic minorities, and people living in wealthier households are more likely to think that Georgia is a democracy than women, older people, people living in urban areas, and people living in poorer households. 

Whether or not people think Georgia is a democracy is a heavily partisan matter. Supporters of the ruling party were more than three times more likely to think Georgia is a democracy (75%) than supporters of opposition parties (24%) and more than twice as likely than voters who had no partisan affiliation (32%).

The survey also asked about Georgia’s democratic standing relative to its neighbouring countries. A plurality of voters (34%) report that democracy in Georgia used to be a good example for neighbouring countries, but has ceased to be one in recent years. A quarter of the population (25%) thinks Georgian democracy has never been an example for neighbours, while another quarter (23%) believes democracy in Georgia is exemplary in relation to the region. A sixth (18%) of the population does not know which of the above statements comes closest to their views. In other words, 59% of the public thinks that Georgian democracy has ceased to be a good example for neighbouring countries (34%) or that it has never been an exemplary democracy in the first place (25%). 

Regression analysis suggests that a number of variables help predict the public’s thoughts on democracy in Georgia. People living in Tbilisi, people with technical education, and non-partisan voters are more likely to think that democracy in Georgia has never been exemplary for its neighbours than people living outside the capital, people with other levels of education, and partisan voters.

Freedom House scores from the 2000s and 2010s suggest that even though Georgia has never lagged behind in terms of the quality of democracy in its immediate neighbourhood, the quality of democracy a little further to the West has proven to be a more difficult challenge to meet.

Throughout most of the 2000s, Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania registered significantly higher scores than Georgia. This holds true for the year 2006-2007 when Georgia received its highest Freedom House under the United National Movement’s rule.

In the 2010s, Georgia performed better than all neighbours it shares a land border with, including Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Across the Black Sea, it has had a quality of freedom comparable to Moldova and Ukraine and has scored worse than Bulgaria and Romania.

This observation holds for 2014-2015 when Georgia registered the highest Freedom House score throughout the Georgian Dream's tenure  (2012-present).

Caucasus Barometer 2021: Changing attitudes amid the pandemic

Today, CRRC Georgia released the most recent wave of the Caucasus Barometer survey, which was conducted between December 2021 and January 2022. The results of the survey shed light on a wide range of changes in the public’s attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy, attitudes towards the media and information security, the COVID-19 pandemic,  and various socio-economic issues.

Dr. David Sichinava, CRRC Georgia’s Research Director, and Nino Mzhavanadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia, presented the findings of the new wave of Caucasus Barometer. 

A recording of the presentation is available below:

The 2021 Caucasus Barometer survey was the eleventh wave of the survey to be made publicly available. It included 1540 respondents, and had a response rate of 23%. The survey’s margin of error is 2.27%. The survey was conducted using computer assisted personal interviewing. 

The 2021 wave of Caucasus Barometer is available for download here and to explore here.

Georgians want immigration restrictions for Russians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director of CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been an outflow of Russians to the South Caucasus.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and accompanying domestic crackdown in Russia and imposition of sanctions, there has been an outflow of Russians to the South Caucasus — leaving many in Georgia feeling uneasy.

On 7 March, Georgia’s Ministry of Economy estimated that 20,000–25,000 Russians had come to Georgia since the invasion. In Armenia, the government has reported that around 5,000 Russians have been moving to the country daily since the start of the war. 

This mass migration has raised fears in Georgia. It has been argued that Russia could use the presence of a large number of Russian citizens as a pretext for military intervention in the past. As a result, many have begun to propose that Georgia’s lax migration policies be tightened against Russians. In response, further concerns were raised about the implicit Russophobia embedded within this discourse. 

Data from CRRC Georgia’s survey on Ukraine suggests that a majority of the public support the introduction of migration restrictions. Overall, 59% of the public reported that they would support the introduction of migration restrictions. In contrast, 31% were opposed and 9% were uncertain.

When the data is broken down by social and demographic variables, it indicates that support for migration restrictions varies substantially between groups. 

Young people were significantly more supportive of migration restrictions. Controlling for other factors, young people (aged 18–34) had a 60% chance of supporting the introduction of restrictions. By comparison, this drops to 54% among those aged 35–54 and 44% among those who were 55+.

Ethnic minorities were also significantly less supportive of the introduction of migration restrictions. While ethnic Georgians had a 61% chance of supporting restrictions, ethnic minorities had a 44% chance, controlling for other factors. 

Supporters of different parties also held significantly different views. People who supported an opposition party had a 65% chance of supporting restrictions while supporters of the ruling party had a 43% probability of doing so. People who refused to answer which party they supported had a 45% chance of supporting restrictions, while people who were uncertain over which party to support had a 58% chance of supporting restrictions.

The above data reflects the significant concerns of the Georgian public around the war in Ukraine, the uncertainties around what large scale immigration from the Russian Federation would mean for Georgia, and likely anger at Russians for the war which Vladimir Putin has unleashed in Ukraine.

Note: The social and demographic breakdowns shown in this blog post are generated from a regression model. The regression model includes age, sex, IDP status, a simple additive index of durable goods ownership (a common proxy for wealth), ethnicity (minority or not), education level, and party which the respondent supports. The data used in this blog post is available here.

Грузини хочуть, щоби їхній уряд підтримав Україну

Війна Росії з Україною шокувала світ. Вона також шокувала Грузію, а нове опитування від CRRC Georgia викриває ступінь наявних політичних наслідків. 

Наслідки війни, що стосуються зовнішньої та внутрішньої політики Грузії, виявилися доволі масштабними. Офіційна позиція Грузії щодо війни була суперечливою: в той час як прем’єр-міністр Іраклі Гарібашвілі категорично заявив, що Грузія не приєднається до санкцій, накладених Заходом проти Росії, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі почала медійний та дипломатичний бліц у Європі, висловлюючи рішучу підтримку Україні. 

На відміну від реакції влади щодо війни, реакція суспільства була однозначною. Грузини виходять в підтримку України у всіх містах та селах. 

З огляду на війну в Україні та навколишні потрясіння в Грузії, 7-10 березня CRRC Georgia провели опитування, яке охопило 1092 респондента. Результати опитування дозволили зробити висновки щодо того, кого грузини звинувачують у війні (Росію), яких дій грузини прагнуть від свого уряду (підтримати Україну), а також щодо внутрішніх політичних наслідків реакції влади (“Грузинська мрія”  понесла значні втрати у підтримці виборців). 

Грузини звинувачують Росію у війні

Переважна більшість грузинського суспільства покладає відповідальність за війну на Росію (43%) або на Володимира Путіна (37%). Інакше вважають 3% респондентів за винятком 9%, які не визначилися.  

Громадськість також запитали про мотивацію Росії до війни. Отримані дані показали, що більшість вважає, що Росія почала війну аби захопити певні території (34%) чи Україну загалом (25%), щоб відновити Радянський Союз (20%), а також щоб запобігти вступу України в НАТО (17%). Інакше відповіли менш ніж 10% опитаних. 

  

Суспільство хоче, щоб грузинська влада підтримала Україну

Респондентів запитали, чи вважають вони, що уряд Грузії має висловити більшу підтримку уряду України, має залишити наявний рівень підтримки, зменшити рівень підтримки чи не підтримувати взагалі. Значна більшість опитаних вважають, що підтримки має бути більше (61%) або що вона має залишатися на наявному рівні (32%). Лише 2% вважають, що підтримки має бути менше, 1% вважають, що її взагалі не має бути. 

Окрім зазначеного вище, респондентів запитали, чи були на їхню думку прийнятними чи неприйнятними певні дії уряду  у відповідь на кризу. 

Переважна більшість грузин підтримує надання гуманітарної допомоги Україні (97%), прийняття українських біженців (96%), а також надання фінансової допомоги Україні. 

Дві третини опитаних (66%) підтримують ідею надання дозволу грузинським добровольцям поїхати в Україну; уряд Грузії намагався завадити цьому. 

Близько половини (52%) підтримали б грузинську владу у озброєнні України. 

 

Суспільство хоче, щоб Грузія взяла участь у санкціях

Громадськість бажає, аби санкції проти Росії були сильнішими, а більшість хоче, щоб Грузія приєдналася до них. Це різко контрастує з відмовою прем’єр-міністра Іраклі Гарібашвілі приєднатися до санкцій або впровадити власні. 

Опитуваних також запитали, чи вважають вони, що країни, які наклали санкції на Росію, мають посилити їх, утримувати на наявному рівні, зменшити силу санкцій чи не накладати їх на Росію взагалі. 

Результати показали, що переважна більшість вважає, що санкції мають бути посилені (71%) або залишитися на наявному рівні (10%). Лише 4% вважає, що санкції мають бути пом’якшені, 3% відсотки вважають, що вони мають бути зняті взагалі.  

На питання про те, чи уряд Грузії має приєднатися до санкцій, більшість респондентів відповіли ствердно (66%). Думки розділилися щодо того, чи Грузія має приєднатися до всіх санкцій (39%), чи до деяких (27%). Лише 19% відповіли, що Грузія не має приєднуватися до санкцій взагалі. 14% не були певні у цьому питанні. 

Євроатлантичне майбутнє України та Грузії

З огляду на вторгнення Росії, Україна подала заявку до Європейського Союзу, і цей крок швидко наслідували Грузія та Молдова. 

Громадськість рішуче підтримує подання заявки Грузією та Україною на статус кандидата в ЄС. В той же час, відзначаються невеликі зміни думок щодо загальної підтримки членства Грузії в ЄС та НАТО (яка вже була високою) з початку війни. 

Респондентів запитали, наскільки сильно вони підтримують або не підтримують надання Україні та Грузії членства в Європейському Союзі. Ці дані показали високу підтримку грузинським суспільством надання статусу кандидата до ЄС обидвом країнам. 

Респондентів також запитали, чи підтримують вони інтеграцію Грузії в Європейський Союз, НАТО, а також в очолений Росією митний союз. 

Дані опитування “Кавказький барометр 2020”, яке включало в себе подібне  питання, показали, що 73% грузинів підтримували членство в ЄС, 71% підтримували членство в НАТО. Сьогодні, 75% підтримує членство в ЄС і 70% підтримує членство в НАТО, що статистично не відрізняється від даних за 2020 рік. 

Заяви президента та прем’єр-міністра щодо війни

Прем’єр-міністр Грузії Іраклі Гарібашвілі зазнав значної критики щодо своєї реакції на війну. В той час як більшість світової спільноти запровадила санкції у відношенні до Росії, Гарібашвілі твердо заявив, що Грузія не буде брати участі у санкціях. Президент України Володимир Зеленський опублікував твіт з подякою грузинському народу за підтримку, та в той же час розкритикував грузинську владу за її відсутність. 

На противагу заявам прем’єр-міністра, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі отримала широке схвалення за її реакцію відносно конфлікту. Зурабішвілі висловила рішучу підтримку Україні, а також здійснила дипломатичний та медіа-тур країнами Європи у підтримку України. 

Зважаючи на зазначене вище, не дивно, що громадськість підтримує дії президента щодо війни значно більше, ніж дії прем’єр-міністра. 

В той час як 64% погоджуються з діями Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 41% погодилися з діями Гарібашвілі, що показує розрив у 23%. Окрім цього, 15% не схвалили дії Зурабішвілі, а 39% не схвалили дій Гарібашвілі. Таким чином, рейтинг чистого схвалення Зурабішвілі складає +49%, а рейтинг чистого схвалення Гарібашвілі складає +2%. 

 

Якщо розглядати дані, розбиті за партійними уподобаннями, вони демонструють, що вищий рівень ефективності Саломе Зурабішвілі порівняно з Гарібашвілі виходить з більшого рівня підтримки з боку опозиції: в той час як 61% опозиції підтримують дії та реакції Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 32% підтримали дії Гарібашвілі. На противагу, Гарібашвілі та Зурабішвілі мають доволі подібний рівень підтримки серед прихильників “Грузинської мрії”. 

Політичні наслідки

З огляду на непопулярну реакцію Гарібашвілі щодо війни, не дивно, що підтримка “Грузинської мрії” скоротилася. 

Щоб визначити політичні преференції респондентів, в ході опитування ставили такі питання: а) за кого вони б голосували, якщо б парламентські вибори проводилися завтра. Якщо респондент не був певний у своїх симпатіях, пропонувалося відповісти, якій з партій вони віддають перевагу. 

Дані демонструють зниження у 10% в підтримці “Грузинської мрії”. Сьогодні, 22% респондентів підтримали б “Грузинську мрію” на виборах, якщо вони проходили б завтра. Для порівняння, у опитуванні в січні 2022 32% респондентів відповіли на це питання на користь влади. 

Таким чином, “Грузинська мрія”, хоча б тимчасово, втратила близько третини своїх виборців. 

Однак, незрозуміло, чи ця втрата буде перманентною. Дані не показують зростання підтримки опозиції порівняно до даних за січень. Радше, серед громадськості зросли показники невизначеності щодо того, кого б вони підтримали. 

Опитування CRRC Omnibus у січні 2022 показало, що 27% респондентів відповіли, що вони були непевні щодо того, кого вони б підтримали на парламентських виборах, в той час як у березні в опитуванні, присвяченому Україні, 38% респондентів відповіли так само, що демонструє зростання на 12%. 

Дані також демонструють невелике зниження підтримки опозиції: в січні 2022 підтримка опозиції становила 25%, а в березні 2022 вже 20%. 

Доля респондентів, що відмовилися відповідати, яку партію вони б підтримали, змінилася в порівнянні двох опитувань в межах похибки (з 17% в січні до 20% в березні).  

В той час як офіційна реакція на російську війну була апатичною, громадськість одностайно підтримала Україну та майже будь-які дії у допомогу країні в боротьбі проти Росії. Погляди суспільства на євроатлантичне майбутнє Грузії майже не змінилися. Тим не менш, погляди суспільства на владу змінилися, а “Грузинська мрія” втратила, щонайменше тимчасово, близько третини своїх прихильників.   

Автори статті: Дастін Гілбрет, Давид Січінава, Крістіна Вачарадзе, Анано Кіпіані, Ніно Мжаванадзе, Махаре Ачаідзе, співробітники CRRC Georgia. 

Переклад статті та матеріалів виконала Олександра Зур’ян - правозахисниця, співробітниця Центру участі та розвитку (Тбілісі). 

Погляди, висловлені у статті не обов'язково відповідають поглядам CRRC Georgia  або інших пов’язаних організацій. 

Дані, на основі яких базується ця стаття, доступні тут.

Ця стаття була вперше опублікована в рубриці Data Blog від CRRC та OC Media.

Georgians want their government to support Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, David Sichinava, Anano Kipiani, Kristina Vacharadze, Nino Mzhavanadze, and Makhare Atchaidze, CRRC Georgia staff members. The views presented within the article reflect the views of the authors' alone, and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has shocked the world. The war also shook Georgia, with new polling from CRRC Georgia revealing the extent of the political fallout so far.

The implications of the war for Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy and politics are wide-ranging. The official Georgian response to the war was incongruous: while the Prime Minister, Irakli Gharibashvili, flatly stated Georgia would not join the West in sanctioning Russia, the President, Salome Zourabishvili, went on a media and diplomatic blitz in Europe voicing strong support for Ukraine. 

In contrast to the government’s response to the war, the public’s response was clear. Georgians have been rallying in support of Ukraine in city, town, and village.

In light of the war in Ukraine and the surrounding upheaval in Georgia, CRRC Georgia conducted a survey between 7–10 March which included 1,092 respondents. The results lead to a range of conclusions around who Georgians blame for the war (Russia), what Georgians want the government to do (support Ukraine), and the domestic political fallout of the government’s response (Georgian Dream has lost significant support).

Georgians blame Russia for the war

The vast majority of the Georgian public places responsibility for the war on Russia (43%) or Vladimer Putin (37%). Other responses were named by 3% or less of the public, aside from uncertain responses (9%).

The public was also asked about Russia’s motivation for the war. The data indicates that most people believe that Russia started the war to conquer territory (34%) or Ukraine specifically (25%), to revive the Soviet Union (20%), and to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO (17%). Other responses were named by less than 10% of people.

The public wants the Georgian Government to support Ukraine

The survey asked respondents whether they think the Government of Georgia should support the Government of Ukraine more, at its current level, a bit less than at present, or not at all. A large majority of the public reported that they should support Ukraine more (61%) or at current levels (32%). Only 2% said less than at current levels and 1% not at all.

Aside from the above, respondents were asked whether a number of different actions would be acceptable or unacceptable for the Government to take in response to the crisis. 

The vast majority of Georgians support supplying humanitarian aid to Ukraine (97%), accepting Ukrainian refugees (96%), and providing financial assistance to Ukraine (91%).

Two-thirds of people (66%) support allowing Georgian volunteers to travel to Ukraine, something the government has attempted to block.

Around half (52%) would support the Georgian government arming Ukraine.

The public wants Georgia to participate in sanctions

The public wants sanctions against Russia to be stronger, and a majority want Georgia to join them. This stands in stark contrast to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s rejection of sanctions.

The survey asked whether the public thought the countries which have imposed sanctions on Russia should strengthen them, keep them at current levels, lighten them, or not sanction Russia at all. 

The results show that a large majority think that sanctions should either be strengthened (71%) or remain at current levels (10%). Only 4% think the sanctions should be lightened, and 3% think they should be removed entirely.

When asked whether the Government of Georgia should join in the sanctions, a majority agreed with this view (66%). Views were split on whether Georgia should participate in all sanctions (39%) or some of the sanctions (27%). Only 19% reported that Georgia should not participate in the sanctions at all. A further 14% were uncertain on this issue.

Georgia and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Future

In light of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, a move quickly followed by Georgia and Moldova. 

Public opinion strongly supports Georgia and Ukraine’s application to candidate status. At the same time, there has been little movement in terms of overall support for Georgia’s membership in the EU and NATO (which was already high) since the start of the war.

Respondents to the survey were asked how strongly they supported or did not support Ukraine and Georgia becoming candidates in the European Union. The data indicates strong support from the Georgian public for both countries becoming candidates in the European Union.

Respondents on the survey were asked how strongly they support Georgia’s integration with the European Union, NATO, and the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. 

Data from the 2020 Caucasus Barometer survey using the same question wording and answer options found that 73% of Georgians supported EU membership and 71% supported NATO membership. Today, 75% support EU membership and 70% support NATO membership, statistically indistinguishable shares from the 2020 data.

The president and prime minister’s performance on the war

The Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili, has received significant criticism for his response to the war. While large swaths of the world imposed sanctions on Russia, Gharibashvili firmly stated that Georgia would not participate in the sanctions. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, even tweeted a thank you to the Georgian public for its support, while slighting the Georgian government for its lack thereof. 

In contrast to the Prime Minister, the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabishvili, has received broad praise for her performance in relation to the conflict. Zourabishvili expressed clear support for Ukraine in the conflict and travelled throughout Europe on a media and diplomatic tour in support of Ukraine.

Given the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the public is significantly more approving of the president’s performance in relation to the war than of the prime minister’s work.

While 64% of the public approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 41% approved of Gharibashvili’s performance, a 23 percentage point gap. In contrast, 15% of the public disapproved of Zourabishvili’s performance while 39% disapproved of Gharibashvili’s performance. This leads to a net approval for Zourabishvili of +49% and a net approval rating of +2% for Gharibashvili.

When looking at data broken down by party preferences, the data indicates that Salome Zourabishvili’s performance level being higher than Gharibashvili’s stems from a greater degree of support from the opposition: while 61% of opposition supporters approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 32% supported Gharibashvili’s performance. In contrast, Gharibashvili and Zourabishvili had quite similar levels of approval from supporters of Georgian Dream.

The political fallout

With Gharibashvili’s unpopular response to the war, it is unsurprising that Georgian Dream’s base of political support has shrunken.

To identify respondents’ political preferences, the survey asked respondents a) who they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. If the respondent was uncertain, they were asked who they sympathised with compared to other parties. 

The data showed a 10 percentage point decline in support for Georgian Dream. At present, 22% of respondents would support Georgian Dream in elections held tomorrow. This compares to 32% of respondents on a January 2022 survey. 

That is to say, Georgian Dream has, at least temporarily, lost around a third of its voters.

However, it is unclear whether this loss is permanent. The data does not show a gain in support for the opposition relative to January. Rather, the public became increasingly uncertain over who they would support. 

On the January 2022 CRRC Omnibus survey, 27% of respondents reported they were uncertain about who they would support in parliamentary elections, while in the March Ukraine survey, 38% of respondents reported the same, a twelve percentage point increase. 

The data also shows a slight decline in support for the opposition, with 25% supporting an opposition party in January of 2022, compared with 20% in March. 

The remaining respondents refused to answer which party they would support, the share of which shifted within the margin of error between the two surveys (20% in March and 17% in January).

While the official response to Russia’s war has been lackadaisical, the public unambiguously support Ukraine and support doing almost anything to help the country in its fight against Russia. The Georgian public’s views of the country’s Euro-Atlantic future has changed little. However, the public’s view of the government has changed, with Georgian Dream, at least temporarily, losing around a third of its supporters. 

The data this article is based on is available here.

Young Georgians do not want a military solution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia, and David Sichinava, Research Director at CRRC Georgia. All views, place names, and terminology used in this article are the words of the authors alone, and may not necessarily reflect the views of OC Media’s editorial board, CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised fears in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that military aggression might be expected from Georgia. As Russia mobilised its military along Ukraine’s borders, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia declared military readiness to avoid ‘possible provocation from Georgian authorities’, while the de facto authorities in South Ossetia ordered an examination of its troops. 

Despite sponsored videos attempting to provoke this type of response in Georgia, as well as Western commentators questioning whether Georgia might attempt a military response, Georgian authorities have not hinted at the prospect of any military incursion in the two regions amidst the war in Ukraine. Government affiliated media have also not made any argument for doing so. 

Moreover, Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories rejects the pursuit of a military solution altogether and aims to achieve the ‘full de-occupation’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through peaceful means.

Recently released data from the CRRC Georgia and Caucasian House Survey on Youth Civic and Political Engagement and Participation in Peacebuilding shows that young people in Georgia support this policy approach. 

The survey was administered in the summer of 2021 and interviewed 1,116 Georgians between the ages of 18–29. 

The survey asked whether the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be resolved by the use of force or through negotiations. 

The overwhelming majority (95%) of young Georgians said that they supported negotiations rather than the use of force. Only 2% said that the conflicts should be resolved by force, while 3% had no opinion.

The majority of young people in Georgia were in favour of reconciliation and forgetting about past hostilities. Almost two-thirds (62%) agreed that it was necessary to forget the past and think about the future together to have peace with Abkhazians and Ossetians. About the same share (64%) said that ordinary people currently living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were as much victims of the conflicts as Georgians. 

At the same time, a majority of young Georgians disagreed (60%) with the idea that ‘it is important for us to be the first to apologise to Abkhazians and Ossetians for war crimes committed by the Georgian side’. A fifth (19%) neither agreed nor disagreed, while 11% agreed with the idea. A further 10% were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Aside from supporting the peaceful resolution of the conflict, a majority of young Georgians (66%) reported they were willing to participate in reconciliation efforts. Ethnic Georgians (69%) were more willing to participate in efforts aimed at reconciliation compared to ethnic minorities (42%). So were those who were working (72%) compared to respondents (62%) who were not. 

Young Georgians who said they knew someone currently living in South Ossetia were more likely to be willing to participate in reconciliation efforts (77%) compared to those who had no acquaintances there (68%). Importantly, having acquaintances in Abkhazia was not associated with willingness to participate in reconciliation efforts.

Young Georgians who claimed that they were well-informed about the conflicts were more likely to express a willingness to participate in reconciliation (82%), than those with lower levels of awareness (57%).

Those who agreed that Georgians should forget about the past and think about the future with Abkhazians and Ossetians were also more predisposed towards participation in reconciliation efforts (75%) compared to those who were against forgetting (56%). Still, the majority in both groups were willing to take part in peacebuilding activities.

The results of the CRRC Georgia/Caucasian House study reflect the generally peaceful attitudes of Georgians towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

An earlier study conducted in April 2020 for Conciliation Resources showed that a majority (71%) of Georgians regardless of age believed that the Georgian government was in a position to step up and improve relations between Georgian and Abkhazian societies. 

A large majority of the public supported direct dialogue with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia (70%). The next most commonly supported step was the identification of common interests and the development of joint solutions to problems (48%). 

In the light of Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, fears arose around whether Georgia might pursue a military escalation towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nonetheless, neither evidence on the ground, nor public opinion in Georgia show an appetite for such a pursuit. 

The Georgian public, including young people, is overwhelmingly against forced re-incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia, and most support the improvement of relations with the societies there. 

While the data presented here was collected prior to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, and public opinion can shift drastically amidst changing political situations, this data is a good reminder that an overwhelming majority of Georgians, including its youth, look for peace, not war.

Note: The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

The analysis was carried out using multinomial regression. The regression modelling the willingness to participate in the reconciliation efforts included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–23, 24-29), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), experience of job loss due to pandemic (lost job or not), current perceived economic rung (lower, medium, higher), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), party affiliation (Governing party, opposition, no party, don’t know/refuse to answer), and durable goods index. Non-demographic variables tested as part of the analysis included interest in current interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (interested, neutral, not interested), interest in Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s politics (interested, neutral, not interested), having acquaintances in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia (having, not having), acquaintance with Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s conflicts (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards the need of forgetting the past and thinking about the future together for peace (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia being as much victims of conflicts as Georgians (agree, neutral, disagree).