Deserving to be beaten and tolerating violence: Attitudes towards violence against women in Azerbaijan

Domestic violence counts for a considerable part of violence against women worldwide, with as many as 38% of all murders of women in 2013 being committed by intimate partners, compared with only 6% of murders of men according to the World Health Organization. The gendered character of domestic violence is a pressing issue in the South Caucasus. In Georgia, 1 in 11 married women has been a victim of physical domestic violence. Compounding the issue, 78% of women in Georgia consider domestic violence a private matter that should remain in the family, according to the United Nations Population Fund in 2010. Although, in Georgia 25 women were reported to have been killed by their husbands or partners in 2014 alone, the number is widely believed to be higher due to non-systematic practices of recording violence against women. In contrast to both Azerbaijan and Georgia, in Armenia there is still no legislation against domestic violence, with Amnesty International reporting that the numbers of women having experienced violence from their husbands or family members in 2008 was as high as 1 in 4 women. Azerbaijan presents a similarly alarming case, with 83 women that have been killed and 98 that committed suicide as a result of domestic violence in 2013, according to the Council of Europe. Against this background, it is important to have a closer look at people’s attitude towards violence against women and more specifically, towards domestic violence in Azerbaijan.

CRRC-Azerbaijan’s 2012 Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey in Azerbaijan, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), provides an opportunity to explore the attitudes of different socio-demographic groups of the Azerbaijani population towards violence against women. Respondents were asked, to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements, “There are times when women deserve to be beaten” and “Women should tolerate violence in order to keep their families together.” This blog post looks into how the attitudes of the representatives of various socio-demographic groups differ towards these two statements, which are jointly referred to as “violence against women”.

In general, Azerbaijanis are more inclined to agree that women should tolerate domestic violence in order to keep their family together (40%) than to agree that there are times when a woman deserves to be beaten (22%). Thus, part of the Azerbaijani population thinks that even though women do not deserve to be beaten, they should still tolerate violence in order to keep their families together.

In Azerbaijan, men are more inclined than women to think that there are times when women deserve to be beaten and/or that women should tolerate violence in order to keep their families together. Thus, 13% more men than women think that there are times when women deserve to be beaten, and 9% more men think that women should tolerate violence in order to keep their families together. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that women themselves (16% in the former case, and an alarming 36% in the latter one) also agree with the statements. 

Note: Answers to both statements, “There are times when women deserve to be beaten” and “Women should tolerate violence in order to keep their families together,” were re-coded here and in the rest of the analysis as follows: “completely agree” and “somewhat agree” into “agree,” and “completely disagree” and “somewhat disagree” into “disagree.” Options “Do not know” and “Refuse to answer” are excluded from the analysis throughout the blog.

Attitudes towards violence against women also vary by settlement type. When moving from rural settlements to the capital, less people believe that women deserve to be beaten or that women should tolerate violence. The difference is visible when considering that 1 in 3 people in rural settlements think that there are times when women deserve to be beaten, against only 1 in 10 people agreeing with the statement in Baku. Moreover, almost every other person in rural settlements believes that women should tolerate violence in order to keep their families together, against less than 1 in 4 people that think so in Baku.

 

Attitudes towards violence against women also vary by economic situation. About a third (30%) of those that describe their economic situation as poor believe that there are times when women deserve to be beaten and half of them believe that women should tolerate violence, compared with 16% and 17% of those reporting their economic situation as good. Thus, it seems that the better their economic situation, the less Azerbaijanis tend to think that violence against women is justifiable.

 

Note: Answer options on economic situation were re-coded as follows: “very good” and “good” into “good” and “very poor” and “poor” into “poor”.

When it comes to the level of education, the most visible cleavage in relation to attitudes towards violence against women is between the people with higher education and everyone else. Not unexpectedly, people with higher education are less inclined to believe that women deserve to be beaten or that they should tolerate violence, compared to the rest of the population of Azerbaijan.

 

Note: Level of education was re-coded as follows: options “Vocational/technical degree”, “High school diploma (10 or 11 years)”, “Nine year diploma,” and “Did not obtain a nine year diploma” were combined into “High school/technical degree or lower,” and options “Bachelors degree/5 years diploma” and “Any degree above bachelors” were combined into “Bachelors degree/5 years diploma or higher”.


This blog post explored the attitudes of different socio-demographic groups in Azerbaijan towards violence against women, with a specific focus on domestic violence. The analysis showed that the more educated and the better off economically people are, the less they tend to believe that women should be beaten or that they should tolerate violence in order to keep their families together. The same is also true for women and people living in the urban settlements  ̶  especially in the capital  ̶  as opposed to men and people living in rural settlements of Azerbaijan.

What do you think are the attitudes of people in Georgia and Armenia towards violence against women? Join in the conversation on the CRRC Facebook page or in the comments section below. 

Tracing regional inequalities in the Georgian education system (Part 2)

The first part of this blog post described the regional distribution of 2014 United National Exams (UNE) mean scores in Georgia. Here in the second part, we look at applicants’ gender and location (as explained below) in order to understand how mean 2014 UNE scores differ by these variables. This post also considers the role and quality of teachers in these regional disparities.

A location variable was generated for the present analysis, based on the applicants’ municipality of registration. This variable breaks down the applicants into five groups: those coming from the capital, large cities (Kutaisi, Rustavi, Batumi, Poti), municipalities in Western Georgia (including both urban and rural settlements), municipalities in Eastern Georgia (again, including both urban and rural settlements), and ‘other’ (IDPs and foreign-registered applicants). Although it is not possible to differentiate between urban and rural residents of the municipalities using UNE data, in general, municipalities included in the Eastern and Western Georgia groupings mainly consist of  rural populations.

As descriptive analysis presented in the first part of this blog post showed, applicants from Tbilisi and large cities scored the highest. Applicants coming from ethnic minority municipalities and certain mountainous areas of Western Georgia received the lowest scores. In order to check whether regional differences are systematic or random, a statistical technique called Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was employed. ANOVA checks whether the mean score of the groups under analysis differ from each other and whether a difference is statistically significant. The ANOVA results show that the main effects of gender, F(1, 26311)= 136.43, p<0.001, and location, F(4, 26311)= 396.36, p<0.001 are significant factors in applicants’ exam scores, while the interaction of these two variables is not significant, F(4, 26311)=1.67, p=0.1531. Post-hoc analysis demonstrates that there are no significant differences between the scores of applicants from the municipalities of Western and Eastern Georgia.

As shown in the chart above, in all locations, female applicants had higher mean scores than males. Applicants from Tbilisi – both males and females – were the most successful. Residents of large urban areas performed better than applicants from predominantly rural municipalities. Finally, applicants from the ‘other’ group scored higher than those from predominantly rural municipalities.

Although, in general, female applicants scored better than males, the difference was not vast. Importantly, there are significant regional gaps between applicants, which are clearly revealed by UNE scores. A number of reasons likely contribute to this disparity.

To start, Georgia is characterized by endemic regional inequality, including uneven quality of education in the country. There is an especially large gap between large urban areas and predominantly rural municipalities. The lack of quality education and good teachers in rural areas is obvious from the results of international tests taken by schoolchildren (TIMSS, PISA, PIRLS). Although, in these tests, Georgian pupils, overall, score around or above world averages, the picture is bleaker when looking at the scores by settlement type.

In Georgia, there is generally a lack of good teachers – nationally, over 90% of teachers of certain disciplines failed their certification exams in 2013. Still, the low quality of teachers in rural areas is more pronounced. If we look at the statistics for pupils per certified teachers (i.e. teachers who have passed special exams and hence are considered better performers compared with their peers), we see that this number is highest in ethnic minority municipalities – that is, there are fewer certified teachers with more students. In Marneuli, Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki municipalities, there are one hundred or more pupils per certified teacher, while in Sachkhere municipality in Imereti the respective number is 25.

As school education, which should be instrumental in preparing pupils for university admission exams, appears to be inadequate, university applicants (and their parents) often hire private tutors rather than attend school in the final (11th and 12th) grades. Considering that private tutors are in many cases active teachers, the availability of quality tutors in rural areas is also lower, while better private tutors are found in the capital and large urban areas. This factor also contributes to regional disparities in UNE scores.

This series of blog posts explored the results of 2014 Unified Entrance Exams, taking into consideration regional and gender factors. Both descriptive and exploratory analysis shows that there are significant disparities between applicants, especially from the geographic point of view. While UNE was an excellent opportunity for many applicants who would not have had the chance to be accepted to a higher educational institution within the previous corrupt admissions system, certain segments of the population still do not enjoy equal opportunities, not because of the UNE per se, but due to the existing endemic problems that the Georgian secondary education system faces. In spite of its impressive success, the improved university admissions system has not tackled Georgia’s deep-rooted educational inequalities.

Have other insights? Join the conversation on our Facebook page or in the comments section below.

Tracing regional inequalities in the Georgian education system (Part 1)

It has been almost ten years since United National Exams (UNE) for university admissions were introduced in Georgia, and the introduction of UNE has been named by the World Bank as one of the most successful reforms implemented since the Rose Revolution. Previously, university admissions were directly administered by the higher educational institutions, and entrance exams were often the site of highly corrupt practices. UNE ultimately led to the complete elimination of corruption and nepotism from the admissions process.

Corruption aside, fair and exclusively merit-based UNE were expected to give a better chance to applicants from outside Tbilisi, including representatives of ethnic minorities, to enroll in the best educational institutions in Georgia. Some, largely unsystematic evidence, however, suggests that this expectation has not been met. While at present, we do not possess longitudinal data which would enable us to draw comparisons between the situation before and after the reform, we do have data to look at how admitted applicants from different regions of Georgia performed on the 2014 exams. The publicly available 2014 UNE database contains scores for all exam takers (about 26,000 individuals) along with basic demographic data about them, such as date of birth, gender, and municipality where the applicant was registered at the time of exam. It should be noted that the applicants’ place of registration does not necessarily accurately reflect their actual place of residence in Georgia, since no one is obliged by law to live in their place of registration. This is especially true for IDPs, who despite being registered in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, in fact generally reside in areas controlled by Georgia, mainly in Tbilisi (40% of the whole IDP population) and Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti (32%). However, registration data still makes sense as many people in Georgia, especially the youth graduating secondary schools, generally live in their place of registration.

The map below displays the distribution of UNE scores by applicants’ municipality in 2014. The municipalities on the map below have been assigned a color based on the standard deviation of the applicants’ mean scores. Standard deviation indicates how distant a particular data point, an exam score in this instance, is from the mean. It also “quantifies the amount of variation or dispersion of a set of data values.”  On the map, negative standard deviations indicate values less than the national mean, while positive ones indicate values above the national mean.

  

Looking at the regional distribution of mean exam scores on the map above, a number of patterns can be observed. High and low scores are concentrated territorially and form distinct geographic patterns. Applicants from the capital and large urban areas (Kutaisi, Batumi, Rustavi, Poti) on average have received the highest scores. Another area of concentration of high scores can be observed in Kakheti. The performance of representatives of municipalities from the central-western parts of Georgia was slightly worse (Racha-Lechkhumi, eastern municipalities of Imereti, as well as Khashuri and Gori). Interestingly enough, IDP contestants’ results are also quite high, especially those registered in Sukhumi municipality.

Municipalities with predominantly non-ethnic Georgian populations have the lowest mean exam scores in the country. Applicants from Marneuli, Bolnisi, Akhalkalaki, Ninotsminda and Tsalka municipalities performed the worst on average during the last UNE. Upper Adjara and Svaneti are two other areas with concentrations of low scores.

UNE scores portray a larger problem with the education system in Georgia – regional inequality of access to quality education. Applicants coming from regions and especially ethnic minority applicants are less likely to score high on exams even though they provide everyone with an equal chance. Moreover, provided that advanced knowledge of the state language – Georgian –was necessary to pass the exams, to a certain extent, the UNE discriminated against ethnic minority exam takers, especially those from Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, who are often not fluent in Georgian.

Despite the fact that the National Assessment and Examinations Center (NAEC) quickly acknowledged this latter problem and, starting from 2010, offered exams in minorities’ native languages (Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian), as it is clear from the map above,  the disparity between predominantly Georgian-speaking and ethnic minority municipalities remains. 

This blog post described regional disparities in terms of UNE exam scores in Georgia. In the next blog post, we will investigate whether gender and settlement type impact UNE scores. Despite the above explanations for regional disparities not being exhaustive, they give some food for thought and discussion. Have other insights? Join the conversation on our Facebook page or in the comments section below.

On courts and trust: Perceptions of the judiciary in Georgia

As in many countries in transition, reform of the judiciary has been a major issue in Georgia. The country has gone through a number of reforms since the early 1990s. After the bitter September 2012 prison abuse scandal, the post-2012 election period saw a renewed attempt at reforming the judiciary by the newly elected government. This attempt involved a series of legislative changes in 2012, 2013 and 2014. While these changes might have passed unnoticed on the part of the general public, the high profile trials and indictments of former top officials, including President Mikheil Saakashvili, the Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabashvili, Mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava, Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili and Chief Prosecutor and Minister of Justice Zurab Adeishvili have certainly attracted the public’s attention.

As the prison scandal, judicial reforms and trials continue to make headlines three years into the new government, it is interesting to look at the dynamics of public trust in the judiciary in Georgia and to explore factors that could be linked to it. Using data from CRRC-Georgia’s 2014 survey Attitudes towards the Judicial System in Georgia, funded by USAID through the East-West Management Institute, this blog post explores Georgian citizens’ trust towards the judiciary by looking at three factors that are commonly used in the literature to explain levels of trust in public institutions: (1) perceived performance (Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal, 2011); (2) fairness  (Rothstein, 2004; Mishler and Rose, 1997); and (3) trust in incumbents (Sztompka, 1999). As Georgian citizens indicate that courts and judges are one of the first things that come to their mind when thinking of the judiciary, we refer to courts in this post to represent the judiciary.

In order to explore how assessments of the courts’ performance are associated with trust in courts in Georgia, we look at trust in courts by perceived court performance. The latter is measured by the answers to the question asking how Georgian courts work after the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. The chart below shows that half of those that reported better performance also reported trusting courts, while roughly the same share (54%) of those who reported worse performance reported distrust in courts. Unsurprisingly, the data proves that the more people perceive that courts are performing well, the more they tend to trust them. This conclusion is also backed by correlation analysis which shows significant, but relatively weak correlation between these variables.

Note: During the analysis, the answers to the question “How much do you trust or distrust courts?” were re-coded from the 10-point scale used in the questionnaire into a 3-point scale where original options 1 through 4 were combined into “Distrust,” options 5 and 6 were combined into “Neither trust nor distrust” and options 7 through 10 were combined into “Trust.” Options “Do not know” and “Refuse to answer” are excluded from the analysis here as well as in the rest of the analysis. Answer options to the question “How did the Georgian courts work after the 2012 Elections?” were re-coded as follows: “much better” and “somewhat better” into “better”, and “somewhat worse” and “much worse” into “worse”. 

Fairness is another factor that helps to explain the level of trust in courts. It can be measured through the level of (dis)agreement with the statement “All people are equal before the law in Georgia.” Similar to the previous chart, the chart below shows that about half of those agreeing that everyone is equal before the law in Georgia trust courts, while half of the people that disagree with the statement distrust courts. Therefore, the more that Georgians agree that all people are equal before the law in Georgia, the more they tend to trust courts. The correlation between these two variables is also significant and relatively weak.

Note: The answers to the statement “All people are equal before the law in Georgia” were re-coded from the 10-point scale used in the questionnaire into a 3-point scale where original options 1 through 4 were combined into “Disagree,” options 5 and 6 were combined into “Neither agree nor disagree” and options 7 through 10 were combined into “Agree”.

Finally, the literature suggests that trust in an institution is an aggregation of trust in an institution’s incumbents i.e. the people that are employed or that represent an institution. Here, the perceived level of judges’ fairness, measured by (dis)agreement with the statement, “Overall, the judges are fair in Georgia,” serves as a window into trust in court incumbents. Unsurprisingly, 69% of those that agree that judges are fair report trusting courts, and 63% of those that disagree report distrusting them. Thus, the more people believe judges are fair, the more they tend to trust courts in Georgia. This conclusion is also backed by correlation analysis that showed significant and strong correlation between Georgian citizens’ trust in courts and their assessment of judges’ fairness.

Note: The answers to the question “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the opinion that Georgian judges are fair?” were re-coded from a 10-point scale used in the questionnaire into a 3-point scale where original options 1 through 4 were combined into “Disagree,” options 5 and 6 were combined into “Neither agree nor disagree” and options 7 through 10 were combined into “Agree”.

This blog post explored associations between levels of trust in courts in Georgia and some factors that are considered important to the level of trust in public institutions. The analysis found that all three factors discussed – perceived performance, perceived fairness and trust in incumbents – can help explain levels of trust in the judiciary in Georgia and that they can potentially serve as explanatory variables for further analysis of trust in courts. Unsurprisingly, the charts presented above display an almost symmetrical compatibility between (dis)agreement with statements and levels of (dis)trust, while correlation analysis also backed the results. Still, it would be interesting to explore the effects of political discourse, especially when emphasis is placed on “change” and “reform,” in order to see whether perceptions are affected by personal experience with institutions or by the general climate which emphasizes change in everyday public discourse.

What other factors are at play when thinking about trust in the judiciary in Georgia? Join in the conversation on the CRRC-Georgia Facebook page or in the comments section below.

Trust and Distrust in Political institutions in Azerbaijan

[This is a guest blog post by Anar Valiyev, Azer Babayev, Hajar Huseynova and Khalida Jafarova, prepared in the framework of the Research Beyond the Ivory Tower project of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors alone, and may not reflect the views of CRRC-Armenia, CRRC-Azerbaijan, or CRRC-Georgia.]

This blog post is based on research on (dis)trust in political institutions in Azerbaijan. Internationally, levels of trust in political institutions often reflect how well these institutions perform in relation to citizens’ expectations. This is not necessarily the case in Azerbaijan. Although survey results consistently show that trust in the President is high, crucial political institutions such as Parliament and local government are less trusted and, overall, the level of trust is not very high. This is important because of two implications: on the one hand, high levels of political trust can aid economic development and political stability. Distrust in political institutions, on the other hand, can lead to low voter turnout and the weakening of democratic reforms. Allegedly, it may also lead to corruption.

As in other post-Communist states, in Azerbaijan, political distrust is historically rooted. Even during the Communist regime, trust toward state institutions was not high due to high levels of corruption, nepotism and mismanagement of institutions. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, declining trust levels and poor public management have led to political apathy and low membership in political organizations.

In Azerbaijan, which is a presidential republic, trust in the President and trust in other institutions of the executive government differ from each other. While, according to CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer survey, 56% of the population reports trust and 22% distrust in executive government, e.g. the Ministers, 84% of the population reports trusting the President of Azerbaijan. However, only 39% of the population reports trusting local government. Attitudes towards local government are also reflected in very low turnout during municipal elections – 32% in 2009, 23% in 2011, 39% in 2014. It is possible that people do not see much value in participating in these elections due to the ineffectiveness of municipalities.

In order to address the issue of distrust in political institutions, the government should take immediate action by making the work of state institutions transparent and public, educating the public on the importance of state institutions, and involving the public in the decision-making processes.

Getting to the streets: Who is more inclined to protest in Georgia?

While elections bring citizens to vote on a regular basis thus fulfilling the minimal  ̶  necessary but not sufficient  ̶  condition for democracy, as set out by Schumpeter in 1942, petitions, demonstrations and various forms of organized protests are also an effective way for citizens in democratic societies to both exercise the power of the sovereign in between elections and to express discontent with elected representatives. These activities become more popular when other forms of institutional or civic channels are absent, dysfunctional, or alien to the majority of the population.

Georgia has had quite a rich experience with protests and demonstrations after independence in 1991. These have been mainly driven at efforts to change the government, although the last couple of years have seen demonstrations of a social nature with regards to LGBT (both pro- and anti-LGBT rights) and women’s rights.  Authors like McAdams (1982) and Van Zomeran et. al (2008) use people’s perceptions of a movement’s efficacy to bring the expected/desired change, among other factors, in order to explain their willingness to participate in such movements. Thus, the more people perceive an activity as efficacious for the aimed outcome, the more they are willing to take part in it. Given the above, it is interesting to explore whether perception of efficacy of protest actions is equally characteristic for different socio-demographic groups, and if not – representatives of which groups are more inclined to perceive protests and demonstrations as efficacious and eventually take part in them in Georgia.

Using data from CRRC-Georgia’s 2014 survey Volunteering and civic participation in Georgia, funded by USAID through the East West Management Institute, this blog post explores who is more inclined to participate in demonstrations based on the perceived efficacy of actions. Efficacy is measured through agreement or disagreement with the statements, “For me, actions like holding peaceful demonstrations to demand something from the government are pointless, because the government will do whatever it wants anyway,” and “I think that holding peaceful demonstrations is important, because in this way the government is forced to take into consideration people’s demands,” which were originally two opposing statements offered to respondents. In tangent to these questions, the blog post explores how the answers of people with different levels of education, household economic situations and a background of recent participation in public meetings or political rallies differ based on perceived efficacy of peaceful demonstrations.

While there were minor differences in the level of perceived efficacy of demonstrations by gender, age and settlement type, visible differences were observed by level of education. The chart below demonstrates that the higher peoples’ level of education in Georgia, the more they tend to see peaceful demonstrations as an efficacious tool to affect government decision-making. Thus, 78% of those with higher education report perceiving demonstrations as important in forcing the government to take into consideration people’s demands, compared to 64% of those with secondary or lower education.

Note: Level of education was re-coded as follows: “no primary education”, “primary education”, “incomplete secondary education” and “completed secondary education” into “secondary or lower”; “incomplete higher education”, “completed higher education” and “PhD or Post-Doctoral” into “Higher”. Both here and in the following charts in this blog post, agreement and strong agreement with any of the two opposing statements offered to the respondents were grouped during data analysis. The option “agree with none of the statements,” as well as answers “Do not know” and “Refuse to answer” were excluded from the analyses.

A poor economic situation may also lead to belief in efficacy of and, eventually, participation in protest actions. Although one may expect that people who report that money is not enough for food and/or clothes are more likely to participate in a peaceful demonstration in order to influence the government in Georgia, survey data suggests that this is not the case. In fact, the worse people perceive their household’s economic condition to be, the less they are inclined to see peaceful demonstrations as an efficacious tool to influence the government. Thus, 42% of Georgians that report money is not enough for food see protests as pointless, compared to only 19% of those that report having a very good household economic condition (those who report they can afford to buy expensive durables or anything they need).

Note: In the question on household economic situation, options “We can afford to buy some expensive durables” and “We can buy anything we need” were combined during the analysis. Options “Do not know” and “Refuse to answer” were excluded from the analysis.

Although Georgians that participated in meetings and/or rallies in the past 6 months appear to be more optimistic than others in relation to the efficacy of demonstrations, roughly one in five people that reported previous participation do not see demonstrations as efficacious in influencing decision-making. Rather than pessimistic, as would be the case with those that have not tried to engage in such activities, this segment of active citizens may better be described as disappointed.

Note: Two different questions were used to measure participation in a political rally or a public meeting. During the analysis, the answer “Yes” to at least one of these questions was classified as “I took part in a political rally and/or a public meeting in the past 6 months” and the rest were classified as “I took part in neither a political rally nor a public meeting in the past 6 months.” Options “Do not know” and “Refuse to answer” were excluded from the analysis.

This blog post has shown that those that recently participated in public meetings or rallies, as well as more educated and wealthy Georgians perceive peaceful demonstrations as more efficacious in affecting government decision-making, compared to those who have not recently participated in meetings or rallies, are less educated and are poorer. If perceived efficacy of demonstrations would define choices on whether to participate in a demonstration or not, then one can expect the rich, the educated and the people that were recently active in public meetings or rallies to be the first to get to the streets for a demonstration.

How does this match up with your understandings of protestors in Georgia? Join in the conversation on our Facebook page, here.

To learn more about the data, check out the 2014 Policy, Advocacy, and Civil Society Development in Georgia report or refer to CRRC’s online data analysis tool.

Premarital sex and women in Georgia

Conservative traditions have always been strong in Georgian society, and especially so when it comes to relationships. Nonetheless, men are often allowed and even encouraged to engage in premarital sex, while it is usually considered unacceptable for women. Using data from the survey Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU in Georgia (EU Survey) funded by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and conducted by CRRC-Georgia in 2009, 2011 and 2013, this blog post looks at who reports more liberal views in regard to premarital sex in Georgia – men or women – and whether there are any differences in attitudes based on respondent age, level of education, or settlement type.

Attitudes towards premarital sex are changing in Georgia. In 2009, when asked, “How justified or unjustified is it for a woman to have sex before marriage?” 78% of Georgians reported that it is never justified. In 2013, 69% reported the same. In contrast, a much lower share of the population thinks that premarital sex is never justified for men – 39% in 2013, slightly up from 33% in 2011.

While dominant values, religion, and patriarchy engender many stereotypes about gender in Georgia, women also play an important role in maintaining them. A slightly higher percentage of women than men reported in 2011 that it is never justified for women to have premarital sex (70% and 58% respectively) while in 2013 and 2009 the percentages are almost equal.

Counter-intuitively, the younger generation (18-35 year olds) in Georgia disapproves of premarital sex for women to almost the same extent as older generations. As shown in the chart below, 18-35 year old Georgians are nearly as likely as 36-55 year olds to report that it is never justified for women to have sex before marriage. The youngest age group, however, is slightly less likely to report disapproval compared with Georgians who are 56 years old and older.

Residents of the capital are the least conservative on this issue, but rates of disapproval have declined both in and outside the capital since 2009.  In 2013, only 48% of Tbilisians thought that premarital sex was never justified for women compared with 65% in 2009. In non-capital urban settlements, disapproval declined slightly from 83% in 2009 to 71% in 2013. Rural residents are the most conservative, with 79% thinking that premarital sex for women should never be justified in 2013, but some change can be seen over the years in rural settlements as well – in 2011 and 2009, 88% of rural residents reported that women having premarital sex is never justified.

Education also plays a role in forming Georgians’ attitudes towards controversial issues. In 2013, 63% of those with higher education believed that premarital sex was never justified for women, while 81% of those with secondary technical and 84% of those with secondary or lower education reported the same.

To sum up, level of education, age and settlement type are important to consider when examining Georgians’ attitudes towards premarital sex. Although Georgians generally disapprove of women having premarital sex, attitudes appear to be changing.

Well-being of the elderly in the South Caucasus: A problem today, a bigger problem tomorrow

The world population is getting older, and this trend will likely continue as a result of decreasing mortality and declining fertility. International organizations predict that the aging of the population will cause economic problems in countries that already have difficulties in providing proper welfare for the elderly. The countries of the South Caucasus are no exception in this regard. According to the Global AgeWatch Index, by 2050, the population over the age of 60 will exceed 30% in Armenia and Georgia and reach nearly 26% in Azerbaijan, compared with, 14.7% 20.1%, and 8.8%, respectively, at present. This blog post examines the demographic composition and economic situation of the elderly in the South Caucasus countries based on 2013 CRRC Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey data. The post focuses on people who are at or above the standard retirement age (63 years old or older for men and women in Armenia, 59.5 years old or older women and 62 years old or older men in Azerbaijan, and 60 years old or older women and 65 years old or older men in Georgia), and when asked about their primary activity or situation, report that they are retired and not working. This group constitutes 12% of all respondents in CB 2013, and will be referred to as the ‘elderly’ throughout the blog post. The elderly who are at or above retirement age, but still work, are not included in the present writing. After examining the amounts and sources of income the elderly have, the blog reviews self-assessments of whether that income is enough to cover basic needs. 

In all three South Caucasus countries, citizens receive an old age pension, regardless of whether they worked or not. In Armenia and Georgia, the average pension (USD 63 and USD 81, respectively) is close to the official subsistence minimum (USD 65 and USD 79, respectively), while in Azerbaijan the average pension (USD 190) is somewhat higher than the subsistence minimum (USD 160). It should be noted that cost of living is also higher in Azerbaijan. As pensions are close to the subsistence minimums, a very low income level, the economic condition of the elderly is challenging. 

According to CB 2013, more than half of the elderly in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and two thirds in Georgia are women, which can be explained by the shorter life expectancy for males. In Azerbaijan and Georgia, more old people live in rural areas than in Armenia, and more than 40% of them in Azerbaijan and Georgia are widowed, compared with 34% in Armenia. Sixteen percent of the elderly in Georgia live alone, compared with 12% in Armenia and 7% in Azerbaijan. It is probably, in part, due to this last finding that elderly household income in Azerbaijan is higher than in other countries – the last month’s household income for more than 70% of Georgian and Armenian elderly was USD 250 or lower, while in Azerbaijan 70% had more than USD 250. Salaries were named as a source of household income by the Azerbaijani elderly more often than in Armenia and Georgia, likely because they are less likely to live alone. 

Note: The chart only shows the percentage of “Yes” responses for the five most frequently named sources of income.

When asked to rate their households’ economic situation on a ten-point scale, the majority of the elderly in all three countries named middle and low positions – codes “5” or lower. The elderly in Armenia assessed their households’ economic situation worse than in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In Armenia 52% of the elderly state that money is not enough for food while, 26% and 39% in Azerbaijan and Georgia report the same.

The poor economic situation of the elderly is further demonstrated by their need to borrow money for regular expenses. The elderly in all three countries report borrowing money for food, although, Georgians and Azerbaijanis do so less frequently than Armenians. Nearly a third of the elderly in Armenia say they borrow money for food at least monthly, while only 15% in Azerbaijan and Georgia say the same. The elderly in all three countries are less likely to borrow money to pay for utilities than to buy food.

Besides borrowing money for food and utilities, the elderly report limiting their consumption of certain products. Although such limitations are characteristic of all age groups, the elderly are more likely to do so compared to the rest of the population. Most elderly people state that they limit their consumption of meat and fish. Nearly half of Armenia’s elderly say they also limit consumption of butter and milk, while only 21% of Azerbaijanis and 31% of Georgians report the same. Armenians are also much more likely to limit consumption of fish, fruits and vegetables.

Thus, the economic condition of the elderly in the South Caucasus countries is unsatisfactory. Most of the elderly, especially in Armenia, state that their income is not enough for food and utilities. Consequently, they have to borrow money and limit consumption of certain products. This can be considered a cause for concern, especially as the share of the elderly population will increase in the upcoming decades, and the state will face further economic challenges without having worked out those of today.

A taxi driver’s tale, Part 2: The poverty of social status in Georgia

Looking at the association between an individual’s social status and his/her standing in the labor market, the first part of this blog post concluded that higher labor market mobility is characteristic for people with high social status, and that those with high social status have better chances of finding an attractive job. Yet, the question remains whether people with higher social status actually live better lives i.e., enjoy economic well-being and have better perceptions about their and their children’s future. To answer this question, this blog post examines how social status is associated with individual and household well-being. Data again comes from CRRC’s 2013 Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey.

According to Geostat, the subsistence minimum in Georgia was GEL 137 in 2013 (approximately USD 80). CB 2013 asks a question about personal income last month, but the answer options are given in categories (income ranges). The subsistence minimum of $80 falls into the category between $51 and $100. It is used in the blog post as a reference category to compare, on the one hand, individuals with higher incomes and, on the other hand, individuals with lower incomes. The group of respondents reporting not having personal income are considered a separate group.

As expected, social status is positively associated with personal income. Almost half of the representatives of the high social status group made more than $100 last month, whereas only 30% of the low status group and 36% of the middle status group managed to exceed the same threshold. Interestingly, the no income category prevails in the high and middle social status groups. One in every three people in these groups reports having no personal income compared to one in every four in the low status group.

Unsurprisingly, the higher its social status, the more money a household spends. Geostat reported GEL 900 (approximately USD 500) as average monthly household expenditures in 2013. In CB’s corresponding question, this falls into the category between $401 and $800. Again, this is used as a reference category to differentiate households spending more than the average from households spending less than the average. A higher social status is still positively associated with higher spending. However, the overall economic condition of Georgian households looks quite poor. As the chart below shows, even in the high social status group, the majority of households spent under $401 last month, and only 19% spent more than the reference category. In the low social status group, almost everyone (91%) spent less than the reference category, meaning that the low status group households spend significantly less than Georgian households on average.

The poor economic condition of the majority of the Georgian population is confirmed by CB questions about personal savings and debt. The vast majority of Georgians do not have savings, regardless of their social status. However, the high social status group (17%) is almost twice as likely to have some savings compared with members of the low (8%) and middle (9%) status groups. Likewise, money is more often owed to the representatives of the high status group (25%) compared to the middle and low status group members (18% and 12% respectively). The data does not show significant differences in terms of personal debts. Approximately 40% of each group reports owing money.

So far, it has been demonstrated that high social status is helpful to overcome economic hardship, but does not guarantee it. The reported gap between a household’s income and the amount of money it needs to cover its basic needs reinforces this statement. Half of the high status group representatives affirm that during the past 12 months there were occasions when their household did not have enough money to buy food. In the middle and low status groups, more than 70% reported the same. Moreover, the majority of the middle and low status groups and 40% of the high status group had to borrow money to cover utilities in the past six months.

The chart below shows that even representatives of the high social status group can largely satisfy only basic needs. Half reported that money is enough for food and clothes, but not for expensive durable goods (a new refrigerator or washing machine, for example). In the low status group, 35% stated that money is not enough even for food. Interestingly, a quarter of the middle and one in every ten of the high status group report facing the same problem.

It is not surprising that the poor economic realities of households are reflected in perceived place on an imaginary economic “ladder”. The chart below shows that only 19% in the high social status group perceive their household’s economic rung as high (45% place their households on the middle rungs and about one third towards the lower end). In the middle and low social status groups, the majority believes their households stand on the low rungs (46% and 54% respectively).

Note: Original answers were on a 10-point scale. For this graph, answers were re-coded as follows: rungs 1 through 4 – Low, rungs 5-6 – Middle, rungs 7 through 10 – High. 

At the same time, belonging to a higher social status group helps people to be more optimistic – 71% of the high status group believes that they will be better off in five years. Despite pressing current economic conditions, the other two groups are also quite optimistic – 57% of the middle and 43% of the low status group believe in a better future. Optimism absolutely flourishes, and the relevance of current social status fades when individuals contemplate their children’s future. Over 90% of all social status groups believe in a brighter financial situation for their descendants. Notably, all three status groups agree that the most important factor that will contribute to the well-being of the next generation is education.

This blog post described how social status is associated with economic well-being and perceptions about the future. The most important message to the taxi driver is that a higher social status in contemporary Georgia leads to more mobility on the labor market, as well as relatively higher income and spending. However, social status alone is hardly enough to overcome poverty and substantially improve well-being. Perhaps this explains why a man with more than one university diploma chooses to continue driving a taxi.

A taxi driver’s tale, Part 1: Social status in the Georgian labor market

Taxi drivers tell perhaps the most telling story of Georgia’s economic transition. They often complain that the transition made their high social status useless, thus pushing them into taxi driving. This often heard and mocked complaint highlights the contrast between what is expected from and what is delivered by the labor market. Taxi drivers expect their social status to remain at work in economic life, while the mockers believe that social status has no relevance for Georgia’s current labor market. Based on CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey data, this blog post shows that the taxi drivers are not entirely wrong. According to 2013 Caucasus Barometer survey, higher social status is associated with a higher likelihood of employment, a better job, and greater mobility on the labor market.

The taxi drivers often “operationalize” their social status as having a diploma or two from one or more higher educational institutions. In Georgia, another common cue to signal high social status is family background, normally operationalized in the same way. Not only are these two cues at the core of the taxi driver’s tale, but notably, the same characteristics often prevail when traditionally selecting a favorable bride or groom. Hence, the two cues fit the Weberian understanding of social status as perceived prestige and esteem that is related to economic relations, but cannot be reduced to it.

Following the taxi drivers’ perspective, this post proposes a simple index of social status, which includes two components: (1) respondent’s level of education, and (2) level of education of the respondent’s parents. In both cases, education variables are recoded so as to have three categories: (1) secondary or lower education, (2) secondary technical education, and (3) incomplete or complete tertiary education.

The index is a simple sum of these indicators and hence, it ranges from 0 to 4. At the highest extreme of the index stands a person with tertiary education having at least one parent with tertiary education (score 4). A person without any of these characteristics stands at the lower extreme of the continuum (score 0). Individuals with scores between the extremes are counted as having middle social status. As shown below, more than half the population belongs to the middle status group, whereas 28% and 19% fall into the low and the high social status groups respectively.  

Looking at the distribution of social status groups across settlement type, age and gender, it is notable that 39% of Tbilisi residents are in the high status group compared to only 7% of residents of rural areas. Low (42%) and middle (51%) status groups are predominant in rural areas. Urban settlements outside the capital have the highest percentage of the middle status group (62%). Interestingly, no important differences can be observed by gender. Younger cohorts tend to have higher education as well as more educated parents compared to older cohorts, and are thus more likely to belong to a higher status group.  

But, does social status have implications for an individual’s standing on the labor market? The Caucasus Barometer uses several questions to measure respondents’ employment status. While those who are employed or self-employed are identified using one survey question (“Which of the following best describes your situation?” with answer options including “Working either part-time or full-time” and “Self-employed”), identifying the unemployed is a trickier affair. To do so, it is necessary to separate those who do not work by choice and those with physical constraints to labor force participation from those who do not work resulting from a failure to find a job, i.e. the unemployed. To identify the latter group, a combination of two questions has been used - is the respondent interested in a job and if so, is he or she ready to start working within two weeks if a suitable job were available. Respondents who do not meet these two conditions are not formally unemployed and are not counted as part of the active labor force.  

From cross-tabulating an individual’s social status and his/her employment status, it is evident that the plurality of the low status group is out of the labor force (34%) or unemployed (29%). In contrast, the plurality of the high status group is employed (43%). However, it is noteworthy that one in three of the high social status group is unemployed (35%), while almost half of the individuals with low social status, on the other hand, were never employed.

Thus, the higher the individual’s social status, the higher his/her employment chances. Moreover, the status group a person belongs to indicates his/her occupational status. More than half of the high social status group works in high status positions, i.e. managers and professionals. A plurality of the low social status group (41%) works as unskilled laborers (elementary occupations, sales people, and baby sitters). Nonetheless, the majority of the low and middle status group enjoy mid-level occupations, such as technician, clerk, or skilled agriculture worker.

Note: The variable used to measure occupational status is JOBDESC. Respondents were asked, “Which of the following best describes the job you do?” Suggested answer options included: Manager; Professional; Technician / Associate professional; Clerical support worker; Service / Sales worker; Skilled agricultural / Forestry / Fishery worker; Craft and related trades worker; Plant and machine operator / Assembler; Elementary occupation; and Armed forces occupation. For this blog post, the options “Manager” and “Professional” were combined into the category ‘high’. “Armed forces occupations”, “Plant and machine operators”, “Craft and related trade workers”, “Skilled agricultural workers”, “Clerical support workers”, and “Technicians” were combined into the category ‘middle’, and “Elementary occupations” and “Service/sales workers” were grouped into the category ‘low’.  

Social status is also associated with employment sector and type of work for those who work. People who belong to the high status group rarely own businesses (18%) and are generally either state employees (41%) or employees of private companies (40%). At first glance it may seem paradoxical that those in the lower status group are more likely to own a business (55%), however, taking a closer look at Georgian reality makes it clear that these business owners are mostly self-employed agricultural workers or petty traders. Those in the middle status group are more or less equally distributed between the public, private and self-owned business sectors. As noted, people belonging to the low and middle status groups are more likely to work in agriculture (40% and 19% respectively). Individuals in the high status group are employed by educational institutions (24%) more often than in any other sector.

Importantly, the data shows that the Rose Revolution marked an important threshold for the Georgian labor market. The majority of employed individuals of all status groups started working at their primary workplace after 2004. This year perhaps also marked an important shift in the structure of the economy as 46% of the high and 33% of the middle status groups lost their job after 2004.
Not only are high status individuals more mobile, but so too are their household members who were more than twice as likely to find a new job in the last 12 months compared to the household members of individuals belonging to the low status group (16% vs. 7%). However, exactly the same was true about losing a job in the last 12 months – household members of those in the high status group lost jobs twice as often as those in the low status group.

This blog post has shown that the taxi driver’s tale of frustration has an observable underpinning – social status, operationalized as an individual’s and his/her parents’ education, is associated with an individual’s standing on the labor market. People belonging to the high status group are more likely to be employed, generally have better jobs, and exhibit greater mobility on the labor market. Hence, the preliminary conclusion drawn from this blog post is optimistic for the taxi driver, who perceives his current job as inferior to his status. If he belongs to a high social status group, he is more likely to find a better job. The second blog post in this series will describe how social status is related to household income and spending, as well as an individual’s perceived economic rung.

How to buy votes when you can’t buy votes

Today, less than democratic regimes face a serious dilemma – how do you buy votes to win an election without becoming an international pariah. Unfortunately for a society and fortunately for an autocrat, the wheels of power and administrative resources an incumbent regime wields provide ample opportunity to manipulate electoral outcomes through what are otherwise legitimate activities related to state spending and coercion. In this blog post the term autocrat is used descriptively rather than in an evaluative or normative sense i.e. in a manner synonymous to a ruler of a less than democratic regime.

Notably, almost all governments in the world hold some form of election. Even fully authoritarian regimes such as North Korea  and Uzbekistan regularly hold elections after all. In hybrid regimes, which are neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic (Armenia and Georgia among them), elections are often contested by multiple parties who see them as the legitimate means of gaining power. Political scientists have taken note and have come to call hybrid regimes which hold elections either electoral authoritarian or competitive authoritarian.

Elections in such regimes serve a number of purposes including legitimacy building on the international stage and enhancing stability at home. As Andreas Schedler has noted:

Electoral authoritarian regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty. Balancing between electoral control and electoral credibility, they situate themselves in a nebulous zone of structural ambivalence.

This “nebulous zone of structural ambivalence” leads to elections which are neither clearly stolen, nor clearly free and democratic. Direct electoral fraud may damage a state and its leading bureaucrats’ reputations abroad, potentially lead to sanctions, civil unrest or even a revolution as occurred in Georgia in 2003. The presence of influential international organizations’ election monitoring missions increases the likelihood that the direct purchase of votes from the electorate, ballot box stuffing or other obvious violations of democratic norms will be publicized and punished in some form. Yet, the “democratic uncertainty” that accompanies fully free elections presents the possibility that an autocrat could lose their power. So, if an autocratic regime desires the benefits accompanying formal adherence to democratic rules, but simultaneously does not want to lose power or create instability domestically, it must find a means to illicitly secure votes without directly buying them.

Increasing social spending or creating employment, social benefit and similar programs is one way an autocrat can attempt to buy votes without directly buying them. Manipulating public spending in order to improve electoral outcomes was first termed a “political business cycle” by Nordhaus in 1975. His work hypothesized that politicians would favor pre-electoral policies that, in the short term, yield lower rates of unemployment and higher rates of inflation instead of policies that would encourage an optimal balance of both in the long term. In doing so, a government uses fiscal policy to improve the economic situation in the short term and, as a result, popular perception of a party’s performance immediately before elections to improve their chances at the polls.

While spending is one avenue for an autocrat to seek, coercion is a second option when spending alone may produce uncertain results. Notably, Bhasin and Gandhi, looking at presidential elections in every authoritarian country from 1990 to 2008, have argued that before elections “regimes will moderate their use of violence against ordinary citizens, while simultaneously directing state-sponsored repression towards opposition elites. Ordinary citizens are likely to experience greater repression after the election.” While direct, physical violence is one form of coercion autocrats sometimes rely on, a regime can also use fines and fees in order to punish the society it governs.

Autocrats thus may  have carrots (spending) and sticks (coercion) which they can use to manipulate electoral outcomes in their favor. Using the 2006-2013 state monthly income and spending data from the Georgian Ministry of Finance, this blog looks at social spending and other income, which consists of non-tax revenues from the sale of services and goods, and from fines and penalties. While the exact denomination and number of fines and penalties would be a better indicator, which would allow us to fully test whether Bhasin and Gandhi’s theory is accurate in the Georgian case, other income is used here as a proxy since the Georgian government has not published a full account of the fines it has administered.

In Georgia, a country which has consistently been ranked as having a less than democratic but not fully authoritarian regime by major democracy scoring indexes such as Freedom House and Polity IV, a clear political business cycle can be observed when looking at social spending between 2006 and 2013, the years for which monthly data on social spending and other income is available from the Ministry of Finance. The chart below shows, on the one hand, the monthly average of social spending for each election year, excluding the month before elections, and, on the other hand, social spending the month before elections. In every case, the latter has been higher than the former.

The clearest example of electorally motivated social spending in Georgia was in December 2007, in the lead up to the 2008 snap presidential elections that were held on 5 January, 2008. The dramatic increase in social spending makes particular sense when considering the options available to an autocrat to attract votes – spending and coercion. On November 7, 2007 the government violently cracked down on opposition protests in Tbilisi. These actions triggered widespread anger, and had the government continued to use coercion, it would likely have further decreased popular support for it. The incumbent regime realized it was left with spending alone – the “carrot” – to attract voters, and the precipitous rise in spending indicates this. While social spending remained stable from January to September 2007, varying from GEL 51.8 million to 54.8 million, it increased to Gel 66.4 million in October, to GEL 134.3 million in November, and to GEL 206.6 million in December.

In addition to attempting to ‘buy’ voter loyalty, an autocrat can also attempt to coerce it, be it physically or financially. Looking at the Georgian state budget’s other income line from 2006 to 2013, a fiscal coercion cycle appears in addition to the social spending cycle described above. In the chart below, pre-electoral highs in other income are shown together with the average monthly other income collected each election year, excluding the pre-electoral high for the given year. The pre-electoral high occurred two months before elections every election year except 2010, when it occurred one month before elections.

Note: The other income average (blue bars) includes the month before elections, except for in 2010, since, as noted above, in all other election years the pre-electoral high occurred two months before elections. 
Correction: This graph originally presented the pre-electoral high in other income as 140 million in 2006; this is the figure for other income for March, rather than August of 2006. The graph has been updated to reflect the correct average in other income and the correct pre-electoral high in other income. The pre-electoral income in 2008 was originally reported as nearly equal to the average other income. In fact it was significantly lower than the average, two months before the elections.

On all occasions except the 2008 January elections, the state collected a significant amount more in other income during pre-electoral highs. In 2006, the state collected 137% of the average monthly other income before elections, 186% before the May 2008 elections, 338% before the 2010 elections, 453% before the 2012 elections, and 171% before the 2013 elections.

While without detailed data on the denomination and number of fines and penalties it is impossible to prove that the Georgian government – UNM and GD alike – has been trying to punish the electorate after elections and elites before elections, as hypothesized by Bhasin and Gandhi, the regular dramatic increases in other income before elections suggests that the government is punishing elites before elections. This is well exemplified by the 2012 pre-electoral period, when the government fined Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream coalition a number of times in the lead up to elections.

Once again, the 2008 January elections appear to be an outlier. Other income dropped from GEL 41.2 million in October to GEL 10.5 million in November of 2007, the month that the snap presidential elections were announced. It seems reasonable to suppose that the government believed and feared that an attempt at further coercion, after putting down popular protests, would have been more costly than beneficial for their electoral outcomes – the government had exceeded their ’coercion budget’ so to speak. This likely explains the astronomical rise in social spending discussed above.

Autocrats can and do use carrots and sticks to manipulate electoral results in Georgia. This blog post looked at social spending as a “policy carrot” and other income as a “policy stick”. In the month before elections, social spending has consistently increased in Georgia, while two months before elections other income too has increased, with the only exception occurring in the aftermath of the events of November 2007. This suggests clear pre-electoral spending and coercive cycles in Georgia, implying that the government consistently attempted to manipulate electoral outcomes.

Voter Participation and Civic Engagement in Georgia and Armenia

How individuals engage with those around them is a crucial part of civic life, and people in all societies practice certain forms of civic engagement. There are various approaches to measure civic engagement. The OECD refers to voter turnout as the “best existing means of measuring civic and political engagement,” because it considers those who vote more likely to participate in the political process in other ways. Thus, voter turnout can serve as a “proxy for civic and political engagement.” This blog post draws upon official electoral statistics and public opinion survey data from the CRRC Caucasus Barometer (CB) survey to analyze expressions of civic engagement in Armenia and Georgia. Specifically, it looks at reported involvement in volunteer activities, attendance at public meetings and religious services, and positive attitudes toward public criticism and protest of government actions in order to look at how closely voter participation corresponds to other measures of civic engagement in these countries. 

Considering that Georgia is a parliamentary republic, and Armenia is a semi-presidential republic, elections for these institutions would expect to attract the highest turnouts. According to the Georgian Central Election Commission, the 2012 Parliamentary elections brought 61.31% of registered voters to the polls, while according to the Central Electoral Commission of Armenia, the 2013 Presidential election saw a 60.05% turnout.  Hence, Georgia and Armenia had nearly identical voter turnout, although irregularities and a lack of transparency in vote counts were reported in Armenia’s 2013 elections, possibly increasing turnout figures. 

How does electoral turnout match up with other forms of civic engagement? In 2013, Armenians (31%) were more likely than Georgians (19%) to report performing “volunteer work without compensation” during the past six months. Notably, participation in volunteer activities represents a form of civic engagement beneficial for the construction of bridging social capital, which helps foster social trust and cooperation. Only 17% of Georgians and 9% of Armenians reported attendance at a public meeting during the past six months. As for frequency of attendance of religious services, Georgians were also slightly more likely to indicate regular attendance: 43% reported attending religious services at least once per month, compared to 32% of Armenians. 

Citizens also engage with society by expressing criticism or protesting the actions of government. In the words of Harrop A. Freeman, protest actions have historically been a “means of effectuating change within the law when law’s normal procedures were inadequate,” and thus represent an active form of engagement. In measuring public attitudes toward – but not necessarily actual participation in —protesting and criticism of government, CB asks respondents, “Which of the following statements do you agree with: ‘People should participate in protest actions against the government, as this shows the government that the people are in charge,’ or ‘People should not participate in protest actions against the government, as it threatens stability in our country?” 71% of Armenians and 52% of Georgians agreed with the first statement. When asked, “How important or unimportant it is for a good citizen to be critical towards the government?” 58% of Georgians and 41% of Armenians reported the belief that it is important for a good citizen.

Georgians and Armenians participate in elections at almost the same rate, but Georgians are more likely to think that a good citizen should be critical towards the government. They are also more likely to have attended a public meeting over the past six months and to have attended religious services at least once per month, important indicators of bridging social capital. Armenians are more likely to express the belief that people should participate in protest actions as well as more likely to have done volunteer work during the past six months. Thus a strong conclusion cannot be drawn from the data at hand as to whether Armenians or Georgians demonstrate more civic engagement overall. 

For more information on civic engagement in Georgia and Armenia please consult the CRRC’s Online Data Analysis tool. For additional analysis of civic engagement, refer to the OECD’s Better Life Index.