ECFR report: Befuddling data

Public opinion found its way into a major report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), but through the back door. The chart below, from page 28 of the report, appears to compare support for integration with Russia/CIS versus EU integration in the six EU “neighborhood” states.


But the footnote reveals that this data is a pastiche from a number of national opinion surveys that asked questions about attitudes toward EU integration. This type of data presentation can lead us astray, for a few reasons:

1. Comparability: A footnote claims that the variously worded questions are nevertheless “roughly comparable.” However, the subjects of the questions range from actual political integration, to foreign policy alignment, to “strategic partnership.” Some are concrete (“If a referendum were held next Sunday…”), others abstract (“With which of the following does Armenia’s future most lie?”). The form of the questions also varies. Some explicitly offer a choice between Russia and EU, others probe attitudes about the EU alone, still others offer unknown options for partnership. More fundamentally, many respondents in the “neighborhood” countries may not believe that EU integration is actually a feasible option. Asking about preferences for integration in the CIS versus the EU is meaningful only if people feel this is a realistic choice.

2. Unknown Sources: There is no indication of the survey sources. Even if the data itself is of high quality, methodology certainly was different in each of the polls. Timing is a particular concern. Commendably, the authors of the report do note that the survey in Georgia was carried out in 2007, while the others were in 2008. But political events at various points during those years (the Russia-Georgia conflict, the economic crisis, gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine, among others) could influence responses.

3. Presentation: For some countries, the combined responses total nearly 100% (Belarus, Ukraine), others are far less (Georgia, at around 50%) or far more (Moldova, with 120%). Presumably this reflects the different types of questions asked, or possibly missing values. But the chart fails to tell us which responses account for these discrepancies.

This kind of data presentation is a little disconcerting. Although it is very encouraging to see public opinion data in a major report, one would wish for a slightly more cautious presentation. To be able to draw powerful conclusions, a more consistent approach to gathering the data would be required.

In the coming days, we’ll put up a follow-up post presenting CRRC’s data on attitudes toward cooperation with EU and Russia in the South Caucasus countries.

Nokia's Fictional Georgia Map | Some Way to Go...

For those of you previously following our blog, you will be aware that we have a fascination with maps, and have pointed to the absence of the Caucasus in Google Maps. Recently I tried out the maps feature on my Nokia phone (one of those with a snazzy GPS). I knew that the map would be rough, but I was surprised to find that it had a major road in it that doesn't exist.


As highlighted with the arrow, there is an extension of the A302 that runs right over Tbilisi Sea. No one I have talked to ever had heard about this road being planned, and it wouldn't make much sense either: you would have to build a bridge of nearly 2 km across the waters, when the M27 bypass in the north works perfectly well.

Highlighting this issue to Nokia was complicated. The websites hide themselves behind automated replies; Navtech (the company that supplies the maps and has a feedback mechanism) also gives an automated reply that indicates that map updates are determined by Nokia. Eventually, I did get through on Nokia's new online platform, Ovi.com, where I did get a friendly response and a promise that they would forward the information. Let's see.

Now if that sounds like a lot of effort, it's partially because we think that better maps could make a huge difference. Imagine citizens sending in SMSes if certain public services don't deliver (electricity, water, garbage collection). And imagine if everybody could look at that map. We would instantly know where real problems are.

Where accountability is still developing, mobile devices could provide critical solutions. But for that, the maps would have to get a lot better -- and that's true for Google maps as well.

Russian Public Opinion on the August 2008 Conflict -- A Year Later

On August 4, the Levada Center, an independent Moscow-based public opinion polling organization, released the results of its survey of Russians’ attitudes toward last year’s conflict with Georgia. There are few surprises: the beliefs of most Russians continue to align with Moscow’s official version. The great majority of respondents see either Georgian or Western (especially US) provocation as the cause for the war, and Russia’s role as essentially reactive, aimed at keeping peace and stability in its near abroad.

However, compared with the results from the Levada Center’s September 2008 survey (you can read that, and our analysis, here), there has been some shift in attitudes. Last year, 40% of Russians thought that their country’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent would benefit Russia. Now, a year later, with Russia and Nicaragua still alone in their recognition of the breakaway regions, 29% of Russians think this has benefited Russia (but still only 15% think this action was actually harmful for the country).

Respondents also now appear to be slightly more uncertain about both the US’s role in the Caucasus and Russia’s involvement in the conflict. Last fall, 49% of respondents said that the main reason for the war was that US leadership was trying to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus. Now only 34% agree with that, and 17% found the question difficult to answer. And in 2008, 70% of respondents gave the Russian leadership their full support, saying that their leaders did everything possible to avoid an escalation of the conflict and bloodshed; that figure dropped to 57% in 2009. At the same time, the percentage of respondents outrightly critical of Russia’s actions remains in the single digits across the board.

Finally, respondents continue to be split about what should become of the breakaway republics. Thirty-five percent think Abkhazia and South Ossetia should join the Russian Federation, while 41% and 40%, respectively, believe they should be independent states. (Interestingly, respondents seem to think of the two republics monolithically, despite their quite different histories and circumstances.) Only 17% of respondents think the two territories should join the RF immediately -- many Russians seem less than eager for Russia to officially expand into an already unstable region.

The full results (in Russian) can be found here; we’ve also translated them into English below for those who want to take a closer look.

--

04.08.2009 On the anniversary of the military conflict in the Caucasus

Between July 17 and 20, the Yuri Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) carried out a representative survey of 1600 Russian citizens in 128 locations across 46 regions of the country. The distribution of answers to the questions of this study is given as the percent of the total number of respondents, along with data from prior surveys. The statistical error is less than or equal to 3.4%

Are you interested in what is happening now in South Ossetia?

Yes, considerably	11
Yes, somewhat	39
Not really	28
Not at all	16
Difficult to answer	6

In your opinion, should Abkhazia be part of Georgia, part of Russia, or be an independent state?

	2004	2006	2007	2009
Part of Georgia	14	13	7	6
Part of Russia	32	41	34	35
An independent state	29	27	32	41
Difficult to answer	25	19	27	18

In your opinion, should South Ossetia be part of Georgia, be part of Russia, or be an independent state?

	2004	2006	2007	2009
Part of Georgia	12	12	9	6
Part of Russia	34	40	34	35
An independent state	30	26	32	40
Difficult to answer	24	22	25	19

In your opinion, did (in 2008: “will”) Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia benefit Russia, harm Russia, or neither benefit nor harm Russia?

	2008	2009
Benefit	40	29
Harm	15	15
Neither benefit nor harm	28	40
Difficult to answer	17	16

In your opinion, what was the main reason for the conflict in South Ossetia in August of last year? (answers are ordered)

	2008	2009
The Georgian leadership had discriminatory policies toward the Ossetian and Abkhaz populations	32	35
The leadership of the US was trying to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus and create tension between Georgia and Russia.	49	34
The leadership of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were trying to keep in power, constantly provoking a tense situation	5	9
The Russian leadership tried to use a policy of “divide and rule” to preserve its influence in the Caucasus	5	5
Difficult to answer	9	17

Which of the following opinions about the reason for the actions of the Russian leadership with regards to the conflict do you most agree with? (answers are ordered)

	2008	2009
The Russian leadership did everything possible to not allow an escalation of the conflict or bloodshed	70	57
The Russian leadership gave into the provocation from Georgia and let itself be drawn into this conflict, which will have negative consequences for Russia internationally	16	21
The Russian leadership gradually incited the Georgian-Ossetian conflict for the sake of attaining its own geopolitical interests	4	5
Difficult to answer	10	17

What is your opinion of the Russian military intervention in the South Ossetian conflict in August 2008?

It is proof of the failure of Russian diplomacy and the inability of the Russian leadership to solve problems between countries by means of peaceful negotiations	13
It was the only possible way out of the situation that had taken shape	67
Difficult to answer	20

In your opinion, why did the countries of the West support Georgia in the South Ossetian conflict? (answers are ordered)

	2008	2009
Because the West’s leadership is trying to weaken Russia and “force it out” of the Caucasus	66	62
Since the shelling of the military installations by the Russian forces on Georgian territory caused deaths among the civilian population	8	10
Because, in bringing its forces into Georgian territory, it violated the sovereignty of that country	7	6
Because the actions of Russia resulted in the conflict spreading to other territories, particularly Abkhazia	5	5
Difficult to answer	14	17

In your opinion, is the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia now becoming more strained, does it remain tense, or is tension decreasing and life becoming more peaceful?

	2008	2009
The situation is becoming more strained	6	5
The situation remains tense	57	48
The tension is decreasing and life is becoming more peaceful	30	31
Difficult to answer	7	16

In your opinion, should Russia continue to keep its forces in South Ossetia or will it remove its forces from there?

	2008	2009
Keep its forces in South Ossetia	56	54
Remove its forces from South Ossetia	27	24
Difficult to answer	17	22

What do you think regarding the inclusion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Russian Federation?

	2008	2009
This should be done as soon as possible	20	17
This should most probably be done, but later, once emotions have cooled	26	24
Whether this should be done or not should be thought over	25	28
It is not worth doing this	12	17
Difficult to answer	17	14

Road Safety and the South Caucasus | WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety

A recent report published by the World Health Organization (WHO) claims that over 90% of the world’s fatalities on the roads occur in low-income and middle income countries, which constitute only 48% of the world’s vehicles. The study assesses the status of road safety in 178 countries, identifies gaps in road safety and proposes recommendations for intervention.

A principal finding reveals that very few countries have comprehensive road safety laws that are effectively enforced. Hence, only 29% of the countries meet basic criteria for reducing speed in urban areas, and less than 10% of countries rate the enforcement of their speed limits as effective. Moreover, only 20% of low-income countries have a law requiring young children in cars to be in car restraints in contrast to 90% of high income countries , which have similar regulations. Additionally, only 57% of countries require seatbelts to be used by passengers in both front and rear seats.

The report provides data on the three South Caucasus countries as well: the separate country profiles include data on the availability and enforcement of road safety laws, statistics on the vehicles and road traffic fatalities. According to the study Georgia has the highest number of fatal and non-fatal traffic accidents in the Caucasus. The data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs shows that 737 road traffic fatalities and 7,349 non-fatal road traffic injuries were reported in 2007. Officially in 2007 the number of the reported road causalities was lower in Armenia: 371 reported fatalities and 2,720 non fatal road traffic injuries, with a significant majority of incidents involving pedestrians. However, the actual numbers in both countries could possibly be higher, considering the fact that in some cases the non-fatal injuries go unreported and post-accident results are rarely recorded.

Yet, Georgia scores surpisingly high on the enforcement of the road safety laws. -- perhaps given its quite successful police reform and recent emphasis on breathalyzer tests. Drunk-driving law enforcement is rated nine out of ten (ten being the most effective), though the State Road Police 2007 data reveals that 37% of the road traffic deaths in the country involved alcohol. Road safety law enforcement scores are striking in Azerbaijan as well, where all the road traffic law enforcements, including drunk-driving, motorcycle helmet, seat-belts and child restraints are rated nine out of ten.

When drawing conclusions, however, we need to take into consideration that the ratings are based on the results of a self-administered survey, and represent the populations’ perceptions of the law enforcement, rather than the facts. While the report provides information on the methodology, it is still unclear, for example, how many people were surveyed and how the respondents were selected.

The full report can be found here.

CRRC Data Initiative 2008 now online!

Do you want to know how the global financial crisis has influenced people in the South Caucasus, what their views of NATO integration are, how they feel about their relationship with Russia and the West, how many friends they have and how healthy they are? The CRRC Data Initiative has answers to these and many more questions on political attitudes, social development, health, education, migration, and social capital. The 2008 dataset is now online!

We interviewed around 8000 people in the South Caucasus, which makes it the single largest dataset available on the developments in the Caucasus. Comparison over time is also easier, as the dataset contains data from 2007 and 2008. While keeping the core section over the time, we have enriched the 2008 dataset with a section on people’s perceptions of the European Union.

Register here to receive free access to the dataset. You need SPSS to process it (trial versions available online, or through your university), and if you want to find out how to use SPSS, we offer a quick crash course on our website. (Important: as you analyze, make sure you filter for the right years and countries, otherwise you have all-Caucasus all-year responses jumbled together.)

Soon you will be able to use our datasets online, without SPSS, so stay tuned for updates!

Introducing More Subtitling in Georgia | Policy Supported by Evidence

Georgian parliament is set to debate the introduction of broader subtitling (to replace dubbing) of foreign-language films on television. From the research point of view, this is excellent public policy. There may be some aesthetic disadvantages to subtitling, and viewers may take some time to get used to subtitles rather than voiceovers, but overall the educational advantages far outweigh any possible disadvantage.

Subtitling, rather than dubbing, has long been associated with superior foreign language ability. Countries that subtitle generally tend to be good in foreign languages. Examples include the Scandinavian countries, but also Netherlands. Several transition countries have taken the clever decision to go for subtitling, in order to further boost foreign-language ability. In Georgia (and the Caucasus generally), English is not spoken very widely.

http://mediadeskpoland.eu/upload/PP_Comite_media_280708_FINAL.pdf

Yellow: subtitles; Red: dubbing; Green: voiceover.

Countries that dub systematically tend to be relatively poor in foreign languages, examples including Germany (in spite of fairly high-quality teaching in schools), France, and Spain, and even worse in their pronounciation. Georgia has great opportunities if it develops extensive foreign language skills in English, maintains the skills in Russian, and ideally adds yet other languages (French, Persian, Turkish, German). Subtitling is one important step in that right direction.

The research evidence for this is strong. Danish and Romanian high school students, according to a 2003 Danish study, outperform German and Italian students in English comprehension. Denmark and Romania provide subtitles, Germany and Italy dub foreign-language films. In one study, 25% of Dutch primary school children said that they learned more English from television than at school. Scandinavian success in educational tests is consistently linked to subtitling on TV. Many other experimental setups have demonstrated the positive impact of subtitling on foreign language acquisition, including a better understanding of pronunciation (see Koolstra, 2002). Realistically, Georgia would have to invest dozens of millions to achieve a comparable impact through teaching across schools, and would still not reach the out-of-school population.

However, there is another important argument in favor of subtitling -- but one that is less obvious. Average families in Georgia watch television for around three hours per day. International studies have shown that television has a negative impact on children and youth -- but this impact could be reversed if children watch television in a foreign language, with subtitles. Studies demonstrate that television with subtitles helps children to learn reading (more strictly speaking: text recognition, or "decoding"), since they need to rely on subtitles to recognize what is being said (Koolstra, 1997). In other words, by subtitling, television becomes a powerful educational instrument that strengthens the link to written language per se, including one's own national language.

This draft law is an excellent public policy initiative by the government. It is cheap, comprehensive, turns a potential problem (TV consumption by children and youths) into a real asset, and could increase educational levels. From the research point of view, the available evidence suggests that subtitling deserves unqualified support.

Koolstra, C.M., Peeters, A.L., & Spinhof, H. (2002). The pros and cons of dubbing and subtitling. European Journal of Communication, 17(3), 325-354.

Koolstra, C.M., van der Voort, T.H.A., & van der Kamp, L.J.Th. (1997). Television's Impact on Children's Reading Comprehension and Decoding Skills: A 3-Year Panel Study. Reading Research Quarterly, 32(2), 128–152.

Announcing New Fellowship | UC Berkeley Scholars Workshop

The Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ISEEES) at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), in collaboration with the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC), is soliciting proposals from scholars in the Social Sciences and History from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to participate in a two-week workshop at UCB from November 7 to November 21, 2009. The workshop is funded by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

A total of four scholars from the South Caucasus (“Carnegie Fellows”) will be brought to UCB for an intensive review of the key literature, theoretical approaches, and methods employed in a particular field of scholarship. Each Carnegie Fellow will work with a paired UCB faculty member and graduate student with knowledge of the Carnegie Fellow’s field theme to develop undergraduate and graduate syllabi and teaching materials, explore innovative teaching and research techniques and technologies, and prepare a literature review for use by other Carnegie Fellows and scholars from the South Caucasus. The language of the workshop will be English.

Airfare, hotel, and meal expenses will be paid for by ISEEES. In addition, ISEEES will either pay for or reimburse each Carnegie Scholar for up to $600 in expenses relating to purchasing, copying, and posting teaching materials. ISEEES will provide letters of invitation, but each Carnegie Fellow will be responsible for obtaining a US visa with assistance from the local CRRC offices in Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan.

Who is eligible to participate?

• Citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
• Scholars who hold a "Kandidatskaya" degree or higher
• Scholars who have a level of proficiency in written and spoken English that is sufficient to conduct independent research and engage in a debate.

How to apply/documents to submit

• Completed application form
• Statement of purpose, explaining the applicant’s research and teaching experience and future plans (not exceeding 3 pages)
• Sample of scholarly research (not exceeding 10 pages)
• Curriculum Vitae

Application forms can be found at CRRC website. The website also has a detailed description of the purpose and design of the workshop. Applicants should be sure to read the Program Description to ensure that they are familiar with the design and requirements of the program.

Applications should be submitted via email to applications@crrccenters.org no later than September 11, 2009.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Georgian IDP Settlements: UNICEF Report

How are the thousands of people in Georgia who were internally displaced by last year’s conflict faring? A partial answer is found in UNICEF’s June 2009 report assessing water, sanitation and hygiene conditions amongst IDPs in Georgia nine months after the August 2008 conflict, which, at its peak, displaced 138,000 people.

The authors of the assessment, carried out jointly by Action Contre la Faim and the International Rescue Committee, commend the Georgian government for acting quickly to resettle the nearly 30,000 people who could not return to their homes after being displaced. However, as the one-year anniversary of the conflict approaches, there is concern that the momentum is fading, while many of the gaps in infrastructure that resulted from the rapid resettlement process remain unaddressed.

The report evaluates both temporary collective centers and new settlements for IDPs, as well as a representative sample of villages adjacent to the settlements. The assessment is based on interviews with “key people and representatives” in the communities (although it is not entirely clear how these people were selected), as well as evaluations by experts. The report therefore allows one to compare community members’ own perceptions of their circumstances with the observations of specialists. The resident and expert evaluations often align rather closely, although there are some divergences. For example, the chart below shows that IDPs in a number of communities have a more positive assessment of their water supply than experts, while for most of the villages there is a consensus that the situation is rather bad.

These discrepancies could be related to displaced persons’ prior living conditions: if, for example, an IDP formerly only had access to water from a well or spring, then running water for two hours a day in the new location may seem adequate – even if an expert would view the situation as in need of improvement.

Given the central role that water, sanitation and hygiene conditions play in day-to-day life, it is unsurprising that IDPs rank these items below only income and jobs (approximately 90% of IDPs are unemployed) when assessing their greatest needs. The report identifies a number of serious problems, the most pressing of which is reliable access to water (necessary not only for drinking and bathing, but also cooking, cleaning, and operation of toilets). Furthermore, although the large majority of collective centers and villages had safe drinking water, 40% of new settlements did not have water that passed national standards.

However, water was not the only issue of concern. Washing facilities in the majority of the settlements, regardless of type, were rated as either poor or non-existent. Problems with solid waste disposal impact not only these communities, but also the surrounding environment: the surveyed population dumps 6,000 tons of waste onto the Georgian landscape each year. On a positive note, all settlements scored very high on hygiene knowledge and practices.

One of the most noteworthy findings of the report is that the villages assessed were in many respects worse off than the IDP settlements – the chart above gives some sense of this. Moreover, 75% of villagers do not have access to an adequate quantity of water, versus 41% of of IDPs. Sixty-four percent of villagers, as opposed to 33% of IDPs, lack access to any bathing facilities. It appears that the water and sanitation conditions of ordinary rural Georgians lag behind those of displaced persons. And the infrastructure of those villages in which IDPs have been resettled face the additional strain of the extra population.

Fortunately, the report proposes some actions for the future, employing a detailed prioritization formula to determine a cost-benefit ratio based on the project cost, projected benefit and number of people served. Projects with low cost-benefit ratios (such as installing new waste bins) are recommended, as well as those that are durable (have a long-lasting impact) and those in settlements in critically poor condition. In addition to infrastructure fixes, the report suggests some more creative approaches, such as starting recycling and composting projects to cut down on solid waste (something even most US communities have yet to do satisfactorily).

The full report can be found here.

2008 Armenia Corruption Survey of Households Report

2008 Armenia Corruption Survey of Households report highlights the main findings of USAID MAAC Activity Corruption Survey of Households. The report includes survey & sample methodology, opinions on general situation in Armenia, perceptions of corruption, personal experience with corruption and awareness of anti-corruption initiatives.

The report is available for download in English and Armenian at CRRC-Armenia website.

This is a cross-post from CRRC-Armenia blog.

Joel Lazarus on Political Parties and Western Democracy Promotion in Georgia

Why, after almost two decades of independence, do Georgia’s political parties and party system remain so weakly institutionalised? Joel Lazarus, a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, attempted to answer this question in a public lecture on June 18th at the CRRC-Georgia entitled "Georgian Political Parties and Western Democracy Promotion".

While acknowledging Georgia’s democratic potential from a theoretical perspective, in his doctoral research Lazarus seeks to identify the domestic and international explanations for why political parties in Georgia and the party system within which they operate remain so weakly institutionalised.

Joel explored the following major domestic explanations:

• No early experience of democratic politics;
• Lack of a tradition of rational bureaucratic governance;
• Remaining patron-client structures, fiefdoms;
• Privatisation of social sphere;
• Weak citizen-party linkages;
• Low levels of organisation; Very low levels of trust in parties and other political institutions;
• Absence of pro-democratic values, such as: tolerance, self-reliance, restraint.

Joel proffered these international explanations:

• Political democracy promotion usually expressed in backing “reformers” and excluding all others;
• The international community ignoring and sometimes even praising unfree and unfair elections and constitutional/electoral code manipulations;
• A shift in donor funding from civil society/media to direct government support after Rose Revolution.

To summarize, Joel argues in his thesis that Western “democracy promotion” has actually served to exacerbate polarization and conflict in Georgian party politics, thereby serving to undermine any potential process of party and party system institutionalisation.

You can see the PowerPoint presentation below!

Joel Lazarus is a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. His doctoral research focuses on: “Promoting Democracy? Georgian Political Parties and Western Democracy Promotion.”

Financial crisis in Armenia | EV research center’s assessment

The global financial crisis has affected 70% of Armenians, states the Economy and Values Research Center, which recently conducted a study of the impact of the financial crisis in Armenia. The study included a survey of 1000 households in all the regions of Armenia and a survey of 60 large- and medium-sized businesses.

The financial crisis has had an impact across Armenia. The report indicates an 11-25% decrease in income throughout the country. The largest decrease in income is observed in Yerevan, where 40% of the respondents report that their income has dropped by 26-50%.

The crisis has also impacted consumer preferences. Thus, 80% of households will start purchasing cheaper goods. Additionally, 30% of households plan to cut or postpone their spending on communications, durable goods and vacation.

The impact of the crisis on the business sector is significant. According to the study 90% of the businesses surveyed reported that they have been affected by the crisis, and only 5% think that it will not influence them. Moreover, businesses are pessimistic in their predictions, with 80% of the surveyed businesses thinking that the situation will deteriorate further in 2009.

Strategies to overcome the crisis likely mirror those of businesses in other countries. The majority of the businesses surveyed plan to cut administrative expenses and postpone investments. Forty percent, particularly small- and medium-sized businesses, plan to downsize.

The results of the study are available here (in Armenian only).

Environmental Change and State Security | Setting Priorities Right

On June 5, the Center for Social Sciences (CSS) at Tbilisi State University hosted yet another insightful lecture, this time delivered by Professor Stephen Jones from Mount Holyoke College.

 
As the title of the lecture “Environmental Change and Acute Conflict in Georgia” indicates, the discussion evolved around the relationship between the environment and state security. Professor Jones argued that environmental changes, if not addressed timely and properly may trigger ethnic tension. He emphasized that the risk is especially higher in Georgia, where 40-50% of the population lives on the margin, and even a small environmental change in the absence of appropriate infrastructure can lead to major losses in the country.

While the Georgian government recognizes the environmental aspect of human security by signing on to international conventions and treaties on environmental protection, it chooses a rather “hands off” approach when it comes to the implementation. Military spending remains the main priority for the government pushing other issues vital for the state security off the list. Among the issues that are of great importance to Georgian state security but are rather neglected by the government Professor Jones highlighted:

• Demographic decline and the loss of educated young workers;
• Underfunded healthcare;
• Economic hardship;
• Unsolved issues connected with ethnic minorities; 
• Democratic deficit – strong president, weak legislative power and opposition.

 
As an illustration of his argument Professor Jones brought two examples where environmental changes in Georgia have led to lethal results. In 1998 and the following years, thousands of eco-migrants from Adjara and Svaneti were resettled in Tsalka, a multiethnic district in Kvemo Kartli region. The process of resettlement was rather chaotic and it resulted in ethnical clashes between the Greek and Armenian communities of Tsalka and the new settlers.

Another ethnic conflict sprang after the land privatization in Gardabani and Marneuli, two districts mostly populated with ethnic Azerbaijanis. Ethic Azerbaijanis claimed that the land distribution was done in a non-transparent manner and land was leased to private firms form the capital. Moreover, when the land was leased to the local population, the preference was given to the ethnic Georgians.

Stephen Jones is the foreign Academic Supervisor of CSS International Master’s program Transformation in the South Caucasus, which is currently recruiting students from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia for 2009-10 academic year. Visit CSS web-site for more information on the admissions procedure or the upcoming events.

Prof. Neil MacFarlane on the August war and its implications

How has the politics in the region changed after the August war? Professor Neil MacFarlane gave a public lecture at the Center for Social Sciences of Tbilisi State University on May 13, 2009. His lecture was devoted to the Implications of the War in Georgia for the International Relations of the Caucasus.

According to Professor MacFarlane, the war has fundamentally changed international relations in the South Caucasus. He noted that although it is too early to draw final conclusions, but some shifts following the war can be highlighted already.

Increased Russian influence in the region – After restoring political order and recovering from the economic turmoil of the 1990s, Russia’s sphere of interest in the near abroad was next on Putin’s list of tasks. According to Dr. MacFarlane, control over the South Caucasus makes control over the North Caucasus easier for Russia. However, Georgia had been challenging Russian’s aspirations for control in the region by declaring itself a liberal, democratic western-oriented country. By intervening with its military, Russia showed that it is both capable and willing to assert its influence.

Reduced US engagement – The change of the administration in the US and the financial crisis played decreased US engagement in Georgia. The Obama administration is seeking to restore the US relationship with Russia and will not sacrifice that relationship for Georgia’s sake, according to Dr. MacFarlane. Moreover, due to the financial crisis, one of the first cuts the US will make will be in money given for aid.

Increased EU involvement – Professor MacFarlane described the Western response to the war in August as “shameful”. Moreover, most of the steps (albeit symbolic) taken by the EU during the crisis were rather personality driven (referring to Sarkozy). However, after the war the EU has increased its presence in the region through its monitoring missions and moderators.

Prospects for the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – The war provided an incentive for Armenia to diversify its relationships and reduce its security dependency on Russia by starting talks with Turkey. The positive developments in the Armenia - Turkey relationship may lead to Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement.

Professor Neil MacFarlane is the Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at St. Annes College, University of Oxford. Professor MacFarlane is a specialist on the regional dynamics of the former Soviet Union. He is also interested in the impact of international organizations in the management and resolution of civil conflicts and in the political and economic transitions of former communist states. Professor MacFarlane works with the Center for Social Sciences and comes for regular visits. You can consult the CSS website for further information.

Georgian Protests | Getting the Numbers Right

Georgia has seen long-standing protests, now lasting for almost 5 weeks. Some opposition supporters have expressed surprise why so few people continue to come to the protests, with only a few thousand coming out onto the street for current protest events. "How is it", one supporter wondered, "that we talked to people in February and March and practically everyone was dissatisfied, but now we only have a handful actually out supporting us? Did we get it wrong?"

They got it right and wrong at the same time. Very roughly (and apologies in advance for the generalization), we can observe the following distribution in Georgia at this point. 20% - 30% of the population support the government. 20% support the more strident opposition. 50% to 60% are undecided politically, or only have a weak affiliation (say, with the relatively new Christian Democrats). The key to the political contest is winning over those that are undecided, many of whom voted with the government in the last two elections. They are dissatisfied with certain aspects of the government, but also not committed to any current alternative.

Put in other terms:

• 20-30% want stability
• 20% want change, even if this is risky (since they believe the government to be a force of destabilization)
• 50-60% want significant change, but also sufficient stability

This means that for the opposition, they could have found up to 80% of the population agreeing with them that they want change -- but with limited research, it was difficult for the opposition to ascertain that the overwhelming majority only wanted change up to a point, and only if stability could be guaranteed. The example illustrates how surface impressions can mislead, and how more detailed opinion research would have been needed to guide an appropriate opposition strategy.

Georgian Asylum Applications Rise: Significance

In several surveys , we have asked the question: "would you leave Georgia if you had the chance?" We believe that this question is a good measure to gauge people's perception of their current situation.

We wondered if perhaps another interesting way to get at the state of Georgians' attitude toward Georgia is to look at asylum applications. Since 1990, according to UNHCR data, 79,121 asylum application have been filed in Europe and North America. While this could equate to fewer that 79,121 people, since people could have filed multiple applications, the number is significant. While asylum applications before the Rose Revolution had been rising dramatically, they began to fall after 2004.

However, last year witnessed a renewed uptick in asylum applications. Fascinatingly from a research perspective, the locus of asylum applications for Georgians has also migrated.



So what exactly does this tell us? As seen in the graph above, the locus of almost all asylum applications in Europe and the United States in the early 1990s were in Germany. BAMF, the German Office for Migration and Refugees was notoriously lax in the '90s and at one point Germany was getting 300,000 asylum applications a year. This lead to a controversial and difficult battle in Germany, which finally changed its asylum law and streamlined its processes. A new efficiency took hold. Whereas before, long backlogs had made it easy for migrants to work while their asylum cases was being processed (and generally rejected), a host of agreements and EU level legislation made it much easier for Germany to deport Georgians. As a result we see the dramatic decline in the percentage of Georgian asylum applicants placing claims in Germany.

Switzerland is seen as offering the best return package. It is commonly known among Georgian migrants that one should file an asylum claim in Switzerland to return back to Georgia. This may explain the constant, yet low level of Swiss claims.

The major change, however, is Greece. In 2007 and 2008, 39 percent and 40 percent of all asylum applications made by Georgians in either Europe or the US were lodged in Greece. The feminization of labor migration and Georgians connection to Greece through the large Pontic Greek community, which predominantly migrated to Greece, has led to large scale employment of Georgians in domestic care in Greece. However, why are the asylum applications jumping. One reason may be that Greece is cracking down on the visa overstayers and those not allowed to be in Greece (documenting unauthorized work is more difficult). If the asylum process is working slowly in Greece, then it may be a good opportunity for Georgians to have temporary leave to remain in Greece (i.e. be on Greek soil legally) and work under the table. However, we aren't sure and think more research into this would be worthwhile. Ultimately, it may be less a sign of increased dissatisfaction but more a result of changes in European Member States with regard to implementation of migration and asylum law.

Either way the results are fascinating.