Joel Lazarus on Political Parties and Western Democracy Promotion in Georgia

Why, after almost two decades of independence, do Georgia’s political parties and party system remain so weakly institutionalised? Joel Lazarus, a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, attempted to answer this question in a public lecture on June 18th at the CRRC-Georgia entitled "Georgian Political Parties and Western Democracy Promotion".

While acknowledging Georgia’s democratic potential from a theoretical perspective, in his doctoral research Lazarus seeks to identify the domestic and international explanations for why political parties in Georgia and the party system within which they operate remain so weakly institutionalised.

Joel explored the following major domestic explanations:

• No early experience of democratic politics;
• Lack of a tradition of rational bureaucratic governance;
• Remaining patron-client structures, fiefdoms;
• Privatisation of social sphere;
• Weak citizen-party linkages;
• Low levels of organisation; Very low levels of trust in parties and other political institutions;
• Absence of pro-democratic values, such as: tolerance, self-reliance, restraint.

Joel proffered these international explanations:

• Political democracy promotion usually expressed in backing “reformers” and excluding all others;
• The international community ignoring and sometimes even praising unfree and unfair elections and constitutional/electoral code manipulations;
• A shift in donor funding from civil society/media to direct government support after Rose Revolution.

To summarize, Joel argues in his thesis that Western “democracy promotion” has actually served to exacerbate polarization and conflict in Georgian party politics, thereby serving to undermine any potential process of party and party system institutionalisation.

You can see the PowerPoint presentation below!

Joel Lazarus is a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. His doctoral research focuses on: “Promoting Democracy? Georgian Political Parties and Western Democracy Promotion.”

Financial crisis in Armenia | EV research center’s assessment

The global financial crisis has affected 70% of Armenians, states the Economy and Values Research Center, which recently conducted a study of the impact of the financial crisis in Armenia. The study included a survey of 1000 households in all the regions of Armenia and a survey of 60 large- and medium-sized businesses.

The financial crisis has had an impact across Armenia. The report indicates an 11-25% decrease in income throughout the country. The largest decrease in income is observed in Yerevan, where 40% of the respondents report that their income has dropped by 26-50%.

The crisis has also impacted consumer preferences. Thus, 80% of households will start purchasing cheaper goods. Additionally, 30% of households plan to cut or postpone their spending on communications, durable goods and vacation.

The impact of the crisis on the business sector is significant. According to the study 90% of the businesses surveyed reported that they have been affected by the crisis, and only 5% think that it will not influence them. Moreover, businesses are pessimistic in their predictions, with 80% of the surveyed businesses thinking that the situation will deteriorate further in 2009.

Strategies to overcome the crisis likely mirror those of businesses in other countries. The majority of the businesses surveyed plan to cut administrative expenses and postpone investments. Forty percent, particularly small- and medium-sized businesses, plan to downsize.

The results of the study are available here (in Armenian only).

Environmental Change and State Security | Setting Priorities Right

On June 5, the Center for Social Sciences (CSS) at Tbilisi State University hosted yet another insightful lecture, this time delivered by Professor Stephen Jones from Mount Holyoke College.

 
As the title of the lecture “Environmental Change and Acute Conflict in Georgia” indicates, the discussion evolved around the relationship between the environment and state security. Professor Jones argued that environmental changes, if not addressed timely and properly may trigger ethnic tension. He emphasized that the risk is especially higher in Georgia, where 40-50% of the population lives on the margin, and even a small environmental change in the absence of appropriate infrastructure can lead to major losses in the country.

While the Georgian government recognizes the environmental aspect of human security by signing on to international conventions and treaties on environmental protection, it chooses a rather “hands off” approach when it comes to the implementation. Military spending remains the main priority for the government pushing other issues vital for the state security off the list. Among the issues that are of great importance to Georgian state security but are rather neglected by the government Professor Jones highlighted:

• Demographic decline and the loss of educated young workers;
• Underfunded healthcare;
• Economic hardship;
• Unsolved issues connected with ethnic minorities; 
• Democratic deficit – strong president, weak legislative power and opposition.

 
As an illustration of his argument Professor Jones brought two examples where environmental changes in Georgia have led to lethal results. In 1998 and the following years, thousands of eco-migrants from Adjara and Svaneti were resettled in Tsalka, a multiethnic district in Kvemo Kartli region. The process of resettlement was rather chaotic and it resulted in ethnical clashes between the Greek and Armenian communities of Tsalka and the new settlers.

Another ethnic conflict sprang after the land privatization in Gardabani and Marneuli, two districts mostly populated with ethnic Azerbaijanis. Ethic Azerbaijanis claimed that the land distribution was done in a non-transparent manner and land was leased to private firms form the capital. Moreover, when the land was leased to the local population, the preference was given to the ethnic Georgians.

Stephen Jones is the foreign Academic Supervisor of CSS International Master’s program Transformation in the South Caucasus, which is currently recruiting students from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia for 2009-10 academic year. Visit CSS web-site for more information on the admissions procedure or the upcoming events.

Prof. Neil MacFarlane on the August war and its implications

How has the politics in the region changed after the August war? Professor Neil MacFarlane gave a public lecture at the Center for Social Sciences of Tbilisi State University on May 13, 2009. His lecture was devoted to the Implications of the War in Georgia for the International Relations of the Caucasus.

According to Professor MacFarlane, the war has fundamentally changed international relations in the South Caucasus. He noted that although it is too early to draw final conclusions, but some shifts following the war can be highlighted already.

Increased Russian influence in the region – After restoring political order and recovering from the economic turmoil of the 1990s, Russia’s sphere of interest in the near abroad was next on Putin’s list of tasks. According to Dr. MacFarlane, control over the South Caucasus makes control over the North Caucasus easier for Russia. However, Georgia had been challenging Russian’s aspirations for control in the region by declaring itself a liberal, democratic western-oriented country. By intervening with its military, Russia showed that it is both capable and willing to assert its influence.

Reduced US engagement – The change of the administration in the US and the financial crisis played decreased US engagement in Georgia. The Obama administration is seeking to restore the US relationship with Russia and will not sacrifice that relationship for Georgia’s sake, according to Dr. MacFarlane. Moreover, due to the financial crisis, one of the first cuts the US will make will be in money given for aid.

Increased EU involvement – Professor MacFarlane described the Western response to the war in August as “shameful”. Moreover, most of the steps (albeit symbolic) taken by the EU during the crisis were rather personality driven (referring to Sarkozy). However, after the war the EU has increased its presence in the region through its monitoring missions and moderators.

Prospects for the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict – The war provided an incentive for Armenia to diversify its relationships and reduce its security dependency on Russia by starting talks with Turkey. The positive developments in the Armenia - Turkey relationship may lead to Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement.

Professor Neil MacFarlane is the Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at St. Annes College, University of Oxford. Professor MacFarlane is a specialist on the regional dynamics of the former Soviet Union. He is also interested in the impact of international organizations in the management and resolution of civil conflicts and in the political and economic transitions of former communist states. Professor MacFarlane works with the Center for Social Sciences and comes for regular visits. You can consult the CSS website for further information.

Georgian Protests | Getting the Numbers Right

Georgia has seen long-standing protests, now lasting for almost 5 weeks. Some opposition supporters have expressed surprise why so few people continue to come to the protests, with only a few thousand coming out onto the street for current protest events. "How is it", one supporter wondered, "that we talked to people in February and March and practically everyone was dissatisfied, but now we only have a handful actually out supporting us? Did we get it wrong?"

They got it right and wrong at the same time. Very roughly (and apologies in advance for the generalization), we can observe the following distribution in Georgia at this point. 20% - 30% of the population support the government. 20% support the more strident opposition. 50% to 60% are undecided politically, or only have a weak affiliation (say, with the relatively new Christian Democrats). The key to the political contest is winning over those that are undecided, many of whom voted with the government in the last two elections. They are dissatisfied with certain aspects of the government, but also not committed to any current alternative.

Put in other terms:

• 20-30% want stability
• 20% want change, even if this is risky (since they believe the government to be a force of destabilization)
• 50-60% want significant change, but also sufficient stability

This means that for the opposition, they could have found up to 80% of the population agreeing with them that they want change -- but with limited research, it was difficult for the opposition to ascertain that the overwhelming majority only wanted change up to a point, and only if stability could be guaranteed. The example illustrates how surface impressions can mislead, and how more detailed opinion research would have been needed to guide an appropriate opposition strategy.

Georgian Asylum Applications Rise: Significance

In several surveys , we have asked the question: "would you leave Georgia if you had the chance?" We believe that this question is a good measure to gauge people's perception of their current situation.

We wondered if perhaps another interesting way to get at the state of Georgians' attitude toward Georgia is to look at asylum applications. Since 1990, according to UNHCR data, 79,121 asylum application have been filed in Europe and North America. While this could equate to fewer that 79,121 people, since people could have filed multiple applications, the number is significant. While asylum applications before the Rose Revolution had been rising dramatically, they began to fall after 2004.

However, last year witnessed a renewed uptick in asylum applications. Fascinatingly from a research perspective, the locus of asylum applications for Georgians has also migrated.



So what exactly does this tell us? As seen in the graph above, the locus of almost all asylum applications in Europe and the United States in the early 1990s were in Germany. BAMF, the German Office for Migration and Refugees was notoriously lax in the '90s and at one point Germany was getting 300,000 asylum applications a year. This lead to a controversial and difficult battle in Germany, which finally changed its asylum law and streamlined its processes. A new efficiency took hold. Whereas before, long backlogs had made it easy for migrants to work while their asylum cases was being processed (and generally rejected), a host of agreements and EU level legislation made it much easier for Germany to deport Georgians. As a result we see the dramatic decline in the percentage of Georgian asylum applicants placing claims in Germany.

Switzerland is seen as offering the best return package. It is commonly known among Georgian migrants that one should file an asylum claim in Switzerland to return back to Georgia. This may explain the constant, yet low level of Swiss claims.

The major change, however, is Greece. In 2007 and 2008, 39 percent and 40 percent of all asylum applications made by Georgians in either Europe or the US were lodged in Greece. The feminization of labor migration and Georgians connection to Greece through the large Pontic Greek community, which predominantly migrated to Greece, has led to large scale employment of Georgians in domestic care in Greece. However, why are the asylum applications jumping. One reason may be that Greece is cracking down on the visa overstayers and those not allowed to be in Greece (documenting unauthorized work is more difficult). If the asylum process is working slowly in Greece, then it may be a good opportunity for Georgians to have temporary leave to remain in Greece (i.e. be on Greek soil legally) and work under the table. However, we aren't sure and think more research into this would be worthwhile. Ultimately, it may be less a sign of increased dissatisfaction but more a result of changes in European Member States with regard to implementation of migration and asylum law.

Either way the results are fascinating.

PhD thesis: What are the Motives for Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan?

The perception that the global rise of Islamic activism is nurtured by a phenomenon depicted as “Global Jihad” is contested in a recent PhD dissertation titled "Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context". Dr. Sofie Bedford focused upon the growing Juma (Shiite) and the Abu Bakr (Sunni) mosque communions in Baku and argues in her thesis that they are, by and large, being nurtured by politics on a national level. The mobilization of Islamic activism in Azerbaijan can be understood as a result of:

(a) The younger generations wish to break ties with Soviet institutional structures, in particular those that are characterized by authoritative measures towards individual choice
(b) Discontent with societal development after Azerbaijan’s independence

Azerbaijan, considered as one of the least religious nations in the world, has since the end of the 1990’s experienced repressive state measures towards domestic Islamic movements. The pretext for state sanctioned clampdowns against the growing national opposition with distinguishable Islamic features required, according to decision makers, unorthodox countermeasures.

“By re-imposing strict state control over the religious practitioners and the religious organizations, the leadership in the independent republic hoped, just as their Soviet predecessors, to neutralize the oppositional potential in religion in order to avoid a development as in neighboring Iran. Some Moslem groups that questioned the religious structures got classified as oppositional and were actively opposed by the state”. Sofie Bedford

Friday prayers at the Abu Bakr mosque in Baku, Azerbaijan

Bedford argues that a crucial component of the state repression that strengthened Islamists consisted of official negative propaganda on the Abu Bakr mosque as a “nest for violent wahabis” and the Juma communion as “radical Shiites planning an Islamic revolution”. Instead of ending the mobilization of the mosque attendees, the state’s counterstrategy back clashed and strengthened the affinity of the targeted groups as discontent with corrupt state policies thrived.

“Amongst the visitors, and many others, Juma and Abu Bakr came to symbolize an unafraid, creative and free Islam which gave renewed popularity and, consequently, increasing numbers of attendees. It is important to stress that even if there were many similarities between the mobilization processes in the Juma and Abu Bakr communions, the study shows interesting differences, in particular in their interaction with the state in the later stages of the mobilization processes”.

In order to access the full PhD dissertation, please follow this link. In addition to the dissertation, we would also like to recommend this shorter article titled “Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan” for our readers out there.