Tuesday, July 15, 2025

How do Georgians perceive women’s sexual freedom?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Katharine Khamhaengwong, an International Fellow at CRRC Georgia, and Makhare Atchaidze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the Europe Foundation, or any related entity.

Data CRRC has collected shows that there have been significant changes in the attitudes of Georgians towards women’s sexual freedoms since 2013, especially among Muslims, who have seen a large decrease in rates of disapproval, although this has not translated to a significant increase in approval.

The data was collected as part of  the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia survey, carried out for the Europe Foundation between 2013 and 2023.

According to the resulting statistics, the share of Georgians reporting it is always or sometimes justified for a woman to have premarital sex increased from 22% in 2013 to 36% in 2023. Similarly, in 2013, only 32% of Georgians said it was always or sometimes justified for a woman to have a baby outside of marriage, compared with 51% in 2023.These numbers show that attitudes towards sex are loosening, particularly with regard to women. But whose attitudes are changing?

In 2013, 87% of Muslims said that it was never justified for a woman to have sex before marriage, compared to 67% of Armenian Apostolic Christians and 66% of Orthodox Christians. Ten years later, only 58% of Muslims said it was never justified, compared to 68% of Armenian Apostolic Christians and 50% of Orthodox Christians.

However, while the number of Muslims saying that pre-marital sex was never justified fell dramatically, this was not accompanied by a proportionate increase in Muslims saying pre-marital sex was justified. Indeed, there was only an increase from 6% of Muslims reporting that pre-marital sex was sometimes or always justified in 2013 to 15% in 2023. During this same period, the number of Muslims who refused to answer the question went up from only 1% in 2013 to 18% in 2023.

In contrast, the decrease in opposition to pre-marital sex by Orthodox Christians came with a notable increase in the percentage that believed pre-marital sex was always justified — in 2013, only 3% of Orthodox Christians agreed that pre-marital sex was always justified, compared to 13% in 2023. The numbers for pre-marital sex being sometimes justified also went up, from 21% to 26%. The answer refusal rate for this group did not change significantly.This pattern is repeated with attitudes toward having children outside of marriage.

In 2013, 84% of Muslims said this was never justified, while in 2023 only 55% reported the same. In this case, the number of Muslims who said a child outside of marriage was always justified did move from 0% in 2013 to 5% ten years later, but again the biggest change was in those who refused to answer, going from 2% in 2013 to 16% in 2023.The percentage of Muslims who said pre-marital sex was never acceptable decreased by 29 points, as did the percentage of those who said children outside of marriage was never acceptable. The numbers for Orthodox Christians were similarly consistent, both declining by 16 points.

The Armenian Apostolic community differed, however — while their views of pre-marital sex for women were quite consistent, the percent who said having a child outside of marriage was always unjustified went from 80% in 2013 to 60% in 2023. Unlike the case with changing Muslim views, this decrease largely came from Armenian Apostolic Christians saying that children outside of marriage were sometimes (17% to 30%) or always (0% to 5%) justified. The share of refusals did not change significantly.

Meanwhile, Orthodox Christians showed the biggest changes in full approval of pre-marital sex, as well as full approval of having children out of wedlock.Opposition to women having children outside of marriage and to women having premarital sex decreased in Georgia from 2013 to 2023.

Some of the biggest decreases came from Georgian Muslims, who are among the religious groups most disapproving of these behaviours. However, this decrease in opposition does not coincide with an increase solely in approval — instead, in addition to a degree of greater acceptance, Muslims increasingly refused to answer questions about sex.

The data used in this article is available here.

Tuesday, July 08, 2025

Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic politics than foreign affairs

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Kristine Jintchveleishvili, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic rather than international politics, and Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

In Armenia, regression analysis shows that several factors are associated with interest in international politics. For one, women are less likely to be interested compared to men. Separately, older individuals (Aged 55 and older) are about twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to people aged 18–34. Education is another important factor — people with less than a tertiary education are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to those with higher levels of educational attainment.

For interest in domestic politics, regression analysis in Armenia shows that older individuals are significantly more interested than younger people. Those aged 55 and older are 27 percentage points more likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to the youngest age group (18–34). Education also plays a role, with individuals lacking tertiary education showing less interest. Wealth is also correlated with interest. People who live in relatively wealthy households are more likely to be interested in Armenia’s domestic politics compared to those who own less.

Settlement type, ethnicity, and employment status are not statistically significant predictors of interest in international or domestic politics in Armenia.

The pattern for interest in international politics is somewhat similar in Georgia. Women in Georgia are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to men, and older individuals are more interested compared to younger ones — people aged 55 and older are twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to those aged 18–34.

In turn, people living outside of Tbilisi, whether in urban or rural areas, are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to people living in the capital. Additionally, ethnic minorities show lower levels of interest compared to ethnic Georgians.

Finally, wealth is positively associated with interest in international politics — those with the highest wealth levels are more likely to be interested compared to those with less.

Regarding domestic politics in Georgia, regression results demonstrate that rural residents are less likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to people living in the capital. Older individuals and relatively well-off people show greater interest in domestic politics as well.

Education level and employment status were not associated with interest in either international or domestic political affairs in Georgia.

Despite the differences between the two countries, the trend is consistent across both Armenia and Georgia — more people are interested in domestic politics than international politics. The data also shows that Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the 2024 Caucasus Barometer  dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (tertiary or less than tertiary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Tuesday, July 01, 2025

Georgians don’t want to be ruled by church, despite confidence in religious institutions

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Teimuraz Kobakhidze and Katharine Khamhaengwong, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or its affiliates.

However, despite this confidence, 71% of Georgians agree that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote, compared to 15% who disagree, 9% who neither agree nor disagree, and 4% who were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Additionally, a plurality of Georgians, 42%, think churches and religious institutions have too much power in the country, while only 14% think they have too little power. Slightly over a third (36%) think religious organisations have the right amount, and 8% refused to answer or were uncertain over how to respond to the question.

Regression analyses looking at settlement type, sex, age group, education, having a partner or not, and frequency of religious service attendance shows that attitudes vary among different groups towards religious institutions’ role in society.

For confidence in churches and religious groups, sex, age group, and relationship status were not predictors of attitudes, while settlement type, education level, and religious service attendance were.

The groups most likely to express a great deal of confidence in churches and religious institutions were people in rural areas, weekly church attendees, and people with a secondary or lower education.

Education level similarly predicted responses to whether people believe religious leaders should try to influence voters — people with a higher education were less likely to agree that religious leaders should try to influence votes. Sex and relationship status were also correlated: women and those without partners were more likely to say that religious leaders should not influence voting.

Settlement type, age group, and frequency of religious service attendance did not predict attitudes.

Unlike the previous two questions, education level was not predictive of views on whether or not churches and religious organisations had too much or too little power in society. Settlement type, sex, and relationship status were likewise uncorrelated.

Age and frequency of religious service attendance, on the other hand, were predictive.

People who never or very rarely attended religious services were most likely to say that churches and religious institutions had too much power. Similarly, young people (18–34) were more likely to believe religious institutions have too much power. Notably, people who attended religious services monthly were actually more likely than those who attended weekly to think churches and religious institutions should have more power — 20% compared to 15%.

Despite their general favourability toward the church and religious institutions, Georgians do not think these institutions should have more power or that their leaders should try to influence voters.

Tuesday, June 24, 2025

Trust in NGOs in Georgia has grown increasingly polarised

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Zachary Fabos, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC–Georgia or any related entity.

Comparing the frequency of distrust and trust among party supporters between 2021 and 2024 further demonstrates the recent development of political polarisation around NGOs operating in Georgia. While distrust and trust towards the sector was about the same among both Georgian Dream and other party supporters in 2021, by 2024 trust and distrust developed a partisan character.

Distrust grew from 25% of Georgian Dream supporters in 2021 to 39% of Georgian Dream supporters in 2024. Among opposition party supporters, trust grew from 24% to 38%. Those who did not support any party did not experience a similar attitude shift.

An analogous dynamic is at play when looking at media consumption.

Between 2021 and 2024, distrust of NGOs among viewers of the pro-government TV channels ImediPosTV, and Rustavi 2 more than doubled from 20% to 41%. On the other hand, trust in NGOs nearly doubled among viewers of opposition-leaning TV channels FormulaMtavari, and TV Pirveli, from 21% to 39%. The sharp divide in distrust and trust of NGOs points to the politically polarised narratives directed at the sector.

Although distrust towards Georgia’s NGOs hit an all-time high in 2024, time series data demonstrate that skepticism of the sector has grown most prominently among Georgian Dream supporters and viewers of ImediPosTV, and Rustavi 2, aligning with Georgian Dream’s promotion of anti-civil society legislation and conspiracy theories. The politicisation of attitudes surrounding NGOs is further shown in the opposite trend among those who support other parties and watch news from opposition-leaning channels.

Tuesday, May 27, 2025

Happy Georgians are young, wealthy, and religious

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Otar Jintcharadze and Nino Anchabadze, Junior Researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

However, happiness varies with demographic and social variables.

The Caucasus Barometer data suggests that happiness decreases with age. Older individuals (55+) are 19 percentage points less likely than young people (18–34) and 16 percentage points less likely than people aged 35–54 to report feeling happy.

The data also demonstrates a positive correlation between wealth and happiness. Individuals in the fourth quartile of asset ownership are 15 percentage points more likely to report feeling happy compared to those in the bottom quartile.

The Caucasus Barometer also asked respondents about the importance of religion in their daily lives. According to the data, Georgians who consider religion ‘very important’ are eight percentage points more likely to report being happy compared to those who consider religion as only ‘rather important’ or ‘not important’.

Education level, ethnicity, employment status, and settlement type were not significant predictors of happiness in Georgia.

Tuesday, May 13, 2025

Do Armenians and Georgians support protests?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tamar Uzunashvili, a Junior Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

A regression analysis of 2024 data demonstrates that attitudes vary among different social and demographic groups.

Gender and education were significant predictors of supporting protest in Armenia. Men were more likely than women to have a positive attitude towards participating in protests by 16 percentage points.

People with tertiary education were 22 percentage points more likely to support protest participation compared to those with secondary or lower education, and 10 percentage points more likely to support protests than individuals with secondary technical education.

People in Yerevan were more likely to support participation in a protest than people who live in rural or urban areas, where the probability of supporting protests was almost equal.

In Armenia, younger people (18–34) were more likely to support protests than older people (55+).

Wealth, partisanship, and employment did not predict attitudes in Armenia.

In Georgia, the data shows that people were more likely to support protests than oppose them across settlement types. At the same time, individuals who live in the capital were more likely to have positive attitudes toward protests than people in other urban or rural areas.

The data also varied across age groups, with young people (18–34) being substantially more likely to support protests than those who are 55 and older.

Those who support Georgian Dream were less likely to have a positive attitude toward protests than individuals who do not support any political party. People who support the opposition and those who refused to report which party they support had similar attitudes to individuals who did not support any party.

Employment was also a factor, with employed individuals more likely to support protest participation than those who were not employed.

Gender and wealth were not associated with attitudes towards protests in Georgia.

Support for protests is generally high in both Georgia and Armenia, though on the decline in Armenia. Across both countries, younger people are more inclined to support protests.

The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis includes gender (male and female), settlement type (capital, urban, and rural), age group (18–34, 35–54, and 55+), education (secondary and lower, secondary technical, and higher than secondary), a wealth index (0–13), employment (employed and unemployed) and partisanship (no party, Georgian Dream, opposition, and refused to answer) as predictor variables.

Tuesday, May 06, 2025

Increasing optimism for the future in Armenia and Georgia

Since the Velvet Revolution, Armenians across a wide cross-section of society have become increasingly more optimistic about their country’s future. In comparison, Georgians have seen only a modest increase in optimism over the time period, with the uptick concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.

Both Armenia and Georgia have experienced significant political, economic, and social changes over the last decade. In Armenia, the changes have coincided with more Armenians believing that eventually everything will be fine, while in Georgia, there has been a largely steady though slightly upward trend, according to the Caucasus Barometer survey.

In 2017, nearly half of the Armenian population (46%) believed that the situation in their country would never improve. In contrast, more people in Georgia viewed their country’s future positively (68%).

In 2019, optimism in the Armenian population toward the future roughly doubled (80%), surpassing the share with an optimistic outlook in Georgia (69%).  This change took place following Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, which brought Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power.

Between 2019 and 2024, Georgians’ optimism about the future increased by six percentage points, coming to match the share of optimism in Armenia.

These changes in attitudes varied by social and demographic variables.

In Armenia, after the initial increase in optimism following the Velvet Revolution, those aged 35–54 gradually became less optimistic, while other age groups’ attitudes did not change significantly.

In Georgia, optimism rose among people 54 and under between 2019 and 2021, while it rose for older people between 2021 and 2024.

In Armenia, men became less optimistic about the future over time, while in Georgia, both men and women have gradually become more optimistic.

The data shows consistent trends over time in the Georgian population regarding people’s perceptions of their country’s future based on their level of education. However, Georgians with a higher education tend to have a more positive outlook on the country’s future compared to those with a secondary technical education or lower education levels.

In contrast, opinions among Armenians about their country’s future do not fluctuate substantially based on level of education.

Data from Georgia indicates that employed individuals are more optimistic about the country’s future than those who are not working. For example, in 2024, approximately 82% of employed people believed that everything would eventually be fine in Georgia, compared to 70% of people who were not working.

In Armenia, however, working people’s attitudes have declined slightly over time.

The data also shows that residents of rural areas in Georgia view the country’s future more negatively than those living in the capital. Attitudes became more positive between 2019 and 2024 for people in Tbilisi and rose substantially in other urban areas (by 19 percentage points) between 2021 and 2024.

In contrast, in Armenia, optimism is lowest in Yerevan, where attitudes became more negative between 2021 and 2024. Otherwise, attitudes have largely been stable across settlement types.

In 2024, levels of optimism for the future were quite similar in Armenia and Georgia, with optimism having increased substantially in Armenia, following the country’s Velvet Revolution and rising modestly in Georgia. In Armenia, increases in optimism were wide-spread across society, while in Georgia recent changes seem concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.