Happy Georgians are young, wealthy, and religious

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Otar Jintcharadze and Nino Anchabadze, Junior Researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Levels of happiness in Georgia are associated with youth, wealth, and religiosity, according to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer.

While more people indicate being happy than sad in Georgia, this varies by age, wealth, and religion. These social and demographic factors tend to be in line with findings from other contexts. Higher economic wealth is generally associated with greater happiness, as is one’s religiosity. The research on age and happiness by contrast, shows a more complicated set of patterns.

According to the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, 66% of Georgians reported feeling happy, rather than sad, while 10% were more sad than happy — an additional 24% reported being neither happy nor sad. This was the highest reported level of happiness in the past 14 years, while in turn, the percentage of individuals who felt unhappy — which was at its lowest in 2017 — has only slightly increased since.

However, happiness varies with demographic and social variables.

The Caucasus Barometer data suggests that happiness decreases with age. Older individuals (55+) are 19 percentage points less likely than young people (18–34) and 16 percentage points less likely than people aged 35–54 to report feeling happy.

The data also demonstrates a positive correlation between wealth and happiness. Individuals in the fourth quartile of asset ownership are 15 percentage points more likely to report feeling happy compared to those in the bottom quartile.

The Caucasus Barometer also asked respondents about the importance of religion in their daily lives. According to the data, Georgians who consider religion ‘very important’ are eight percentage points more likely to report being happy compared to those who consider religion as only ‘rather important’ or ‘not important’.

Education level, ethnicity, employment status, and settlement type were not significant predictors of happiness in Georgia.

In addition, one’s reported political beliefs and the media a person consumes were notably not associated with happiness. Similarly, whether family members live abroad was not a significant predictor of happiness.

Instead, as the data makes clear, happiness in Georgia is associated with age, wealth, and religiosity, as younger people tend to report greater life satisfaction, wealthier individuals are significantly more likely to describe themselves as happy, and more religious individuals consistently report higher well-being.

Note: The data in this article comes from a series of regression models. The first contains the following demographic variables: gender (male, female), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), employment status (employed, unemployed) and wealth (divided into quantiles). Subsequent models added whether or not respondents reported religion as very important or not (not at all important, not important, rather important) in their daily lives. The data used in this article is available here.

Do Armenians and Georgians support protests?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tamar Uzunashvili, a Junior Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey, a majority of Georgians support protests. In comparison, while over half of the Armenian population is in favour of protests, support has been on the decline since 2019.

Protests in the South Caucasus have intensified recently, particularly in Georgia, where demonstrations have surged since the ruling Georgian Dream party first introduced the controversial Foreign Agent Law in 2023. Over the past year in Georgia, protests have occurred almost daily, particularly since the government’s November 2024 announcement that it was halting the country’s EU accession bid.  Similarly, Armenia has witnessed significant protests between 2017 and 2024, driven by political revolution and war.

Data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey shows that until 2021, public support for protest participation was consistently higher in Armenia than in Georgia. In 2021, attitudes were similar, but in 2024, more people in Georgia believed that people should participate in protests than those in Armenia.

In Georgia, support for protest participation declined between 2008 and 2011. In 2012, it surged by 22 points, with data collection taking place after prison abuse scandals — which showed the humiliation, torture, and inhumane treatment of prisoners — and parliamentary elections that year. In subsequent years, attitudes slowly rose and reached a stable point in 2017, after which there has been little change in attitudes.

In Armenia, support fluctuated between 2008 and 2012 and then stabilised between 2013 and 2019. Since then, however, support has decreased sharply, falling to 50% in 2024 from 71% in 2019.

A regression analysis of 2024 data demonstrates that attitudes vary among different social and demographic groups.

Gender and education were significant predictors of supporting protest in Armenia. Men were more likely than women to have a positive attitude towards participating in protests by 16 percentage points.

People with tertiary education were 22 percentage points more likely to support protest participation compared to those with secondary or lower education, and 10 percentage points more likely to support protests than individuals with secondary technical education.

People in Yerevan were more likely to support participation in a protest than people who live in rural or urban areas, where the probability of supporting protests was almost equal.

In Armenia, younger people (18–34) were more likely to support protests than older people (55+).

Wealth, partisanship, and employment did not predict attitudes in Armenia.

In Georgia, the data shows that people were more likely to support protests than oppose them across settlement types. At the same time, individuals who live in the capital were more likely to have positive attitudes toward protests than people in other urban or rural areas.

The data also varied across age groups, with young people (18–34) being substantially more likely to support protests than those who are 55 and older.

Those who support Georgian Dream were less likely to have a positive attitude toward protests than individuals who do not support any political party. People who support the opposition and those who refused to report which party they support had similar attitudes to individuals who did not support any party.

Employment was also a factor, with employed individuals more likely to support protest participation than those who were not employed.

Gender and wealth were not associated with attitudes towards protests in Georgia.

Support for protests is generally high in both Georgia and Armenia, though on the decline in Armenia. Across both countries, younger people are more inclined to support protests.

The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis includes gender (male and female), settlement type (capital, urban, and rural), age group (18–34, 35–54, and 55+), education (secondary and lower, secondary technical, and higher than secondary), a wealth index (0–13), employment (employed and unemployed) and partisanship (no party, Georgian Dream, opposition, and refused to answer) as predictor variables.

Increasing optimism for the future in Armenia and Georgia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tinatin Gagoshidze, a Junior Researcher fellow at CRRC-Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Since the Velvet Revolution, Armenians across a wide cross-section of society have become increasingly more optimistic about their country’s future. In comparison, Georgians have seen only a modest increase in optimism over the time period, with the uptick concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.

Both Armenia and Georgia have experienced significant political, economic, and social changes over the last decade. In Armenia, the changes have coincided with more Armenians believing that eventually everything will be fine, while in Georgia, there has been a largely steady though slightly upward trend, according to the Caucasus Barometer survey.

In 2017, nearly half of the Armenian population (46%) believed that the situation in their country would never improve. In contrast, more people in Georgia viewed their country’s future positively (68%).

In 2019, optimism in the Armenian population toward the future roughly doubled (80%), surpassing the share with an optimistic outlook in Georgia (69%).  This change took place following Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, which brought Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power.

Between 2019 and 2024, Georgians’ optimism about the future increased by six percentage points, coming to match the share of optimism in Armenia.

These changes in attitudes varied by social and demographic variables.

In Armenia, after the initial increase in optimism following the Velvet Revolution, those aged 35–54 gradually became less optimistic, while other age groups’ attitudes did not change significantly.

In Georgia, optimism rose among people 54 and under between 2019 and 2021, while it rose for older people between 2021 and 2024.

In Armenia, men became less optimistic about the future over time, while in Georgia, both men and women have gradually become more optimistic.

The data shows consistent trends over time in the Georgian population regarding people’s perceptions of their country’s future based on their level of education. However, Georgians with a higher education tend to have a more positive outlook on the country’s future compared to those with a secondary technical education or lower education levels.

In contrast, opinions among Armenians about their country’s future do not fluctuate substantially based on level of education.

Data from Georgia indicates that employed individuals are more optimistic about the country’s future than those who are not working. For example, in 2024, approximately 82% of employed people believed that everything would eventually be fine in Georgia, compared to 70% of people who were not working.

In Armenia, however, working people’s attitudes have declined slightly over time.

The data also shows that residents of rural areas in Georgia view the country’s future more negatively than those living in the capital. Attitudes became more positive between 2019 and 2024 for people in Tbilisi and rose substantially in other urban areas (by 19 percentage points) between 2021 and 2024.

In contrast, in Armenia, optimism is lowest in Yerevan, where attitudes became more negative between 2021 and 2024. Otherwise, attitudes have largely been stable across settlement types.

In 2024, levels of optimism for the future were quite similar in Armenia and Georgia, with optimism having increased substantially in Armenia, following the country’s Velvet Revolution and rising modestly in Georgia. In Armenia, increases in optimism were wide-spread across society, while in Georgia recent changes seem concentrated in urban areas and among those employed.