Caucasus Barometer 2021: Changing attitudes amid the pandemic

Today, CRRC Georgia released the most recent wave of the Caucasus Barometer survey, which was conducted between December 2021 and January 2022. The results of the survey shed light on a wide range of changes in the public’s attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy, attitudes towards the media and information security, the COVID-19 pandemic,  and various socio-economic issues.

Dr. David Sichinava, CRRC Georgia’s Research Director, and Nino Mzhavanadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia, presented the findings of the new wave of Caucasus Barometer. 

A recording of the presentation is available below:

The 2021 Caucasus Barometer survey was the eleventh wave of the survey to be made publicly available. It included 1540 respondents, and had a response rate of 23%. The survey’s margin of error is 2.27%. The survey was conducted using computer assisted personal interviewing. 

The 2021 wave of Caucasus Barometer is available for download here and to explore here.

Georgians want immigration restrictions for Russians

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director of CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there has been an outflow of Russians to the South Caucasus.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and accompanying domestic crackdown in Russia and imposition of sanctions, there has been an outflow of Russians to the South Caucasus — leaving many in Georgia feeling uneasy.

On 7 March, Georgia’s Ministry of Economy estimated that 20,000–25,000 Russians had come to Georgia since the invasion. In Armenia, the government has reported that around 5,000 Russians have been moving to the country daily since the start of the war. 

This mass migration has raised fears in Georgia. It has been argued that Russia could use the presence of a large number of Russian citizens as a pretext for military intervention in the past. As a result, many have begun to propose that Georgia’s lax migration policies be tightened against Russians. In response, further concerns were raised about the implicit Russophobia embedded within this discourse. 

Data from CRRC Georgia’s survey on Ukraine suggests that a majority of the public support the introduction of migration restrictions. Overall, 59% of the public reported that they would support the introduction of migration restrictions. In contrast, 31% were opposed and 9% were uncertain.

When the data is broken down by social and demographic variables, it indicates that support for migration restrictions varies substantially between groups. 

Young people were significantly more supportive of migration restrictions. Controlling for other factors, young people (aged 18–34) had a 60% chance of supporting the introduction of restrictions. By comparison, this drops to 54% among those aged 35–54 and 44% among those who were 55+.

Ethnic minorities were also significantly less supportive of the introduction of migration restrictions. While ethnic Georgians had a 61% chance of supporting restrictions, ethnic minorities had a 44% chance, controlling for other factors. 

Supporters of different parties also held significantly different views. People who supported an opposition party had a 65% chance of supporting restrictions while supporters of the ruling party had a 43% probability of doing so. People who refused to answer which party they supported had a 45% chance of supporting restrictions, while people who were uncertain over which party to support had a 58% chance of supporting restrictions.

The above data reflects the significant concerns of the Georgian public around the war in Ukraine, the uncertainties around what large scale immigration from the Russian Federation would mean for Georgia, and likely anger at Russians for the war which Vladimir Putin has unleashed in Ukraine.

Note: The social and demographic breakdowns shown in this blog post are generated from a regression model. The regression model includes age, sex, IDP status, a simple additive index of durable goods ownership (a common proxy for wealth), ethnicity (minority or not), education level, and party which the respondent supports. The data used in this blog post is available here.

Грузини хочуть, щоби їхній уряд підтримав Україну

Війна Росії з Україною шокувала світ. Вона також шокувала Грузію, а нове опитування від CRRC Georgia викриває ступінь наявних політичних наслідків. 

Наслідки війни, що стосуються зовнішньої та внутрішньої політики Грузії, виявилися доволі масштабними. Офіційна позиція Грузії щодо війни була суперечливою: в той час як прем’єр-міністр Іраклі Гарібашвілі категорично заявив, що Грузія не приєднається до санкцій, накладених Заходом проти Росії, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі почала медійний та дипломатичний бліц у Європі, висловлюючи рішучу підтримку Україні. 

На відміну від реакції влади щодо війни, реакція суспільства була однозначною. Грузини виходять в підтримку України у всіх містах та селах. 

З огляду на війну в Україні та навколишні потрясіння в Грузії, 7-10 березня CRRC Georgia провели опитування, яке охопило 1092 респондента. Результати опитування дозволили зробити висновки щодо того, кого грузини звинувачують у війні (Росію), яких дій грузини прагнуть від свого уряду (підтримати Україну), а також щодо внутрішніх політичних наслідків реакції влади (“Грузинська мрія”  понесла значні втрати у підтримці виборців). 

Грузини звинувачують Росію у війні

Переважна більшість грузинського суспільства покладає відповідальність за війну на Росію (43%) або на Володимира Путіна (37%). Інакше вважають 3% респондентів за винятком 9%, які не визначилися.  

Громадськість також запитали про мотивацію Росії до війни. Отримані дані показали, що більшість вважає, що Росія почала війну аби захопити певні території (34%) чи Україну загалом (25%), щоб відновити Радянський Союз (20%), а також щоб запобігти вступу України в НАТО (17%). Інакше відповіли менш ніж 10% опитаних. 

  

Суспільство хоче, щоб грузинська влада підтримала Україну

Респондентів запитали, чи вважають вони, що уряд Грузії має висловити більшу підтримку уряду України, має залишити наявний рівень підтримки, зменшити рівень підтримки чи не підтримувати взагалі. Значна більшість опитаних вважають, що підтримки має бути більше (61%) або що вона має залишатися на наявному рівні (32%). Лише 2% вважають, що підтримки має бути менше, 1% вважають, що її взагалі не має бути. 

Окрім зазначеного вище, респондентів запитали, чи були на їхню думку прийнятними чи неприйнятними певні дії уряду  у відповідь на кризу. 

Переважна більшість грузин підтримує надання гуманітарної допомоги Україні (97%), прийняття українських біженців (96%), а також надання фінансової допомоги Україні. 

Дві третини опитаних (66%) підтримують ідею надання дозволу грузинським добровольцям поїхати в Україну; уряд Грузії намагався завадити цьому. 

Близько половини (52%) підтримали б грузинську владу у озброєнні України. 

 

Суспільство хоче, щоб Грузія взяла участь у санкціях

Громадськість бажає, аби санкції проти Росії були сильнішими, а більшість хоче, щоб Грузія приєдналася до них. Це різко контрастує з відмовою прем’єр-міністра Іраклі Гарібашвілі приєднатися до санкцій або впровадити власні. 

Опитуваних також запитали, чи вважають вони, що країни, які наклали санкції на Росію, мають посилити їх, утримувати на наявному рівні, зменшити силу санкцій чи не накладати їх на Росію взагалі. 

Результати показали, що переважна більшість вважає, що санкції мають бути посилені (71%) або залишитися на наявному рівні (10%). Лише 4% вважає, що санкції мають бути пом’якшені, 3% відсотки вважають, що вони мають бути зняті взагалі.  

На питання про те, чи уряд Грузії має приєднатися до санкцій, більшість респондентів відповіли ствердно (66%). Думки розділилися щодо того, чи Грузія має приєднатися до всіх санкцій (39%), чи до деяких (27%). Лише 19% відповіли, що Грузія не має приєднуватися до санкцій взагалі. 14% не були певні у цьому питанні. 

Євроатлантичне майбутнє України та Грузії

З огляду на вторгнення Росії, Україна подала заявку до Європейського Союзу, і цей крок швидко наслідували Грузія та Молдова. 

Громадськість рішуче підтримує подання заявки Грузією та Україною на статус кандидата в ЄС. В той же час, відзначаються невеликі зміни думок щодо загальної підтримки членства Грузії в ЄС та НАТО (яка вже була високою) з початку війни. 

Респондентів запитали, наскільки сильно вони підтримують або не підтримують надання Україні та Грузії членства в Європейському Союзі. Ці дані показали високу підтримку грузинським суспільством надання статусу кандидата до ЄС обидвом країнам. 

Респондентів також запитали, чи підтримують вони інтеграцію Грузії в Європейський Союз, НАТО, а також в очолений Росією митний союз. 

Дані опитування “Кавказький барометр 2020”, яке включало в себе подібне  питання, показали, що 73% грузинів підтримували членство в ЄС, 71% підтримували членство в НАТО. Сьогодні, 75% підтримує членство в ЄС і 70% підтримує членство в НАТО, що статистично не відрізняється від даних за 2020 рік. 

Заяви президента та прем’єр-міністра щодо війни

Прем’єр-міністр Грузії Іраклі Гарібашвілі зазнав значної критики щодо своєї реакції на війну. В той час як більшість світової спільноти запровадила санкції у відношенні до Росії, Гарібашвілі твердо заявив, що Грузія не буде брати участі у санкціях. Президент України Володимир Зеленський опублікував твіт з подякою грузинському народу за підтримку, та в той же час розкритикував грузинську владу за її відсутність. 

На противагу заявам прем’єр-міністра, президент Грузії Саломе Зурабішвілі отримала широке схвалення за її реакцію відносно конфлікту. Зурабішвілі висловила рішучу підтримку Україні, а також здійснила дипломатичний та медіа-тур країнами Європи у підтримку України. 

Зважаючи на зазначене вище, не дивно, що громадськість підтримує дії президента щодо війни значно більше, ніж дії прем’єр-міністра. 

В той час як 64% погоджуються з діями Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 41% погодилися з діями Гарібашвілі, що показує розрив у 23%. Окрім цього, 15% не схвалили дії Зурабішвілі, а 39% не схвалили дій Гарібашвілі. Таким чином, рейтинг чистого схвалення Зурабішвілі складає +49%, а рейтинг чистого схвалення Гарібашвілі складає +2%. 

 

Якщо розглядати дані, розбиті за партійними уподобаннями, вони демонструють, що вищий рівень ефективності Саломе Зурабішвілі порівняно з Гарібашвілі виходить з більшого рівня підтримки з боку опозиції: в той час як 61% опозиції підтримують дії та реакції Зурабішвілі відносно війни, лише 32% підтримали дії Гарібашвілі. На противагу, Гарібашвілі та Зурабішвілі мають доволі подібний рівень підтримки серед прихильників “Грузинської мрії”. 

Політичні наслідки

З огляду на непопулярну реакцію Гарібашвілі щодо війни, не дивно, що підтримка “Грузинської мрії” скоротилася. 

Щоб визначити політичні преференції респондентів, в ході опитування ставили такі питання: а) за кого вони б голосували, якщо б парламентські вибори проводилися завтра. Якщо респондент не був певний у своїх симпатіях, пропонувалося відповісти, якій з партій вони віддають перевагу. 

Дані демонструють зниження у 10% в підтримці “Грузинської мрії”. Сьогодні, 22% респондентів підтримали б “Грузинську мрію” на виборах, якщо вони проходили б завтра. Для порівняння, у опитуванні в січні 2022 32% респондентів відповіли на це питання на користь влади. 

Таким чином, “Грузинська мрія”, хоча б тимчасово, втратила близько третини своїх виборців. 

Однак, незрозуміло, чи ця втрата буде перманентною. Дані не показують зростання підтримки опозиції порівняно до даних за січень. Радше, серед громадськості зросли показники невизначеності щодо того, кого б вони підтримали. 

Опитування CRRC Omnibus у січні 2022 показало, що 27% респондентів відповіли, що вони були непевні щодо того, кого вони б підтримали на парламентських виборах, в той час як у березні в опитуванні, присвяченому Україні, 38% респондентів відповіли так само, що демонструє зростання на 12%. 

Дані також демонструють невелике зниження підтримки опозиції: в січні 2022 підтримка опозиції становила 25%, а в березні 2022 вже 20%. 

Доля респондентів, що відмовилися відповідати, яку партію вони б підтримали, змінилася в порівнянні двох опитувань в межах похибки (з 17% в січні до 20% в березні).  

В той час як офіційна реакція на російську війну була апатичною, громадськість одностайно підтримала Україну та майже будь-які дії у допомогу країні в боротьбі проти Росії. Погляди суспільства на євроатлантичне майбутнє Грузії майже не змінилися. Тим не менш, погляди суспільства на владу змінилися, а “Грузинська мрія” втратила, щонайменше тимчасово, близько третини своїх прихильників.   

Автори статті: Дастін Гілбрет, Давид Січінава, Крістіна Вачарадзе, Анано Кіпіані, Ніно Мжаванадзе, Махаре Ачаідзе, співробітники CRRC Georgia. 

Переклад статті та матеріалів виконала Олександра Зур’ян - правозахисниця, співробітниця Центру участі та розвитку (Тбілісі). 

Погляди, висловлені у статті не обов'язково відповідають поглядам CRRC Georgia  або інших пов’язаних організацій. 

Дані, на основі яких базується ця стаття, доступні тут.

Ця стаття була вперше опублікована в рубриці Data Blog від CRRC та OC Media.

Georgians want their government to support Ukraine

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, David Sichinava, Anano Kipiani, Kristina Vacharadze, Nino Mzhavanadze, and Makhare Atchaidze, CRRC Georgia staff members. The views presented within the article reflect the views of the authors' alone, and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has shocked the world. The war also shook Georgia, with new polling from CRRC Georgia revealing the extent of the political fallout so far.

The implications of the war for Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy and politics are wide-ranging. The official Georgian response to the war was incongruous: while the Prime Minister, Irakli Gharibashvili, flatly stated Georgia would not join the West in sanctioning Russia, the President, Salome Zourabishvili, went on a media and diplomatic blitz in Europe voicing strong support for Ukraine. 

In contrast to the government’s response to the war, the public’s response was clear. Georgians have been rallying in support of Ukraine in city, town, and village.

In light of the war in Ukraine and the surrounding upheaval in Georgia, CRRC Georgia conducted a survey between 7–10 March which included 1,092 respondents. The results lead to a range of conclusions around who Georgians blame for the war (Russia), what Georgians want the government to do (support Ukraine), and the domestic political fallout of the government’s response (Georgian Dream has lost significant support).

Georgians blame Russia for the war

The vast majority of the Georgian public places responsibility for the war on Russia (43%) or Vladimer Putin (37%). Other responses were named by 3% or less of the public, aside from uncertain responses (9%).

The public was also asked about Russia’s motivation for the war. The data indicates that most people believe that Russia started the war to conquer territory (34%) or Ukraine specifically (25%), to revive the Soviet Union (20%), and to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO (17%). Other responses were named by less than 10% of people.

The public wants the Georgian Government to support Ukraine

The survey asked respondents whether they think the Government of Georgia should support the Government of Ukraine more, at its current level, a bit less than at present, or not at all. A large majority of the public reported that they should support Ukraine more (61%) or at current levels (32%). Only 2% said less than at current levels and 1% not at all.

Aside from the above, respondents were asked whether a number of different actions would be acceptable or unacceptable for the Government to take in response to the crisis. 

The vast majority of Georgians support supplying humanitarian aid to Ukraine (97%), accepting Ukrainian refugees (96%), and providing financial assistance to Ukraine (91%).

Two-thirds of people (66%) support allowing Georgian volunteers to travel to Ukraine, something the government has attempted to block.

Around half (52%) would support the Georgian government arming Ukraine.

The public wants Georgia to participate in sanctions

The public wants sanctions against Russia to be stronger, and a majority want Georgia to join them. This stands in stark contrast to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili’s rejection of sanctions.

The survey asked whether the public thought the countries which have imposed sanctions on Russia should strengthen them, keep them at current levels, lighten them, or not sanction Russia at all. 

The results show that a large majority think that sanctions should either be strengthened (71%) or remain at current levels (10%). Only 4% think the sanctions should be lightened, and 3% think they should be removed entirely.

When asked whether the Government of Georgia should join in the sanctions, a majority agreed with this view (66%). Views were split on whether Georgia should participate in all sanctions (39%) or some of the sanctions (27%). Only 19% reported that Georgia should not participate in the sanctions at all. A further 14% were uncertain on this issue.

Georgia and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Future

In light of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, a move quickly followed by Georgia and Moldova. 

Public opinion strongly supports Georgia and Ukraine’s application to candidate status. At the same time, there has been little movement in terms of overall support for Georgia’s membership in the EU and NATO (which was already high) since the start of the war.

Respondents to the survey were asked how strongly they supported or did not support Ukraine and Georgia becoming candidates in the European Union. The data indicates strong support from the Georgian public for both countries becoming candidates in the European Union.

Respondents on the survey were asked how strongly they support Georgia’s integration with the European Union, NATO, and the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. 

Data from the 2020 Caucasus Barometer survey using the same question wording and answer options found that 73% of Georgians supported EU membership and 71% supported NATO membership. Today, 75% support EU membership and 70% support NATO membership, statistically indistinguishable shares from the 2020 data.

The president and prime minister’s performance on the war

The Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili, has received significant criticism for his response to the war. While large swaths of the world imposed sanctions on Russia, Gharibashvili firmly stated that Georgia would not participate in the sanctions. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, even tweeted a thank you to the Georgian public for its support, while slighting the Georgian government for its lack thereof. 

In contrast to the Prime Minister, the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabishvili, has received broad praise for her performance in relation to the conflict. Zourabishvili expressed clear support for Ukraine in the conflict and travelled throughout Europe on a media and diplomatic tour in support of Ukraine.

Given the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the public is significantly more approving of the president’s performance in relation to the war than of the prime minister’s work.

While 64% of the public approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 41% approved of Gharibashvili’s performance, a 23 percentage point gap. In contrast, 15% of the public disapproved of Zourabishvili’s performance while 39% disapproved of Gharibashvili’s performance. This leads to a net approval for Zourabishvili of +49% and a net approval rating of +2% for Gharibashvili.

When looking at data broken down by party preferences, the data indicates that Salome Zourabishvili’s performance level being higher than Gharibashvili’s stems from a greater degree of support from the opposition: while 61% of opposition supporters approved of Zourabishvili’s performance in relation to the war, only 32% supported Gharibashvili’s performance. In contrast, Gharibashvili and Zourabishvili had quite similar levels of approval from supporters of Georgian Dream.

The political fallout

With Gharibashvili’s unpopular response to the war, it is unsurprising that Georgian Dream’s base of political support has shrunken.

To identify respondents’ political preferences, the survey asked respondents a) who they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. If the respondent was uncertain, they were asked who they sympathised with compared to other parties. 

The data showed a 10 percentage point decline in support for Georgian Dream. At present, 22% of respondents would support Georgian Dream in elections held tomorrow. This compares to 32% of respondents on a January 2022 survey. 

That is to say, Georgian Dream has, at least temporarily, lost around a third of its voters.

However, it is unclear whether this loss is permanent. The data does not show a gain in support for the opposition relative to January. Rather, the public became increasingly uncertain over who they would support. 

On the January 2022 CRRC Omnibus survey, 27% of respondents reported they were uncertain about who they would support in parliamentary elections, while in the March Ukraine survey, 38% of respondents reported the same, a twelve percentage point increase. 

The data also shows a slight decline in support for the opposition, with 25% supporting an opposition party in January of 2022, compared with 20% in March. 

The remaining respondents refused to answer which party they would support, the share of which shifted within the margin of error between the two surveys (20% in March and 17% in January).

While the official response to Russia’s war has been lackadaisical, the public unambiguously support Ukraine and support doing almost anything to help the country in its fight against Russia. The Georgian public’s views of the country’s Euro-Atlantic future has changed little. However, the public’s view of the government has changed, with Georgian Dream, at least temporarily, losing around a third of its supporters. 

The data this article is based on is available here.

Young Georgians do not want a military solution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. The article was written by Nino Zubashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia, and David Sichinava, Research Director at CRRC Georgia. All views, place names, and terminology used in this article are the words of the authors alone, and may not necessarily reflect the views of OC Media’s editorial board, CRRC Georgia, Caucasian House, or any related entity.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised fears in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that military aggression might be expected from Georgia. As Russia mobilised its military along Ukraine’s borders, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia declared military readiness to avoid ‘possible provocation from Georgian authorities’, while the de facto authorities in South Ossetia ordered an examination of its troops. 

Despite sponsored videos attempting to provoke this type of response in Georgia, as well as Western commentators questioning whether Georgia might attempt a military response, Georgian authorities have not hinted at the prospect of any military incursion in the two regions amidst the war in Ukraine. Government affiliated media have also not made any argument for doing so. 

Moreover, Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories rejects the pursuit of a military solution altogether and aims to achieve the ‘full de-occupation’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through peaceful means.

Recently released data from the CRRC Georgia and Caucasian House Survey on Youth Civic and Political Engagement and Participation in Peacebuilding shows that young people in Georgia support this policy approach. 

The survey was administered in the summer of 2021 and interviewed 1,116 Georgians between the ages of 18–29. 

The survey asked whether the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be resolved by the use of force or through negotiations. 

The overwhelming majority (95%) of young Georgians said that they supported negotiations rather than the use of force. Only 2% said that the conflicts should be resolved by force, while 3% had no opinion.

The majority of young people in Georgia were in favour of reconciliation and forgetting about past hostilities. Almost two-thirds (62%) agreed that it was necessary to forget the past and think about the future together to have peace with Abkhazians and Ossetians. About the same share (64%) said that ordinary people currently living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were as much victims of the conflicts as Georgians. 

At the same time, a majority of young Georgians disagreed (60%) with the idea that ‘it is important for us to be the first to apologise to Abkhazians and Ossetians for war crimes committed by the Georgian side’. A fifth (19%) neither agreed nor disagreed, while 11% agreed with the idea. A further 10% were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Aside from supporting the peaceful resolution of the conflict, a majority of young Georgians (66%) reported they were willing to participate in reconciliation efforts. Ethnic Georgians (69%) were more willing to participate in efforts aimed at reconciliation compared to ethnic minorities (42%). So were those who were working (72%) compared to respondents (62%) who were not. 

Young Georgians who said they knew someone currently living in South Ossetia were more likely to be willing to participate in reconciliation efforts (77%) compared to those who had no acquaintances there (68%). Importantly, having acquaintances in Abkhazia was not associated with willingness to participate in reconciliation efforts.

Young Georgians who claimed that they were well-informed about the conflicts were more likely to express a willingness to participate in reconciliation (82%), than those with lower levels of awareness (57%).

Those who agreed that Georgians should forget about the past and think about the future with Abkhazians and Ossetians were also more predisposed towards participation in reconciliation efforts (75%) compared to those who were against forgetting (56%). Still, the majority in both groups were willing to take part in peacebuilding activities.

The results of the CRRC Georgia/Caucasian House study reflect the generally peaceful attitudes of Georgians towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

An earlier study conducted in April 2020 for Conciliation Resources showed that a majority (71%) of Georgians regardless of age believed that the Georgian government was in a position to step up and improve relations between Georgian and Abkhazian societies. 

A large majority of the public supported direct dialogue with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia (70%). The next most commonly supported step was the identification of common interests and the development of joint solutions to problems (48%). 

In the light of Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, fears arose around whether Georgia might pursue a military escalation towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nonetheless, neither evidence on the ground, nor public opinion in Georgia show an appetite for such a pursuit. 

The Georgian public, including young people, is overwhelmingly against forced re-incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia, and most support the improvement of relations with the societies there. 

While the data presented here was collected prior to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, and public opinion can shift drastically amidst changing political situations, this data is a good reminder that an overwhelming majority of Georgians, including its youth, look for peace, not war.

Note: The data used in the article can be found on CRRC’s online data analysis tool. 

The analysis was carried out using multinomial regression. The regression modelling the willingness to participate in the reconciliation efforts included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–23, 24-29), ethnic group (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), educational attainment (secondary or lower education, or higher than secondary education), employment situation (working or not), experience of job loss due to pandemic (lost job or not), current perceived economic rung (lower, medium, higher), IDP status (forced to move due to conflicts since 1989 or not), party affiliation (Governing party, opposition, no party, don’t know/refuse to answer), and durable goods index. Non-demographic variables tested as part of the analysis included interest in current interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (interested, neutral, not interested), interest in Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s politics (interested, neutral, not interested), having acquaintances in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia (having, not having), acquaintance with Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s conflicts (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards the need of forgetting the past and thinking about the future together for peace (agree, neutral, disagree), attitude towards people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia being as much victims of conflicts as Georgians (agree, neutral, disagree). 

How many votes were bought in Georgia’s local elections?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia, and Givi Silagadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the views of the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the National Endowment for Democracy, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

According to research carried out by CRRC Georgia, 20% of Tbilisi’s population appeared to be willing to sell their vote prior to elections. However, this research also discovered that the popularisation of certain messages may also discourage vote-buying among the population. 

Recent elections in Georgia have featured widespread allegations of electoral fraud. Indeed, the OSCE’s ODIHR, the main election watchdog internationally, said that ‘contestants were able to campaign freely in a competitive environment that was, however, marred by wide-spread and consistent allegations of intimidation, vote-buying, pressure on candidates and voters, and an unlevel playing field.” 

Knowing this type of problem could arise, given that past elections had featured similar allegations, CRRC Georgia attempted to measure and discourage vote-buying in the 2021 municipal elections. To do so, the organisation:

• Conducted a pre-electoral experiment testing what messages might discourage vote-buying in Tbilisi prior to the elections; 
• Delivered the most effective message identified in the pre-electoral experiment on posters to 18,000 households, prior to the elections as part of a randomized control trial and; 
• Measured how effective the messages were at discouraging vote-buying. 

The results point in a positive direction, but are less than conclusive, requiring further research in future elections.

Measuring vote-buying 

Imagine that a stranger came to your home or called you on the phone, and asked you if you use illegal drugs. It is easy to imagine that few people would give an honest response.

To estimate the prevalence of illicit activities, researchers use a method called a list experiment. In list experiments, respondents are shown a list of different activities and asked how many they intend on doing or have done in the past. Half of the respondents are shown a list without a sensitive item and half are shown the same list plus the sensitive activity. By asking respondents how many activities they have engaged in, respondents do not have to tell the interviewer that they have engaged in an illicit activity. 

Researchers can then estimate how many people have engaged in an illicit activity by comparing the average number of activities that the people in the short list group reported versus the number of activities reported by the long list group. 

Willingness to sell a vote

In the lead up to the elections, approximately 3000 Tbilisi residents participated in a survey with the above-described type of experiment. The results suggest that approximately 20% of Tbilisi’s population was willing to sell their vote prior to the election, defined as voting, ‘for a certain candidate in exchange for a gift or money’.

While measuring vote buying can have important implications, discouraging it is arguably better. Indeed, ideally, there would be no vote-buying. In support of this goal, the pre-electoral survey also contained a randomised messaging experiment testing which of five different messages might discourage people from selling their vote most effectively.

The first message attempted to induce embarrassment about Georgia’s declining electoral integrity by comparing the country to positive examples internationally. The second message worked on the same premise, but placed Georgia alongside other countries doing poorly internationally. The third message highlighted the threat that vote-buying presents to Georgia’s western integration prospects. The fourth message reminded the public of the much-maligned ‘dark’ 1990s, which included widespread electoral fraud. The fifth message highlighted the incompatibility of vote-buying with democratic norms. 

The results suggest that the most effective message was the negative international embarrassment message. However, the other messages were also effective, with the exception of the message on democracy. The chart below shows the marginal effect of each message on people’s intentions to sell their votes right after hearing the messages.

Aside from discouraging people from selling their votes, the above messages also changed people’s responses to a set of six questions on attitudes towards vote-buying. The chart below shows the magnitude of the change on a scale varying from 0 to 18 points, with 0 meaning no acceptance of vote-buying and 18 meaning full acceptance of vote-buying. Again, the most effective message on this scale was the message that aimed to embarrass respondents about Georgia’s declining electoral quality, placing it in the ranks of countries that have recently had issues with electoral integrity.

Did the messages work in the real world?

Based on the above results, CRRC conducted a cluster randomized control trial in Tbilisi to test the efficacy of the negative international embarrassment message in the real world. To do so, the organisation designed the poster below, printed 18,000 copies, and delivered these to households that would be interviewed following elections.

After the first round of elections, over 1,200 interviews were conducted with households that did and did not get a copy of the above poster. 

Analyzing these interviews points in a positive direction for the posters, but is far from conclusive. The results point in the direction of vote-buying taking place, and also towards a decline in vote-buying as a result of the posters. However, the results are not definitive, failing to meet standards for statistical significance.

With regard to attitudes, the data indicates some minimal impacts on a few of the survey questions about attitudes towards vote-buying. However, there is no evidence that the poster uniformly shifted attitudes towards less tolerance of vote-buying on the attitude index depicted above. 

What does all of this mean?

The results of the experiment CRRC Georgia conducted are promising, but also definitively inconclusive. They point towards the existence of vote-buying, and they point towards the anti-vote-buying message being effective, but they do not demonstrate this beyond a shadow of a reasonable doubt. 

This conclusion calls for future research. Notably, the pre-electoral survey found statistically and substantively significant effects. However, this survey measured results immediately after respondents heard the message. In contrast, the posters were placed on people’s doorsteps in the weeks leading up to the elections. It is plausible that the effect of the message dissipated over time. In this regard, future research should consider attempts to deliver the message in multiple mediums, multiple times.

The data from the pre-electoral survey also clearly shows that multiple messages were effective, even though the negative international embarrassment message was most effective. In this regard, future research should test out whether delivery of multiple messages and combinations of the above, as well as different messages, is effective at sustaining anti-vote buying attitudes.

Above all, one would hope that this research would be unnecessary in the first place. That it was even conducted points towards a need for the authorities to ensure that vote-buying does not take place.

Georgians are becoming increasingly tolerant

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia, and Otto Saldadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented within the article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the Council of Europe, or any related entity.

Data from surveys done over several years have shown significant increases in tolerance among the Georgian population for diversity in the country, among a wide range of criteria, as well as increased recognition of the importance of minority rights.

It is easy to remember instances of hate-motivated violence in Georgia — one only has to look to last July to see a hate-motivated riot and an attempted murder of someone based on the fact that they looked, to the attacker, like they might be queer. Despite this, new data from the CRRC and Council of Europe survey on hate crime, hate speech, and discrimination in Georgia released today suggests increased levels of tolerance in Georgia compared to 2018 along a wide range of measures.

The data indicates that Georgians are increasingly appreciative of diversity in the country. Between 2018 and 2021, there was a 14 percentage point increase in the share of the public reporting that diversity, in general, is positive. Similarly, there was a 12 percentage point and 14 percentage point increase in the share of the public reporting that ethnic diversity and religious diversity, respectively, are positive.

The data also shows large increases in the share of the public that would approve of someone like them doing business with a wide range of different groups. On this measure, people had the most negative attitudes towards homosexuals and Jehovah’s Witnesses, just as they did in 2018. However, the data shows a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the public that would approve of someone like them doing business with a homosexual and a 13 percentage point rise in the share of the public who reports the same about Jehovah’s Witnesses. In total, there were 10 point or greater shifts for 11 groups asked about on the survey.

Georgians also increasingly think that protecting the rights of different minority groups is important for the country’s development. While most people thought this was the case in 2018 for most groups, there is a marked rise in the share reporting that protecting the rights of LGBT people is important. In 2018, only a third of the public thought this was important, while in 2021, roughly half of the public (47%) reported the same.

The data tends to paint a positive picture more broadly. People became more willing to recognise the problems that different minority groups face. The public reports increased recognition of a wide range of minority rights. Georgians increasingly think that hate crime and hate speech are problems in the country.

The data points towards positive attitude changes in Georgia around tolerance, despite prominent instances of hate crime as well as the everyday discrimination that different groups face in Georgia. 

The data this article is based on is available here.

Georgians remain hesitant about vaccinating kids

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. was written by Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia, and Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this blog post reflect the views of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI or CRRC Georgia. 

Data from the CRRC Georgia and NDI December 2021 survey suggest that even fewer people in Georgia are willing to vaccinate their children than those who are willing to get vaccinated themselves.

A 9 November decision by Georgian authorities enabled children aged 12 or older to be vaccinated against COVID-19, so long as there was parental consent. 

In the December 2021 survey, 29% of Georgians reported already being vaccinated while 25% said they plan to get vaccinated, equivalent to 44% of the adult population in total. In contrast, 42% of Georgians said they would not get vaccinated against the coronavirus.  Two-thirds of those who are already vaccinated or willing to be said they would get a booster or already had. 

In contrast, only a quarter of people reported they would be willing to vaccinate, or had already had vaccinated, their children. The majority (59%) says they would not vaccinate their children.

The data indicates that there are a number of differences between those willing to and those not willing to vaccinate their children. 

Notably, people who do not have children under 12 in the household are 1.3 times more likely to say they would vaccinate them compared to people who have children under 12 in the household. 

People who say they are planning to get the vaccine or are already vaccinated themselves are 5 times more likely to say they would vaccinate their children.

People with higher education are 1.3 times more likely to report they would vaccinate their children than people with secondary or lower education. 

People who trust the healthcare system in Georgia are 1.2 times more likely to report the same compared with those who do not trust the healthcare system. 

Georgian Dream and opposition supporters are 1.2 times more likely to say they would vaccinate their children compared to people who did not name any party as closest to them. 

The wealthier a household is, the more likely a person is to say they would vaccinate their child. 

Older people are 1.5 times more likely to express willingness in vaccinating children than young people. 

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The additive index of ownership of different items is a common proxy for wealth.

With this data in mind, together with the late rollout of vaccines for children, perhaps it is unsurprising that as of 16 January, only 15,841 children were vaccinated with at least one dose in Georgia.

The data used in this article is available here.

Who should solve Georgia’s political crises?

This article first appeared in the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author's alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Georgian politics often appears to be in a near-constant crisis — marked by protests, boycotts, and acrimony. But who do Georgians think should solve their political problems?

Since the 2020 parliamentary elections, Georgia has experienced political deadlock. The EU and US both supported attempts to mediate between the government and opposition, ultimately leading to the Charles Michel Agreement. This agreement, though, was eventually abandoned. 

Just this week, the opposition United National Movement (UNM) announced they would stop boycotting parliament, though it is unclear whether this will be a lasting agreement. 

But who can help move things forward? New data from the December 2021 CRRC and NDI survey suggests that the public wants parties to work together and a plurality wants them to resolve their problems themselves.

According to the CRRC and NDI December 2021 survey, 4 out of 5 people in Georgia agree that their favoured political party (if they had one) should cooperate with all other political parties in the parliament, even if the actions/views of some parties might be unacceptable to them. 

Respondents were asked who they thought could best mediate and facilitate through the difficulties that parties are having. 

A third said that parties themselves would make the best mediator and facilitator in this process. Almost one in five said that Western partners would fulfil the role best.

Fewer people said that the president of Georgia, speaker of parliament, or others would be the best facilitators. Notably, roughly one in five do not know who could fulfil this role.

At the same time, more than half of the population does not identify with any political party and every second person in Georgia disagrees that the opposition parties or the ruling party serve the interests of the country and the Georgian people.

A regression analysis shows that attitudes towards who would be the best mediator vary among different groups. 

Compared to men, women were slightly more likely to say that parties themselves would make the best mediator. People with a higher education were 1.2 times more likely to name political parties than people with secondary or lower education. 

Ethnic Georgians were also 1.2 times more likely to do so compared to ethnic minorities and Georgian Dream supporters were 1.3 times more likely to do so than people who did not name a party.

The regression analysis shows that young people are slightly more likely to name Western partners as their preferred mediators compared to older people. 

People who live in the capital were around 1.4 times more likely to name Western partners compared to other urban and rural areas. 

Ethnic Georgians were 7 times more likely to do so compared to ethnic minorities, and opposition supporters were around 3 times more likely to think of Western partners as the best for mediation compared to Georgian Dream supporters. 

Additionally, people who approve of Georgia’s membership in NATO were 2.6 times more likely to prefer Western partners as facilitators compared to people who do not approve of Georgia’s membership in NATO.

As for the president of Georgia, people with secondary technical education were slightly more likely to name the president as the best mediator compared to people with lower or higher levels of education. Ethnic Georgians were also slightly more likely to think the same compared to ethnic minorities.

Note: This chart was generated from a regression model. The model includes gender (male, female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, tertiary), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), party respondent names as closest to his/her views (Georgian Dream, opposition party, did not name a party (Don’t know, Refuse to answer, No party)), support for NATO membership (approve, disapprove) and an additive index of ownership of different items, a common proxy for wealth.

Georgians want their political parties to cooperate and generally are more likely to think that the ruling and opposition parties do not serve the interests of the country and the people. 

Though the public’s opinion differs when it comes to who could best facilitate dialogue between parties, a plurality think the parties themselves should do it.  

Opposition supporters, people living in the capital, and people who support Georgia’s membership in NATO were more likely to think of Western partners as the best facilitators, while Georgian Dream supporters were more likely to think that parties themselves should lead and facilitate dialogue.

The problems facing Georgian courts

Note: This article first appeared in the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Mariam Kobaladze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, USAID, East-West Management Institute, or any related entity.

Over the last few years, the court system in Georgia has been subject to criticism from politicians, civil society, and international bodies. The criticism mostly focused on the independence of judges, the selection and appointment of members of the Supreme Court, legislative shortcomings, access to court decisions, and the quality of court decisions, among a range of other issues. Prior to this, public trust in courts had already been low relative to other institutions, with only 17% of the public reporting they trusted the courts in 2019. 

Studies CRRC Georgia published in 2021 suggest that the main issue business people and legal professionals see in the court system is justice not delivered in a timely fashion. Yet, they view the issues in the court system as symptoms of the broader problems that other actors criticise.

When asked about the main challenges businesses face in the courts, half of businesses named time-related issues. The length of trials was named by 31% and delayed enforcement of court decisions was named by 19%. Relatively few, 10%, felt that the lack of independence of courts was an issue. 

The long timelines for court trials and enforcement of decisions were also discussed extensively in qualitative research. Businesses reported that trials can take years to conclude. Even when they do, enforcement of decisions takes so long that inflation and currency fluctuations can eat away at the value of settlements. As a result, some business people report that decisions settled in their favour, ‘merely stayed on paper’. Knowing that inflation and currency fluctuations will ultimately reduce the value of settlements, some businesses report that there is a strong incentive for those they are suing to delay trials and enforcement. 

The results were quite similar in a study of legal professionals’ attitudes that CRRC Georgia conducted in the spring and summer of 2021. Lawyers highlighted that court hearings and the issuance of rulings took longer than the limits set out in legislation. An NGO lawyer from Tbilisi told CRRC: ‘It is a fact that the court system cannot complete almost any case within the legally set norms […] often resolution of cases is so late that any interest towards the case is lost and it is impossible to restore the violated right’. 

Judges are aware of the problem. When discussing the long timelines around cases, they blamed heavy caseloads. They further noted that this also resulted in lower-quality decisions. ‘The increase in the number of cases impacts quality’,  a judge working in the criminal courts told CRRC. ‘Sometimes quality is damaged, sometimes [timelines]. Case trials are not finished on time.’

These were not the only issues with the judiciary that study participants mentioned. Lawyers mentioned issues around a dearth of common practice and lack of independence among investigators. While judges felt that low public trust was a problem for the court system as well as insufficient social guarantees for judges after retirement.

The above does not demonstrate that a lack of independence and opaque selection procedures for judges are not a problem. Rather, lawyers tended to suggest that most of the issues noted above were symptoms of the courts’ fundamental problems rather than the disease itself. They reported that without addressing the root causes, including how appointments throughout the judiciary are made, as well as case distribution rules, the judiciary is likely to continue functioning at sub-optimal levels. 

As Georgia’s government argues with the West, the public want ever closer relations

Note: This article was first published in the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint publication of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dustin Gilbreath, the Deputy Research Director at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article reflect the views of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Europe Foundation, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Over the past year, Georgia’s government has engaged in a series of spats with the Western governments and institutions, despite data suggesting people want the opposite.

Last year saw more damage to Georgia’s relationship with the West than in any other time in recent memory. 

In July, the US Embassy said it was ‘deeply disturbed and exasperated’ after the ruling Georgian Dream party withdrew from the Charles Michel Agreement, a deal which the President of the European Union spent multiple days in Georgia negotiating. ‘Refusing’ financial aid that one Member of the European Parliament said would not have been available anyway due to failures to reform the judiciary, was another notable strike in Georgia’s declining Western relations. 

The head of the Georgian Dream Party’s increasingly regular spats with the US Ambassador can only be further damaging relations. Concomitantly, the tone of US statements has gone from one of concern to talk of ‘risk[ing] tyranny’. 

All the while, data from the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia, funded by the Europe Foundation and implemented by CRRC Georgia, shows that the public wanted closer relations with the West in the period leading up to the scandals noted above.

The share of people thinking Georgia should focus its political and economic efforts on Russia has declined since 2013. Two-thirds of people named Russia as one of the countries Georgia should have closer political relations with than others in 2013, compared with only a third in 2021. The data is quite similar when it comes to economic cooperation.

Note: Respondents were asked, ‘Which of the following countries and unions should Georgia have the closest [economic/political] cooperation with?’ They were allowed to provide up to three responses. As a result, the sum of responses does not equal 100%.

While Russia’s importance to Georgians has been on the decline, people’s views of the West have been on the rise. 

In 2015, 49% of people said Georgia’s closest political relations should be with the EU, less than the share naming Russia. Since then, there has been a 13 percentage point rise, bringing the share of the public thinking that relations should be closest with the EU 30 points above those reporting the same of Russia. 

The data on economic relations paints a similar picture, with a 17 percentage point rise in the share of the public thinking that Georgia’s closest economic relations should be with the European Union between 2019 and 2021.

The data paints a similar picture of attitudes towards the US. There was a rise from 46% of the public thinking Georgia should have the US among its closest political partners in 2015 to 61% in 2021. Between 2019 and 2021, the data shows a six percentage point increase in this view. 

The change is even larger with regards to attitudes towards economic relations with the US, with a 19 percentage point rise between 2015 and 2021, including a nine percentage point rise between 2019 and 2021.

The Georgian public increasingly thinks that Georgia should have closer political and economic relations with the West, while fewer and fewer people think Georgia should focus its political and economic relations to the North. Despite the public’s views, the Georgian Western relation remains on the rocks. 

The data used in this article are available here.

The Gakharia Effect

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint production of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Givi Siligadze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia, and Tsisana Khundadze, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of NDI, CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

In February, then Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia resigned in response to a disagreement within the ruling party regarding the detention of Nika Melia, the leader of the United National Movement. But how did his resignation affect people’s political views?

Gakharia was among the most popular leaders from the ruling party and led Georgian Dream during the 2020 Parliamentary elections.  

Analysis of a February 2021 NDI survey, which was ongoing at the time of Gakharia’s resignation, suggests the immediate effect of Gakharia’s resignation was a nine percentage point decline in support for Georgian Dream.

The CRRC and NDI telephone survey was conducted between 17–24 February 2021. On 17 February, a day before Gakharia’s resignation, every third (32%) Georgian considered Georgian Dream as the political party closest to them, 12% named an opposition party, and more than half (56%) did not specify any party (responding no party, don’t know, or refuse to answer). 

After Gakharia resigned on 18 February, Georgian Dream numbers dropped to around every fifth person (22%) naming it as the party closest to them. One in seven Georgians (15%) named an opposition party, and almost two thirds (63%) did not name a party. 

A regression analysis, controlling for a wide range of factors, suggests that after taking into account differences between people interviewed before and after Gakharia’s resignation, there was a nine percentage point drop in support for Georgian Dream as a result of the resignation.  

Further analysis showed that Gakharia’s resignation did not affect support for opposition parties. Rather, support shifted to other response options generally.  Thus, the PM leaving the party contributed to Georgian Dream supporters becoming disillusioned, though the opposition did not gain much from the resignation either. 

Different groups of the public were affected differently. 

People living in Tbilisi, people with higher education levels, and employed people were significantly less likely to name the ruling Georgian Dream party as being closest to them after Gakharia’s resignation. 

In contrast, the resignation did not affect party identification for people who were not working, people with secondary or a lower levels of education, or people living outside the capital. 

While the changes in party support are logical, the circumstances of the resignation could also reasonably be expected to change people’s views of the government. This is particularly true given Gakharia’s popularity and contribution to the perception that the government was effectively handling the pandemic. 

Yet, regression analyses suggest no changes in terms of people’s attitudes towards the direction the country was headed, the performance of parliament, assessments of the government’s economic COVID mitigation measures, or vaccination intention. 

The above analysis shows that while Gakharia was critical to Georgian Dream support, his departure did not significantly affect how people thought about other issues in the country.

Note: The above data analysis is based on logistic regression models which included the following variables: age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), gender (male or female), education (completed secondary/lower, secondary technical, or incomplete higher education/higher), employment situation (working or not), ethnicity (ethnic Georgian or ethnic minority), party identification (Georgia Dream, opposition, no party/DK/RA), settlement type (Tbilisi, other urban areas, or rural areas) and interview date (before Gakharia's resignation or after Gakharia's resignation).

Do Georgians differentiate between the Russian people and Russian state?

Note: This article originally appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint publication of CRRC Georgia and OC Media. It was written by Dr. Tamuna Khostaria, a Senior Researcher at CRRC Georgia, and Nino Mzavanadze, a Researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article reflect the views of the authors alone, and do not neccesarily reflect the views of GFSIS, CRRC Georgia, or any related entity.

Given the hostile relations between Russia and Georgia over the last 30 years, Georgian public opinion towards their northern neighbour could be expected to be less than positive. But do Georgians differentiate between the Russian state and the Russian people?

A study CRRC-Georgia conducted for the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) South Caucasus Office in 2021 shows that people have conflicting attitudes towards Russia and Russians. 

The data suggest that the Georgian public’s attitudes towards Russian people and the Russian state differ significantly. Half of people living in Georgia (52%) report having a positive attitude towards Russian people, with only 7% reporting negative attitudes. 

At the same time, half of the population (54%) reported having a negative attitude towards the Russian Federation, while only 18% held positive views. 

A quote from one 29-year-old ethnic Georgian woman from Tbilisi who holds a higher education and who participated in a focus group reflects these sentiments:

‘For me, Russia is an occupier, but my [negative] attitude is not towards ordinary Russian people, because if my government did horrible things that would not mean that I am like that too. I adore Russian literature, but I dislike Russia with its ruler. But again, that does not mean that I despise the people’.

Overall, 17% of people reported having a positive attitude towards Russia and Russian people, 21% a positive attitude towards Russian people and a negative attitude towards the state, 7% a negative attitude towards both, 22% neutral attitudes towards both, and 33% a mixture of attitudes. Less than 1% had a positive attitude towards Russia and a negative attitude towards Russians; as a result, this category is not included in subsequent analysis.

Which set of attitudes people position themselves in was associated with a number of factors, according to a set of regression analyses. 

Men were significantly more likely to have positive attitudes towards Russian people but not the state than women. Women were significantly more likely to report neutral or uncertain attitudes towards both. 

Attitudes also vary by education level.  People with secondary education or lower were significantly more likely to report positive attitudes towards Russia and Russians. In contrast, people with tertiary education reported more positive views towards Russians but not Russia.

People in Tbilisi were more likely to hold positive attitudes towards Russians but not Russia than in other settlement types, while people in rural areas were less likely to fall into this grouping and more likely to hold neutral views. 

Older people were more likely to have positive views of Russians but not Russia.  This finding might be explained by the closer relations which older people had with Russians during the Soviet Union. 

Indeed, this view was often expressed in focus groups, with participants noting that friendships are less common among young people. One 50-year-old ethnic Georgian woman with a higher education from Samagrelo stated:

‘Considering we are neighbours, we should deepen relationships and make them better. People can make anything happen. Politics is one thing, but people’s power is boundless. My generation feels that way, but the younger generation feels differently. They don’t speak Russian either, and can’t imagine any kind of relationship with Russians. We, the older generation, have more nostalgic sentiments [and can] set politics aside.’

Attitudes also vary with foreign policy preferences. People with negative attitudes towards Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration also tended to be more likely to have positive views of both Russia and Russians. In contrast, those who were positive about Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration held a broader mix of views. 

People who had a negative attitude towards Georgia joining NATO were roughly 2.5 times more likely (32%) to have a positive attitude towards Russian people and the state compared with people who held a positive attitude towards Georgia’s integration into NATO (13%). 

The data showed a similar pattern with attitudes towards Georgia’s integration with the European Union.

The findings suggest that attitudes towards the Russian people and the Russian state differ in Georgia. 

Men, those living in the capital, people with tertiary education, and older people held a more positive attitude towards the people, but not the state.  

As younger people have relatively weak links with Russians, it is reasonable to assume that what goodwill exists towards Russians is likely to wane in the future. How dynamics play out given these findings though, remains an open question. What is clear though is that people with negative attitudes towards Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration also have more positive attitudes towards both Russia and Russians.

Note: The above quantitative analysis is based on two multinomial logistic regression models, where the dependent variable is attitudes towards the Russian state and Russian people with the following categories: Positive attitudes towards Russian people and state, positive attitudes towards Russian people but not state, negative attitude towards Russian people and state, Neutral attitude towards Russian people and state, any other attitude towards Russian people and/or state, excluding people who had positive attitudes towards the Russian state but negative attitudes towards Russians. This variable was generated using two survey questions, with one question about people's attitudes towards the state and the other about attitudes towards Russian people. The independent variables include (a) demographic variables (gender, age, settlement type, and education) and attitudes towards joining the EU; and (b) demographic variables and attitudes towards joining the NATO.