Public Perceptions of Georgia's Potential Involvement in a War

Most Georgians believe it is unlikely the country will become involved in a war, though a significant minority remain unsure. Perceptions of war risk differ across demographic groups and are strongly shaped by political views and media trust.

Peace is the core issue that Georgian Dream and its supporters frequently present as the government’s primary achievement. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine the ruling party has increasingly emphasized the threat of potential conflict and portray the preservation of peace as a key element of their success and a pillar of political stability.

In this context, understanding how the public perceives the likelihood of war becomes especially relevant. Data from CRRC Georgia’s spring 2024 Caucasus Barometer survey  suggests that a majority (62%) of the public considers it unlikely that Georgia will become involved in any war, while 16% consider it as likely. Nearly one in five people (21%) remain uncertain on the issue.

Further analysis shows that perceptions of the likelihood that Georgia may become involved in any war is associated with demographic factors such as age, education, and type of settlement. Older individuals (55+) are 15 percentage points while people between 35 and 54 years of age are 11 percentage points less likely to believe that Georgia will become involved in a war compared to younger people. Those with a technical secondary education perceive a higher risk of involvement than people with a lower level of education. Meanwhile, rural residents are more uncertain about the likelihood of war and are also less likely to think that war is likely.  

Notably respondent’s sex, employment status, ethnicity or household wealth does not significantly influence this perception.

Media trust is another important factor. Those who do not trust television are 12 percentage points more likely, and those who do not watch TV channels are 8 percentage points more likely, to perceive a higher risk of war compared to those who trust Imedi TV. Notably those who report that they trust Rustavi 2 for news on politics and events are 13 percentage point less likely to believe that Georgia will stay out of a war compared to those who trust Imedi TV.

Political preferences also appear to influence perceptions around the likelihood of war. People who support opposition parties are 10 points more likely to say that Georgia is likely to become involved in any war. Respondents who did not provide a party preference about party support are 5 percentage points more likely to respond “Don’t know” to the war risk question and 11 percentage points less likely to say war is unlikely compared to Georgian dream supporters.

Furthermore, beliefs about who is responsible for the war inUkraine are also associated with perceptions of the likelihood that Georgia will become involved in a war. Respondents who blame Ukraine or Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the war are 9 percentage point more likely to perceive that it is unlikely Georgia will be involved in any war, compared to those who blame Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In contrast, respondents who answered “Don’t Know” regarding responsibility are 19 percentage points less likely to believe that Georgia’s involvement in any war is unlikely, compared to those who blame Russia or Putin. Furthermore, those who are uncertain about who holds responsibility are also more likely to be undecided about Georgia’s potential involvement in a war, with 24 percentage point higher likelihood of choosing “Don’t Know” about risk of war. Finally, those who blame Ukraine or Zelensky are 10 points less likely to be undecided about Georgia’s potential involvement in a war compared to those who blame Russia or Putin.

Finally, perceptions of the country’s political direction are also linked to how people assess the risk of Georgia becoming involved in a war. People who believe Georgia is going in the right direction are 16 percentage points more likely to say war is unlikely compared to those who think it’s going in the wrong direction. Respondents who don’t know how the country is doing politically are less likely to say war is unlikely and more likely to say they don’t know about a risk of war. Those who think there’s no change in the political direction are 7 percentage points more likely to say “Don’t know” about a risk of war.

Finally, respondents who support Georgia’s EU membership are 9 percentage points less likely to believe that it is likely Georgia will become involved in a war, compared to those who do not support EU membership. In contrast, support for NATO membership shows no significant association with perceptions of war risk.

Overall, perceptions of Georgia’s potential involvement in a war is shaped not only by demographics, but also by political views, media trust, beliefs about responsibility for the war in Ukraine, perceptions of the country’s domestic politics and support of EU membership. Those who do not trust TV or watch TV are more likely to perceive a higher risk of Georgia’s involvement in a war. People who support opposition parties are also more likely to view the risk of involvement as higher. On the other hand, those who believe Georgia is going in the right direction are more likely to say war is unlikely, while those who feel there is no change in the political direction are more likely to say “Don’t know” about the risk of a war. Similarly, respondents who blame Ukraine or Zelensky for the war are more likely to think that Georgia will not become involved in any conflict. Notably, support for Georgia’s EU membership is associated with a lower perceived likelihood of the country becoming involved in a war.

This article was written by Eto Gagunashvili, a researcher at CRRC Georgia.

This analysis is based on a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable is ‘How likely or unlikely is it that Georgia gets involved in any war?’ with three answer options: Unlikely, Likely, and Don’t Know. The independent variables include gender, age, settlement type, education, ethnicity, employment, household wealth index, partisanship, trust towards TV stations, who holds the most responsibility for the war in Ukraine, In which direction is Georgia’s domestic politics going, to what extent would you support Georgia’s membership in the EU and to what extent you support Georgia’s membership in-NATO.

How do Georgians perceive women’s sexual freedom?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Katharine Khamhaengwong, an International Fellow at CRRC Georgia, and Makhare Atchaidze, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia, the Europe Foundation, or any related entity.

Data CRRC has collected shows that there have been significant changes in the attitudes of Georgians towards women’s sexual freedoms since 2013, especially among Muslims, who have seen a large decrease in rates of disapproval, although this has not translated to a significant increase in approval.

The data was collected as part of  the Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia survey, carried out for the Europe Foundation between 2013 and 2023.

According to the resulting statistics, the share of Georgians reporting it is always or sometimes justified for a woman to have premarital sex increased from 22% in 2013 to 36% in 2023. Similarly, in 2013, only 32% of Georgians said it was always or sometimes justified for a woman to have a baby outside of marriage, compared with 51% in 2023.These numbers show that attitudes towards sex are loosening, particularly with regard to women. But whose attitudes are changing?

In 2013, 87% of Muslims said that it was never justified for a woman to have sex before marriage, compared to 67% of Armenian Apostolic Christians and 66% of Orthodox Christians. Ten years later, only 58% of Muslims said it was never justified, compared to 68% of Armenian Apostolic Christians and 50% of Orthodox Christians.

However, while the number of Muslims saying that pre-marital sex was never justified fell dramatically, this was not accompanied by a proportionate increase in Muslims saying pre-marital sex was justified. Indeed, there was only an increase from 6% of Muslims reporting that pre-marital sex was sometimes or always justified in 2013 to 15% in 2023. During this same period, the number of Muslims who refused to answer the question went up from only 1% in 2013 to 18% in 2023.

In contrast, the decrease in opposition to pre-marital sex by Orthodox Christians came with a notable increase in the percentage that believed pre-marital sex was always justified — in 2013, only 3% of Orthodox Christians agreed that pre-marital sex was always justified, compared to 13% in 2023. The numbers for pre-marital sex being sometimes justified also went up, from 21% to 26%. The answer refusal rate for this group did not change significantly.This pattern is repeated with attitudes toward having children outside of marriage.

In 2013, 84% of Muslims said this was never justified, while in 2023 only 55% reported the same. In this case, the number of Muslims who said a child outside of marriage was always justified did move from 0% in 2013 to 5% ten years later, but again the biggest change was in those who refused to answer, going from 2% in 2013 to 16% in 2023.The percentage of Muslims who said pre-marital sex was never acceptable decreased by 29 points, as did the percentage of those who said children outside of marriage was never acceptable. The numbers for Orthodox Christians were similarly consistent, both declining by 16 points.

The Armenian Apostolic community differed, however — while their views of pre-marital sex for women were quite consistent, the percent who said having a child outside of marriage was always unjustified went from 80% in 2013 to 60% in 2023. Unlike the case with changing Muslim views, this decrease largely came from Armenian Apostolic Christians saying that children outside of marriage were sometimes (17% to 30%) or always (0% to 5%) justified. The share of refusals did not change significantly.

Meanwhile, Orthodox Christians showed the biggest changes in full approval of pre-marital sex, as well as full approval of having children out of wedlock.Opposition to women having children outside of marriage and to women having premarital sex decreased in Georgia from 2013 to 2023.

Some of the biggest decreases came from Georgian Muslims, who are among the religious groups most disapproving of these behaviours. However, this decrease in opposition does not coincide with an increase solely in approval — instead, in addition to a degree of greater acceptance, Muslims increasingly refused to answer questions about sex.

The data used in this article is available here.

Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic politics than foreign affairs

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Kristine Jintchveleishvili, a junior researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, Armenians and Georgians are more interested in domestic rather than international politics, and Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

Understanding political interest enables an understanding of how informed and engaged individuals are in civic life. Scholars have long argued that political interest is a key predictor of democratic participation — from voting to protesting. In the South Caucasus, where democratic institutions are far from consolidated, understanding who is engaged in politics and how offers insight into both opportunities and barriers to deeper democratic engagement.

When it comes to interest in international politics, 2024 Caucasus Barometer data shows that 45% of Armenians expressed interest compared to 30% in Georgia. By comparison, in Armenia, 63% of the public said they were interested in domestic politics compared to 54% in Georgia.

In Armenia, regression analysis shows that several factors are associated with interest in international politics. For one, women are less likely to be interested compared to men. Separately, older individuals (Aged 55 and older) are about twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to people aged 18–34. Education is another important factor — people with less than a tertiary education are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to those with higher levels of educational attainment.

For interest in domestic politics, regression analysis in Armenia shows that older individuals are significantly more interested than younger people. Those aged 55 and older are 27 percentage points more likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to the youngest age group (18–34). Education also plays a role, with individuals lacking tertiary education showing less interest. Wealth is also correlated with interest. People who live in relatively wealthy households are more likely to be interested in Armenia’s domestic politics compared to those who own less.

Settlement type, ethnicity, and employment status are not statistically significant predictors of interest in international or domestic politics in Armenia.

The pattern for interest in international politics is somewhat similar in Georgia. Women in Georgia are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to men, and older individuals are more interested compared to younger ones — people aged 55 and older are twice as likely to be interested in international politics compared to those aged 18–34.

In turn, people living outside of Tbilisi, whether in urban or rural areas, are less likely to be interested in international politics compared to people living in the capital. Additionally, ethnic minorities show lower levels of interest compared to ethnic Georgians.

Finally, wealth is positively associated with interest in international politics — those with the highest wealth levels are more likely to be interested compared to those with less.

Regarding domestic politics in Georgia, regression results demonstrate that rural residents are less likely to be interested in domestic politics compared to people living in the capital. Older individuals and relatively well-off people show greater interest in domestic politics as well.

Education level and employment status were not associated with interest in either international or domestic political affairs in Georgia.

Despite the differences between the two countries, the trend is consistent across both Armenia and Georgia — more people are interested in domestic politics than international politics. The data also shows that Armenians are generally more politically interested than Georgians.

The results presented in this article came from a regression model of the 2024 Caucasus Barometer  dataset. The regressions included the following variables: sex (male or female), age group (18–34, 35–54, 55+), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), ethnic group (ethnic majority or ethnic minority), educational attainment (tertiary or less than tertiary), employment (working, not working), and wealth (ownership of 13 different durable goods, a common proxy for wealth).

Georgians don’t want to be ruled by church, despite confidence in religious institutions

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Teimuraz Kobakhidze and Katharine Khamhaengwong, researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or its affiliates.

Data from the ISSP 2018 religion survey shows that while Georgians have more confidence in churches and religious organisations than in schools, the business world, the legal system, and parliament, they also largely believe that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote. In total, very few believe that churches and religious institutions in Georgia should have more power.

The relationship between the state and the Georgian Orthodox Church is complicated and contested. While the Georgian government has provided the church with an annual budgetary allocation of millions of dollars, the government has also proposed and passed various measures the church has opposed, ranging from making Orthodoxy the state religion to protections for various minority groups.

Within the general populace, two thirds (67%) of Georgians have a great deal of confidence in churches and religious organisations, and 88% have at least some confidence in them. As other CRRC research has consistently shown, people’s own religious organisations and the army are the most trusted institutions in Georgia. This pattern appears within the ISSP survey as well, with churches and religious organisations being the most trusted institutions asked about on the survey. As the vast majority of Georgians are Orthodox Christians, the religious institution in question will typically be the Georgian Orthodox Church.

However, despite this confidence, 71% of Georgians agree that religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote, compared to 15% who disagree, 9% who neither agree nor disagree, and 4% who were uncertain or refused to answer the question.

Additionally, a plurality of Georgians, 42%, think churches and religious institutions have too much power in the country, while only 14% think they have too little power. Slightly over a third (36%) think religious organisations have the right amount, and 8% refused to answer or were uncertain over how to respond to the question.

Regression analyses looking at settlement type, sex, age group, education, having a partner or not, and frequency of religious service attendance shows that attitudes vary among different groups towards religious institutions’ role in society.

For confidence in churches and religious groups, sex, age group, and relationship status were not predictors of attitudes, while settlement type, education level, and religious service attendance were.

The groups most likely to express a great deal of confidence in churches and religious institutions were people in rural areas, weekly church attendees, and people with a secondary or lower education.

Education level similarly predicted responses to whether people believe religious leaders should try to influence voters — people with a higher education were less likely to agree that religious leaders should try to influence votes. Sex and relationship status were also correlated: women and those without partners were more likely to say that religious leaders should not influence voting.

Settlement type, age group, and frequency of religious service attendance did not predict attitudes.

Unlike the previous two questions, education level was not predictive of views on whether or not churches and religious organisations had too much or too little power in society. Settlement type, sex, and relationship status were likewise uncorrelated.

Age and frequency of religious service attendance, on the other hand, were predictive.

People who never or very rarely attended religious services were most likely to say that churches and religious institutions had too much power. Similarly, young people (18–34) were more likely to believe religious institutions have too much power. Notably, people who attended religious services monthly were actually more likely than those who attended weekly to think churches and religious institutions should have more power — 20% compared to 15%.

Despite their general favourability toward the church and religious institutions, Georgians do not think these institutions should have more power or that their leaders should try to influence voters.

The data used in this article is available here. The regression analysis used in this article included the following variables: settlement type (capital, other urban, rural), age (18-34, 35-55, 55+), sex (male or female), education (secondary or lower, secondary technical, or higher than secondary), employment status (employed or unemployed), relationship status (has a spouse or partner, does not have a spouse or partner), and frequency of attendance of religious services (never or less than once per year, at least once per year, at least once per month, at least once per week).

Trust in NGOs in Georgia has grown increasingly polarised

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Zachary Fabos, a researcher at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC–Georgia or any related entity.

Data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer survey shows that supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party are increasingly likely to distrust NGOs, suggesting that the party’s rhetoric regarding civil society is working among its followers.

The survey also showed that those who trust pro-government media outlets have moved towards distrusting NGOs, while those who trust opposition leaning outlets have become more trusting.

In April, Georgia’s one-party parliament passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), requiring individuals and organisations receiving foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’. The law punishes non-registration with fines and prison sentences of up to five years. Condemned by Georgia’s European partners and the US, the law is widely considered an attack on Georgia’s NGO sector and independent journalism. The introduction of FARA follows a slew of other actions by the Georgian Dream government aimed at discrediting and fomenting suspicion towards the country’s NGO sector.

Georgian Dream’s attack on civil society appears to have been effective in changing their supporters’ attitudes, with distrust in NGOs at an all-time high, according to Caucasus Barometer Georgia data.

According to CRRC–Georgia’s 2024 Caucasus Barometer, 32% of the Georgian public report distrusting the NGO sector. This is considerable growth since 2021, when less than a quarter (23%) of the population reported distrust.

Comparing the frequency of distrust and trust among party supporters between 2021 and 2024 further demonstrates the recent development of political polarisation around NGOs operating in Georgia. While distrust and trust towards the sector was about the same among both Georgian Dream and other party supporters in 2021, by 2024 trust and distrust developed a partisan character.

Distrust grew from 25% of Georgian Dream supporters in 2021 to 39% of Georgian Dream supporters in 2024. Among opposition party supporters, trust grew from 24% to 38%. Those who did not support any party did not experience a similar attitude shift.

An analogous dynamic is at play when looking at media consumption.

Between 2021 and 2024, distrust of NGOs among viewers of the pro-government TV channels Imedi, PosTV, and Rustavi 2 more than doubled from 20% to 41%. On the other hand, trust in NGOs nearly doubled among viewers of opposition-leaning TV channels Formula, Mtavari, and TV Pirveli, from 21% to 39%. The sharp divide in distrust and trust of NGOs points to the politically polarised narratives directed at the sector.

Although distrust towards Georgia’s NGOs hit an all-time high in 2024, time series data demonstrate that skepticism of the sector has grown most prominently among Georgian Dream supporters and viewers of Imedi, PosTV, and Rustavi 2, aligning with Georgian Dream’s promotion of anti-civil society legislation and conspiracy theories. The politicisation of attitudes surrounding NGOs is further shown in the opposite trend among those who support other parties and watch news from opposition-leaning channels.

The data used in this article can be found here.

Happy Georgians are young, wealthy, and religious

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This article was written by Otar Jintcharadze and Nino Anchabadze, Junior Researchers at CRRC Georgia. The views presented in the article are the authors’ alone and do not necessarily represent the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

Levels of happiness in Georgia are associated with youth, wealth, and religiosity, according to data from the 2024 Caucasus Barometer.

While more people indicate being happy than sad in Georgia, this varies by age, wealth, and religion. These social and demographic factors tend to be in line with findings from other contexts. Higher economic wealth is generally associated with greater happiness, as is one’s religiosity. The research on age and happiness by contrast, shows a more complicated set of patterns.

According to the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, 66% of Georgians reported feeling happy, rather than sad, while 10% were more sad than happy — an additional 24% reported being neither happy nor sad. This was the highest reported level of happiness in the past 14 years, while in turn, the percentage of individuals who felt unhappy — which was at its lowest in 2017 — has only slightly increased since.

However, happiness varies with demographic and social variables.

The Caucasus Barometer data suggests that happiness decreases with age. Older individuals (55+) are 19 percentage points less likely than young people (18–34) and 16 percentage points less likely than people aged 35–54 to report feeling happy.

The data also demonstrates a positive correlation between wealth and happiness. Individuals in the fourth quartile of asset ownership are 15 percentage points more likely to report feeling happy compared to those in the bottom quartile.

The Caucasus Barometer also asked respondents about the importance of religion in their daily lives. According to the data, Georgians who consider religion ‘very important’ are eight percentage points more likely to report being happy compared to those who consider religion as only ‘rather important’ or ‘not important’.

Education level, ethnicity, employment status, and settlement type were not significant predictors of happiness in Georgia.

In addition, one’s reported political beliefs and the media a person consumes were notably not associated with happiness. Similarly, whether family members live abroad was not a significant predictor of happiness.

Instead, as the data makes clear, happiness in Georgia is associated with age, wealth, and religiosity, as younger people tend to report greater life satisfaction, wealthier individuals are significantly more likely to describe themselves as happy, and more religious individuals consistently report higher well-being.

Note: The data in this article comes from a series of regression models. The first contains the following demographic variables: gender (male, female), settlement type (capital, urban, rural), age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), ethnicity (Georgian, ethnic minority), employment status (employed, unemployed) and wealth (divided into quantiles). Subsequent models added whether or not respondents reported religion as very important or not (not at all important, not important, rather important) in their daily lives. The data used in this article is available here.

Do Armenians and Georgians support protests?

Note: This article first appeared on the Caucasus Data Blog, a joint effort of CRRC-Georgia and OC Media. This post was written by Tamar Uzunashvili, a Junior Fellow at CRRC Georgia. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily reflect the views of CRRC Georgia or any related entity.

According to data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey, a majority of Georgians support protests. In comparison, while over half of the Armenian population is in favour of protests, support has been on the decline since 2019.

Protests in the South Caucasus have intensified recently, particularly in Georgia, where demonstrations have surged since the ruling Georgian Dream party first introduced the controversial Foreign Agent Law in 2023. Over the past year in Georgia, protests have occurred almost daily, particularly since the government’s November 2024 announcement that it was halting the country’s EU accession bid.  Similarly, Armenia has witnessed significant protests between 2017 and 2024, driven by political revolution and war.

Data from the Caucasus Barometer Survey shows that until 2021, public support for protest participation was consistently higher in Armenia than in Georgia. In 2021, attitudes were similar, but in 2024, more people in Georgia believed that people should participate in protests than those in Armenia.

In Georgia, support for protest participation declined between 2008 and 2011. In 2012, it surged by 22 points, with data collection taking place after prison abuse scandals — which showed the humiliation, torture, and inhumane treatment of prisoners — and parliamentary elections that year. In subsequent years, attitudes slowly rose and reached a stable point in 2017, after which there has been little change in attitudes.

In Armenia, support fluctuated between 2008 and 2012 and then stabilised between 2013 and 2019. Since then, however, support has decreased sharply, falling to 50% in 2024 from 71% in 2019.

A regression analysis of 2024 data demonstrates that attitudes vary among different social and demographic groups.

Gender and education were significant predictors of supporting protest in Armenia. Men were more likely than women to have a positive attitude towards participating in protests by 16 percentage points.

People with tertiary education were 22 percentage points more likely to support protest participation compared to those with secondary or lower education, and 10 percentage points more likely to support protests than individuals with secondary technical education.

People in Yerevan were more likely to support participation in a protest than people who live in rural or urban areas, where the probability of supporting protests was almost equal.

In Armenia, younger people (18–34) were more likely to support protests than older people (55+).

Wealth, partisanship, and employment did not predict attitudes in Armenia.

In Georgia, the data shows that people were more likely to support protests than oppose them across settlement types. At the same time, individuals who live in the capital were more likely to have positive attitudes toward protests than people in other urban or rural areas.

The data also varied across age groups, with young people (18–34) being substantially more likely to support protests than those who are 55 and older.

Those who support Georgian Dream were less likely to have a positive attitude toward protests than individuals who do not support any political party. People who support the opposition and those who refused to report which party they support had similar attitudes to individuals who did not support any party.

Employment was also a factor, with employed individuals more likely to support protest participation than those who were not employed.

Gender and wealth were not associated with attitudes towards protests in Georgia.

Support for protests is generally high in both Georgia and Armenia, though on the decline in Armenia. Across both countries, younger people are more inclined to support protests.

The analysis in this article makes use of logistic regression analysis. The analysis includes gender (male and female), settlement type (capital, urban, and rural), age group (18–34, 35–54, and 55+), education (secondary and lower, secondary technical, and higher than secondary), a wealth index (0–13), employment (employed and unemployed) and partisanship (no party, Georgian Dream, opposition, and refused to answer) as predictor variables.