Tracking "CRRC" on the Web | Google Alerts

In the spirit of being data-driven, we try to track when and how people refer to our work on the Internet. The simplest tool for this is Google Alerts, from which we receive the weekly update on some of the main terms that are associated with our work.

One term that has NOT proven useful in this is "CRRC". As it turns out, a number of organizations use this acronym. There is, for example, the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University, which itself is the center for professional military education in the United States. That CRRC says that its "mission is to facilitate the use of captured records to support research, both within and outside the government."

Next to keeping Saddam Hussein's records, CRRC also serves more basic tasks, such as keeping your roof from getting too hot.

This CRRC says that it "maintains a third-party rating system for radiative properties of roof surfacing materials." It's based in California, and has been rating roofs since 1998. We would like to think that this CRRC also is about numbers. Similarly in California is a CRRC that at first sounds as if it's dedicated to recycling. Actually, it's an association of companies in the waste industry, and, as such associations do, both serves their members with services, and lobbies on their behalf. Started in 1958, it's been around for a while.

And then there's another American association. Austere in its Internet design and logo, it also holds the www.crrc.org address. Since they had that .org domain, we had to get a much longer Web address way back when. Based in New Jersey, the Citizen's Rifle and Revolver Club is the oldest CRRC we could identify, and was started in 1938.

Between centers, councils, clubs and industry associations, we also found a more cuddly version of CRRC, this one in the United Kingdom.

If you are a lost rabbit, that is where you most likely would want to find yourself. As the website says:

"Our long term Rabbit residents enjoy the freedom of quiet, purpose built, predator proof enclosures to roam as they wish. [...] They have the chance to wash each other, and play, and spend a lot of time in rows next to each other just watching the world go by."

That doesn't sound like what we do everyday, but it's a nice group to share the search term "CRRC" with.

Any search terms you try to keep track off? Try Google Alerts by clicking here.

ODA Keyword Search

Most CRRC users know about our Online Data Analysis tool, ODA. It is easy to use, continues to be popular, and in less than a year we have had nearly 70.000 charts generated.

What is less well known, as we realized from questions we received, is that ODA also has a useful keyword search, in case you want to find particular pieces of data. Let's say you are interested in Georgian attitudes to the Chinese:

Select the dataset (1), go to Codebook and Keywords (2), and then enter your word (3). In the screenshot here, you already see the results. Note, as highlighted in pink, that we still have occasional typos (marring). These constitute less than 1% of the questions, but yep, the tool is not perfect yet, and you may want to try out different keywords. If you notice a spelling mistake, please leave a comment below.

At any rate, keyword search should further expand the usability of our Online Data Analysis for you, which is why we wanted to let you know about it. Try it out by clicking here on ODA.

Social Capital in Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD)

We have previously worked on social capital, and this issue recently was taken up by the Caucasus Anylatical Digest. The issue discusses the concept of social capital and its relevance to the societies of the South Caucasus.

The author of the first article, Leslie Hough, argues that in contrast to previous perceptions that Georgia is a country with high "bonding" social capital and low "bridging" social capital, in-group solidarity and out-group mistrust, there are in fact vibrant forms of bridging social capital in Georgia; the challenge is the institutionalization of these informal forms of social capital and the alignment of the civil society sector with population's existing priorities and habits. The second article, by Jenny Paturyan, formerly with CRRC, focuses on the low level of social trust in Armenia and its effects on voting behavior and emigration, while the last article, by Anar Valiyev, analyses social capital in Azerbaijan, with the author positing that there is a relatively high level of bonding social capital and correspondingly little bridging social capital in the country, which hinders the development of grass-roots democracy and decreases voter turnout in elections.

All three articles draw on CRRC data, and there are a number of tables highlighting the main aspects of social capital. While we know the authors well, and thus almost feel a bit sheepish in recommending their work, the articles do summarize broad research in accessible style, thus well worth reading. Find the articles here.

Leaving Thoughts by British Political Officer in Georgia

David Gale, who had served as Political Officer at the British Embassy since 2007, recently wrote down some of his thoughts upon leaving Georgia, after covering a turbulent time. It was refreshing to read a direct and evenhanded take on a number of issues, from a diplomat who has been following events very closely.

One aspect we especially liked in David's reflections is that he repeatedly highlights polling, as a way of understanding the preferences of the Georgian electorate. To read David's thoughts click here.

Fatalism and Political Perceptions in Georgia

Widespread apathy and a general disbelief that good can come from joint effort is a major factor hindering social capital in Georgia. One indicator of apathy can be fatalism, meaning the belief that all events are predetermined and therefore inevitable. This blog explores the level of political fatalism in Georgia and how it is connected to Georgians’ perceptions of the country’s current political course and democracy. Many Georgians have fatalistic attitudes about their ability to influence political decisions (or are unsure), and this type of political fatalism is associated with perceptions of democracy and political course.

In March 2011 CRRC, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), conducted the sixth wave of a survey on voting and public attitudes in Georgia. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they felt they could influence political decisions affecting their lives on a five-point scale. The results show that most Georgians are either unsure or do not feel they can influence political decisions that affect their lives.

How does this fatalistic attitude affect the way Georgians think about politics? The answer may not be straightforward, but as further analysis suggests there are some trends worth exploring. For example, people who do not feel they can influence political decisions that affect their lives tend to believe Georgian politics is going in the wrong direction. 

Note: The original five-point scale is collapsed to a three-point scale by merging strongly agree and agree, and strongly disagree and disagree responses.

There are slight, yet consistent differences between these groups. 35% of Georgians who think that they cannot influence political decisions that affect their lives also believe that Georgia is going in the right direction. However, 48% of those who think they can influence political decisions that affect their lives believe Georgia is going in the right direction. The latter are also less likely to believe that Georgia is going in the wrong direction compared to political fatalists. 

Georgians who demonstrate fatalism with respect to the political sphere are also more likely to believe that Georgia is not a democracy.

The data shows that 47% of Georgians who think that they can influence political decisions consider Georgia to be a democracy. In contrast, 37% of those who think they cannot influence political decisions consider Georgia to be a democracy (50% say it is not a democracy).

Thus, the results indicate that many people in Georgia have fatalistic attitudes towards their ability to influence political decisions (or are unsure), and that this type of political fatalism is associated with perceptions of democracy and political course. Whether this type of political fatalism affects Georgians’ political perceptions or Georgians’ perceptions of political situations encourage fatalism is a topic for further discussion.

BBC on Gender Roles in the Caucasus | CRRC Data

BBC's Damien McGuinness recently did a short report on gender roles in Georgia. The report used some CRRC data. Click here for the audio piece. The segment on Georgia starts at about 4:30, and our data is cited at 5:45.

You find the link to the report, written by Mariam Naskidashvili, itself here.

The French Senate Bill and Armenian Perceptions on Turkey

As the New York Times reports, on January 23, 2012 the French Senate “approved a bill […] criminalizing the denial of officially recognized genocides, including the Armenian genocide begun in 1915.” The bill has fanned tensions between Turkey and France, emphasizing the complexities of politics and perceptions. Turkish immigrants and French citizens of Turkish origin in Paris, as well as Turks in Ankara and in Istanbul have protested against the bill. Publicity has emphasized Turkey’s objections to the bill as well as the country’s perspective on the events of 1915.

Less attention has been given to the country and population of Armenia itself, leaving many questions unanswered. What does this mean for the future of Armenia-Turkey relations, as well as popular perceptions in these countries? And what are these perceptions to start out with? The 2010 CB asked Armenians how they think the population of Turkey perceives both the country of Armenia and its population. These set of questions were exclusively asked in Armenia and pertain to the population and country of Armenia, rather than the perceptions of Armenians throughout the world or in Turkey. When asked, “Please tell me, in your opinion, how negative or how positive is the population of Turkey's general attitude towards Armenians?” 62% of Armenians felt Turkey’s population had a negative attitude towards Armenians. 17% of Armenians felt Turkey’s population had a generally positive attitude towards Armenians.

Similarly, people were asked, “In your opinion, how negative or how positive is the population of Turkey's general attitude towards the country of Armenia?” More than half of the population (69%) of Armenia felt that Turkey’s population had a negative attitude towards Armenia and 9% thought Turkey’s population had a positive view of Armenia.

Recent politics has highlighted the historical events, while perceptions guide interactions. However, the data has shown that in some instances economic factors overshadow politics and perceptions. This is emphasized by 2010 CB data that shows a willingness on the part of Armenians to conduct business with Turks despite what they perceive to be Turkish discontent towards Armenians and Armenia. In response to the question, ‘Would you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with Turks?’ 45% of Armenians said they approved of conducting business with Turks while 53% said they did not approve.

The data indicates more negative perceptions of Turkish attitudes towards Armenia and Armenians than positive. Yet, almost half of the adult population of Armenia is willing to conduct business with Turks. This could prove to be a mediating factor between the two countries. The economic benefits of trade with Turkey as perceived by Armenians are presented in a previous blog, “Armenian attitudes towards opening the border with Turkey”. But what impact will the new bill have on the future of political, social and economic relationships between Turkey and Armenia? Will it alter Armenian-Turkish public perceptions?

Georgian Attitudes to Judicial Independence | EWMI JILEP report

Recently we undertook extensive research into judicial independence in Georgia for EWMI. This is what EWMI just put up on the website:

On January 24, 2012 CRRC presented a study entitled, “Attitudes towards the Judicial System in Georgia.” The study was supported by the Judicial Independence and Legal Empowerment Project (JILEP), implemented by the East West Management Institute (EWMI) and funded by USAID.

Since 2003, much has been done to reform the Georgian judicial system including the establishment of a High School of Justice, restructuring of the High Council of Justice, and major changes in the makeup of the judiciary and prosecutor’s office. However, these successes have been accompanied by serious concerns, particularly regarding judicial independence. International organizations from the Council of Europe to the US State Department have urged further reform of the system.

Relatively little research has been conducted to ascertain how Georgians themselves feel about their judicial system. It is with this in mind, that the East West Management Institute engaged the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), to undertake a comprehensive study of public attitudes toward the judicial system. CRRC employed a methodology that included citizen surveys, focus groups, and interviews which resulted in robust findings grounded in both quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

Representatives of the Georgian judiciary, non-governmental and international organizations working in the area of rule of law attended the presentation.

The link to the article is here. And find the report, which we tried to keep crisp and accessible while also rich in nuance and detail, by clicking here.

EU Survey Report Released: Knowledge and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia

On January 16, 2012 the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and CRRC presented a report entitled “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the European Union in Georgia” based on nationwide surveys conducted in Georgia by CRRC in 2009 and 2011. The 2009 survey was the first comprehensive study of Georgian attitudes towards the European Union. Koba Turmanidze, Country Director of CRRC-Georgia presented the report. Following the presentation, a panel of representatives from the EU Delegation, including Boris Iarochevitch and Oliver Reisner, the Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany--Ortwin Hennig, and Dr. Kakha Gogolashvili--Director of Center for EU Studies at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) gave commentary on the data and its potential implications for the Georgia-EU relationship.

The data reveals that a majority of Georgians (80%) support Georgia joining the EU. As described in the report, support for Georgia’s membership in the EU has increased over time, but so too has support for EU membership for all other Eastern Partnership countries, as well as Turkey and Russia. While support for membership is high, knowledge of what exactly membership entails and the overall functions of the EU can be strengthened.

As noted by the panel, the findings of the report imply that Georgia is moving in the right direction for EU membership in several areas. Georgians’ support is compatible with the objectives of membership; however, there are many areas that need to be improved. Representatives from the EU delegation suggested increasing efforts to educate Georgians about collaborative efforts between Georgia and the EU. Overall, the report indicates a positive relationship with the EU and has generated enthusiasm among scholars and politicians alike.

Those interested in learning more about the study can access the datasets at CRRC’s Online Data Analysis (ODA) webpage. The report is also available in English and Georgian on CRRC’s website.

Democracy in Georgia

In the wake of Russian protests for free and fair elections— one of the hallmarks of democracy— the international community has again turned its attention on democratization in the post-Soviet region. Democracy, in its various forms, represents something different to everyone. So what does it mean for Georgians? Do Georgians consider Georgia to be a democratic state in its present form? What are their perceptions of democracy? CRRC, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute-Georgia, conducted a repeated survey on public attitudes in Georgia from November 2008 to September 2011 in which respondents were asked a series of questions about democracy. Survey results show that just under half of the population considers Georgia to be a democracy. Also, most Georgians associate democracy with liberty, freedom of speech, media and expression, rather than government accountability and free and fair elections.

From April 2010 to September 2011, Georgians were asked ‘Is Georgia a democracy now’? The figure below shows that since July 2010 there has been a steady increase in the percentage of Georgians who believe Georgia is a democracy with 45% believing so in September 2011.

When asked to gauge the extent of Georgia’s transition to democracy in the September 2011 survey, 39% of Georgians said ‘Georgia is already a democracy but still needs improvement’, while 28% said Georgia is not a democracy, but is moving in that direction. In contrast, only 5% of Georgians believe Georgia is not and will never be a democracy.

Thus, the data shows that just under half of the population (45%) considers Georgia to be a democracy, and many people believe Georgia is either already a democracy that needs improvement or is not yet a democracy but is still developing in that direction. But what does democracy mean to Georgians? The 2011 survey asked, ‘What does democracy mean to you?’ 47% of Georgians interpret democracy to mean freedom of speech/media/hearing different views. 42% associate democracy with liberty and 40% say equality before the law/protection of justice. In contrast, only 7% say government accountability and 16% think democracy means free and fair elections. The results elicit a strong difference in the Georgian interpretation of democracy which prizes liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views above free and fair elections.

Respondents were allowed to provide their own responses. The percentages do not add to 100% because respondents could name up to three items.

Thus, survey data tells us that the percentage of Georgians who think Georgia is a democracy is increasing over time, that there is room for improvement, and that the concept of democracy is more associated with liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views, than government accountability and free and fair elections. This is important in light of recent global events in which ordinary citizens have begun to challenge their state systems and certain features of their democracy.

How do you think Georgia fairs on its path to democracy? Has Georgia reached its goal or is there still room for improvement?

Boy or Girl? Child Gender Preference in the South Caucasus

Survey data shows that there is a strong preference for male children over female children throughout the South Caucasus. As mentioned in the March 4, 2010 edition of The Economist, after 1991 there has been an increase in the ratio of boys to girls in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The sex ratio rose from 103-106 boys to 100 girls in 1991 to 115-120 boys to 100 girls by 2000. The 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB) indicates that gender preferences in the South Caucasus remain skewed in favor of males with 54% of Armenians, 27% of Azerbaijanis and 46% of Georgians prefer to have male children if given a choice.

The 2010 CB asked people living in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia the following question—“If a family has one child, what would be the preferred gender of the child?” The answers were unprompted as respondents were not given a list of possible responses such as “girl”, “boy” or “it does not matter”. Overall, Armenians and Georgians prefer boys to girls while more than half of Azerbaijanis claim gender “does not matter”.

The preference for male children holds when the data is split by male and female respondents. Results from Armenia show the highest preference for a male child with 59% of men and 50% of women who prefer a boy, compared to 5% of men and 14% of women who prefer a girl. In Georgia 57% of men and 36% of women prefer a boy and 5% of men and 12% of women prefer a girl. In Azerbaijan 60%-68% of men and women say the sex of the child ‘does not matter’.

When sliced by settlement type (capital, urban and rural), the data shows that rural inhabitants in all three countries prefer male children over female children. 57% of the rural Georgian population prefers boys and this figure is 71% in Armenia. Azerbaijan, on the other hand continues the trend of perceived impartiality with 32% of rural respondents preferring boys.

Despite a relatively high percentage of claims that gender “does not matter” in the three countries, there is a low percentage of individuals whose overall preference is for a girl. On the whole, Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians are more inclined to say they prefer boys or that it “does not matter”, rather than say they prefer girls. For example, in Azerbaijan—the country with the highest percentage of claims that gender “does not matter”—only 9% of the adult population prefers girls. This trend is similar in Georgia and Armenia in which there is a 9-10% preference for girls. Thus, the data shows that there is a strong preference for male children over female children in the South Caucasus.

Why do you think this is the case?

Can a Cut NATO Supply Route Through Russia Benefit Georgia and Azerbaijan?

The 20th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is upon us, and US-Russian tensions have risen as Russia contemplates terminating the NATO supply route through Russia. International news reports such as The New York Times detail the threat as a “death blow” to the U.S.-led NATO mission in Afghanistan and indicate that this could be a blessing in disguise for NATO hopeful Georgia, as well as for Azerbaijan.

NATO has two main transportation routes via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which connects Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus: the NDN North and NDN South. The NDN North transit route initiates in Latvia, crosses through Russian territory and enters Afghanistan via the Afghan-Uzbek border. The potential blessing for Georgia and Azerbaijan lies in NATO’s NDN South transit route that spans from the port of Poti in Georgia to the Afghan-Uzbek border. The potential termination of the NDN North route leaves the NDN South route as a viable alternative. The NDN South route currently facilitates the transportation of 30% of the U.S.-NATO supplies to Afghanistan, as reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Should Russia close its borders to NATO, and the NDN North route cease to function, this could provide an opportunity for economic diversification in the way of transit fees for Georgia and Azerbaijan. This move could also open trade possibilities between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, as well as add leverage for future NATO membership.

Map from Google Earth. Courtesy of CSIS

Therefore, the issues at hand are two-fold. Are Georgia and Azerbaijan willing or prepared for further commitments to the NDN South transit route? What implications does this have for both the future of Georgian and Azerbaijani NATO membership as well as commercial trade?

First, CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB), shows that NATO membership is supported (fully and somewhat) by 70% of the Georgian population. Support for NATO membership is less in Azerbaijan where 44% of the population is supportive (fully and somewhat) (See the previous post by Nikola for more details). Thus, increased use of the NDN South route could generate an opportunity to demonstrate further interests in NATO membership. Based on public support for NATO membership, more use of the NDN South route could be welcomed.

Second, more traffic through the NDN South route could economically benefit Georgia and Azerbaijan. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) shows that trade in commercial services (including transport) is a growing industry in Georgia. As indicated below, Georgia has seen an increase from 2009 to 2010 in import and export transportation (excluding government services). Azerbaijan has seen a slight decline in export transportation, but an increase in import transportation.

Data retrieved from WTO website

Thus, Georgia and Azerbaijan could benefit at least economically if Russia decides to cut off the NDN North transit route.

Labor Migration Article | Zvezda Dermendzhieva

In a recent article in Post-Communist Economies, Zvezda Dermendzhieva uses Caucasus Barometer data to compare labour migration from the South Caucasus.

We found one of the more remarkable results to be that "while individuals with higher education are not more likely to become migrants in general, having higher education is associated with up to four times higher probability of migration to a high-income OECD country among Armenians and Georgians. The results are in line with theoretical arguments that skill distribution and returns to education in the host country relative to the home country affect the selection of migrants, and that the cost of migration plays an important role in the migration decision."

Zvezda Dermendzhieva also suggests that migration indirectly contributes to economic development by raising local incomes in demand. In the same vein, she finds "a significant correlation between having a migrant and running a family business in Armenia, which suggests that migrants' earnings can provide scarce capital for business investment and support the development of the private sector in the region."

Interested in finding out more? Check the online abstract here.

Graduation Ceremony for the Junior Fellowship Program in Azerbaijan

On October 15, 2011, CRRC-Azerbaijan organized a conference recognizing the completion of its first Junior Research Fellowship Program (JRFP). The conference featured five presentations of individual research projects by the winners of the JRFP essay contest, as well as information about the general activities of CRRC-Azerbaijan office followed by an award ceremony and lunch. More than 30 invitees attended the event, representing civil society, academia, governmental agencies, and international organizations.

The JRFP aimed at building the social science research capacity among students or recent graduates in Azerbaijan. Competitively-selected program participants participated in a three-stage set of intensive trainings on qualitative and quantitative research methods, including introduction to policy analysis and public policy paper writing. The presenters demonstrated their learned skills and research findings at the conference.

(From the left: Gursel Aliyev, Robia Charles, Aynur Ramazanova, Yulia Aliyeva)

During the award presentation ceremony, the top three finalists - Aynur Ramazanova, Nargiz Guliyeva and Shabnam Agayeva - were presented with notebooks. The fourth and fifth finalists--Aysel Aliyeva and Vladimir Rodin - received netbooks. All other participants of the third stage of the program received certificates of participation.

The Junior Research Fellowship Program was generously supported by the OSI Think Tank Fund, Budapest.

Armenian Corruption Survey Retrospective | still relevant

The Mobilizing Action Against Corruption (MAAC) effort in Armenia, led by Casals, has come to an end. We undertook four surveys for this USAID project, three household surveys and one business survey. Unfortunately it proved impossible to do a survey among civil servants. The surveys showed that Armenia made practically no progress against corruption, over the three years.

An overwhelming amount of Armenians believed that corruption is a serious problem, and there was only limited change on the fringes.

The data remains available for analysis, and we believe that it continues to be important. There is a final legacy report that Casals published, accessible here.

To find the data sets, and the corruption reports, click here.

A Further Look at Material Deprivation

Continuing to explore standards of living in the South Caucasus, this blog looks at the between four sources of household income and material deprivation using data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer. Each of the four sources of income (salaries, pensions or government transfers, sales from agricultural goods, and remittances) are categorized by their importance to the household and then cross tabulated with material deprivation. The findings suggest that families reliant on salaries and remittances are better off, while families receiving pensions and government transfers, or those who sell agricultural products as their primary source of income have higher than average rates of material deprivation.

Salaries and pensions/government transfers are by far the most important sources of income, mentioned by around 50% of people in all three countries. Agriculture is mentioned as an income source by over 25% of respondents in Azerbaijan and Georgia, but is reported by only 17% of Armenians, where remittances are the third most common source of income. Twenty percent of Armenians and 17% of Georgians report income from remittances, but family transfers are relatively rare in Azerbaijan, with fewer than 7% reporting receiving remittances.

Chart 1

In the South Caucasus as a whole, people who list salaries as their household’s primary source of income have half the average material deprivation rate of 32%. By taking the ratio of the average rate of material deprivation (blue bar) and the material deprivation rate for salaries as the primary source of income (red bar), Chart 2 shows that households primarily relying on salaries for income have less than half (44%) the average material deprivation rate in Armenia. This figure is 52% of the average material deprivation rate in Georgia, and 63% of the average material deprivation rate in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, households in the South Caucasus that did not report salaries as an income source are 1.4 times as likely to be materially deprived.

Chart 2

Pensions and government transfers are the second most important source of income in the South Caucasus. Chart 3 shows that households where government transfers are the primary source of income have more than 1.5 times the average rate of material deprivation, while those where pensions and government transfers are the second source of income have three-fourths the average rate of material deprivation. This suggests that government transfers throughout the South Caucasus are not large enough to live without poverty, but can effectively supplement a main income. The trend is most extreme in Armenia where households relying on the government for their primary source of income are over two times as likely to be materially deprived, while households where government funds are a secondary source of income have three-fifths the average rate of material deprivation. In Azerbaijan, government transfers have a much weaker correlation with material deprivation. In fact, data from graphs 2 and 3 shows that households receiving government transfers as their primary source of income are twice as likely to be materially deprived as households dependent on salaries in Azerbaijan, three times as likely in Georgia, and five times as likely in Armenia.

Chart 3

As chart 4 shows, income from sales of agricultural products is correlated with higher material deprivation rates across the South Caucasus, supporting previous findings showing that material deprivation is concentrated in rural areas. Armenia has the lowest percentage of households reporting income from the sale of agricultural goods, and also the smallest changes in material deprivation based on income from agriculture. Georgian households dependent on agriculture for either their primary or secondary source of funding are around 1.4 times more likely to be materially deprived than the country average, while Azerbaijani households are almost 1.8 times as likely. In Armenia and Georgia, relying on pensions and government transfers is the strongest indicator of material deprivation, while in Azerbaijan it is dependence on sales from agricultural products.

Chart 4

Only 13% of respondents in the South Caucasus report receiving money from remittances, but chart 5 shows that households most reliant on remittances are less likely to be materially deprived. The trend is especially strong in Georgia, where households dependent on remittances as the primary source of income have 58% of the country’s average material deprivation rate.

Chart 5

Although overall trends are consistent across all three South Caucasus countries, the importance of each income source on standard of living varies rather widely. Material deprivation in Azerbaijan seems to reflect a large divide between urban and rural areas, with family transfers, salaries, and government transfers much less strongly correlated to changes in material deprivation than in Georgia or Armenia. In Georgia more people mention government transfers than salaries as an income source, and for those reliant on state transfers, the material deprivation rate is over 70%. Although Armenia has by far the lowest material deprivation rate, at under 19%, it has a huge disparity between households with salaries as their primary source of income and households dependent on government transfers.

Gender | How Does the South Caucasus Compare?

CRRC’s report “How Does the South Caucasus Compare?” aims to put attitudes towards gender in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the three countries of the South Caucasus region, into a global context. Comparing data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2010 with that of the CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB), the report shows that on several crucial questions of gender equality, there are significant cleavages between the South Caucasus neighbors.

To read how Caucasian gender attitudes compare, click here.

Fancy Living Abroad? 39% of Young Armenians Say "Preferably Forever"

Last year, Ani Navasardyan asked, “Why do so many Armenians leave Armenia?” Migration is also an issue in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Data from the CB 2010 reveals that around half of the respondents in Georgia (47%) and Azerbaijan (52%) are interested in temporary migration. Still, Armenia stands out since 64% of the adult population is open to the idea of temporarily leaving the country.

With regard to permanent migration, only 7% of Georgians are interested in leaving the country, compared to 17% of Azerbaijanis and 29% of Armenians who say that they would be interested in leaving their country for good.

The analysis by age group shows that younger people in all 3 countries prefer to migrate temporarily. Three out of four young Armenians (77%) between the ages of 18 to 35 are interested in going abroad temporarily. Equally striking, in its own way, is that many people 56 years and older would leave (38%). In Azerbaijan and Georgia too, interest in temporary migration declines with age. Interestingly, young and middle aged Georgians show a similar interest in temporary migration with affirmation rates of 58% and 52%, respectively.

When looking at the interest in permanent migration by age category, there is also a trend where younger people have more of a desire permanently migrate abroad. Georgia has the lowest percentage of young people (9%) who are interested in permanent migration. There are more than twice as many young Azerbaijanis (24%) who would leave permanently, and more than four times as many young Armenians (39%).

If you are interested in slicing CRRC's data on migration by gender, settlement type, income, knowledge of English or other aspects, we welcome you to analyze our data online.

Armenian attitudes towards opening the border with Turkey

During the 20th anniversary of Armenian independence from the Soviet Union on September 21, 2011, the Armenian news service Hetq reported that the organizers of celebratory events were delivering commemorative T-shirts made in Turkey – which has had closed borders with Armenia since 1993. Despite the fact that trade between Armenia and Turkey flourishes via Georgia, the border between the two countries remains closed. What does the population of Armenia actually think about opening the border with Turkey?

While a majority of Armenians do not support opening the border with Turkey without preconditions and think that opening the border may be harmful for both Armenia’s internal political processes and national security, a large proportion of the Armenian population thinks that opening the border will be beneficial for the Armenian economy.

Data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer shows that 50% of Armenians do not support the Armenian government opening the border with Turkey without preconditions, while 34% support this action.

In addition, there is a significant difference in opinions on how opening the border with Turkey will affect internal political processes and national security in Armenia. 44% of Armenians think it may be harmful for internal political processes in Armenia, while only 12% see opening the border as beneficial. Moreover, more than half (58%) of the adult Armenian population thinks that opening the borders will have a harmful effect on Armenian national security, in contrast to only 7% who think this will be beneficial.

Unlike internal political processes and national security, 49% of Armenians think that opening the borders with Turkey will be beneficial for Armenian economy. This is 17% more than those who claim opening the border will be harmful.

Similarly, 45% of Armenians approve doing business with Turks (CB 2010). Thus, while there is still a perception of potential threat from Turkey for the internal political processes and national security of Armenia, economic expectations raise the amount support for opening the border between Armenia and Turkey.

For more information, check out the CB 2010 dataset for Armenia which is available online.

Class in the Caucasus | Article by Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock

Using data from the Caucasus Barometer, Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock argue that "in economic and socio-political terms there are as yet just two real classes among actual and potential employees in the South Caucasus – middle classes and lower classes – and that although these classes differ in their standards of living and political dispositions, these are unlikely to become bases for conflict between them."

Interested in more detail? Check the abstract online.