Georgia and Russia: Can positive relations between the populations overcome the political turmoil?

On the third anniversary of the 2008 August war the Russian Foreign Minister said that Russia will not renew ties with Georgia as long as the Georgian President Mikhail Saakhashvili is in power. Relations between the Georgian and Russian governments have been at a standstill since the conflict in 2008. Nevertheless, the attitudes of Georgians towards Russians remain positive.

While relations between the Georgian and Russian governments can be described as troublesome, Georgians remain positive towards the Russian people. According to the Caucasus Barometer 2010, 73% of Georgians approve of doing business with Russians, compared with 79% who approve of doing business with Ukrainians (the highest rated result for this question). Moreover, 42% of Georgians approve of Georgian women marrying Russians which was the second highest rated result for this question after Ukrainians (45%). In addition, data from the Caucasus Barometer suggests that people who have a better knowledge of Russian are more likely to approve of Georgian women marrying Russians. The data also shows that 90% of Georgians think they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of Russian, while 32% think they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of English.

Socio-cultural characteristics such as a sizeable Georgian diaspora in Russia and Orthodox religion may also play a role in the positive perception of Russians by Georgians. The Georgian Ministry of the Diaspora estimates that the number of Georgians residing in Russia varies between 800,000-900,000 people. Also, the strong role of religion in Georgian society might help to explain positive attitudes towards Russians. Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) are good. For example, the ROC recognizes the canonical authority of the GOC over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as was confirmed by both patriarchs during their August 2011 meeting in Kiev to commemorate St. Vladimir Equal-to-the-Apostles the Baptizer of Russia.

Nevertheless, positive attitudes towards the Russian people do not influence Georgia’s predominant pro-Western orientation. According to the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, 70% of Georgians support membership in NATO and 71% think that English should be a mandatory language in schools, while only 16% think that Russian should be a mandatory language in Georgian schools. Georgian-Russian political relations are also at odds with the different approaches towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi claims both territories as an integral part of Georgia, while Moscow has recognized their independence.

Georgians have positive attitudes towards the Russian people despite political turmoil between the Georgian and Russian governments. We do not have data on Russian attitudes towards Georgian people. However, do you think that positive attitudes between people could pave the way to a Georgian-Russian rapprochement?

Intermarriage in the South Caucasus

As a continuation of the blog, Forbidden Love: Attitudes Toward Interethnic Marriage in the South Caucasus, this blog focuses only on approval/disapproval rates and the socio-cultural preferences of women marrying men from different ethnic and national groups.

According to the 1996-1997 World Value Survey, 98% of both Azerbaijanis and Armenians and 99% of Georgians considered the family to be important in their lives. Marriage can be viewed as an important step towards the formation of families and the family itself can have an important impact on individual identity formation.

Data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer shows that 54% of Azerbaijanis approve of an Azerbaijani woman marrying a Turkish man and this was the highest rated result for the question. Similar Turkic identity and linguistic similarity between the nations may be part of the reason behind this. Azerbaijanis have much lower levels of approval for marriage with other groups, ranging from 74% disapproval of marriage with Iranians to 98% disapproval of marriage with Armenians.

While there is more disapproval than approval of intermarriage in all three countries of the South Caucasus, Georgians expressed higher rates of approval towards intermarriage than Azerbaijanis. 45% of Georgians approve of Georgian women marrying Ukrainian men, followed by the second and third highest approval rating for marriage with Russians (42%) and Greeks (41%), respectively. There are slightly lower levels of approval (between 39% and 35%) for marriages with Italians, Americans, Germans, Ossetians and Abkhazians. The highest rate of disapproval (between 77% and 80%) was for marriages with Iranians, Turkish, Indians, Kurds and Chinese. Analyzing these data, it is possible to notice that Georgians have the highest levels of approval for marriages with predominately Orthodox groups, while they show the highest levels of disapproval for marriages with some non-Christian groups. The strong role of the religion in Georgian society might explain preferences to marry with Orthodox and other Christian groups. For example, according to the CB 2010, 90% of Georgians consider religion to be important in their daily lives.

Armenians have lower levels of approval for intermarriage than Georgians, but they show more approval for such marriages than Azerbaijanis. Russians have the highest approval rate (49%) followed by Italians, Americans, Ukrainians, Germans and Greeks with slightly lower levels of approval ranging from 41% to 37%. The highest disapproval levels are for marriages with Kurds, Iranians, Turks and Azerbaijanis. Levels of approval/disapproval for Armenian women marrying other ethnicities may be influenced by political preferences. For example, both the Armenian government and Armenian people have positive attitudes towards Russia. Also, the fact that Armenians have more positive attitudes towards marriage with Russians than with other groups might include the fact that there is a large number of Armenians living in Russia (2,250,000 according to armeniandiaspora.com), and both knowledge and use of the Russian language is widespread in Armenia. The CB 2010 suggests that only 5% of Armenians have no basic knowledge of Russian.

This data show that attitudes towards intermarriage in the South Caucasus may be influenced by a variety of different factors in this diverse region. Thus, it is interesting to consider what roles factors such as religion, political alliances and ethnicity, among others, can play in marital preferences.

Material Deprivation in the South Caucasus

Material deprivation is a non-monetary measure of poverty which measures ownership of durable goods considered valuable by a society for a good standard of living. The CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer provides a limited assessment of material deprivation by measuring household ownership of nine durable goods in South Caucasian homes: TVs, DVD players, washing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners, cars, landline telephones, cell phones, and computers. The results indicate a great deal of variety in levels of material deprivation by country, but show that material deprivation is mostly prevalent within rural areas and among the poorly educated in the South Caucasus.

When the ownership of durable goods is defined as the possession of fewer than four of the nine items, 32% of the South Caucasus is materially deprived. Armenia has the lowest level of material deprivation at just under 19%, while Azerbaijan has a material deprivation rate of around 25%, and Georgia has a rate of 48%. When the definition of material deprivation is expanded to include households possessing fewer than five of the household items, the material deprivation rate increases dramatically to 38% in Armenia, 47% in Azerbaijan, 64% in Georgia, and to 51% in the entire South Caucasus.

Despite the percentile difference between the countries, living in a rural settlement and low education are similar characteristics shared by most materially deprived people throughout the South Caucasus.

In the South Caucasus as a whole, as well as within each state, the capital has the lowest rate of material deprivation, rural areas the highest, and urban non-capital areas lie in between. For example, in the South Caucasus as a whole, only 15% of capital inhabitants own fewer than four of the items, while this figure is 30% for urban non-capital areas and 47% for rural inhabitants. Georgia and Armenia’s material deprivation rate in the capital is half that of urban non-capital areas, and one third that of rural areas. In Azerbaijan the biggest gap in living standards is between rural and urban non-capital areas, rather than between the capital and urban areas. In all three countries the rate of material deprivation in rural areas is over three times that of the capital.

In addition to the high variance based on location, material deprivation is negatively correlated with the education level of the respondent. The material deprivation rate for people with only a primary education or less is over 50%, while it is only 16 % for people with completed higher education, and just 7% for those with post-graduate degrees. In fact, in Azerbaijan and Armenia, no survey respondents with post-graduate degrees and less than 8% of those with higher education are materially deprived. In Georgia, 15% of those with post-graduate degrees and 27% of those with completed higher education own fewer than four of the durable goods. However, these rates are still far below the country average of 47%.

In each country and in the region as a whole, the achievement of at least a secondary technical education is the threshold for a lower than average level of material deprivation. Despite some trend-defying findings such as the relatively low rate of durable good possession for those with no education in Armenia, the overall trend in the South Caucasus clearly shows that a higher level of educational achievement corresponds with a lower rate of material deprivation. Moreover, a failure to move past high school education is linked with a higher than average risk of living in a materially deprived household.

Upswing of Transition in Georgia

This past summer, Freedom House launched the 14th edition of its Nations in Transit (NIT) report. The publication comprehensively monitors democratic developments in 29 countries from Central Europe to Eurasia, amongst them Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. CRRC is represented in the report with data from the 2010 Corruption Survey in Armenia.

Each chapter of NIT assesses a country with regard to media independence, judicial framework fairness of jurisdiction, freedom of elections and levels of corruption. The overall analysis finds that the ever-growing tenures of authoritarian leaders in the former Soviet Union have contributed to a number of looming governance problems (e.g., including the inability to develop law-based systems or tackle corruption).

As for the South Caucasus, Freedom House reports a deteriorating situation for Azerbaijan and Armenia in the fields of democracy and local governance. The assessment for Georgia is more positive. The country improved its ratings in democracy, national governance, electoral processes and corruption. Yet, Georgia’s judiciary was marked down due to persisting inconsistencies in interpretation, enforcement of legislation, and inhumane conditions in detention facilities for example.

Rule of Law in Georgia - Opinions and Attitudes of the Population

As a part of the Caucasus Barometer Report Writing Competition held by CRRC in the spring of 2011, we would like to present the second report (the first report was published recently) written by Salome Tsereteli-Stephen. The report deals with the rule of law in Georgia and here is a short summary of Salome’s findings and an analysis of the subject.

Establishing a sustainable, law-based system of governance is central to Georgia’s aspirations of becoming a full-fledged member of the democratic family of nations. This goal is repeatedly held up by politicians of all stripes as essential to the country’s development.

According to data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, 47% of Georgians believe that the country is governed by the rule of law, with 27% disagree. While Georgians’ opinions are divided on whether the country is governed by the rule of law, there also seems to be confusion about what the rule of law actually entails. Thirty-eight percent of Georgians agree that the winner of elections is entitled to govern the country as he or she sees fit, with only 31% who disagree and a further 25% who said they did not know. This indicates a strong lack of awareness regarding the rule of law as a concept.

The full report available at the CRRC's website.

Engagement without recognition?

The Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts did not emerge in the 2008 August war. However, they escalated in the early 1990’s when both territories engaged in wars of secession and there are different approaches to the resolution of these conflicts. For the EU, these are regional issues with broad security implications. However, from the viewpoint of the Georgian government, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are primarily internal political issues. Tbilisi claims both territories as integral parts of Georgia even though it has not been exercising full control over either entity for several years.

Georgian public opinion supports government claims over these two territories. Data from CRRC’s 2009 survey entitled, “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU” in Georgia shows that territorial integrity was the most mentioned issue of significance for Georgia.

The question in this survey asked the respondents to name up to 3 most important issues facing Georgia without ranking. This methodology is different than that used in the Caucasus Barometer where respondents are asked to indicate the most important issue facing the country.

Moreover, 43% of Georgians mentioned the restoration of territorial integrity as an important issue with which the international community can help. For example, many Georgians believe that issues involving territorial integrity (65%) and national security (68%) will improve if Georgia joins EU. This is in light of the fact that 46% of Georgians expect a major military conflict with Russia in the next 5 years and 80% of Georgians consider joining NATO to be an important issue (CB 2010).

No approach to resolving these conflicts (e.g., neither the August war, nor isolation of both territories) has brought any resolution to date. With regard to the Abkhaz conflict specifically, data from the CB 2010 shows that ideas about what would be the most important activity to resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is split between 18% of Georgians who would like to see greater involvement by civil society, 18% who prefer the signing of a non use of force agreement with Abkhazia, and 20% of Georgians who don’t know what would be best.


In contrast to the Georgian view, the EU sees the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as regional issues with broader security implications, rather than as internal Georgian problems. Many academic circles in the EU and USA suggest a policy of “engagement without recognition” towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example, in the 2010 October edition of the Washington Quarterly, Lincoln Mitchell and Alexander Cooley wrote that “pledging enduring support for Georgia’s territorial integrity is somewhat meaningless” because the more both breakaway regions are pressured to choose between Tbilisi and Moscow, they will choose latter. According to them, the more these areas are isolated by the international community, the more likely they are to increase their dependence on Moscow. In addition, the European Union Institute for Security Studies suggests that the “engagement without recognition” policy might be beneficial for Georgia as well because it does not question Georgia’s territorial integrity, nor does it force Georgia to recognize the self-proclaimed independence of both regions.

How do you think Georgia should deal with its "breakaway" territories?

Which way to go?

Georgia in the European Union?

Three striking aspects of the Georgia-EU relationship are: 1) Georgian’s overwhelming desire for EU membership, 2) large differences in attitudes on social values between Georgia and the EU, and 3) lack of consensus as to whether or not Georgia belongs to Europe, Asia or “Eurasia”. Data from CRRC’s 2009 survey entitled, “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU” in Georgia shows that Georgians are overwhelmingly enthusiastic about EU membership. In fact, Georgians are more keen on EU membership than the Western Balkan states and Turkey, even though the latter two are more serious candidates for the next wave of enlargement.

Data from a poll conducted by the Italian Foundation, Compagnia di San Paolo and the German Marshal Fund show that Turkish public support for joining the EU dropped from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010. Support for EU membership in Croatia is 56% and 53% in Serbia. In contrast, 79% of Georgians in 2009 would vote for EU membership and 61% think it is very important for the Georgian government to strengthen ties with the EU. In addition, about a third of the population believe that Georgia will be prepared to join the EU in less than 5 years, while one fifth answered in 5-10 years. The opinions on if Georgia will actually join the European Union in less than 5 years or in 5-10 years period are almost the same.

However, data from the 2008 World Values Survey in Georgia shows that the country is divided by this EU aspiration and opinions on social values—many of which are at odds with social values in EU societies. For example, trust in religious institutions is much higher in Georgia (95%) relative to EU member states (19% EU average). A higher percentage of Georgians specifically would not want a neighbor who is HIV+ (40%) or a homosexual (87%) compared to the EU average of 17% and 20% who say the same on each question, respectively. Also, 50% of Georgians think that their way of life needs protection against European influences (CB 2009).

Another important question is whether Georgia can be defined as a European country. 54% of Georgians agree with the statement that “I am Georgian and therefore I am European” (CRRC’s 2009 EU survey) However, there is still tension around defining Georgia as a European country, not least because of its location east of Turkey. Vallery Giscard d’Estaing mentioned that Turkey is a non European state because its capital lies in Asia and 95% of its population lives outside of Europe. If Ankara is in Asia, then how is possible to recognize Tbilisi as a European capital when it lies further to the East? It is difficult to speak about the prospect of EU integration in the South Caucasus without the integration of Turkey. It might be unrealistic to expect a map of the EU in which there is a huge gap for Turkey and the inclusion of a small Caucasian country. This may be one reason why 52% of Georgians think Turkey should become a member of the EU (CRRC’s 2009 EU survey).

Europe or Asia?

Besides EU aspirations, differences on social values and geographic and cultural identity, the current economic and financial crisis might impact Georgian attitudes towards the EU. The EU has been a symbol of wealth, liberal policies and open society for many years. However, the bailouts in Greece, Portugual and Ireland, as well as severe financial crises in Spain and Italy make the EU seem less attractive. In any case, despite the government’s membership ambitions and further reforms, accession does not seem to be realistic at the moment. The EU also may not be ready for enlargement as it has to adopt new institutional reforms in order to absorb additional members.

A second wave of the “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU” survey in Georgia will be available this August. It will be interesting to compare the 2009 and 2011 results. What do you think? Do you think that Georgia should be a member of the EU? Does the country have a serious chance of becoming an EU member?

Georgia Adopts Law on the Status of Religious Minorities

On July 5, 2011 Georgia adopted a new legislative amendment into the country’s civil code stating that religious minority groups with “historic ties to Georgia” or those defined as religions by members of the Council of Europe can register as legal entities of public law. The initial draft of the law specifically mentioned the Roman Catholic Church, Muslim and Jewish communities, Armenian Apostolic Church and the Evangelical Baptist Church as having “close historic ties with Georgia”. However, the final draft did not specifically name these five groups.

The criminal code and Article 19 of the Georgian Constitution address freedom of religion and belief in the country. However, prior to this week Georgia was one of few post-Soviet countries that did not have a statutory law or government resolution on either religion or the legal status of religious associations. The 2002 Concordat between the Georgian government and the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is the exception.

The GOC has considerable influence in Georgian society as the majority (80-84%) of the population belongs to the Orthodox Church. 10-13% identify as Muslim, 4% as Armenian Apostolic and there are less numerous religious minority groups such as Roman Catholics and Evangelical Baptists (2002 census and CB 2010). Additionally, Article 9 of the Georgian Constitution “recognizes the special importance of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgian history but simultaneously declares complete freedom of religious belief and confessions, as well as independence of the church from the state.”

The new law has received considerable public interest and a flurry of media attention, especially in light of the importance of religious issues in the country. Annual data from the Caucasus Barometer survey shows that certain aspects of religion are significant. Attendance at religious services is relatively low (18% of the population attends once a week or more, 17% once a month, 52% attends either only special holidays or less often and 11% never attends). However, 84% of Georgians trust religious institutions and 90% of the population considers religion to be important in daily life (2010 Caucasus Barometer).

The law has gained criticism from the GOC and several Georgian opposition parties, including the Christian Democratic Movement, the New Rights Party and Our Georgia-Free Democrats. The passing also takes place soon after a meeting between Patriarch Ilia II of the GOC and Catholicos Garegin II of the Armenian Apostolic Church in June regarding status and property issues of the respective churches in Armenia and Georgia.

Opponents view the law as undermining the GOC’s role in the country and as having a negative effect on relations between Georgia’s ethnic and religious minority groups. They also argued for more lengthy public discussion about the issue. In contrast, for the ruling party, the passing of the law can be seen as an important step in Georgia’s democratization and as fulfilling the country’s international obligations with respect to freedom of religion. One of the most important follow up questions will be what it specifically means for religious minority groups to register as legal entities of public law.

What do you think? Do you think the new law is a step in the right direction?

Carnegie Research Fellowship Program | Winners Announced

Six scholars from the South Caucasus have been selected to join a prestigious program administered by CRRC and the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). Carnegie Research Fellowship Program (CRFP) offers local scholars in the social sciences non-degree research opportunities at universities and institutes in the United States. The program is directed at advanced researchers that already have a demonstrated track record in social science research. The research period lasts up to 4 months, starting in either September 2011 or January 2012. All costs for the scholars are covered, including round-trip airfare.

The following scholars have been selected as finalists for this year’s program through a competitive application process including interviews: three scholars from Armenia (Asya Darbinyan, Tamara Tonoyan and Tatevik Zadoyan), two scholars from Georgia (Maia Simonishvili and Eka Pirtskhalava) and one scholar from Azerbaijan (Turkhan Sadigov). We would like to congratulate them on their success and wish them a productive semester in the US.

For those who are interested in applying for the next round, keep your eye on CRRC’s website and Facebook page in February 2012!

MyPlace Website is up!

We have previously mentioned our participation in MyPlace, a collaborative research project covering 16 countries, and financed by the EU under Framework Program 7. Their website is now up! What is it all about? To quote from the MyPlace website:

"MYPLACE explores how young people's social participation is shaped by the shadows (past, present and future) of totalitarianism and populism in Europe.

Conceptually, it goes beyond the comparison of discrete national 'political cultures' or reified classifications of political heritage ('postcommunist'/'liberal democratic'); it is premised rather on the pan-European nature of a range of radical and populist political and philosophical traditions and the cyclical rather than novel nature of the popularity they currently enjoy.

Empirically, MYPLACE employs a combination of survey, interview and ethnographic research instruments to provide new, pan-European data that not only measure levels of participation but capture the meanings young people attach to it.

Analytically, through its specific focus on 'youth' and the historical and cultural contextualization of young people's social participation, MYPLACE replaces the routine, and often abstract, iteration of the reasons for young people's 'disengagement' from politics with an empirically rich mapping of young people's understandings of the civic and political space that they inhabit.

In policy terms, MYPLACE identifies the obstacles to, and facilitators of, young people's reclamation of the European political arena as 'my space'."

Want to find out more? Go to the project website here.

Caucasus Barometer: Unpacking Public Trust in the President

In the spring of 2011, CRRC ran the Caucasus Barometer Report Writing competition and now we have an opportunity to present some of the results to you. The first report is written by one of the competition winners, Keti Khachidze, and addresses trust in the Georgian president. Here is a quick summary of her findings and analysis.

In recent years, the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, has confronted a series of mass demonstrations demanding his resignation. During these opposition-led protests, his political opponents frequently claimed that the president has “lost public trust” and therefore ought to step down. However, results of CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer survey show that contrary to the allegations of his critics, President Saakashvili continues to enjoy high levels of trust across a wide cross section of society. In fact, he may be more widely trusted now than he has been for several years.

The president enjoys support from a broad cross section of society; those who live in rural areas as well as high earners in the capital are more likely to trust the president. Members of the Azerbaijani ethnic minority in Georgia are especially supportive, as are those who trust the media and those who see Georgia as a place where fair elections are held. The president can also count on the trust of state sector employees, and people who feel positively about international institutions such as NATO and the UN.

However, Tbilisi remains a place where distrust of the president is relatively entrenched, especially among those with lower incomes. Furthermore, several types of people are not only less likely to trust the president, but are much more likely to distrust him. These groups include people who have recently had family members who have lost jobs, those who are least satisfied with their own lives, people who do not trust elections or the media, as well as those who are skeptical of the international community. This suggests a significantly divided political landscape in Georgia. While the president can continue to count on the trust of a majority of the population, there are many groups who appear to be firmly skeptical of him.

Read the report here.

Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey | new TESEV report

TESEV’s Foreign Policy Programme recently published a report entitled ‘Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey’, which analyses Turkish attitudes towards international relations with several countries, including Armenia. The main finding of their survey regarding attitudes towards Armenia is that Turks are more supportive of undergoing various kinds of rapprochement with Armenia than they are of fully re-establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border.

Turkish perspectives on re-establishing diplomatic relations and rapprochement vary greatly depending on region. The greatest level of support for re-establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia comes from those residing in South East Anatolia, with 59% of respondents expressing their support. The most opposition comes from those residing in the Black Sea region, with 60% of respondents expressing their opposition.

Respondents from South East Anatolia also express the greatest support for economic, political and cultural rapprochement with Armenia; 62% of respondents support economic rapprochement, 60% support political rapprochement and 60% support cultural rapprochement. Respondents from South East Anatolia appear to support across the board reconciliation with Armenia, while those from other regions are more mixed in their attitudes.

Regarding attitudes towards European Union membership, 69% of respondents want Turkey to join while 26% are opposed to joining. The main reasons for supporting EU membership are the easing of visa restrictions and economic benefits. Worth noting is that respondents, by a large number, feel the greatest obstacle to EU membership is Europe’s Islamophobia.

When asked about the United States, over half (52%) of respondents feel the US is unfriendly towards Turkey, the primary reason for this being that the US thinks only of its own benefits. Despite this, more than half (53%) of respondents feel the future of relations between Turkey and the US will be positive.

Turks have very strong opinions on foreign policy in the Middle East. Respondents feel that Israel is the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region (23%), followed by the US (12%) and terrorism (7%). Many Turks feel that Turkey could be a model for other countries in the Middle East, politically (72%), economically (80%) and culturally (82%). Three quarters of respondents support Turkey playing a role in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Akgün M., Gündoğar S.S., Görgülü A., Aydın E.E. 2011. 'Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey', TESEV.

Follow this link for the full report. 

Seminar Report: Perceptions about Georgia: Leading or Loosing the Struggle for Democracy

A joint seminar on May 10th by Clingendael Institute and the Eurasian Partnership Foundation (EPF), and co-sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, debated the state of the rule of law and democracy in Georgia, and the possible application of a “Georgian model” in the wider region. Following a keynote speech by Robert de Groot, Dutch Director General for European Cooperation, high level speakers and participants from the Georgian government (including Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze), parliament (including opposition leader Irakli Alasania), media and civil society, from EPF’s regional network, and the European Union were asked to present their views in three panels. These different views generated an impressive and constructive debate on the state of democracy in Georgia. The final question about a Georgian model and its applicability elsewhere in the region led to interesting, multifaceted responses. In conclusion it can be said that the debate about sensitive political issues in Georgia took place in a truly constructive atmosphere of which all participants can be proud.

A report and data presented by EPF can be downloaded from the Cringendeal website.

Works in Progress Series | List and Stats

In Georgia, we are close to wrapping up the Works-in-Progress series for this semester, which we have been organizing in collaboration with American Councils. It's been a successful run with a range of different topics and speakers.

Donnacha O Beachain comparing Georgian and Kyrgyz revolutions

Here are our stats, thanks to Timothy Blauvelt.

Presenters:   Georgians - 15%

                    US - 30%

                    UK - 25%

                    Other EU and Canada - 30%

Topics:         Politics, Policy, Political Science - 55%

                   History - 15%

                   Archeology, Ethnology, Musicology - 15%

                   Other (Economics, Social Media, Healthcare) - 15%

Ideally we would like some more Georgians to come forward and present their ongoing research projects in the future. For now, see the program we had below.

January 26: Donnacha O Beachain, Dublin City University – Kyrgyzstan 2005 and 2010

February 2: Gavin Slade, Oxford University – Overturning the Criminal Nobility

February 9:  Koba Turmanidze, CRRC – Assessing the State of Democracy: Citizen Outlook from the South Caucasus.

February 16: Tom De Waal, Carnegie Foundation – Georgia's Choices of State Models

February 23: CRRC Junior Fellows – Economic Conditions of Households in Georgia

March 2: Ryan Hughes, University of Michigan – An Archeological Survey of the Vani Site

March 9: Sonya Kleshik, CRRC – Language Policy in Georgia

March 16: John Graham, Princeton University – Pencils and Erasers: Harmonizing Georgian Chant in the Early 20^th Century

March 23: Kevin Tuite, University of Montreal – Khevsur Shrine Invocations: Poetics, Performance and Agonism

March 30: Hans Gutbrod, CRRC – Social Capital in Georgia

April 6: George Welton, GeoWel @ CRRC Project – Access to Justice in Central Asia

April 13: Oliver Reisner, EU Delegation to Georgia – Contemporary Georgian Historiography

April 27: Onnik Krikorian, Global Voices – Social Media in the South Caucasus

May 4: Dan Healey, Swansea University – Medical Research in Stalin's Gulag: A Scientific Culture Behind Barbed Wire, 1930-56

May 11: Paul Crego, US Library of Congress – Strategic Patience: A Way Forward?

May 18: Thijs Rommens, K.U. Leuven – The European Neighborhood Policy and Civil Society in Georgia

May 25: Michaela Ferrari, Fulbright Fellow – Assessing Clinicians' and Women's Attitudes Toward Family Planning in Georgia

June 1: Krista Goff, University of Michigan – The Georgian-Speaking Minority in the Azerbaijan SSR

June 8: Giorgi Khelashvili, Tbilisi State University – The Soviet Legacy and Post-Soviet Foreign Policy in the Caucasus

June 15: Peter Rozic, Georgetown University – Lustration Politics: Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Countries

If you'd like to present, let us know. Otherwise, to hear about the events, follow Works-in-Progress on Facebook.

Georgian Social Capital in the Media!

We have previously highlighted the research on social capital that CRRC has undertaken with the generous support of USAID. As we said at the time, and have argued in subsequent presentations, social capital is a missing link in Georgia. Its absence impedes social, economic and political development.

Our research has recently been picked up by media outside Georgia, providing summaries on our findings. Two of these articles begin with familiar images. “Georgia’s Not So Big Society,” in The Economist’s blog, compares generous Georgian hospitality with its hectic and impatient traffic. Thomas de Waal, in his article, “The Anatomy of Apathy,” published in The National Interest, begins his reflections with the contrast between the run-down facades of buildings and the warm and welcoming apartments within.

To read these broader reflections on social capital research in Georgia, please visit the article on the Economist website, and you can find de Waal piece's in the National Interest here.

What’s behind the May 2011 protests in Georgia?

There have been three main protests since 2007 that have demanded the Georgian president, Mikhail Saakhashvili, to step down. These three protests have been described in detail in international and qualified local coverage, such as that on EurasiaNet and Civil.ge. So what, from the point of view of research, are the main differences between the protests in 2007, in 2009 and in 2011?

There are a number of striking differences. First, the most recent protest has been the least attended. Reuters reported that around 10,000 people protested at the peak of the May 2011 protests. According to CRRC estimates, subsequently picked up by a lot of media, up to 60,000 people did so in 2009 and between 50,000 and 100,000 people participated in the 2007 protest.

Second, this decline in protest numbers is mirrored by a change in national sentiment about the direction in which Georgian politics is going. A March 2011 survey conducted by CRRC for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) shows that the percentage of people who say Georgian politics is going in the wrong direction has diminished since 2007.


In 2007, 40% of respondents thought that the direction of politics in Georgia was going mainly or definitely in the wrong direction, whereas in March 2011, that number was 19%. In other words, since 2007 the number of people who thought Georgia is going in the wrong direction has halved. As the slide shows, many more people now also think that Georgia is definitely going in the right direction.

Third, several media outlets have highlighted that the majority of protesters in May 2011 seemed to be above 50 years old. As Koba Turmanidze, CRRC Georgia Country Director, notes, the results from a 2011 CRRC media survey show that older people (who are not retired) continue to be less employed than younger people, and are less happy with their own and Georgia’s economic conditions than younger people. Their unhappiness may also reflect that they have been less engaged in post-Rose Revolution Georgia.

Moreover, results from the 2010 CB also show that the poorer a person considers the economic level of his/her household to be compared to most of the households around them, the more they agree that people should participate in protest actions against the government since the people should be in charge.

2010 CB-Georgia

The numbers do not sum to 100% because the ‘don’t know’ and ‘refuse to answer’

categories have been removed. Note that few people characterize their own
economic condition as "very good", thus the results are less representative.
More details on request.

This may be important in a country where 91% of the population consider rising prices to be worse than in 2008.

Next to the differences that we have identified, do you think there was anything that made the 2011 protests different to previous waves of demonstrations? (Note that you can also do some analysis yourself on our data interface ODA).

Conference on Social Protection and Social Inclusion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

The South Caucasus Social Protection and Social Inclusion regional conference was held in Tbilisi, Georgia on May 19th and 20th. Both the CRRC-Armenia and CRRC-Azerbaijan offices presented country reports on these issues.

Supported by the European Commission (EC), the reports provide overviews of the economic systems, labor markets and education systems in the South Caucasus. The research outlines demographic trends, and examines the modernization of the social protection systems in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Moreover, they address issues of poverty, pensions and healthcare.

Attendees of the conference, organized by the EC as well, were mostly Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian government officials from relevant ministries and agencies, as well as NGOs and research organizations.

The country reports (in English) can be downloaded from here. You will find them useful reference documents on all the issues of social protection and social inclusion in the three countries. Executive summaries are available in Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani as well as in Russian.

CRRC Starts Youth Engagement Research | European Project

As of June 1, CRRC has started work on a collaborative project on youth engagement, called MYPLACE. MYPLACE is an FP7 Collaborative Large-scale integrating project funded under the 2010 Social Sciences and Humanities call ‘Democracy and the shadows of totalitarianism and populism: the European experience’. It brings together a consortium of 16 research institutions from 14 European countries as well as 14 stakeholder public institutions (museums, NGOs, archive and document centres).

The coordinating institution is the University of Warwick. The coordinator is Professor Hilary Pilkington (Department of Sociology).

In addition to CRRC, the other project partners are:

• Tallinn University, Estonia
• University of SS Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia
• University of Bremen, Germany
• Jena University, Germany
• University of Eastern Finland, Finland
• University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
• ISCTE, Lisbon University Institute, Portugal,
• ‘Region’, Ul’ianovsk State University, Russian Federation
• Daugavpils University, Latvia
• Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences, Zagreb, Croatia
• Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
• University of Debrecen, Hungary
• Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
• Panteion University of Athens, Greece

The project runs from June 1st 2011-31 May 2015.

MYPLACE stands for Memory Youth Political Legacy And Civic Engagement. The project investigates how young people’s social participation is shaped by the shadows of totalitarianism and populism in Europe.

Why is this an important question to ask? The current generation of young people is united by the experience of growing up in a Europe that is largely free of both right and left-wing authoritarian regimes. They also share the lack of any first-hand memory of the cold war and the associated fears and prejudices that divided Europe or direct experience of living under a communist, authoritarian or fascist political regime. At the same time, they share the experience of growing up in the first global economic crisis in the post-World War Two period, which we might expect to provide the far right a fertile ‘recruitment’ ground. Moreover, because the current generation of young people in Europe has little or no experience of extremist and populist politics, it may be particularly vulnerable to radical political agendas.

Why is it important to ask this question now? In the current context of economic recession political parties and movements of the far right are becoming increasingly visible. In the 2009 European parliamentary elections, far-right political parties won substantial support in a number of EU member states. They also made parliamentary representation breakthroughs in countries where they have had little previous success. This is a pattern repeated in a number of European countries in national and regional elections.

In this context MYPLACE asks how young people’s engagement with the past is likely to shape their reception to contemporary populist political agendas. It draws no simple ‘straight lines’ from ‘authoritarian’ pasts to precarious democratic presents or futures. It is premised on the assumption that radical and populist political and philosophical traditions are pan-European and cyclical rather than embedded in discrete national ‘political cultures’ or based on rigid classifications of political heritage (‘totalitarian’, ‘communist’, ‘fascist’) and open to ‘healing’ through ‘democratization’. This makes the project genuinely trans-European.

Expertise in youth studies of the project partners means we start with a clear understanding of young people not as passive objects of political manipulation but as active political agents. Evidence from a number of ‘colour revolutions’ in countries of former communist Europe as well as anti-globalization, anti-poverty, anti-war and anti-cuts campaigns, indeed suggests that young people’s political consciousness is not a blank canvas and that young people are not only mobilised but can effectively network, organise and lead major political actions.

MYPLACE is interdisciplinary, bringing together researchers trained in a range of social sciences (sociology, politics, anthropology, psychology and cultural studies). It will include a large scale survey in 14 countries to measure young people’s political and civic participation and attitudes. Interviews and focus groups will be used to understand the meanings young people attach to such participation as well as to explore how these meanings are transmitted across generations. Around 50 ethnographic case studies of young people’s actual civic participation and political activism will also be conducted across the countries of the project.

Policy makers and practitioners are involved in the project from its outset through nationally based Youth Policy Advisory Groups. Through these groups, the project will implement its objective of creating an active and sustainable dialogue between academic, public and policy institutions. The project’s findings will feed into regional, national and EU level policy making centres as well as a range of youth activist, anti-racism/xenophobia networks. An important objective of the project is to inform policy-makers about the range of political and civic activities in which young people are involved, rather than focusing on ‘problems’ in the youth sphere.

If you want to know more, the contact details for further information about the project are the following:

• Project Coordinator: Hilary Pilkington, Dept of Sociology, University of Warwick, h.pilkington [att] warwick.ac.uk
• Project Manager: Martin Price, Dept of Sociology, University of Warwick, M.R.Price [att] warwick.ac.uk

Project website: http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/ 

For CRRC Tina Zurabishvili will be the lead on most of this project, and we will inform you about further updates through our blog. Get in touch if you want to find out more. 

Ask CRRC | Population Sizes and Sample Sizes

Q: The 2010 Caucasus Barometer includes about 2,000 completed interviews in each country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. However, the three countries vary in size; the population of Armenia is just under 3 million, Georgia has a population of about 4.6 million, and the population of Azerbaijan is about 8.4 million (according to the CIA World Factbook). How can the same or a similar sample size be appropriate for each country?

A: Great question! Contrary to popular belief, the total population size has little effect on the necessary sample size. Necessary sample size is more dependent on the amount of variability between members of a population. Only one person would need to be sampled if there were no variability in a population and every member would give identical answers.

Let’s use a physical example to make this more clear:

The two populations above have the same average height, but the members of Population B have much more variability in height than the members of Population A. Thus, if you were sampling Population B you would need a much larger sample size in order to reach the same level of certainty about the population’s average height than you were if you were sampling Population A. In short, the greater the amount of variability in the population, the larger your sample size needs to be in order to capture that variability.

Other issues that affect sample size include how accurate you want conclusions drawn from the sample to be and how certain you want those conclusions to be. In making a precise statement, you could say, for example, that “from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, our best estimate of the proportion of Tbilisi residents who have travelled to another country is 18.5%, and we are 95% sure that the true value is between 15.5% and 21.5%.” Technically speaking, 95% is our confidence level and our margin of error is 3%. Therefore, we are 95% sure that the true value lies within the range of our best estimate plus or minus 3%. To increase your level of confidence or reduce the margin of error, you would need a larger sample size -- and more money to pay for the extra interviews.

Here is one more thing worth knowing about sampling. Imagine a country of 5 million people, and a village of 500 inhabitants (both with the same amount of variability). Let’s say you require a sample of 200 from the country to reach a 95% level of confidence and a 3% margin of error. How many inhabitants of the village should be sampled to reach that same level of confidence and the same margin of error? Take a guess.

Done? The number is surprisingly high: we still need to sample one hundred and forty three inhabitants from the village. So while the country is 10,000 times the size of the village, it only requires an extra 57 people in the sample to achieve the same margin of error at the same level of confidence. In other words, one entirely counter-intuitive aspect about sampling is that small populations may still require a large proportion to be sampled to get representative findings.

In summary, while population size is one of the four factors that influence the necessary sample size for any survey (and even more factors have to be considered for complex surveys like the CB), its influence is relatively negligible.

Do you have further questions? Write a comment and let us know.

Blood Donation in the South Caucasus: Refill, Please!

With the upcoming World Blood Donor Day on June, 14, the question about current attitudes towards blood donation in the South Caucasus is worth examining. While there are considerable efforts in all three countries to increase donation rates and improve blood screening, donation rates remain below 1%, according to WHO data for Armenia and Georgia, and thereby stand at the lower end in international comparison. Increasing the availability of safe blood is of tremendous importance to guarantee the minimum needs for patients. Here we summarize some of the main information provided by the WHO, as it relates to the South Caucasus.

Armenia has registered a growing amount of blood collection over the last few years. In 2009, 54.6% of the donations came from paid donors (US$ 30 per donation), 40.4% from family/ replacement donors and 5% from voluntary non-remunerated donors. The financial incentives for blood donation are strongly anchored, and groups advocating unpaid donation have to compete against remunerated donation offered by the pharma industry. While blood donation is currently financed through the national budget, it is envisaged to shift responsibility to private initiatives. There are already several organisations that advocate for non-remunerated blood donation, mainly Club 25 or the Fund for Armenian Relief.

In Azerbaijan, blood collection figures more than doubled between 2003 and 2006. In 2008, a law was passed by which only non-paid donors are admitted. There is no remuneration for donors with the exception of reimbursement for travel expenses in some cases. Islamic religious groups in Azerbaijan have participated in efforts to increase blood donation. Last year, a campaign was held at mosques and places of pilgrimage during the religious holiday of Ashura. The blood donation system in Azerbaijan is funded by the government and overviewed by the Research Institute on Haematology and Transfusiology, which includes the central blood bank. Apparently the main problems relate to supplies of consumables, which are not always available (e.g. blood bags, tubes etc).

In Georgia, the donation rate would need to increase by some 60% in order to cover the needs of Georgian patients. The transfusion system is privately managed, although there is government funding for blood donation and tests. The system suffers from a lack of quality control of blood donations, which is especially critical as the rate of Hepatitis C carriers is as high as 6%. Like in Armenia, the expectation for re-numeration for blood donation is deeply rooted. Currently, 95% of blood donations come from paid donors. There are two blood banks promoting voluntary non-remunerated blood donation in Georgia: the Jo Ann Medical Centre blood bank and the Gudushauri Hospital Blood Bank, both of which only work with volunteer donors. In 2009, the First Lady of Georgia started regular volunteer blood donation campaigns.

Sources and further information are available here.

If You Were Asked What Everyone Else Thought of Your Country...

By Sarrah Bechor

CRRC recently completed its 8th annual Caucasus Barometer survey, gathering data about perceptions of trust, livelihood and social realities during face-to-face interviews in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Some of the results from these countries have been compared to results from 22 other countries that were surveyed as part of the 2010 Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey.

One question asked members of these 25 countries whether or not they believed their countries were generally liked or disliked. Results show that well over half of the population of the South Caucasus countries believed that their respective countries are generally liked: 76% of Armenians, 68% of Georgians and 52% of Azerbaijan agreed with the statement.

The percentages of don’t know/refuse to answer (DK/RA) responses are also quite interesting. Nineteen percent of Georgians, 25% of Azerbaijanis and 10% of Armenians responded that people did not know about their respective countries. It might be interesting to understand why certain populations such as Pakistanis, Azerbaijanis or Russians have a rather large percentage (10% or more) of people who say they don’t know what others think of their country, as opposed to other populations such as the French, Indians or Americans who have very little percentages of don’t know responses. We can identify a few patterns by breaking up the list of 25 countries into different groups:

Western Europe: Britain, France, Germany and Spain

Hubs of Tourism/History of Interaction: Indonesia, India, Jordan, Egypt, Argentina, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil, US and Turkey

Politically Contentious: China, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia

Isolated South Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (These countries could also fall under the politically contentious category due to the presence of frozen, past or potential conflicts)

Many of the Western European countries on the list are either hubs of tourism or have a history of international interaction (e.g., history of colonial, economic or political prominence). These countries have lower percentages of DK/RA responses. Politically-contentious states such as Russia and China are either overshadowed by regional conflict such as in the case of Lebanon in the Middle East, South Korea which is often related to issues involving North Korea, or China, Russia and Pakistan. The South Caucasus region could also fall into the politically contentious category and they are relatively isolated from the international arena.

In this way, citizens who said that they didn't know or refused to answer have also provided interesting information just as those who said that they perceived their country to be generally liked or disliked.

Please visit CRRC’s webpage for the 2010 CRRC Caucasus Barometer and the webpage for the Pew Global Attitudes Project to get more information about the surveys, or to access the original questionnaires and datasets.

We would love to hear your thoughts on this theme as well!

Follow-Up Media Landscape Survey

By Tamar Zurabishvili

In September 2009, CRRC conducted a baseline survey on the Georgian media landscape within the scope of an EU-funded project entitled, “Strengthening the Media's Role as a Watchdog Institution in Georgia”, implemented by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. The results of the study have informed a far-reaching public debate on the state of media, attitudes of the Georgian population toward the media, and perceptions of its independence and professionalism. The survey continues to be a point of reference, as this recent article illustrates. The ongoing debate suggests that there is considerable demand for fact-based research about the Georgian media.

The follow-up Media Landscape survey, conducted by CRRC in April-May 2011 with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a unique opportunity to analyze attitudes of the Georgian population towards the media, as well as to monitor changes in media consumption. Among the findings, our preliminary analysis shows that the number of internet users has increased two-fold since September 2009. Internet as the primary source of information is still limited, but with now 5% it has nearly doubled in the last 18 months. At the same time, respondents say that most Georgians use the internet as a tool for social networking. There thus are new opportunities for Georgian media outlets that may seek to reach out to internet users more proactively and to develop more attractive internet media products.

These are only the first snapshots. More data and analysis will be available soon. For now, the questionnaire and dataset for the 2009 survey can be downloaded in SPSS and STATA formats from CRRC’s website. We welcome your visit!

ODA – CRRC Data Analysis Online

CRRC is happy to announce its new Online Data Analysis (ODA) program! Crunching numbers from CRRC surveys is now easier than ever.

The CRRC Georgia office has initiated and created this special program with the help of Irakli Naskidashvili. The ODA provides users with the opportunity to access survey data and analyze data online without having to use any special statistical program, such as SPSS or STATA.

The ODA is extremely user-friendly. With one click you can choose a survey question of interest and receive a chart and a table in Excel online. Charts and tables can be exported and downloaded in accessible formats.

Currently we have available on the ODA both the 2009 and 2010 Caucasus Barometer surveys, which includes data on all the three South Caucasus countries. The ODA will be periodically updated with new data gathered by CRRC.

An example of a slide on ODA:

An example of a table on ODA:

Interested? Check out ODA now!

Public Attitudes in Georgia: CRRC Polling Results

CRRC conducted a survey on political and economic attitudes in Georgia for the National Democratic Institute (NDI), funded by the Swedish International development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The fieldwork of the survey took place in March, 2011 and surveyed 2,893 respondents in Georgia. The survey covered the issues of public importance, perceptions and attitudes toward democracy and ongoing reforms, as well as various domestic and foreign affairs.

According to the survey results, economic and social problems such as jobs and rising prices are major source of concerns for the majority of the population: 46% of respondents said that situation has worsened in respect of jobs since January 2008 (37% said it was the same).

Beyond that, the survey highlights many nuances that often are disregarded when just looking at the headlines. Below, for example, you see that there is a fair amount of appetite for discussion on specific policies.

The survey results were presented by NDI at a press conference on April 6, 2011 and other presentations followed, throughout Georgia.This included public meetings in Batumi, Gori, Kutaisi, Rustavi, and a number of other cities.

The survey results were widely covered by many media sources, such as Civil.ge, the Messenger, 24 hours, Rezonansi, as well as through the TV channels, such as Rustavi2 and Imedi. The results are accessible from the NDI website.

C-R Policy Brief on IDP Attitudes to Conflict, Return, Justice

In March, Conciliation Resources (C-R) has published a report on IDP attitudes to conflict, return and justice, which we have already highlighted in a previous blog-post. As you may recall, this report was based on a survey of IDPs which CRRC undertook for C-R in the summer of 2010.

Now, C-R has published a policy brief on the same issue.

This is a short crisp summary of some of the main findings, also with C-R's policy recommendations.

C-R highlights five main suggestions:

1. focus on IDP's welfare and integration;
2. giving the displaced a voice;
3. facilitating information exchange and a broad public discussion on return;
4. utilizing IDPs as a resource for peace, bridging between different groups;
5. responding to the demand for justice.

If you are interested in the raw data, this is also accessible from C-R's website. For now, find the link to the highly readable report here.