tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37309767.post4028951427808838125..comments2024-01-04T13:54:21.297+04:00Comments on Social Science in the Caucasus: Housing IDPs | Lessons LearntHansGhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02363857450625734125noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37309767.post-68409225347960025682008-09-18T10:29:00.000+04:002008-09-18T10:29:00.000+04:00You've touched upon a big issue. No one knows the...You've touched upon a big issue. No one knows the numbers. ICRC did a database of collective centers and came up with a number of approximately 98,000 that wasn't scientific and didn't include very small collective centers (less than 2 families?). MRA has a much larger number based on the number of people registered. In my work I came across some collective centers that are full of registered people, collective centers that are full on non-registered people, and collective centers that are full on paper with registered people, but are empty.<BR/><BR/>Anywhere between 100,000 and 180,000 I think is a realistic number to program by.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37309767.post-17920217402282017352008-09-06T10:45:00.000+04:002008-09-06T10:45:00.000+04:0020,000 might not be going home from this conflict,...<I>20,000 might not be going home from this conflict, but there are 130,000 +/- that were already living in collective centers and<BR/>weren't/aren't likely to go home either. On top of this there are local populations living in collective centers and/or worse housing conditions.</I><BR/><BR/>The figures I saw showed that there are around 220,000 "old caseload" IDPs living in collective centres right now. This is what really shocked me when I arrived in Tbilisi, and made me worry about the fate of the "new caseload" much more. Once I then realised that many local populations, particularly outside Tbilisi are actually living in similar conditions to the IDPs, I wasn't sure whether to worry less or worry more... Certainly Georgia needs some radical solutions to their housing crisis, but - despite the IDP strategy approved by the government in April - it's likely that the government's fixation on privatization will prevent them from realizing those solutions.Paul Chttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13361948689477122420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37309767.post-73024368347039919372008-09-04T19:13:00.000+04:002008-09-04T19:13:00.000+04:00a thoughtful response, received in that email disc...a thoughtful response, received in that email discussion on IDPS:<BR/><BR/>-----------<BR/>Thank you [...] for summarizing a number of the points in the<BR/>discussion. I just wanted to add a couple of points that might seem<BR/>inconsequential, but I think that they are important.<BR/><BR/>1 - 20,000 might not be going home from this conflict, but there are<BR/>130,000 +/- that were already living in collective centers and<BR/>weren't/aren't likely to go home either. On top of this there are<BR/>local populations living in collective centers and/or worse housing<BR/>conditions. There are people renting out their space in collective<BR/>centers to migrant laborers from Samegrelo... It is important that<BR/>any approach keeps these facts in mind. This is one other reason why<BR/>I think (and agree with you) that local governments might be a way<BR/>in. They are interested in having a functioning local community,<BR/>they can cross-cut across these issues.<BR/><BR/>2 - GoG does have an IDP strategy - although it was developed in 2006-<BR/>2007, it contains a lot of good ideas that will be very relevant when<BR/>the funding starts coming through. I agree the question will be how<BR/>to get the GoG to put the funding to back this document.<BR/><BR/>3 - To say a few words about the Urban Institute program (full<BR/>disclosure - I managed the program from 2006-2007). The housing<BR/>market in Kutaisi did not skyrocket because of the program. The<BR/>vouchers were priced for the outskirts of the town (meaning a lower<BR/>than average price for Kutaisi as a whole). Additionally in the<BR/>second year of the project there were 81 families that purchased<BR/>housing. Although I don't have the number of housing sales in<BR/>Kutaisi for 2006-2007 program year (Sept - Sept), the overall 2007<BR/>numbers were 1,357 housing sales in Kutaisi. 81 sales are a drop in<BR/>the bucket and did not substantially contribute to the price of<BR/>housing rising. The Georgian market did this, and it is still up<BR/>195% compared to when we started the program. Do deal with this, we<BR/>developed a recommendation for the government of Georgia of the<BR/>fundamentals of a flexible voucher pricing system that would be more<BR/>in tune to the housing market flucuations than what we used in<BR/>implementing the project. The analysis of the two years of the<BR/>program showed that income of the IDPs and hence cost of the voucher<BR/>was the largest (and only significant) contributing factor to IDPs<BR/>being able to purchase housing. So...I would argue vouchers might<BR/>still be relevant (say starting early next year) and that they would<BR/>be able to address the housing needs of 70-80% of the displaced<BR/>population. Subject to a few caveats of course.<BR/><BR/>4 - A combination approach to shelter is needed. This is painfully<BR/>obvious, with so many pilot programs that were going on (CC<BR/>rehabilitation, new construction, vouchers, social housing models,<BR/>condominium management models) that there needed to be a model that<BR/>provided choice to IDPs while being cost effective and providing a<BR/>safety net to the most vulnerable IDPs. I would argue that<BR/>privatization isn't necessarily bad in some cases because a) some<BR/>CC's don't really need substantial renovation to become decent living<BR/>spaces (these are mainly ex-hotels I would say), b) privatization<BR/>doesn't necessarily mean just privatizing, altough MRA I think was<BR/>seeing it that way. Privatization could be used in combination with<BR/>renovation which would provide IDPs the same thing vouchers did - a<BR/>regular home that they owned (and presumably because they owned it<BR/>they would invest in it and maintain it - this theory has a lot of<BR/>academic back-up from a host of situations).<BR/><BR/>Okay - at this point I'm beginning to ramble :-) And yes - there will be funding for the next few seasons that<BR/>definitely need to be taken advantage of.<BR/><BR/>Andy [coordinates available on request]HansGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02363857450625734125noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37309767.post-55310248497432758262008-09-04T19:06:00.000+04:002008-09-04T19:06:00.000+04:00Two options suggested:"(1) do large-scale thorough...Two options suggested:<BR/><BR/>"(1) do large-scale thorough rehabilitation of existing buildings," was something the government was looking at as a temporary shelter solution. Unfortunately the buildings identified by the government were 80% unsuitable, leading to questions about whether there are in fact suitable buildings.<BR/><BR/>"(2) to build new housing from scratch (NRC has done the latter on a small scale)" - and this was the government's preferred option for the longer-term, using prefabricated housing. The problem is the scale and the timing - the critical factor is getting people into shelter for the winter. The danger is that, once they're in those temporary shelters, they're going to have to stay there for another 16 years - while the old caseload of IDPs continues to rot in the pits they live in.<BR/><BR/>The other proposals seem more viable - rental subsidies and payments to host families. Both would draw on existing stock, would inject funds into the economy in a more distributed way and would not force the growth of a bubble economy around construction (which would mainly benefit the political mafia and NGOs).Paul Chttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13361948689477122420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37309767.post-30146111480996927962008-09-02T09:06:00.000+04:002008-09-02T09:06:00.000+04:00Indeed, investing in the “temporary” IDP housing –...Indeed, investing in the “temporary” IDP housing – collective centers/public buildings – is a very unsustainable undertaking. Our follow-up assessments in Azerbaijan has demonstrated that although such projects make a difference for the inhabitants of these buildings, this effect is highly unsustainable. No matter how much community work you do, once you’re out, there is no up-keep and the deterioration accelerates. <BR/><BR/>While investing in individual, durable housing is much more expensive, the pay-off is so much higher. As for the government’s sensitivity to the return issue, the ownership can formally stay with the state and IDP get the right of use “until the time they get a chance to return”. That’s how NRC did it in Azerbaijan. We also located the new settlement for IDPs not far from their previous place of temporary residence – a Baku suburb. What we learned through our temporary housing projects is here: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/AMMF-7B5DF5?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=azeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com