Social Science in the Caucasus

Georgian Attitudes to Judicial Independence | EWMI JILEP report

2012-01-25T16:58:00.004+04:00

Recently we undertook extensive research into judicial independence in Georgia for EWMI. This is what EWMI just put up on the website:

On January 24, 2012, at 13:00, at Hotel Betsy, the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) presented its study entitled, “Attitudes towards the Judicial System in Georgia.” The study was supported by the Judicial Independence and Legal Empowerment Project (JILEP), implemented by the East West Management Institute (EWMI) and funded by USAID.

Since 2003, much has been done to reform the Georgian judicial system, from the establishment of the High School of Justice, to the restructuring of the High Council of Justice, to making major changes in the makeup of the judiciary and prosecutor’s office. However, these successes are accompanied by serious concerns, particularly regarding judicial independence. International organizations from the Council of Europe to the US State Department have urged further reform of the system.

Relatively little research has been conducted to ascertain how Georgians themselves feel about their judicial system. It is with this in mind, that the East West Management Institute engaged the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), to undertake a comprehensive study of public attitudes toward the judicial system. CRRC employed a methodology that included citizen surveys, focus groups, and interviews which resulted in robust findings grounded in both quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

Representatives of the Georgian judiciary, non-governmental and international organizations working in the area of rule of law attended the presentation.

The link to the article is here. And find the report, which we tried to keep crisp and accessible while also rich in nuance and detail, by clicking here.

EU Survey Report Released: Knowledge and Attitudes towards the European Union in Georgia

2012-01-18T17:40:00.008+04:00

On January 16, 2012 the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and CRRC presented a report entitled “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the European Union in Georgia” based on nationwide surveys conducted in Georgia by CRRC in 2009 and 2011. The 2009 survey was the first comprehensive study of Georgian attitudes towards the European Union. Koba Turmanidze, Country Director of CRRC-Georgia presented the report. Following the presentation, a panel of representatives from the EU Delegation, including Boris Iarochevitch and Oliver Reisner, the Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany--Ortwin Hennig, and Dr. Kakha Gogolashvili--Director of Center for EU Studies at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) gave commentary on the data and its potential implications for the Georgia-EU relationship.

The data reveals that a majority of Georgians (80%) support Georgia joining the EU. As described in the report, support for Georgia’s membership in the EU has increased over time, but so too has support for EU membership for all other Eastern Partnership countries, as well as Turkey and Russia. While support for membership is high, knowledge of what exactly membership entails and the overall functions of the EU can be strengthened.

As noted by the panel, the findings of the report imply that Georgia is moving in the right direction for EU membership in several areas. Georgians’ support is compatible with the objectives of membership; however, there are many areas that need to be improved. Representatives from the EU delegation suggested increasing efforts to educate Georgians about collaborative efforts between Georgia and the EU. Overall, the report indicates a positive relationship with the EU and has generated enthusiasm among scholars and politicians alike.

Those interested in learning more about the study can access the datasets at CRRC’s Online Data Analysis (ODA) webpage. The report is also available in English and Georgian on CRRC’s website.

Democracy in Georgia

2012-01-12T17:37:00.011+04:00

In the wake of Russian protests for free and fair elections— one of the hallmarks of democracy— the international community has again turned its attention on democratization in the post-Soviet region. Democracy, in its various forms, represents something different to everyone. So what does it mean for Georgians? Do Georgians consider Georgia to be a democratic state in its present form? What are their perceptions of democracy? CRRC, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute-Georgia, conducted a repeated survey on public attitudes in Georgia from November 2008 to September 2011 in which respondents were asked a series of questions about democracy. Survey results show that just under half of the population considers Georgia to be a democracy. Also, most Georgians associate democracy with liberty, freedom of speech, media and expression, rather than government accountability and free and fair elections.

From April 2010 to September 2011, Georgians were asked ‘Is Georgia a democracy now’? The figure below shows that since July 2010 there has been a steady increase in the percentage of Georgians who believe Georgia is a democracy with 45% believing so in September 2011.

When asked to gauge the extent of Georgia’s transition to democracy in the September 2011 survey, 39% of Georgians said ‘Georgia is already a democracy but still needs improvement’, while 28% said Georgia is not a democracy, but is moving in that direction. In contrast, only 5% of Georgians believe Georgia is not and will never be a democracy.

Thus, the data shows that just under half of the population (45%) considers Georgia to be a democracy, and many people believe Georgia is either already a democracy that needs improvement or is not yet a democracy but is still developing in that direction. But what does democracy mean to Georgians? The 2011 survey asked, ‘What does democracy mean to you?’ 47% of Georgians interpret democracy to mean freedom of speech/media/hearing different views. 42% associate democracy with liberty and 40% say equality before the law/protection of justice. In contrast, only 7% say government accountability and 16% think democracy means free and fair elections. The results elicit a strong difference in the Georgian interpretation of democracy which prizes liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views above free and fair elections.

Respondents were allowed to provide their own responses. The percentages do not add to 100% because respondents could name up to three items.

Thus, survey data tells us that the percentage of Georgians who think Georgia is a democracy is increasing over time, that there is room for improvement, and that the concept of democracy is more associated with liberty and freedom of speech/media/hearing different views, than government accountability and free and fair elections. This is important in light of recent global events in which ordinary citizens have begun to challenge their state systems and certain features of their democracy.

How do you think Georgia fairs on its path to democracy? Has Georgia reached its goal or is there still room for improvement?

Boy or Girl? Child Gender Preference in the South Caucasus

2011-12-26T12:15:00.008+04:00

Survey data shows that there is a strong preference for male children over female children throughout the South Caucasus. As mentioned in the March 4, 2010 edition of The Economist, after 1991 there has been an increase in the ratio of boys to girls in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The sex ratio rose from 103-106 boys to 100 girls in 1991 to 115-120 boys to 100 girls by 2000. The 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB) indicates that gender preferences in the South Caucasus remain skewed in favor of males with 54% of Armenians, 27% of Azerbaijanis and 46% of Georgians prefer to have male children if given a choice.

The 2010 CB asked people living in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia the following question—“If a family has one child, what would be the preferred gender of the child?” The answers were unprompted as respondents were not given a list of possible responses such as “girl”, “boy” or “it does not matter”. Overall, Armenians and Georgians prefer boys to girls while more than half of Azerbaijanis claim gender “does not matter”.

The preference for male children holds when the data is split by male and female respondents. Results from Armenia show the highest preference for a male child with 59% of men and 50% of women who prefer a boy, compared to 5% of men and 14% of women who prefer a girl. In Georgia 57% of men and 36% of women prefer a boy and 5% of men and 12% of women prefer a girl. In Azerbaijan 60%-68% of men and women say the sex of the child ‘does not matter’.

When sliced by settlement type (capital, urban and rural), the data shows that rural inhabitants in all three countries prefer male children over female children. 57% of the rural Georgian population prefers boys and this figure is 71% in Armenia. Azerbaijan, on the other hand continues the trend of perceived impartiality with 32% of rural respondents preferring boys.

Despite a relatively high percentage of claims that gender “does not matter” in the three countries, there is a low percentage of individuals whose overall preference is for a girl. On the whole, Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians are more inclined to say they prefer boys or that it “does not matter”, rather than say they prefer girls. For example, in Azerbaijan—the country with the highest percentage of claims that gender “does not matter”—only 9% of the adult population prefers girls. This trend is similar in Georgia and Armenia in which there is a 9-10% preference for girls. Thus, the data shows that there is a strong preference for male children over female children in the South Caucasus.

Why do you think this is the case?

Can a Cut NATO Supply Route Through Russia Benefit Georgia and Azerbaijan?

2011-12-07T16:48:00.011+04:00

The 20th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is upon us, and US-Russian tensions have risen as Russia contemplates terminating the NATO supply route through Russia. International news reports such as The New York Times detail the threat as a “death blow” to the U.S.-led NATO mission in Afghanistan and indicate that this could be a blessing in disguise for NATO hopeful Georgia, as well as for Azerbaijan.

NATO has two main transportation routes via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which connects Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus: the NDN North and NDN South. The NDN North transit route initiates in Latvia, crosses through Russian territory and enters Afghanistan via the Afghan-Uzbek border. The potential blessing for Georgia and Azerbaijan lies in NATO’s NDN South transit route that spans from the port of Poti in Georgia to the Afghan-Uzbek border. The potential termination of the NDN North route leaves the NDN South route as a viable alternative. The NDN South route currently facilitates the transportation of 30% of the U.S.-NATO supplies to Afghanistan, as reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Should Russia close its borders to NATO, and the NDN North route cease to function, this could provide an opportunity for economic diversification in the way of transit fees for Georgia and Azerbaijan. This move could also open trade possibilities between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, as well as add leverage for future NATO membership.

Map from Google Earth. Courtesy of CSIS

Therefore, the issues at hand are two-fold. Are Georgia and Azerbaijan willing or prepared for further commitments to the NDN South transit route? What implications does this have for both the future of Georgian and Azerbaijani NATO membership as well as commercial trade?

First, CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB), shows that NATO membership is supported (fully and somewhat) by 70% of the Georgian population. Support for NATO membership is less in Azerbaijan where 44% of the population is supportive (fully and somewhat) (See the previous post by Nikola for more details). Thus, increased use of the NDN South route could generate an opportunity to demonstrate further interests in NATO membership. Based on public support for NATO membership, more use of the NDN South route could be welcomed.

Second, more traffic through the NDN South route could economically benefit Georgia and Azerbaijan. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) shows that trade in commercial services (including transport) is a growing industry in Georgia. As indicated below, Georgia has seen an increase from 2009 to 2010 in import and export transportation (excluding government services). Azerbaijan has seen a slight decline in export transportation, but an increase in import transportation.

Data retrieved from WTO website

Thus, Georgia and Azerbaijan could benefit at least economically if Russia decides to cut off the NDN North transit route.

Labor Migration Article | Zvezda Dermendzhieva

2011-11-12T17:20:00.001+04:00

In a recent article in Post-Communist Economies, Zvezda Dermendzhieva uses Caucasus Barometer data to compare labour migration from the South Caucasus.

We found one of the more remarkable results to be that "while individuals with higher education are not more likely to become migrants in general, having higher education is associated with up to four times higher probability of migration to a high-income OECD country among Armenians and Georgians. The results are in line with theoretical arguments that skill distribution and returns to education in the host country relative to the home country affect the selection of migrants, and that the cost of migration plays an important role in the migration decision."

Zvezda Dermendzhieva also suggests that migration indirectly contributes to economic development by raising local incomes in demand. In the same vein, she finds "a significant correlation between having a migrant and running a family business in Armenia, which suggests that migrants' earnings can provide scarce capital for business investment and support the development of the private sector in the region."

Interested in finding out more? Check the online abstract here.

Graduation Ceremony for the Junior Fellowship Program in Azerbaijan

2011-11-09T17:55:00.006+04:00

On October 15, 2011, CRRC-Azerbaijan organized a conference recognizing the completion of its first Junior Research Fellowship Program (JRFP). The conference featured five presentations of individual research projects by the winners of the JRFP essay contest, as well as information about the general activities of CRRC-Azerbaijan office followed by an award ceremony and lunch. More than 30 invitees attended the event, representing civil society, academia, governmental agencies, and international organizations.

The JRFP aimed at building the social science research capacity among students or recent graduates in Azerbaijan. Competitively-selected program participants participated in a three-stage set of intensive trainings on qualitative and quantitative research methods, including introduction to policy analysis and public policy paper writing. The presenters demonstrated their learned skills and research findings at the conference.

(From the left: Gursel Aliyev, Robia Charles, Aynur Ramazanova, Yulia Aliyeva)

During the award presentation ceremony, the top three finalists - Aynur Ramazanova, Nargiz Guliyeva and Shabnam Agayeva - were presented with notebooks. The fourth and fifth finalists--Aysel Aliyeva and Vladimir Rodin - received netbooks. All other participants of the third stage of the program received certificates of participation.

The Junior Research Fellowship Program was generously supported by the OSI Think Tank Fund, Budapest.

Armenian Corruption Survey Retrospective | still relevant

2011-11-08T19:15:00.000+04:00

The Mobilizing Action Against Corruption (MAAC) effort in Armenia, led by Casals, has come to an end. We undertook four surveys for this USAID project, three household surveys and one business survey. Unfortunately it proved impossible to do a survey among civil servants. The surveys showed that Armenia made practically no progress against corruption, over the three years.

An overwhelming amount of Armenians believed that corruption is a serious problem, and there was only limited change on the fringes.

The data remains available for analysis, and we believe that it continues to be important. There is a final legacy report that Casals published, accessible here.

To find the data sets, and the corruption reports, click here.

A Further Look at Material Deprivation

2011-11-02T19:13:00.001+04:00

Continuing to explore standards of living in the South Caucasus, this blog looks at the between four sources of household income and material deprivation using data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer. Each of the four sources of income (salaries, pensions or government transfers, sales from agricultural goods, and remittances) are categorized by their importance to the household and then cross tabulated with material deprivation. The findings suggest that families reliant on salaries and remittances are better off, while families receiving pensions and government transfers, or those who sell agricultural products as their primary source of income have higher than average rates of material deprivation.

Salaries and pensions/government transfers are by far the most important sources of income, mentioned by around 50% of people in all three countries. Agriculture is mentioned as an income source by over 25% of respondents in Azerbaijan and Georgia, but is reported by only 17% of Armenians, where remittances are the third most common source of income. Twenty percent of Armenians and 17% of Georgians report income from remittances, but family transfers are relatively rare in Azerbaijan, with fewer than 7% reporting receiving remittances.

Chart 1

In the South Caucasus as a whole, people who list salaries as their household’s primary source of income have half the average material deprivation rate of 32%. By taking the ratio of the average rate of material deprivation (blue bar) and the material deprivation rate for salaries as the primary source of income (red bar), Chart 2 shows that households primarily relying on salaries for income have less than half (44%) the average material deprivation rate in Armenia. This figure is 52% of the average material deprivation rate in Georgia, and 63% of the average material deprivation rate in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, households in the South Caucasus that did not report salaries as an income source are 1.4 times as likely to be materially deprived.

Chart 2

Pensions and government transfers are the second most important source of income in the South Caucasus. Chart 3 shows that households where government transfers are the primary source of income have more than 1.5 times the average rate of material deprivation, while those where pensions and government transfers are the second source of income have three-fourths the average rate of material deprivation. This suggests that government transfers throughout the South Caucasus are not large enough to live without poverty, but can effectively supplement a main income. The trend is most extreme in Armenia where households relying on the government for their primary source of income are over two times as likely to be materially deprived, while households where government funds are a secondary source of income have three-fifths the average rate of material deprivation. In Azerbaijan, government transfers have a much weaker correlation with material deprivation. In fact, data from graphs 2 and 3 shows that households receiving government transfers as their primary source of income are twice as likely to be materially deprived as households dependent on salaries in Azerbaijan, three times as likely in Georgia, and five times as likely in Armenia.

Chart 3

As chart 4 shows, income from sales of agricultural products is correlated with higher material deprivation rates across the South Caucasus, supporting previous findings showing that material deprivation is concentrated in rural areas. Armenia has the lowest percentage of households reporting income from the sale of agricultural goods, and also the smallest changes in material deprivation based on income from agriculture. Georgian households dependent on agriculture for either their primary or secondary source of funding are around 1.4 times more likely to be materially deprived than the country average, while Azerbaijani households are almost 1.8 times as likely. In Armenia and Georgia, relying on pensions and government transfers is the strongest indicator of material deprivation, while in Azerbaijan it is dependence on sales from agricultural products.

Chart 4

Only 13% of respondents in the South Caucasus report receiving money from remittances, but chart 5 shows that households most reliant on remittances are less likely to be materially deprived. The trend is especially strong in Georgia, where households dependent on remittances as the primary source of income have 58% of the country’s average material deprivation rate.

Chart 5

Although overall trends are consistent across all three South Caucasus countries, the importance of each income source on standard of living varies rather widely. Material deprivation in Azerbaijan seems to reflect a large divide between urban and rural areas, with family transfers, salaries, and government transfers much less strongly correlated to changes in material deprivation than in Georgia or Armenia. In Georgia more people mention government transfers than salaries as an income source, and for those reliant on state transfers, the material deprivation rate is over 70%. Although Armenia has by far the lowest material deprivation rate, at under 19%, it has a huge disparity between households with salaries as their primary source of income and households dependent on government transfers.

Gender | How Does the South Caucasus Compare?

2011-10-16T08:49:00.002+04:00

CRRC’s report “How Does the South Caucasus Compare?” aims to put attitudes towards gender in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the three countries of the South Caucasus region, into a global context. Comparing data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2010 with that of the CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB), the report shows that on several crucial questions of gender equality, there are significant cleavages between the South Caucasus neighbors.

To read how Caucasian gender attitudes compare, click here.

Fancy Living Abroad? 39% of Young Armenians Say "Preferably Forever"

2011-10-14T08:50:00.001+04:00

Last year, Ani Navasardyan asked, “Why do so many Armenians leave Armenia?” Migration is also an issue in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Data from the CB 2010 reveals that around half of the respondents in Georgia (47%) and Azerbaijan (52%) are interested in temporary migration. Still, Armenia stands out since 64% of the adult population is open to the idea of temporarily leaving the country.

With regard to permanent migration, only 7% of Georgians are interested in leaving the country, compared to 17% of Azerbaijanis and 29% of Armenians who say that they would be interested in leaving their country for good.

The analysis by age group shows that younger people in all 3 countries prefer to migrate temporarily. Three out of four young Armenians (77%) between the ages of 18 to 35 are interested in going abroad temporarily. Equally striking, in its own way, is that many people 56 years and older would leave (38%). In Azerbaijan and Georgia too, interest in temporary migration declines with age. Interestingly, young and middle aged Georgians show a similar interest in temporary migration with affirmation rates of 58% and 52%, respectively.

When looking at the interest in permanent migration by age category, there is also a trend where younger people have more of a desire permanently migrate abroad. Georgia has the lowest percentage of young people (9%) who are interested in permanent migration. There are more than twice as many young Azerbaijanis (24%) who would leave permanently, and more than four times as many young Armenians (39%).

If you are interested in slicing CRRC's data on migration by gender, settlement type, income, knowledge of English or other aspects, we welcome you to analyze our data online.

Armenian attitudes towards opening the border with Turkey

2011-10-13T13:01:00.009+04:00

During the 20th anniversary of Armenian independence from the Soviet Union on September 21, 2011, the Armenian news service Hetq reported that the organizers of celebratory events were delivering commemorative T-shirts made in Turkey – which has had closed borders with Armenia since 1993. Despite the fact that trade between Armenia and Turkey flourishes via Georgia, the border between the two countries remains closed. What does the population of Armenia actually think about opening the border with Turkey?

While a majority of Armenians do not support opening the border with Turkey without preconditions and think that opening the border may be harmful for both Armenia’s internal political processes and national security, a large proportion of the Armenian population thinks that opening the border will be beneficial for the Armenian economy.

Data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer shows that 50% of Armenians do not support the Armenian government opening the border with Turkey without preconditions, while 34% support this action.

In addition, there is a significant difference in opinions on how opening the border with Turkey will affect internal political processes and national security in Armenia. 44% of Armenians think it may be harmful for internal political processes in Armenia, while only 12% see opening the border as beneficial. Moreover, more than half (58%) of the adult Armenian population thinks that opening the borders will have a harmful effect on Armenian national security, in contrast to only 7% who think this will be beneficial.

Unlike internal political processes and national security, 49% of Armenians think that opening the borders with Turkey will be beneficial for Armenian economy. This is 17% more than those who claim opening the border will be harmful.

Similarly, 45% of Armenians approve doing business with Turks (CB 2010). Thus, while there is still a perception of potential threat from Turkey for the internal political processes and national security of Armenia, economic expectations raise the amount support for opening the border between Armenia and Turkey.

For more information, check out the CB 2010 dataset for Armenia which is available online.

Class in the Caucasus | Article by Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock

2011-10-07T17:49:00.000+04:00

Using data from the Caucasus Barometer, Ken Roberts and Gary Pollock argue that "in economic and socio-political terms there are as yet just two real classes among actual and potential employees in the South Caucasus – middle classes and lower classes – and that although these classes differ in their standards of living and political dispositions, these are unlikely to become bases for conflict between them."

Interested in more detail? Check the abstract online.

Migration from the South Caucasus

2011-10-07T12:20:00.008+04:00

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the “Iron Curtain” opened new prospects for migration for people in the South Caucasus. Comparing data from all three countries in the region shows a tendency that Armenians have a greater interest in both temporary and permanent emigration than Azerbaijanis and Georgians. The blog covers different aspects which may influence the emigration. These are: number of trips abroad, education level, unemployment, average monthly income, family members and close friends currently residing abroad.

According to the 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB), 64% of Armenians would leave Armenia for a certain period (i.e. temporarily), while fewer Azerbaijanis (52%) and Georgians (47%) would do the same. CRRC data also shows that Armenians are more willing to permanently leave their country (29%), than the Azerbaijanis (17%) and Georgians (7%).

Interestingly, ethnic Armenians within Georgia alone are also more likely to permanently emigrate from the country than the other internal ethnic groups. 42% of the ethnic Armenian population in Georgia reported the desire to leave Georgia forever compared to 7% of ethnic Azerbaijanis and 6% of ethnic Georgians within the country.

Additionally, there is a pattern in which people who have travelled abroad are more inclined to emigrate in all three countries. Nearly eight-in-ten Azerbaijanis (78%) who have once travelled abroad would temporarily leave the country followed by 71% who travelled abroad twice or more and 48% for those who have never travelled abroad. Similarly, 71% Armenians who have been at least once abroad are more interested in temporary migration than their compatriots who have never travelled (48%) outside Armenia. Again, Georgians favor temporary migration the least, but still follow the same pattern in which those who reported at least one trip outside Georgia are more interested to emigrate temporarily than the Georgians who have never been abroad.

Apart from number of trips abroad, education level influences the desire for temporary migration. In all three countries, people with higher education are more interested in temporary emigration. Specifically, this figure is 68% in Armenia, 63% in Azerbaijan and 56% in Georgia. There is no difference in results between people with secondary or technical and lower than secondary education; however, there is a trend in which Armenians with secondary and lower than secondary education (62% and 61%) are more willing to leave Armenia compared to Azerbaijanis (54% and 48%) and Georgians (43% and 42%).

In addition, the fact that unemployment is considered to be most important issue in Georgia (52%) and Armenia (46%), as well as low incomes in both countries, may be some of some of the reasons why people may want to emigrate from the South Caucasus. According to 2010 CB, 47% of Armenians reported that number of available jobs decreased within the past year. This figure is 44% in Azerbaijan and 41% in Georgia. Additionally, according to state statistical agencies in the three countries, the average monthly nominal salary in Armenia in 2010 was equivalent to $292 while it was $335 in Georgia (2009) and $421 in Azerbaijan (2010).

There are also a variety of other political and social issues that may influence the desire to emigrate. For example, more Armenians have family members (63%) or friends (47%) currently living abroad, compared to 41% of Azerbaijanis 41% of Georgians who say the same for family members and 30% of Azerbaijanis and 21% of Georgians who say the same for friends.

There are various reasons why people want to emigrate from the South Caucasus. Despite similar patterns there is a tendency that Armenians are more interested in emigration than the Azerbaijanis and Georgians.

Is the South Caucasus a homogenous region?

2011-09-29T09:50:00.007+04:00

In a recent datablog, the Guardian published a map visualizing how the former Soviet countries are doing 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union. The map compares the 15 former Soviet countries in terms of economic development, demographics and democratic transition. It also divides the countries into five regions: Russia, the Baltic countries, the EU borderlands, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. While the countries in the EU borderland region (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) are depicted as going in very different directions, the other four regions are presented as fairly homogenous. This blog will focus only on the South Caucasus region. Is it really a homogenous region as depicted? Survey data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB) shows that there are striking similarities and differences in the region. This blog will show this by using some questions on gender issues and the perception of the greatest threat to the world in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as examples.

The Guardian’s datablog compares the performance of the former Soviet countries by making use of statistics from various sources. The result is a map that divides the countries into five geographic regions consisting of countries sharing a specific path of development. The Baltic republics turned west and “never looked back”, Central Asia remains “nostalgic”, and Russia and the Caucasus have “mixed fortunes”. Only Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine – termed the EU borderlands – develop in different directions, according to the datablog.

The perspective is, of course, a rather general one. However, there are differences with regard to the three countries of the South Caucasus. Georgia is slightly more Western oriented. Azerbaijan also stands out in other respects with population and economic growth since 2000. Nevertheless, in comparison to the other four regions, the Caucasian countries seem to be fairly close to each other in many respects. Live expectancy has risen sharply and infant mortality rates have improved. Furthermore, Armenia and Georgia show a very similar development with respect to GDP per capita.

Source: The Guardian Datablog, 17 August 2011, "End of the USSR: visualising how the former Soviet countries are doing, 20 years on" http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/aug/17/ussr-soviet-countries-data

Does this picture of a homogenous region persist when we look at the values and perceptions of citizens in the South Caucasus? The 2010 CB shows a mixed picture. For example, a vast majority of citizens in all countries agree that a man should normally be the major breadwinner in a family (83% of Georgians, 84% of Azerbaijanis and 85% of Armenians). The perception that women and man equally share the responsibility for earning the income of a household is supported by 14% of people in Georgia and Armenia and 16% in Azerbaijan. There is also overwhelming disapproval for a woman being the major breadwinner of a family – only 2% of Georgians, 1% of Armenians and 0% of Azerbaijanis support this idea (see below).

While people in the South Caucasus largely agree on the question of who should normally be the major breadwinner, there are considerable differences in perceptions of who the actual breadwinner in the majority of their country's families is. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, 75% and 65% of people, respectively say that the man is the actual breadwinner. Only 6% and 17%, respectively say a woman. The situation in Georgia, however, seems to be very different. 39% of Georgians believe a woman is the actual breadwinner in the majority of Georgian families. This is followed by 36% who say a man is the breadwinner and 20% who think there is an equally shared responsibility among women and men.

Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians also show significant differences in the way they perceive the growing gap between the rich and the poor. In the 2010 CB, they were asked to choose the greatest threat to the world on a list of five dangers. The spread of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat for a plurality of respondents in all three countries. However, in Armenia and Azerbaijan the growing gap between the rich and the poor ranks second with 25% and 21% respectively, while this was the least important of the five dangers to Georgians (7%).

These are only a few examples of similarities and differences among the countries of the South Caucasus. Further similarities (mostly on moral issues) and differences (e.g. western orientation or language preferences) can be examined using our Online Data Analysis tool (ODA).
What similarities and differences do you find most interesting?

Georgia's desire for NATO membership

2011-09-27T17:29:00.016+04:00

On September 15th 2011, the former American Ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volker, delivered a speech at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies about NATO’s past development, present capabilities and future challenges. The second part of the speech addressed relations between NATO and Georgia. According to Ambassador Volker, the enlargement of the alliance will not be on the agenda during the next summit in Chicago.

Even though there is no indication of Georgia’s possible membership in the near future, the majority of Georgians continue to support their country’s membership in NATO.

So what does the data tell us about Georgian support for NATO membership? Data from the 2009 and 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB) again allows a closer analysis of three aspects that influence Georgian attitudes: age, education and trust towards the executive government.

According to the 2010 CB, 70% of Georgians support NATO membership and this number has increased by more than 10% since 2009 (from 59%).

Additionally, full support for NATO membership has increased among young people. The 2009 CB shows that one third (33%) of Georgians between the ages of 18 to 35 fully supported Georgia’s NATO membership, followed by 31% between the ages of 36 to 55 and 20% for those aged 56 or more. However, according to the CB 2010, full support among the younger generation has increased to 44%, while this figure is 29% for the other two age groups, respectively.

Apart from age, education level influences support for Georgia’s accession to NATO. People with higher education are more supportive of Georgia’s NATO integration. Specifically, 44% of Georgians with higher education fully support Georgia’s membership in NATO (37% in 2009). There is a small difference between people with secondary education (29%) and those with secondary or lower (32% and 22%, respectively in 2009) education.

Trust towards the Georgian executive government is a third pattern that affects support for membership. 61% of Georgians who fully trust the executive government fully support Georgia’s membership in NATO. This figure is 34% among those who fully distrust the executive government.

Thus, the majority of Georgians support joining NATO even though Georgia does not have official candidate status for membership and will not obtain candidacy status during the next NATO summit in Chicago.

The dataset is available online, if you want to pursue further analysis on factors influencing. [LINK]

Isolation and Opportunity in Eastern Abkhazia. A Survey of Community Security

2011-09-21T10:02:00.032+04:00

The Institute for Democracy and Saferworld recently published a report entitled “Isolation and Opportunity in Eastern Abkhazia. A Survey of Community Security” (2011). This blog focuses on four aspects from the report: most urgent problems facing communities in Eastern Abkhazia, perceptions of personal safety and the role of security actors, potential increased tension, and contact between ethnic groups.

People living in Eastern Abkhazia view bad roads (49%) as the most urgent problem facing the area. According to the report, roads in Eastern Abkhazia have not undergone renovation since conflict in the 1990s, with some exceptions. Consequently, this has created a feeling of isolation, particularly among people residing in villages located far from towns. The second most urgent problem is the closure of the Inguri bridge, mentioned by 32% of respondents. While the first two issues highlight insufficient or poor quality transportation connections, the following three problems refer to concerns about the unresponsiveness of authorities, extortion and lack of potable water. Ethnicity-based discrimination (9%) was the lowest-rated result for this question.

The second aspect is perceptions of personal safety and the role of security actors. Overall, people do not feel their physical security threatened, but they report a wide range of security incidents such as agricultural theft, robbery and gunshots. Also, about a third of respondents (33%) prefer to rely on relatives and friends or no one (26%) for protection, and 10% of people answered that their local government is responsible for protecting them.

Apart from individual security, a majority of respondents (80%) do not expect to see a deterioration of the overall security situation. However, there are concerns about possible triggers that may increase tensions or renew the conflict. For example, 40% of respondents consider that further political escalation between Moscow and Tbilisi may increase tensions or renew the conflict, while shootings (36%) or clashes between armed forces along the Inguri river (30%) are considered to be possible triggers for increased tensions. Additionally, 27% of the surveyed population thinks that further escalation between Tbilisi and Sukhumi may increase tensions or renew the conflict.

According to the report, hostilities and mistrust between ethnic groups in Eastern Abkhazia are low. People are also supportive of any measure to increase the level of contact. While 9% reports mistrust towards other ethnic groups, no respondents noticed any “open hostility”. Over half of people (60%) in Eastern Abkhazia maintain contact with people from other ethnic groups. 28% of people report friendships with people from different ethnicities. This figure is 21% for family ties and 11% for trade and business relations. However, 29% of respondents have no relation with individuals from other ethnic groups.

In addition, half of those interviewed remarked that the protection of human rights would build trust and confidence with other ethnic groups. This is followed by 21% of respondents who believe this could be accomplished by creating community-level mechanisms to resolve local disputes and 18% who think a better economic situation will achieve the same goal.

This is not a survey undertaken by CRRC, thus we cannot comment on methodology or other aspects of the undertaking. However, we did want to highlight this survey as relevant material that may be of interest. You find a link to the publication here.

Does Refusal to Recognize Elections in Abkhazia Reduce Prospects for Resolution?

2011-09-12T17:24:00.012+04:00

A recent New York Times article argues that the failure of Western governments to recognize the latest presidential elections in Abkhazia on August 26, 2011 may hamper conflict resolution. According to the authors, Cooley and Mitchell, Western governments have a “counterproductive disdain” of developments in Abkhazia and isolating Sukhumi will reduce prospects for conflict resolution. The article also sparks a debate about the degree of democratic competition in Georgia and Abkhazia by saying that the recent elections in Abkhazia seemed to be fairly competitive by the standards of countries in the South Caucasus. This all comes at a time when popular perception in Georgia is such that the prospects for reintegration with Georgia have decreased over time and there is no preferred method for finding a solution to the conflict.

According to the article, failure to recognize Abkhazia’s efforts to hold somewhat democratic elections is counterproductive in various ways. First, it unintentionally reinforces Russia’s growing influence in Abkhazia. Second, it “further entrenches the counterproductive position that nothing that happens in Abkhazia, or even the views of the people there, have any bearing on any potential resolution to the conflict” (New York Times, Aug 31 2011, "A Counterproductive Disdain"). This argument raises the question of the EU’s strategy of “engagement without recognition” since European governments have shown little engagement before and after Abkhazia’s presidential elections.

In another article from 2010, the same authors point out that Russian-Abkhaz relations have dramatically changed since the 2008 war. According to their view, the ongoing delegation of basic state functions from Sukhumi to Moscow has further reduced prospects for conflict resolution. Russian troops guarding Abkhazian borders, the Russian ruble in the pockets of Abkhazians, and Russian telephone prefixes (+7) in the region are the most visible signs of this change.

With all of these developments, have the prospects for conflict resolution changed? What do Georgian citizens think are the most important activities to solve the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict? According to CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer (CB), 41% of Georgians think the prospects of Abkhazia becoming an integral part of Georgia have decreased since 2008. 35% think prospects have stayed the same and only 9% believe prospects have increased (14% remain uncertain). Also, a 2010 survey among IDPs in Georgia by CRRC shows that 12% believe Abkhazia will be reintegrated with Georgia within the next 5 years.

When asked what they think is the most important activity as a solution to the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict, 1% of Georgians says recognition of Abkhazia’s independence. An equal amount of the adult population (18%) say civil society should be given a greater role and that a non-use of force agreement should be signed with Abkhazia. A smaller proportion of the population thinks that commencing negotiations with Russia (14%) or signing a non-use of force agreement with Russia (12%) is the most important activity. It is important to note that 17% of Georgians are not sure what would be the most important activity.

What do you think is the most promising approach to resolve the conflict? Do you think the prospects for resolution have decreased?

How Does Gender Determine Roles and Behaviors of Women in and outside of Georgian Families?

2011-09-07T17:55:00.009+04:00

We would like to present the third report from the Caucasus Barometer Report Writing Competition held by CRRC in spring 2011 and written by Mariam Naskidashvili. The first and the second reports were published earlier this summer. The report concerns the roles and behavior of women in Georgian society. Here is a short summary of the report:

Only 1 percent of Georgians say that the main decision maker at home should be a woman, and only 2 percent consider a woman an ideal breadwinner. A majority of the Georgian population does not expect women to drink strong alcohol, smoke tobacco, have premarital sex, or live separately from their parents, according to data from CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer Survey. Georgia is a traditional society where normative roles are strongly attached to gender, and there are quite different forms of behavior expected from men and women. However, the situation is much more complex than it first appears, with more women than men being seen as the primary breadwinners in Georgian families, and some 60 percent of Georgians being comfortable with the idea of having a woman as an immediate boss. While traditional gender roles are still held to be ‘ideal’, the realities of life supersede this, and strong majorities of Georgians say that women should not face obstacles receiving an education or finding work.

When it comes to social mores, it is clear that Georgia remains a conservative country where the majority of people say it is never acceptable for women to have sex outside of marriage. However, Georgia is not monolithic; young Georgians are less conservative, as are those who live in Tbilisi, and those who are more educated. It is possible that these seemingly deeply entrenched attitudes may be changing.

Access the full report here.

Georgia's EU aspirations

2011-08-29T16:04:00.008+04:00

CRRC has just completed a second wave of the survey entitled “Knowledge and Attitudes toward the European Union (EU) in Georgia” (2011). Just over half of the Georgian population thinks that Georgia will actually join the EU at some point in the future and they have high expectations from EU membership. Many Georgians also support membership in the European Union (EU) despite uncertainty over whether or not European citizens share the same views about Georgian accession. This new survey also lets us compare data with the first survey conducted in 2009.

A large percentage of Georgians (69%) support the idea of potential EU membership despite the economic and debt crisis across the EU. Moreover, they are keener on EU membership than citizens of Croatia (52%) and Turkey (38%) even though the latter two states are more likely candidates for EU membership. In addition, according to EU attitudes survey, 53% of Georgians trust the EU, while data from the 2010 Eurobarometer shows that only 37% of Croatians express trust towards the EU.

Georgians also stay optimistic about the timeline for EU accession. According to CRRC’s 2011 survey of attitudes towards the EU in Georgia, 35% of Georgians believe that the country will be ready for EU membership in five years or less, compared to 32% of Georgians who said the same in 2009. Nearly one fifth of the population (19%) thinks that the country will be ready to join in five to ten years, compared to 21% of Georgians who said the same in 2009.

Opinions on when Georgia will actually join the EU are slightly different. In 2011 30% of Georgians believe the country will join in five years or less, while 17% think Georgia will become a member in five to ten years. In 2009 results were almost the same. 31% of Georgians said Georgia would become an EU member in five years or less and 20% claimed the country would join between five and ten years. However, quite a large proportion of Georgians (42%) answered “don’t know” on the same question in 2011 (38% said “don’t know” in 2009).

Support for the idea that Georgia will become an EU member may lie in the fact that just over half (55%) of people in Georgia agree with the statement: “I am a Georgian and therefore I am a European”. Younger Georgians are more likely to agree with this statement. 64% of those between the ages of 18 to 35 agreed, followed by 58% of Georgians between 36 and 55 years old. This figure is 46% for the older generation (age 56+).

However, a majority of Georgians are not sure whether or not European citizens share the same attitude towards possible Georgian accession. 35% of the Georgians think the majority of European citizens would like to see Georgia as a new member state, while 57% answered “don’t know”.

High expectations about EU accession may partially explain why Georgians are so supportive towards EU membership. The majority of people in Georgia think that the EU membership may improve the general political, economic and social situation in the country. For instance, 46% say that the EU membership might decrease poverty. 52% think that EU membership may increase the number of available jobs, and 64% of Georgians believe that EU membership can increase the possibility of restoring territorial integrity.

Thus, the data shows that despite the economic and debt crisis in the EU, Georgians are overwhelmingly supportive towards EU integration and have high expectations from possible membership. Are these expectations justifiable? Share your opinion with us.

Georgia and Russia: Can positive relations between the populations overcome the political turmoil?

2011-08-22T16:19:00.006+04:00

On the third anniversary of the 2008 August war the Russian Foreign Minister said that Russia will not renew ties with Georgia as long as the Georgian President Mikhail Saakhashvili is in power. Relations between the Georgian and Russian governments have been at a standstill since the conflict in 2008. Nevertheless, the attitudes of Georgians towards Russians remain positive.

While relations between the Georgian and Russian governments can be described as troublesome, Georgians remain positive towards the Russian people. According to the Caucasus Barometer 2010, 73% of Georgians approve of doing business with Russians, compared with 79% who approve of doing business with Ukrainians (the highest rated result for this question). Moreover, 42% of Georgians approve of Georgian women marrying Russians which was the second highest rated result for this question after Ukrainians (45%). In addition, data from the Caucasus Barometer suggests that people who have a better knowledge of Russian are more likely to approve of Georgian women marrying Russians. The data also shows that 90% of Georgians think they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of Russian, while 32% think they have at least a beginner’s level knowledge of English.

Socio-cultural characteristics such as a sizeable Georgian diaspora in Russia and Orthodox religion may also play a role in the positive perception of Russians by Georgians. The Georgian Ministry of the Diaspora estimates that the number of Georgians residing in Russia varies between 800,000-900,000 people. Also, the strong role of religion in Georgian society might help to explain positive attitudes towards Russians. Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) are good. For example, the ROC recognizes the canonical authority of the GOC over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as was confirmed by both patriarchs during their August 2011 meeting in Kiev to commemorate St. Vladimir Equal-to-the-Apostles the Baptizer of Russia.

Nevertheless, positive attitudes towards the Russian people do not influence Georgia’s predominant pro-Western orientation. According to the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, 70% of Georgians support membership in NATO and 71% think that English should be a mandatory language in schools, while only 16% think that Russian should be a mandatory language in Georgian schools. Georgian-Russian political relations are also at odds with the different approaches towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi claims both territories as an integral part of Georgia, while Moscow has recognized their independence.

Georgians have positive attitudes towards the Russian people despite political turmoil between the Georgian and Russian governments. We do not have data on Russian attitudes towards Georgian people. However, do you think that positive attitudes between people could pave the way to a Georgian-Russian rapprochement?

Intermarriage in the South Caucasus

2011-08-15T11:43:00.020+04:00

As a continuation of the blog, Forbidden Love: Attitudes Toward Interethnic Marriage in the South Caucasus, this blog focuses only on approval/disapproval rates and the socio-cultural preferences of women marrying men from different ethnic and national groups.

According to the 1996-1997 World Value Survey, 98% of both Azerbaijanis and Armenians and 99% of Georgians considered the family to be important in their lives. Marriage can be viewed as an important step towards the formation of families and the family itself can have an important impact on individual identity formation.

Data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer shows that 54% of Azerbaijanis approve of an Azerbaijani woman marrying a Turkish man and this was the highest rated result for the question. Similar Turkic identity and linguistic similarity between the nations may be part of the reason behind this. Azerbaijanis have much lower levels of approval for marriage with other groups, ranging from 74% disapproval of marriage with Iranians to 98% disapproval of marriage with Armenians.

While there is more disapproval than approval of intermarriage in all three countries of the South Caucasus, Georgians expressed higher rates of approval towards intermarriage than Azerbaijanis. 45% of Georgians approve of Georgian women marrying Ukrainian men, followed by the second and third highest approval rating for marriage with Russians (42%) and Greeks (41%), respectively. There are slightly lower levels of approval (between 39% and 35%) for marriages with Italians, Americans, Germans, Ossetians and Abkhazians. The highest rate of disapproval (between 77% and 80%) was for marriages with Iranians, Turkish, Indians, Kurds and Chinese. Analyzing these data, it is possible to notice that Georgians have the highest levels of approval for marriages with predominately Orthodox groups, while they show the highest levels of disapproval for marriages with some non-Christian groups. The strong role of the religion in Georgian society might explain preferences to marry with Orthodox and other Christian groups. For example, according to the CB 2010, 90% of Georgians consider religion to be important in their daily lives.

Armenians have lower levels of approval for intermarriage than Georgians, but they show more approval for such marriages than Azerbaijanis. Russians have the highest approval rate (49%) followed by Italians, Americans, Ukrainians, Germans and Greeks with slightly lower levels of approval ranging from 41% to 37%. The highest disapproval levels are for marriages with Kurds, Iranians, Turks and Azerbaijanis. Levels of approval/disapproval for Armenian women marrying other ethnicities may be influenced by political preferences. For example, both the Armenian government and Armenian people have positive attitudes towards Russia. Also, the fact that Armenians have more positive attitudes towards marriage with Russians than with other groups might include the fact that there is a large number of Armenians living in Russia (2,250,000 according to armeniandiaspora.com), and both knowledge and use of the Russian language is widespread in Armenia. The CB 2010 suggests that only 5% of Armenians have no basic knowledge of Russian.

This data show that attitudes towards intermarriage in the South Caucasus may be influenced by a variety of different factors in this diverse region. Thus, it is interesting to consider what roles factors such as religion, political alliances and ethnicity, among others, can play in marital preferences.

Material Deprivation in the South Caucasus

2011-08-01T15:40:00.005+04:00

Material deprivation is a non-monetary measure of poverty which measures ownership of durable goods considered valuable by a society for a good standard of living. The CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer provides a limited assessment of material deprivation by measuring household ownership of nine durable goods in South Caucasian homes: TVs, DVD players, washing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners, cars, landline telephones, cell phones, and computers. The results indicate a great deal of variety in levels of material deprivation by country, but show that material deprivation is mostly prevalent within rural areas and among the poorly educated in the South Caucasus.

When the ownership of durable goods is defined as the possession of fewer than four of the nine items, 32% of the South Caucasus is materially deprived. Armenia has the lowest level of material deprivation at just under 19%, while Azerbaijan has a material deprivation rate of around 25%, and Georgia has a rate of 48%. When the definition of material deprivation is expanded to include households possessing fewer than five of the household items, the material deprivation rate increases dramatically to 38% in Armenia, 47% in Azerbaijan, 64% in Georgia, and to 51% in the entire South Caucasus.

Despite the percentile difference between the countries, living in a rural settlement and low education are similar characteristics shared by most materially deprived people throughout the South Caucasus.

In the South Caucasus as a whole, as well as within each state, the capital has the lowest rate of material deprivation, rural areas the highest, and urban non-capital areas lie in between. For example, in the South Caucasus as a whole, only 15% of capital inhabitants own fewer than four of the items, while this figure is 30% for urban non-capital areas and 47% for rural inhabitants. Georgia and Armenia’s material deprivation rate in the capital is half that of urban non-capital areas, and one third that of rural areas. In Azerbaijan the biggest gap in living standards is between rural and urban non-capital areas, rather than between the capital and urban areas. In all three countries the rate of material deprivation in rural areas is over three times that of the capital.

In addition to the high variance based on location, material deprivation is negatively correlated with the education level of the respondent. The material deprivation rate for people with only a primary education or less is over 50%, while it is only 16 % for people with completed higher education, and just 7% for those with post-graduate degrees. In fact, in Azerbaijan and Armenia, no survey respondents with post-graduate degrees and less than 8% of those with higher education are materially deprived. In Georgia, 15% of those with post-graduate degrees and 27% of those with completed higher education own fewer than four of the durable goods. However, these rates are still far below the country average of 47%.

In each country and in the region as a whole, the achievement of at least a secondary technical education is the threshold for a lower than average level of material deprivation. Despite some trend-defying findings such as the relatively low rate of durable good possession for those with no education in Armenia, the overall trend in the South Caucasus clearly shows that a higher level of educational achievement corresponds with a lower rate of material deprivation. Moreover, a failure to move past high school education is linked with a higher than average risk of living in a materially deprived household.

Upswing of Transition in Georgia

2011-07-28T10:02:00.008+04:00

This past summer, Freedom House launched the 14th edition of its Nations in Transit (NIT) report. The publication comprehensively monitors democratic developments in 29 countries from Central Europe to Eurasia, amongst them Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. CRRC is represented in the report with data from the 2010 Corruption Survey in Armenia.

Each chapter of NIT assesses a country with regard to media independence, judicial framework fairness of jurisdiction, freedom of elections and levels of corruption. The overall analysis finds that the ever-growing tenures of authoritarian leaders in the former Soviet Union have contributed to a number of looming governance problems (e.g., including the inability to develop law-based systems or tackle corruption).

As for the South Caucasus, Freedom House reports a deteriorating situation for Azerbaijan and Armenia in the fields of democracy and local governance. The assessment for Georgia is more positive. The country improved its ratings in democracy, national governance, electoral processes and corruption. Yet, Georgia’s judiciary was marked down due to persisting inconsistencies in interpretation, enforcement of legislation, and inhumane conditions in detention facilities for example.

Rule of Law in Georgia - Opinions and Attitudes of the Population

2011-07-27T17:58:00.001+04:00

As a part of the Caucasus Barometer Report Writing Competition held by CRRC in the spring of 2011, we would like to present the second report (the first report was published recently) written by Salome Tsereteli-Stephen. The report deals with the rule of law in Georgia and here is a short summary of Salome’s findings and an analysis of the subject.

Establishing a sustainable, law-based system of governance is central to Georgia’s aspirations of becoming a full-fledged member of the democratic family of nations. This goal is repeatedly held up by politicians of all stripes as essential to the country’s development.

According to data from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, 47% of Georgians believe that the country is governed by the rule of law, with 27% disagree. While Georgians’ opinions are divided on whether the country is governed by the rule of law, there also seems to be confusion about what the rule of law actually entails. Thirty-eight percent of Georgians agree that the winner of elections is entitled to govern the country as he or she sees fit, with only 31% who disagree and a further 25% who said they did not know. This indicates a strong lack of awareness regarding the rule of law as a concept.

The full report available at the CRRC's website.

Engagement without recognition?

2011-07-25T16:03:00.017+04:00

The Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts did not emerge in the 2008 August war. However, they escalated in the early 1990’s when both territories engaged in wars of secession and there are different approaches to the resolution of these conflicts. For the EU, these are regional issues with broad security implications. However, from the viewpoint of the Georgian government, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are primarily internal political issues. Tbilisi claims both territories as integral parts of Georgia even though it has not been exercising full control over either entity for several years.

Georgian public opinion supports government claims over these two territories. Data from CRRC’s 2009 survey entitled, “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU” in Georgia shows that territorial integrity was the most mentioned issue of significance for Georgia.

The question in this survey asked the respondents to name up to 3 most important issues facing Georgia without ranking. This methodology is different than that used in the Caucasus Barometer where respondents are asked to indicate the most important issue facing the country.

Moreover, 43% of Georgians mentioned the restoration of territorial integrity as an important issue with which the international community can help. For example, many Georgians believe that issues involving territorial integrity (65%) and national security (68%) will improve if Georgia joins EU. This is in light of the fact that 46% of Georgians expect a major military conflict with Russia in the next 5 years and 80% of Georgians consider joining NATO to be an important issue (CB 2010).

No approach to resolving these conflicts (e.g., neither the August war, nor isolation of both territories) has brought any resolution to date. With regard to the Abkhaz conflict specifically, data from the CB 2010 shows that ideas about what would be the most important activity to resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is split between 18% of Georgians who would like to see greater involvement by civil society, 18% who prefer the signing of a non use of force agreement with Abkhazia, and 20% of Georgians who don’t know what would be best.

In contrast to the Georgian view, the EU sees the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as regional issues with broader security implications, rather than as internal Georgian problems. Many academic circles in the EU and USA suggest a policy of “engagement without recognition” towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example, in the 2010 October edition of the Washington Quarterly, Lincoln Mitchell and Alexander Cooley wrote that “pledging enduring support for Georgia’s territorial integrity is somewhat meaningless” because the more both breakaway regions are pressured to choose between Tbilisi and Moscow, they will choose latter. According to them, the more these areas are isolated by the international community, the more likely they are to increase their dependence on Moscow. In addition, the European Union Institute for Security Studies suggests that the “engagement without recognition” policy might be beneficial for Georgia as well because it does not question Georgia’s territorial integrity, nor does it force Georgia to recognize the self-proclaimed independence of both regions.

How do you think Georgia should deal with its "breakaway" territories?

Which way to go?

Georgia in the European Union?

2011-07-13T14:37:00.026+04:00

Three striking aspects of the Georgia-EU relationship are: 1) Georgian’s overwhelming desire for EU membership, 2) large differences in attitudes on social values between Georgia and the EU, and 3) lack of consensus as to whether or not Georgia belongs to Europe, Asia or “Eurasia”. Data from CRRC’s 2009 survey entitled, “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU” in Georgia shows that Georgians are overwhelmingly enthusiastic about EU membership. In fact, Georgians are more keen on EU membership than the Western Balkan states and Turkey, even though the latter two are more serious candidates for the next wave of enlargement.

Data from a poll conducted by the Italian Foundation, Compagnia di San Paolo and the German Marshal Fund show that Turkish public support for joining the EU dropped from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010. Support for EU membership in Croatia is 56% and 53% in Serbia. In contrast, 79% of Georgians in 2009 would vote for EU membership and 61% think it is very important for the Georgian government to strengthen ties with the EU. In addition, about a third of the population believe that Georgia will be prepared to join the EU in less than 5 years, while one fifth answered in 5-10 years. The opinions on if Georgia will actually join the European Union in less than 5 years or in 5-10 years period are almost the same.

However, data from the 2008 World Values Survey in Georgia shows that the country is divided by this EU aspiration and opinions on social values—many of which are at odds with social values in EU societies. For example, trust in religious institutions is much higher in Georgia (95%) relative to EU member states (19% EU average). A higher percentage of Georgians specifically would not want a neighbor who is HIV+ (40%) or a homosexual (87%) compared to the EU average of 17% and 20% who say the same on each question, respectively. Also, 50% of Georgians think that their way of life needs protection against European influences (CB 2009).

Another important question is whether Georgia can be defined as a European country. 54% of Georgians agree with the statement that “I am Georgian and therefore I am European” (CRRC’s 2009 EU survey) However, there is still tension around defining Georgia as a European country, not least because of its location east of Turkey. Vallery Giscard d’Estaing mentioned that Turkey is a non European state because its capital lies in Asia and 95% of its population lives outside of Europe. If Ankara is in Asia, then how is possible to recognize Tbilisi as a European capital when it lies further to the East? It is difficult to speak about the prospect of EU integration in the South Caucasus without the integration of Turkey. It might be unrealistic to expect a map of the EU in which there is a huge gap for Turkey and the inclusion of a small Caucasian country. This may be one reason why 52% of Georgians think Turkey should become a member of the EU (CRRC’s 2009 EU survey).

Europe or Asia?

Besides EU aspirations, differences on social values and geographic and cultural identity, the current economic and financial crisis might impact Georgian attitudes towards the EU. The EU has been a symbol of wealth, liberal policies and open society for many years. However, the bailouts in Greece, Portugual and Ireland, as well as severe financial crises in Spain and Italy make the EU seem less attractive. In any case, despite the government’s membership ambitions and further reforms, accession does not seem to be realistic at the moment. The EU also may not be ready for enlargement as it has to adopt new institutional reforms in order to absorb additional members.

A second wave of the “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU” survey in Georgia will be available this August. It will be interesting to compare the 2009 and 2011 results. What do you think? Do you think that Georgia should be a member of the EU? Does the country have a serious chance of becoming an EU member?

Georgia Adopts Law on the Status of Religious Minorities

2011-07-08T19:38:00.003+04:00

On July 5, 2011 Georgia adopted a new legislative amendment into the country’s civil code stating that religious minority groups with “historic ties to Georgia” or those defined as religions by members of the Council of Europe can register as legal entities of public law. The initial draft of the law specifically mentioned the Roman Catholic Church, Muslim and Jewish communities, Armenian Apostolic Church and the Evangelical Baptist Church as having “close historic ties with Georgia”. However, the final draft did not specifically name these five groups.

The criminal code and Article 19 of the Georgian Constitution address freedom of religion and belief in the country. However, prior to this week Georgia was one of few post-Soviet countries that did not have a statutory law or government resolution on either religion or the legal status of religious associations. The 2002 Concordat between the Georgian government and the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is the exception.

The GOC has considerable influence in Georgian society as the majority (80-84%) of the population belongs to the Orthodox Church. 10-13% identify as Muslim, 4% as Armenian Apostolic and there are less numerous religious minority groups such as Roman Catholics and Evangelical Baptists (2002 census and CB 2010). Additionally, Article 9 of the Georgian Constitution “recognizes the special importance of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgian history but simultaneously declares complete freedom of religious belief and confessions, as well as independence of the church from the state.”

The new law has received considerable public interest and a flurry of media attention, especially in light of the importance of religious issues in the country. Annual data from the Caucasus Barometer survey shows that certain aspects of religion are significant. Attendance at religious services is relatively low (18% of the population attends once a week or more, 17% once a month, 52% attends either only special holidays or less often and 11% never attends). However, 84% of Georgians trust religious institutions and 90% of the population considers religion to be important in daily life (2010 Caucasus Barometer).

The law has gained criticism from the GOC and several Georgian opposition parties, including the Christian Democratic Movement, the New Rights Party and Our Georgia-Free Democrats. The passing also takes place soon after a meeting between Patriarch Ilia II of the GOC and Catholicos Garegin II of the Armenian Apostolic Church in June regarding status and property issues of the respective churches in Armenia and Georgia.

Opponents view the law as undermining the GOC’s role in the country and as having a negative effect on relations between Georgia’s ethnic and religious minority groups. They also argued for more lengthy public discussion about the issue. In contrast, for the ruling party, the passing of the law can be seen as an important step in Georgia’s democratization and as fulfilling the country’s international obligations with respect to freedom of religion. One of the most important follow up questions will be what it specifically means for religious minority groups to register as legal entities of public law.

What do you think? Do you think the new law is a step in the right direction?

Carnegie Research Fellowship Program | Winners Announced

2011-07-07T13:03:00.003+04:00

Six scholars from the South Caucasus have been selected to join a prestigious program administered by CRRC and the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). Carnegie Research Fellowship Program (CRFP) offers local scholars in the social sciences non-degree research opportunities at universities and institutes in the United States. The program is directed at advanced researchers that already have a demonstrated track record in social science research. The research period lasts up to 4 months, starting in either September 2011 or January 2012. All costs for the scholars are covered, including round-trip airfare.

The following scholars have been selected as finalists for this year’s program through a competitive application process including interviews: three scholars from Armenia (Asya Darbinyan, Tamara Tonoyan and Tatevik Zadoyan), two scholars from Georgia (Maia Simonishvili and Eka Pirtskhalava) and one scholar from Azerbaijan (Turkhan Sadigov). We would like to congratulate them on their success and wish them a productive semester in the US.

For those who are interested in applying for the next round, keep your eye on CRRC’s website and Facebook page in February 2012!

MyPlace Website is up!

2011-07-07T11:43:00.000+04:00

We have previously mentioned our participation in MyPlace, a collaborative research project covering 16 countries, and financed by the EU under Framework Program 7. Their website is now up! What is it all about? To quote from the MyPlace website:

"MYPLACE explores how young people's social participation is shaped by the shadows (past, present and future) of totalitarianism and populism in Europe.

Conceptually, it goes beyond the comparison of discrete national 'political cultures' or reified classifications of political heritage ('postcommunist'/'liberal democratic'); it is premised rather on the pan-European nature of a range of radical and populist political and philosophical traditions and the cyclical rather than novel nature of the popularity they currently enjoy.

Empirically, MYPLACE employs a combination of survey, interview and ethnographic research instruments to provide new, pan-European data that not only measure levels of participation but capture the meanings young people attach to it.

Analytically, through its specific focus on 'youth' and the historical and cultural contextualization of young people's social participation, MYPLACE replaces the routine, and often abstract, iteration of the reasons for young people's 'disengagement' from politics with an empirically rich mapping of young people's understandings of the civic and political space that they inhabit.

In policy terms, MYPLACE identifies the obstacles to, and facilitators of, young people's reclamation of the European political arena as 'my space'."

Want to find out more? Go to the project website here.

Caucasus Barometer: Unpacking Public Trust in the President

2011-07-01T17:47:00.011+04:00

In the spring of 2011, CRRC ran the Caucasus Barometer Report Writing competition and now we have an opportunity to present some of the results to you. The first report is written by one of the competition winners, Keti Khachidze, and addresses trust in the Georgian president. Here is a quick summary of her findings and analysis.

In recent years, the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, has confronted a series of mass demonstrations demanding his resignation. During these opposition-led protests, his political opponents frequently claimed that the president has “lost public trust” and therefore ought to step down. However, results of CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer survey show that contrary to the allegations of his critics, President Saakashvili continues to enjoy high levels of trust across a wide cross section of society. In fact, he may be more widely trusted now than he has been for several years.

The president enjoys support from a broad cross section of society; those who live in rural areas as well as high earners in the capital are more likely to trust the president. Members of the Azerbaijani ethnic minority in Georgia are especially supportive, as are those who trust the media and those who see Georgia as a place where fair elections are held. The president can also count on the trust of state sector employees, and people who feel positively about international institutions such as NATO and the UN.

However, Tbilisi remains a place where distrust of the president is relatively entrenched, especially among those with lower incomes. Furthermore, several types of people are not only less likely to trust the president, but are much more likely to distrust him. These groups include people who have recently had family members who have lost jobs, those who are least satisfied with their own lives, people who do not trust elections or the media, as well as those who are skeptical of the international community. This suggests a significantly divided political landscape in Georgia. While the president can continue to count on the trust of a majority of the population, there are many groups who appear to be firmly skeptical of him.

Read the report here.

Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey | new TESEV report

2011-06-23T12:55:00.000+04:00

TESEV’s Foreign Policy Programme recently published a report entitled ‘Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey’, which analyses Turkish attitudes towards international relations with several countries, including Armenia. The main finding of their survey regarding attitudes towards Armenia is that Turks are more supportive of undergoing various kinds of rapprochement with Armenia than they are of fully re-establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border.

Turkish perspectives on re-establishing diplomatic relations and rapprochement vary greatly depending on region. The greatest level of support for re-establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia comes from those residing in South East Anatolia, with 59% of respondents expressing their support. The most opposition comes from those residing in the Black Sea region, with 60% of respondents expressing their opposition.

Respondents from South East Anatolia also express the greatest support for economic, political and cultural rapprochement with Armenia; 62% of respondents support economic rapprochement, 60% support political rapprochement and 60% support cultural rapprochement. Respondents from South East Anatolia appear to support across the board reconciliation with Armenia, while those from other regions are more mixed in their attitudes.

Regarding attitudes towards European Union membership, 69% of respondents want Turkey to join while 26% are opposed to joining. The main reasons for supporting EU membership are the easing of visa restrictions and economic benefits. Worth noting is that respondents, by a large number, feel the greatest obstacle to EU membership is Europe’s Islamophobia.

When asked about the United States, over half (52%) of respondents feel the US is unfriendly towards Turkey, the primary reason for this being that the US thinks only of its own benefits. Despite this, more than half (53%) of respondents feel the future of relations between Turkey and the US will be positive.

Turks have very strong opinions on foreign policy in the Middle East. Respondents feel that Israel is the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region (23%), followed by the US (12%) and terrorism (7%). Many Turks feel that Turkey could be a model for other countries in the Middle East, politically (72%), economically (80%) and culturally (82%). Three quarters of respondents support Turkey playing a role in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Akgün M., Gündoğar S.S., Görgülü A., Aydın E.E. 2011. 'Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey', TESEV.

Follow this link for the full report.

Seminar Report: Perceptions about Georgia: Leading or Loosing the Struggle for Democracy

2011-06-21T14:31:00.004+04:00

A joint seminar on May 10th by Clingendael Institute and the Eurasian Partnership Foundation (EPF), and co-sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, debated the state of the rule of law and democracy in Georgia, and the possible application of a “Georgian model” in the wider region. Following a keynote speech by Robert de Groot, Dutch Director General for European Cooperation, high level speakers and participants from the Georgian government (including Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze), parliament (including opposition leader Irakli Alasania), media and civil society, from EPF’s regional network, and the European Union were asked to present their views in three panels. These different views generated an impressive and constructive debate on the state of democracy in Georgia. The final question about a Georgian model and its applicability elsewhere in the region led to interesting, multifaceted responses. In conclusion it can be said that the debate about sensitive political issues in Georgia took place in a truly constructive atmosphere of which all participants can be proud.

A report and data presented by EPF can be downloaded from the Cringendeal website.

Works in Progress Series | List and Stats

2011-06-16T15:21:00.000+04:00

In Georgia, we are close to wrapping up the Works-in-Progress series for this semester, which we have been organizing in collaboration with American Councils. It's been a successful run with a range of different topics and speakers.

Donnacha O Beachain comparing Georgian and Kyrgyz revolutions

Here are our stats, thanks to Timothy Blauvelt.

Presenters: Georgians - 15%

US - 30%

UK - 25%

Other EU and Canada - 30%

Topics: Politics, Policy, Political Science - 55%

History - 15%

Archeology, Ethnology, Musicology - 15%

Other (Economics, Social Media, Healthcare) - 15%

Ideally we would like some more Georgians to come forward and present their ongoing research projects in the future. For now, see the program we had below.

January 26: Donnacha O Beachain, Dublin City University – Kyrgyzstan 2005 and 2010

February 2: Gavin Slade, Oxford University – Overturning the Criminal Nobility

February 9: Koba Turmanidze, CRRC – Assessing the State of Democracy: Citizen Outlook from the South Caucasus.

February 16: Tom De Waal, Carnegie Foundation – Georgia's Choices of State Models

February 23: CRRC Junior Fellows – Economic Conditions of Households in Georgia

March 2: Ryan Hughes, University of Michigan – An Archeological Survey of the Vani Site

March 9: Sonya Kleshik, CRRC – Language Policy in Georgia

March 16: John Graham, Princeton University – Pencils and Erasers: Harmonizing Georgian Chant in the Early 20^th Century

March 23: Kevin Tuite, University of Montreal – Khevsur Shrine Invocations: Poetics, Performance and Agonism

March 30: Hans Gutbrod, CRRC – Social Capital in Georgia

April 6: George Welton, GeoWel @ CRRC Project – Access to Justice in Central Asia

April 13: Oliver Reisner, EU Delegation to Georgia – Contemporary Georgian Historiography

April 27: Onnik Krikorian, Global Voices – Social Media in the South Caucasus

May 4: Dan Healey, Swansea University – Medical Research in Stalin's Gulag: A Scientific Culture Behind Barbed Wire, 1930-56

May 11: Paul Crego, US Library of Congress – Strategic Patience: A Way Forward?

May 18: Thijs Rommens, K.U. Leuven – The European Neighborhood Policy and Civil Society in Georgia

May 25: Michaela Ferrari, Fulbright Fellow – Assessing Clinicians' and Women's Attitudes Toward Family Planning in Georgia

June 1: Krista Goff, University of Michigan – The Georgian-Speaking Minority in the Azerbaijan SSR

June 8: Giorgi Khelashvili, Tbilisi State University – The Soviet Legacy and Post-Soviet Foreign Policy in the Caucasus

June 15: Peter Rozic, Georgetown University – Lustration Politics: Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Countries

If you'd like to present, let us know. Otherwise, to hear about the events, follow Works-in-Progress on Facebook.

Georgian Social Capital in the Media!

2011-06-13T16:40:00.005+04:00

We have previously highlighted the research on social capital that CRRC has undertaken with the generous support of USAID. As we said at the time, and have argued in subsequent presentations, social capital is a missing link in Georgia. Its absence impedes social, economic and political development.

Our research has recently been picked up by media outside Georgia, providing summaries on our findings. Two of these articles begin with familiar images. “Georgia’s Not So Big Society,” in The Economist’s blog, compares generous Georgian hospitality with its hectic and impatient traffic. Thomas de Waal, in his article, “The Anatomy of Apathy,” published in The National Interest, begins his reflections with the contrast between the run-down facades of buildings and the warm and welcoming apartments within.

To read these broader reflections on social capital research in Georgia, please visit the article on the Economist website, and you can find de Waal piece's in the National Interest here.

What’s behind the May 2011 protests in Georgia?

2011-06-09T11:52:00.002+04:00

There have been three main protests since 2007 that have demanded the Georgian president, Mikhail Saakhashvili, to step down. These three protests have been described in detail in international and qualified local coverage, such as that on EurasiaNet and Civil.ge. So what, from the point of view of research, are the main differences between the protests in 2007, in 2009 and in 2011?

There are a number of striking differences. First, the most recent protest has been the least attended. Reuters reported that around 10,000 people protested at the peak of the May 2011 protests. According to CRRC estimates, subsequently picked up by a lot of media, up to 60,000 people did so in 2009 and between 50,000 and 100,000 people participated in the 2007 protest.

Second, this decline in protest numbers is mirrored by a change in national sentiment about the direction in which Georgian politics is going. A March 2011 survey conducted by CRRC for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) shows that the percentage of people who say Georgian politics is going in the wrong direction has diminished since 2007.

In 2007, 40% of respondents thought that the direction of politics in Georgia was going mainly or definitely in the wrong direction, whereas in March 2011, that number was 19%. In other words, since 2007 the number of people who thought Georgia is going in the wrong direction has halved. As the slide shows, many more people now also think that Georgia is definitely going in the right direction.

Third, several media outlets have highlighted that the majority of protesters in May 2011 seemed to be above 50 years old. As Koba Turmanidze, CRRC Georgia Country Director, notes, the results from a 2011 CRRC media survey show that older people (who are not retired) continue to be less employed than younger people, and are less happy with their own and Georgia’s economic conditions than younger people. Their unhappiness may also reflect that they have been less engaged in post-Rose Revolution Georgia.

Moreover, results from the 2010 CB also show that the poorer a person considers the economic level of his/her household to be compared to most of the households around them, the more they agree that people should participate in protest actions against the government since the people should be in charge.

2010 CB-Georgia

The numbers do not sum to 100% because the ‘don’t know’ and ‘refuse to answer’

categories have been removed. Note that few people characterize their own
economic condition as "very good", thus the results are less representative.
More details on request.

This may be important in a country where 91% of the population consider rising prices to be worse than in 2008.

Next to the differences that we have identified, do you think there was anything that made the 2011 protests different to previous waves of demonstrations? (Note that you can also do some analysis yourself on our data interface ODA).

Conference on Social Protection and Social Inclusion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

2011-06-07T16:01:00.007+04:00

The South Caucasus Social Protection and Social Inclusion regional conference was held in Tbilisi, Georgia on May 19th and 20th. Both the CRRC-Armenia and CRRC-Azerbaijan offices presented country reports on these issues.

Supported by the European Commission (EC), the reports provide overviews of the economic systems, labor markets and education systems in the South Caucasus. The research outlines demographic trends, and examines the modernization of the social protection systems in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Moreover, they address issues of poverty, pensions and healthcare.

Attendees of the conference, organized by the EC as well, were mostly Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian government officials from relevant ministries and agencies, as well as NGOs and research organizations.

The country reports (in English) can be downloaded from here. You will find them useful reference documents on all the issues of social protection and social inclusion in the three countries. Executive summaries are available in Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani as well as in Russian.

CRRC Starts Youth Engagement Research | European Project

2011-06-03T17:16:00.001+04:00

As of June 1, CRRC has started work on a collaborative project on youth engagement, called MYPLACE. MYPLACE is an FP7 Collaborative Large-scale integrating project funded under the 2010 Social Sciences and Humanities call ‘Democracy and the shadows of totalitarianism and populism: the European experience’. It brings together a consortium of 16 research institutions from 14 European countries as well as 14 stakeholder public institutions (museums, NGOs, archive and document centres).

The coordinating institution is the University of Warwick. The coordinator is Professor Hilary Pilkington (Department of Sociology).

In addition to CRRC, the other project partners are:

Tallinn University, Estonia
University of SS Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia
University of Bremen, Germany
Jena University, Germany
University of Eastern Finland, Finland
University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
ISCTE, Lisbon University Institute, Portugal,
‘Region’, Ul’ianovsk State University, Russian Federation
Daugavpils University, Latvia
Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences, Zagreb, Croatia
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
University of Debrecen, Hungary
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
Panteion University of Athens, Greece

The project runs from June 1st 2011-31 May 2015.

MYPLACE stands for Memory Youth Political Legacy And Civic Engagement. The project investigates how young people’s social participation is shaped by the shadows of totalitarianism and populism in Europe.

Why is this an important question to ask? The current generation of young people is united by the experience of growing up in a Europe that is largely free of both right and left-wing authoritarian regimes. They also share the lack of any first-hand memory of the cold war and the associated fears and prejudices that divided Europe or direct experience of living under a communist, authoritarian or fascist political regime. At the same time, they share the experience of growing up in the first global economic crisis in the post-World War Two period, which we might expect to provide the far right a fertile ‘recruitment’ ground. Moreover, because the current generation of young people in Europe has little or no experience of extremist and populist politics, it may be particularly vulnerable to radical political agendas.

Why is it important to ask this question now? In the current context of economic recession political parties and movements of the far right are becoming increasingly visible. In the 2009 European parliamentary elections, far-right political parties won substantial support in a number of EU member states. They also made parliamentary representation breakthroughs in countries where they have had little previous success. This is a pattern repeated in a number of European countries in national and regional elections.

In this context MYPLACE asks how young people’s engagement with the past is likely to shape their reception to contemporary populist political agendas. It draws no simple ‘straight lines’ from ‘authoritarian’ pasts to precarious democratic presents or futures. It is premised on the assumption that radical and populist political and philosophical traditions are pan-European and cyclical rather than embedded in discrete national ‘political cultures’ or based on rigid classifications of political heritage (‘totalitarian’, ‘communist’, ‘fascist’) and open to ‘healing’ through ‘democratization’. This makes the project genuinely trans-European.

Expertise in youth studies of the project partners means we start with a clear understanding of young people not as passive objects of political manipulation but as active political agents. Evidence from a number of ‘colour revolutions’ in countries of former communist Europe as well as anti-globalization, anti-poverty, anti-war and anti-cuts campaigns, indeed suggests that young people’s political consciousness is not a blank canvas and that young people are not only mobilised but can effectively network, organise and lead major political actions.

MYPLACE is interdisciplinary, bringing together researchers trained in a range of social sciences (sociology, politics, anthropology, psychology and cultural studies). It will include a large scale survey in 14 countries to measure young people’s political and civic participation and attitudes. Interviews and focus groups will be used to understand the meanings young people attach to such participation as well as to explore how these meanings are transmitted across generations. Around 50 ethnographic case studies of young people’s actual civic participation and political activism will also be conducted across the countries of the project.

Policy makers and practitioners are involved in the project from its outset through nationally based Youth Policy Advisory Groups. Through these groups, the project will implement its objective of creating an active and sustainable dialogue between academic, public and policy institutions. The project’s findings will feed into regional, national and EU level policy making centres as well as a range of youth activist, anti-racism/xenophobia networks. An important objective of the project is to inform policy-makers about the range of political and civic activities in which young people are involved, rather than focusing on ‘problems’ in the youth sphere.

If you want to know more, the contact details for further information about the project are the following:

Project Coordinator: Hilary Pilkington, Dept of Sociology, University of Warwick, h.pilkington [att] warwick.ac.uk
Project Manager: Martin Price, Dept of Sociology, University of Warwick, M.R.Price [att] warwick.ac.uk

Project website: http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/

For CRRC Tina Zurabishvili will be the lead on most of this project, and we will inform you about further updates through our blog. Get in touch if you want to find out more.

Ask CRRC | Population Sizes and Sample Sizes

2011-06-01T13:04:00.011+04:00

Q: The 2010 Caucasus Barometer includes about 2,000 completed interviews in each country: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. However, the three countries vary in size; the population of Armenia is just under 3 million, Georgia has a population of about 4.6 million, and the population of Azerbaijan is about 8.4 million (according to the CIA World Factbook). How can the same or a similar sample size be appropriate for each country?

A: Great question! Contrary to popular belief, the total population size has little effect on the necessary sample size. Necessary sample size is more dependent on the amount of variability between members of a population. Only one person would need to be sampled if there were no variability in a population and every member would give identical answers.

Let’s use a physical example to make this more clear:

The two populations above have the same average height, but the members of Population B have much more variability in height than the members of Population A. Thus, if you were sampling Population B you would need a much larger sample size in order to reach the same level of certainty about the population’s average height than you were if you were sampling Population A. In short, the greater the amount of variability in the population, the larger your sample size needs to be in order to capture that variability.

Other issues that affect sample size include how accurate you want conclusions drawn from the sample to be and how certain you want those conclusions to be. In making a precise statement, you could say, for example, that “from the 2010 Caucasus Barometer, our best estimate of the proportion of Tbilisi residents who have travelled to another country is 18.5%, and we are 95% sure that the true value is between 15.5% and 21.5%.” Technically speaking, 95% is our confidence level and our margin of error is 3%. Therefore, we are 95% sure that the true value lies within the range of our best estimate plus or minus 3%. To increase your level of confidence or reduce the margin of error, you would need a larger sample size -- and more money to pay for the extra interviews.

Here is one more thing worth knowing about sampling. Imagine a country of 5 million people, and a village of 500 inhabitants (both with the same amount of variability). Let’s say you require a sample of 200 from the country to reach a 95% level of confidence and a 3% margin of error. How many inhabitants of the village should be sampled to reach that same level of confidence and the same margin of error? Take a guess.

Done? The number is surprisingly high: we still need to sample one hundred and forty three inhabitants from the village. So while the country is 10,000 times the size of the village, it only requires an extra 57 people in the sample to achieve the same margin of error at the same level of confidence. In other words, one entirely counter-intuitive aspect about sampling is that small populations may still require a large proportion to be sampled to get representative findings.

In summary, while population size is one of the four factors that influence the necessary sample size for any survey (and even more factors have to be considered for complex surveys like the CB), its influence is relatively negligible.

Do you have further questions? Write a comment and let us know.

Blood Donation in the South Caucasus: Refill, Please!

2011-05-24T20:14:00.000+04:00

With the upcoming World Blood Donor Day on June, 14, the question about current attitudes towards blood donation in the South Caucasus is worth examining. While there are considerable efforts in all three countries to increase donation rates and improve blood screening, donation rates remain below 1%, according to WHO data for Armenia and Georgia, and thereby stand at the lower end in international comparison. Increasing the availability of safe blood is of tremendous importance to guarantee the minimum needs for patients. Here we summarize some of the main information provided by the WHO, as it relates to the South Caucasus.

Armenia has registered a growing amount of blood collection over the last few years. In 2009, 54.6% of the donations came from paid donors (US$ 30 per donation), 40.4% from family/ replacement donors and 5% from voluntary non-remunerated donors. The financial incentives for blood donation are strongly anchored, and groups advocating unpaid donation have to compete against remunerated donation offered by the pharma industry. While blood donation is currently financed through the national budget, it is envisaged to shift responsibility to private initiatives. There are already several organisations that advocate for non-remunerated blood donation, mainly Club 25 or the Fund for Armenian Relief.

In Azerbaijan, blood collection figures more than doubled between 2003 and 2006. In 2008, a law was passed by which only non-paid donors are admitted. There is no remuneration for donors with the exception of reimbursement for travel expenses in some cases. Islamic religious groups in Azerbaijan have participated in efforts to increase blood donation. Last year, a campaign was held at mosques and places of pilgrimage during the religious holiday of Ashura. The blood donation system in Azerbaijan is funded by the government and overviewed by the Research Institute on Haematology and Transfusiology, which includes the central blood bank. Apparently the main problems relate to supplies of consumables, which are not always available (e.g. blood bags, tubes etc).

In Georgia, the donation rate would need to increase by some 60% in order to cover the needs of Georgian patients. The transfusion system is privately managed, although there is government funding for blood donation and tests. The system suffers from a lack of quality control of blood donations, which is especially critical as the rate of Hepatitis C carriers is as high as 6%. Like in Armenia, the expectation for re-numeration for blood donation is deeply rooted. Currently, 95% of blood donations come from paid donors. There are two blood banks promoting voluntary non-remunerated blood donation in Georgia: the Jo Ann Medical Centre blood bank and the Gudushauri Hospital Blood Bank, both of which only work with volunteer donors. In 2009, the First Lady of Georgia started regular volunteer blood donation campaigns.

Sources and further information are available here.

If You Were Asked What Everyone Else Thought of Your Country...

2011-05-11T10:28:00.008+04:00

By Sarrah Bechor

CRRC recently completed its 8th annual Caucasus Barometer survey, gathering data about perceptions of trust, livelihood and social realities during face-to-face interviews in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Some of the results from these countries have been compared to results from 22 other countries that were surveyed as part of the 2010 Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey.

One question asked members of these 25 countries whether or not they believed their countries were generally liked or disliked. Results show that well over half of the population of the South Caucasus countries believed that their respective countries are generally liked: 76% of Armenians, 68% of Georgians and 52% of Azerbaijan agreed with the statement.

The percentages of don’t know/refuse to answer (DK/RA) responses are also quite interesting. Nineteen percent of Georgians, 25% of Azerbaijanis and 10% of Armenians responded that people did not know about their respective countries. It might be interesting to understand why certain populations such as Pakistanis, Azerbaijanis or Russians have a rather large percentage (10% or more) of people who say they don’t know what others think of their country, as opposed to other populations such as the French, Indians or Americans who have very little percentages of don’t know responses. We can identify a few patterns by breaking up the list of 25 countries into different groups:

Western Europe: Britain, France, Germany and Spain

Hubs of Tourism/History of Interaction: Indonesia, India, Jordan, Egypt, Argentina, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil, US and Turkey

Politically Contentious: China, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia

Isolated South Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (These countries could also fall under the politically contentious category due to the presence of frozen, past or potential conflicts)

Many of the Western European countries on the list are either hubs of tourism or have a history of international interaction (e.g., history of colonial, economic or political prominence). These countries have lower percentages of DK/RA responses. Politically-contentious states such as Russia and China are either overshadowed by regional conflict such as in the case of Lebanon in the Middle East, South Korea which is often related to issues involving North Korea, or China, Russia and Pakistan. The South Caucasus region could also fall into the politically contentious category and they are relatively isolated from the international arena.

In this way, citizens who said that they didn't know or refused to answer have also provided interesting information just as those who said that they perceived their country to be generally liked or disliked.

Please visit CRRC’s webpage for the 2010 CRRC Caucasus Barometer and the webpage for the Pew Global Attitudes Project to get more information about the surveys, or to access the original questionnaires and datasets.

We would love to hear your thoughts on this theme as well!

Follow-Up Media Landscape Survey

2011-05-10T16:32:00.006+04:00

By Tamar Zurabishvili

In September 2009, CRRC conducted a baseline survey on the Georgian media landscape within the scope of an EU-funded project entitled, “Strengthening the Media's Role as a Watchdog Institution in Georgia”, implemented by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. The results of the study have informed a far-reaching public debate on the state of media, attitudes of the Georgian population toward the media, and perceptions of its independence and professionalism. The survey continues to be a point of reference, as this recent article illustrates. The ongoing debate suggests that there is considerable demand for fact-based research about the Georgian media.

The follow-up Media Landscape survey, conducted by CRRC in April-May 2011 with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a unique opportunity to analyze attitudes of the Georgian population towards the media, as well as to monitor changes in media consumption. Among the findings, our preliminary analysis shows that the number of internet users has increased two-fold since September 2009. Internet as the primary source of information is still limited, but with now 5% it has nearly doubled in the last 18 months. At the same time, respondents say that most Georgians use the internet as a tool for social networking. There thus are new opportunities for Georgian media outlets that may seek to reach out to internet users more proactively and to develop more attractive internet media products.

These are only the first snapshots. More data and analysis will be available soon. For now, the questionnaire and dataset for the 2009 survey can be downloaded in SPSS and STATA formats from CRRC’s website. We welcome your visit!

ODA – CRRC Data Analysis Online

2011-05-10T12:38:00.007+04:00

CRRC is happy to announce its new Online Data Analysis (ODA) program! Crunching numbers from CRRC surveys is now easier than ever.

The CRRC Georgia office has initiated and created this special program with the help of Irakli Naskidashvili. The ODA provides users with the opportunity to access survey data and analyze data online without having to use any special statistical program, such as SPSS or STATA.

The ODA is extremely user-friendly. With one click you can choose a survey question of interest and receive a chart and a table in Excel online. Charts and tables can be exported and downloaded in accessible formats.

Currently we have available on the ODA both the 2009 and 2010 Caucasus Barometer surveys, which includes data on all the three South Caucasus countries. The ODA will be periodically updated with new data gathered by CRRC.

An example of a slide on ODA:

An example of a table on ODA:

Interested? Check out ODA now!

Public Attitudes in Georgia: CRRC Polling Results

2011-05-05T11:22:00.000+04:00

CRRC conducted a survey on political and economic attitudes in Georgia for the National Democratic Institute (NDI), funded by the Swedish International development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The fieldwork of the survey took place in March, 2011 and surveyed 2,893 respondents in Georgia. The survey covered the issues of public importance, perceptions and attitudes toward democracy and ongoing reforms, as well as various domestic and foreign affairs.

According to the survey results, economic and social problems such as jobs and rising prices are major source of concerns for the majority of the population: 46% of respondents said that situation has worsened in respect of jobs since January 2008 (37% said it was the same).

Beyond that, the survey highlights many nuances that often are disregarded when just looking at the headlines. Below, for example, you see that there is a fair amount of appetite for discussion on specific policies.

The survey results were presented by NDI at a press conference on April 6, 2011 and other presentations followed, throughout Georgia.This included public meetings in Batumi, Gori, Kutaisi, Rustavi, and a number of other cities.

The survey results were widely covered by many media sources, such as Civil.ge, the Messenger, 24 hours, Rezonansi, as well as through the TV channels, such as Rustavi2 and Imedi. The results are accessible from the NDI website.

C-R Policy Brief on IDP Attitudes to Conflict, Return, Justice

2011-05-05T10:57:00.001+04:00

In March, Conciliation Resources (C-R) has published a report on IDP attitudes to conflict, return and justice, which we have already highlighted in a previous blog-post. As you may recall, this report was based on a survey of IDPs which CRRC undertook for C-R in the summer of 2010.

Now, C-R has published a policy brief on the same issue.

This is a short crisp summary of some of the main findings, also with C-R's policy recommendations.

C-R highlights five main suggestions:

focus on IDP's welfare and integration;
giving the displaced a voice;
facilitating information exchange and a broad public discussion on return;
utilizing IDPs as a resource for peace, bridging between different groups;
responding to the demand for justice.

If you are interested in the raw data, this is also accessible from C-R's website. For now, find the link to the highly readable report here.

Internet Penetration in Armenia

2011-04-13T13:51:00.034+04:00

Scholar Katy Pearce recently published an article on Epress News (http://www.epress.am/) revealing some interesting points about internet penetration in Armenia. Using information from CRRC's 2010 Caucasus Barometer, Pearce writes that internet penetration tripled from 2009 to 2010 within Armenia. According to Pearce, the most likely reason for this is increased access to mobile internet.

The article reveals that new internet adoption is regionally diverse in Armenia and that men and women make up an equal number of early adopters (new users). Pearce places specific emphasis on the fact that the average age of the mobile internet user is older than would be expected (41).

Pearce posits that the Armenian government's 'Computers for All' Program may have influenced such a sharp increase this past year. The program, which was launched in September 2009, allows Armenian citizens to rent desktop and laptop computers at a low price (11,400-18,300 drams/month and 11,200 drams/month, respectively).

Although the program does account for some of the usage increase, Pearce points out that the program has failed to increase computer literacy in Armenia. According to her, data from the Caucasus Barometer shows that self-reported computer skills have not increased since 2007. Also, Pearce concludes that, while the program has resulted in an increase in the use of computers among the Armenian population, personal computers are still 'prohibitively expensive for most Armenians.'

- 'Internet Penetration in Armenia Tripled in Past 2 Years: Caucasus Barometer', Epress News, 4/12/2011. < http://www.epress.am/en/2011/04/12/internet-penetration-in-armenia-tripled-in-past-2-years-caucasus-barometer/ >

The Caucasus Barometer 2010 Dataset Is Available!

2011-04-07T17:15:00.009+04:00

What are the social, political and economic attitudes of people in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan? Do Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis think employment or territorial integrity is the most important issue facing their respective countries? How do they judge the fairness of elections or media independence? How trusting or supportive are they of the European Union, NATO membership or local institutions? You can find the answer to these questions and many more in CRRC’s 2010 Caucasus Barometer survey dataset which is now available on the CRRC website.

The Caucasus Barometer is CRRC’s annual and nationwide household survey conducted in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and is in its eight year. The survey covers a wide range of attitudes and opinions on economic, social and political issues. The 2010 survey also includes many new questions on gender issues, employment, internet and cell phone usage, as well as questions on Armenia-Turkey and Georgia-Abkhazia relations.

For example, here is a slide from the CB 2010 survey which shows that 70% of the Georgian population supports Georgia’s membership in NATO, while 44% of Azerbaijanis and 37% of Armenians support their respective countries' membership in the organization.

The next slide on emigration shows that Armenians are more inclined to emigrate from Armenia (both permanently and temporarily) than Georgians and Azerbaijanis are from Georgia and Azerbaijan, respectively.

These are two examples of the fascinating kinds of data available from the survey. The questionnaire and dataset in SPSS or STATA are available on CRRC’s website. We welcome your visit!

Caucasus Barometer 2010 reveals Georgian attitudes towards Indians

2011-04-06T21:53:00.000+04:00

A recent article in Georgia Today entitled “India through the eyes of Georgian children” described an exhibition, which was hosted by Bharatma, a Georgian-Indian cultural organization established 20 years ago, in which young Georgian public school students displayed artwork portraying their visions of Indian culture. This organization receives funding from the Indian Embassy to Armenia and Georgia (located in Yerevan) and seeks to foster mutual Georgian-Indian understanding. The exhibition sparks further interest in Georgians' perceptions not only of distant, far-away India, but also on the growing minority of Indians in Tbilisi.

The website for the Indian Embassy to Armenia and Georgia draws historical links between Georgia and India in a cursory summary of India-Georgia bilateral relations. This overview alludes to ties in literature and trade, as well as centuries-old connections dating back to the Mughal era during which Georgians were believed not only to have occupied rather high positions in the Courts but also to have married into the Mughal imperial family.

Currently, a number of Indians reside in Tbilisi as students at Tbilisi State Medical University as well as professionals working for Indian companies with office locations in Georgia. Although, there seem to be both historical and current close ties between Georgians and Indians, it would be interesting to explore specific attitudes of Georgians towards Indians. The recent 2010 Caucasus Barometer included two questions that provide some fascinating insights on Georgians’ approval on doing business with Indians and on Georgian women marrying Indians.

This first figure reveals some interesting findings, particularly that Georgians approve doing business with Ukrainians more than with other groups selected for comparison. While Georgians’ approval of doing business with Indians (60%) does not fare particularly well, it is also, rather strikingly, comparatively not that bad, with just 4% lower than Armenians. Perhaps these figures could reflect some historical ties or a familiarity with Indian culture through exposure to Bollywood films. That the approval percentage is not even higher for Indians could feasibly be a function of a variety of factors, including xenophobia and the fear of foreigners taking Georgians’ jobs.

The figure below presents a much more differentiated, stark picture. In this case, it is evident that a relatively low percentage of Georgians approve of Georgian women marrying Indians. However, data shows that Turks do not garner more approval, nor do the Chinese, who receive even less approval. There are many forces that could conceivably be at play here. For example, religion could be a major factor influencing approval rates, as could a common Soviet history. Geography could also be a viable explanation, as Georgians outside of Tbilisi or urban settlements might not have any interaction with local Indian and Chinese populations. This could potentially render them more foreign to Georgians. Then again, increased interaction might not necessarily be associated with higher approval ratings on doing business or Georgian women marrying Indians.

Understanding any effects of a burgeoning Indian community on Georgians’ approval for doing business or Georgian women marrying Indians would necessitate some kind of analysis over time. Without such, it is difficult to make any firm conclusions. However, upon first glance, this data shows some interesting overall, general attitudes. What could be some other speculations based on this data? We welcome your thoughts!

CRRC-Azerbaijan Junior Research Fellows Compete for the Best PowerPoint Presentation

2011-04-06T10:29:00.008+04:00

On March 11, 2011, the participants of CRRC-Azerbaijan’s Junior Research Fellowship Program (JRFP) competed for the best PowerPoint presentations based on data from the 2009 Caucasus Barometer (CB). The event was their first time demonstrating their skills in organizing and presenting data. The fellowship selection committee and organizers were anxious to see what the fellows would present after many months of training in quantitative data analysis.

All of the presentations were interesting, vibrant and thoughtful. Some of the fellows provided deep insight into challenging social issues. The fellowship selection committee, represented by Leyla Karimli, Sabina Rustamova, Tamerlan Rajabov and CRRC program staff had a difficult time selecting the contest winners. Topical clarity, use of CB data, coherent information and presentation skills were all considered by the committee. The winners of the best three presentations were Aynur Ramazanova, Shahla Mammadova and Nargiz Mammadova.

Aynur Ramazanova examined the experiences of divorced women in Azerbaijan and showed that they are more likely than married women to experience feelings such as loneliness, emptiness and rejection. Shahla Mammadova also dealt with psychological issues arguing that people with a stronger psychological state are more likely to rate their health as ‘good’, get up early in the morning, have a job and generate more income. Nargiz Mammadova compared levels of trust and corruption in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The winners of the competition received external hard drives. The other presenters received USB flash drives as recognition gifts. Please see some photos from the presentations below!

Presentation Summary | Georgian-Abkhaz ‘Dialogue through Research’

2011-04-05T11:02:00.003+04:00

On March, 30 2011 Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava presented findings on the politics of non-recognition as well as results from a forthcoming study on the de-isolation of Abkhazia. Abkhaz and Georgian researchers compiled their findings after conducting interviews and focus groups analyzing the perceptions of each side. The results revealed some interestingly ambivalent attitudes amongst respondents: Abkhazians expressed reluctant feelings towards the West through a rejection of democratic values. At the same time, there was a fear of being absorbed by Russia.

Both scholars concluded that the current Georgian ‘Law on the Occupied Territories’ is a counterproductive policy approach towards the breakaway regions – even in light of Georgian national interests. The current situation carries a danger of further alienation that might cross the threshold of non-reconciliation. Georgia, however, faces a serious trade-off in tailoring its strategy adequately; while the necessity to engage with Abkhazia eventually is acknowledged, engagement would somewhat dilute the ultimate goal of reintegration. Hence, both scholars emphasized the mediating role of the European Union. The EU, while being engaged in the process, follows no clear strategy yet. In contrast, the US has a strategy but refrains from engagement. Such sluggish policies by the West are further alienating Abkhazia and leave the breakaway province with no alternative to closer cooperation with Russia. The possibility of rapprochement is thereby increasingly jeopardized.

Conflict mitigation is the path to take instead of conflict resolution. This means providing the conditions for the de-isolation of Abkhazia and stimulating political debate in the breakaway province. Working successfully with Abkhazia could provide an opportunity for the EU to exemplify its protection of minorities. However, for now Abkhazia is left with few options other than further cooperating with Russia all while fearing its loss of sovereignty, self-preservation and distinctiveness.

Ask CRRC | Sampling Weights II

2011-03-29T10:33:00.012+04:00

Now, let’s move from this simple example to the Caucasus Barometer. When selecting respondents for the CB, CRRC first divides the country into nine geographic divisions: the capital, urban-northeast, urban-northwest, urban-southeast, urban-southwest, rural-northeast, rural-northwest, rural-southeast and rural-southwest. Within each of these nine groups, nine separate samples of voting precincts are randomly selected. Households are randomly selected within each selected voting precinct. Then, a single adult respondent is randomly selected within each selected household.

How do we calculate the sampling weight of a CB respondent? First we calculate the probability that the respondent was in our sample. There are three steps to this process since there are three stages of random selection. Suppose that a respondent is a woman who lives with her husband, her husband’s mother and father, and her two young children in an apartment in voting precinct #2 of district #3 in Saburtalo. Voting precinct #2 of district #3 has 624 households and 18 interviews will be completed there. Tbilisi has 712 voting precincts in total, of which 50 are selected for sampling.

The first step is to calculate the chance that the woman’s voting precinct was selected for sampling, which is 50 in 712. The second step is to calculate the chance that her household was selected once her voting precinct had already been selected, which is 18 in 624. The third step is to calculate the chance that the woman herself was selected once her voting precinct and household had been selected, which is one in four—the four being the four adult members of her family. We can put those three selection probabilities together by multiplying them. This gives us the chance of this woman being interviewed:

The number of adult Georgians that she represents can be calculated as

Individuals living in different regions of the country, in different voting precincts, and in different size families have different probabilities of being selected for the sample. Thus, they have different sampling weights. Therefore, it is important to use an appropriate data analysis program and to use the sampling weights when making estimates about the greater Georgian population from the CB sample.

Ask CRRC | Sampling Weights I

2011-03-25T15:32:00.005+04:00

Q: In the posting on representativeness, you said that every member of the population must have some chance of being selected for the sample. In the next posting about sample size, your Rustavi example had every member of the population with an equal chance of being selected. What if everyone has a chance, but not an equal chance? In this case, is it possible to make a sample be representative of the population?

A: This is very important question! The short answer is yes—the sample can be representative of the population, but you need to do a little extra work. Let’s use a simple example:

Suppose we are interested in comparing the experiences of male and female students in an engineering program. The program has 800 men and 200 women. If we randomly select a sample of 200 students (20% of the total student population in the engineering program), then we should expect only about 40 women in our sample. Suppose we randomly select 100 men and then randomly select 100 women. This means that every man has an equal chance of being selected for the sample and every woman has an equal chance of being selected, but every student did not. If we want to use the responses of the men to say something only about male students or the responses of women to say something only about female students, then we can do this using some simple formulas from statistics. However, what if we want to use of all of the information that we have to say something about the entire population of students?

In this case, different members of the population have different chances of being selected. Every man has a 1 in 8 chance of being selected, while every woman has a 1 in 2 chance. We can turn this around and say that every man who is interviewed represents 8 people including himself and every woman who is interviewed represents 2 people including herself. This is what is known as a sampling weight – every man in the sample has a sampling weight of 8, while every woman in the sample has a sampling weight of 2:

We need to utilize sampling weights when making estimates about an entire population. This means that we need to use different statistical formulas than the simple ones used above. We also need to use a computer program that has built-in functions to make estimates about populations using data with sampling weights (e.g., SPSS for estimates or STATA for estimates and associated margins of error). As long as we do that, then our sample is still representative of our population even though every member of the population did not have the same chance of being selected for an interview.

Data on access to justice in Central Asia now available

2011-03-25T14:32:00.003+04:00

Last month we published a blog post with findings from CRRC’s first research project in Central Asia. An extensive analytical report, datasets and frequency tables are now available on the CRRC website. The research focused on how citizens in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experience access to justice.

What do people consider to be the main problems in their communities? Where do people go to solve different legal issues? How do people assess the legal system in their country? How much do people actually know about their legal rights? These are some of the questions the research has sought to answer.

A huge amount of data is waiting to be explored so check out the CRRC website to get direct access to previously non-existing data on access to justice in Central Asia.

Conference Summary | "Building Turkish Awareness of Armenian Genocide"

2011-03-24T16:33:00.002+04:00

By Ben Bronstein

On March 15th 2011, the ‘Yerkir’ Union and the Caucasus Institute held an international conference on Building Awareness of Turkish Society Regarding the Armenian Genocide. Speakers included Armenian experts as well as Cengiz Aktar and Ali Bayramoğlu, two Turkish experts who initiated the ‘I Apologize’ campaign in Turkey. The ‘I Apologize’ campaign was launched in 2008 by a group of Turkish intellectuals, allowing Turks the opportunity to personally apologize for the Armenian Genocide by signing an online petition. At present, approximately 70,000 people have signed the petition.

The first talk overviewed the history of denial of the genocide by the Turkish government and society as a whole. Despite the many years of negative attitudes towards recognition of the genocide, the speaker, David Hovhannisyan, felt reason for optimism after his time with the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission because of the understanding and compassion he and his Turkish colleagues eventually came to share.

In his talk ‘Developing a Policy of Memory in Turkey’, Cengiz Aktar addressed various kinds of memory – academic, cultural, personal and public. In each case, Mr. Aktar stressed that, while developing a widespread policy of memory in Turkey will take time, there has been progress. Mr. Aktar pointed to the influence of Hrant Dink, the impact of Armenian film and music, the restoration of Armenian churches and the growing public discourse surrounding Armenia and Armenians.

Ruben Melkonyan, in his talk entitled ‘The Turkish Government Policy Toward the Armenian Community in Turkey’, described the history of the Turkish government’s discriminatory treatment of Armenians (as well as towards Kurds, Greeks and Jews) during the 20th century following the genocide. In closing, Mr. Melkonyan addressed the issue of how the Armenian community in Turkey has been pressured to oppose recognition of the genocide.

Anush Hovannisyan addressed the history of Turkish attitudes towards recognition of the genocide. Her talk pointed to the changes that have taken place over time in Turkey and the various positions held by Turks today, from the extreme to the pragmatic.

During his talk on the ‘I Apologize’ campaign, Ali Bayramoğlu stressed that recognition of the genocide is not enough; relationships must be repaired and the political and cultural connections between Turks and Armenians must be mended.

The final talk, by Richard Giragosian, focused on the need for both Turks and Armenians to make efforts to repair the damaged relationship between the two peoples. For Turkey, Mr. Giragosian emphasized the need not only for recognition of the genocide, but an overall revolution in thinking about history. For Armenia, Mr. Giragosian accentuated the negative effects of constantly defining ones’ self with victimhood, and the detrimental effect of using the genocide as a test of ‘good or bad Turks’. Finally, Mr. Giragosian underlined the fact that complete reconciliation will not be possible until both Armenia and Turkey make serious progress in democratization. Because of this, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations between the two countries – including opening the border – as a first step. Mr. Giragosian’s final words were that ‘neither country can go back and the only way is forward’.

E-transparency in Georgia: A key to faith in democracy?

2011-03-23T16:55:00.006+04:00

Can more available public information on Georgian governmental websites promote institutional trust and enhance faith in democracy in Georgia? This is the topic of a recent book called “Electronic Transparency in Georgia” by the Institute for Freedom of Information (IDFI). The book presents findings on the accuracy and relevance of information provided on various Georgian governmental websites. The relevant research was carried out in Georgia between August and December 2010 and was within the wider framework of IDFI’s aim to promote access to public information, including budgets, staff salaries in different ministries, among other types of information.

Electronic transparency is becoming more of an issue as internet usage gradually increases in Georgia. The figure below shows that according to the Caucasus Barometer (CB), 18% of Georgians used the internet every day in 2010, whereas 13% used the internet every day in 2009. Data from the CB also consistently shows that those who more frequently use the internet are younger Georgians with more education and live in the capital.

IDFI observes some positive improvements to e-transparency such as the introduction of an online system in October 2010 by the State Procurement Agency. This online system will publish details about tenders and increase transparency in procurement procedures. However, according to IDFI, most governmental websites in Georgia do not display information about their functions, budgets or details about the implementation of state-funded projects. Some sites also do not feature a postal or email address. Subscriptions to news bulletins are rare, as are open platforms where people could express their opinions through forums, polls or blogs.

Can a lack of public information online influence faith in democracy in Georgia? This is especially relevant when bearing in mind the results of the survey,“Public Attitudes Towards Elections in Georgia”conducted by CRRC in April 2010, where 48% of Georgians said they did not believe that Georgia was a developed democracy at that moment (36% said yes, 17% said don’t know and 1% refused to answer).

The findings of the IDFI suggest that Georgia has quite a way to go to achieve governmental openness. According to IDFI, a more open and interactive approach to public information on governmental websites may increase institutional trust, promote active citizenry as well as a belief in democratic government. In addition, a stronger desire for such information from the population and an interest in government activities may encourage more open government. What do you think?

Transparency International Georgia launches platform to fix your street

2011-03-22T10:52:00.003+04:00

According to a poll CRRC conducted for the National Democratic Institute (NDI), 38% of the Georgian population says roads is the most important local issue for them. Sewage, streetlights and trash collection are other issues that the population finds important.

These are a findings that Transparency International Georgia (TIG) cites in a recent press release to announce the launch of the online platform FixMyStreet.ge (in Georgian chemikucha.ge). The idea is that when a problem is spotted on Tbilisi's streets, such as potholes in the sidewalk, you go to the website FixMyStreet.ge and report the problem. After you have filed a report of a problem, it is highlighted on an online map and the Tbilisi City Hall is automatically informed about the issue.

Online platforms to report issues in your community to get the authorities to quickly respond to them have previously been implemented in Western Europe and Canada. TIG's initiative now allows also Tbilisi residents to directly communicate problems on their streets with the Tbilisi administration, and monitor the authorities' response to the reported issues.

You will find all the information you need to start contributing to making Tbilisi a safer and more pleasant city at the FixMyStreet website.

Georgians on Abkhazia: What Is to Be Done?

2011-03-21T09:56:00.007+04:00

By Sonya Kleshik

One of the previous CRRC blogs discussed some results from CRRC’s recent survey called “IDPs in Georgia” which gauged the opinions and attitudes of IDPs displaced from Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 conflict towards return, conflict resolution and justice. CRRC’s annual survey, the Caucasus Barometer (2010) also included a series of questions on Georgia-Abkhazia relations asked to the non-IDP population of Georgia. The results show that Georgians are divided on issues regarding justice and territory in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Over half of Georgians either agree and very strongly agree that past injustices from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict need to be addressed in order to resolve the conflict, while over a third either agree and very strongly agree that the injustices of the past should be left behind. This reveals a division among Georgians in what they feel is the best way forward regarding conflict resolution. This also indicates the difficulties that policymakers face in representing the interests of the population on the issue.

A closer look at the divide among settlement type reveals an interesting picture about differing attitudes between Georgians from the capital and rural areas, specifically. While the highest percentage of those who strongly agree that past injustices should be left alone are rural residents (50%), the largest percentage of those who strongly agree think that past injustices should be addressed live in the capital (47%).

Georgians were also asked about their opinion on the prospects of returning Abkhazia to Georgian control – whether they thought that the chances had increased, decreased, or stayed the same after the 2008 conflict. Forty-one percent of Georgians say that the prospects of return had decreased, while 35% said that prospects stayed the same.

Georgians, as divided as they are about how to deal with the past, seem to agree that the chances of returning Abkhazia are either the same or less than before 2008. What does this mean for Georgian-Abkhaz relations and for Georgian policymakers? How can these differences in opinion be reconciled? What makes the rural population more inclined to leave past injustices behind them and those in the capital to want injustices addressed?

Check out Caucasus Barometer 2010 for more data by clicking here.

Spreading the News: File Sharing through Mobile Phones in Armenia

2011-03-19T12:27:00.002+04:00

How do multimedia phones affect the way media is consumed and circulated? Katy Pearce lays out interesting findings for the case of Armenia in the International Journal of Communication (5, 2011, pp. 511-528).

Amongst others, Pearce’s analysis relies on CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer (CB), illustrating the use of information and communication technology. The data indicates that Armenians are adapting to personal computers and the Internet more slowly than are individuals in neighboring and more economically developed countries. Only 14.7% of Armenian households own a personal computer, 77.4% of respondents report no basic computer skills, and 71% report no Internet skills. Web contents in the Armenian language are still limited.

The delay in some technological access also, paradoxically, fosters creativity: mobile phone usage is rapidly expanding and reached almost 81% in 2008. Especially the spread of multimedia phones since 2006 enables Armenians to substitute services that would be otherwise provided by personal computers. Pearce explores how Armenians share videos, pictures and audio files and in which way prevalent cultural norms foster social sharing. While most of the circulating files serve entertainment purposes, the author illustrates through selected cases how politically relevant contents play a role in population engagement – and are used within this realm by opposition activist groups.

For the full report, click here.

IDPs in Georgia – Attitudes towards return, conflict resolution and justice

2011-03-17T14:57:00.008+04:00

Under which conditions would IDPs be willing to return to Abkhazia? Should past injustices be addressed or left alone? What do IDPs consider the main reasons for the outbreak of the war in the early 1990s? The research project “IDPs in Georgia”, conducted by CRRC for Conciliation Resource (CR) with the financial support of the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability, provide insight to these questions and many more.

The research targeted IDPs displaced from Abkhazia as a result of the 1992-1993 conflict and focused on attitudes towards return, conflict resolution and justice. It included a large representative survey of IDPs currently living in collective centers, and focus groups with IDPs in private accommodation.

On March 15, 2011, Magdalena Frichova from CR together with CRRC presented the results of the survey at the EU delegation in Georgia. In addition to EU representatives, the audience consisted of ambassadors, representatives of the Georgian government and several international NGOs. The presentation sparked a lively debate especially about the conditions under which IDPs would be able and willing to return to Abkhazia. The audience expressed interest in further analysis of the data that are now available for the public. The participants also pointed out the need for more evidence based research to serve as a basis for future policies on conflict resolution in Georgia.

The results were also presented to civil society representatives in Abkhazia. In particular, the Abkhaz audience was surprised to see that the percentage of IDPs who support the use of force to solve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is very small (6% say the conflict can be resolved by force, and an additional 20% say it can be resolved by force as a last resort). At a presentation for Georgian NGOs on March 14, the debate focused mainly on IDPs’ dwellings back in Abkhazia and the fact that the majority of IDPs would face problems with regard to housing if return were made possible today. This is because most IDP dwellings have either been destroyed or are now being occupied by others (approximately 75% in total).

The overall purpose of the project was to inform future policies on IDPs and displacement, as well as to specifically provide a starting-point for an objective debate. CR has produced an analytical report that is now available from their website, together with frequency tables and slides. The dataset and the methodology and fieldwork report are available upon request from CRRC - Georgia. Based on the survey results, CR will also produce a discussion package including policy recommendations that will be addressed to the international community and to the Georgian authorities. Keep your eyes open at the CR website and here at the blog – more material from the research coming soon!

Understanding Georgian EUphoria: I am Georgian, therefore I am European! But am I also then an EU supporter?

2011-03-04T10:11:00.002+04:00

Georgians are in a state ‘EUphoria’. That is one of the claims made by academic Martin Muller in his article entitled “Public Opinion Toward the European Union in Georgia” in the latest edition of Post-Soviet Affairs (2011 27,1 pp. 64-92). Data used in this article are based on a 2009 CRRC survey called “Knowledge and Attitudes Towards the EU”. With 77% of the population in favor of EU membership, positive attitudes to the European Union (EU) in Georgia ‘dwarfs’ those in the other countries that constitute the EU’s Eastern Partnership – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Given this ‘Euro-enthusiasm,’ Muller’s paper asks: What are the determinants of positive attitudes to the EU amongst Georgians?

Muller explores a range of possible explanatory factors for pro-EU attitudes in Georgia including socio-cultural background (age, sex, education, ethnicity), economic situation, knowledge of the EU, political beliefs, cosmopolitanism (foreign languages, study abroad etc.), instrumental gain from closer ties to the EU, and attitudes to Russia. Conducting a multivariate regression of CRRC data the study isolates key predictors of pro-EU attitudes. The results turn up some surprising relationships between the variables that will be potentially of interest to the wider public as much as to policy-makers.

For one thing, on Muller’s analysis, late Prime Minister’s Zurab Zhvania’s proclamation that ‘I am Georgian, therefore I am European’ does not translate into ‘I am Georgian, therefore I am European and therefore an EU supporter’. In fact, Muller’s conclusions suggest that cultural identification with Europe is a weaker predictor of EU support than a range of other factors. What are these factors? A fear of Russia? Economic status? Support for the ruling party? To find out the answers to these questions, the article can be accessed at:

http://crrccenters.org/activities/publications/.

Armenia Civil Society Index | 2009 Findings

2011-03-03T09:55:00.015+04:00

In 2009, Counterpart International Armenia was given the rights by CIVICUS to use their methodology to conduct a public opinion survey and measure the Civil Society Index (CSI) in the Republic of Armenia. On February 22nd, Counterpart International Armenia presented the respective report.

According to CIVICUS, 'the two primary goals of the CSI are to enhance the strength and sustainability of civil society, and to strengthen civil society’s contribution to positive social change' ('Introduction to the CSI', http://www.civicus.org/csi).

The CSI assessment combines multiple indicators to provide a visual display of five following key dimensions:
1. Civic Engagement: 'The extent to which individuals engage in social and political initiatives.'
2. Level or Organisation: 'The degree of institutionalisation that characterises civil society.'
3. Practice of Values: 'The extent to which civil society practices some core values.'
4. Perceived Impact: 'The extent to which civil society is able to impact the social and policy arena, according to internal and external perceptions.'
5. External Environment: 'The above four dimensions are analysed in the context of "external environment", which includes the socioeconomic, political and cultural variables within which civil society operates (CIVICUS Civil Society Index, 'Armenian Civil Society', Analytical Country Report, 2010. pp. 6.).

The five key dimensions are plotted in order to produce the 'Civil Society Diamond diagram'. Armenia's 'Civil Society Diamond diagram' looks like this:

What the diagram shows is that, while Armenia's dimensions of 'Level of Organisation', 'Practice of values' and 'External Environment' demonstrate similar levels of development, the dimensions of 'Civic Engagement' and 'Perception of Impact' are lacking (CIVICUS Civil Society Index, 'Armenian Civil Society, CIVICUS Civil Society Index, 2010. pp. 6.).

According to the study, the weak score for 'Civic Engagement' is due to the lack of participation in civil society by the civilian population. Despite this, those who do participate do so 'frequently and extensively'. Also worth noting is that the 'Practice of Values' dimension shows a 'considerable level of internalisation and promotion of values in Armenian civil society'. The 'Perception of Impact' dimension is the lowest score and the 'External Environment' dimension continues to be obstructed by corruption and lack of devotion to the rule of law, according to the report (CIVICUS Civil Society Index, 'Armenian Civil Society', 2010. pp. 7.).

While presenting the report, Lusine Hakobyan, lead CSI coordinator for Counterpart International, acknowledged the local and international organisations that joined in evaluating the state and trends of Armenian civil society. Particularly, thanks were addressed to CRRC-Armenia for assisting with the sampling for the public opinion survey throughout Armenia.

The event was attended by H.E. Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch of the Embassy of the U.S.A., who gave the keynote address. The report was officially launched by the Head of Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office in Yerevan, Ambassador Sergey Kapinos. The study was implemented by Counterpart International with support from USAID, CIVICUS World Alliance for Civic Participation, OCSE office, UNDP, Civic Development and Partnership Foundation, NGO Center/northern branch, Partnership and Teaching NGO, Professionals for Civil Society NGO, the Caucasus Research and Resource Centers, Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation and Antares Holding.

Further, Counterpart International-Armenia partnered with the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) to develop another comparative study, which compliments the CIVICUS CSI country analytical reports of Armenia and Turkey. The study was conducted in the framework of the Cross Border Cooperation Initiative supported by The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

- 'Armenian Civil Society' from Transition to Consolidation', CIVICUS Civil Society Index, Analytical Country Report, 2010.
- 'Introduction to the CSI', http://www.civicus.org/csi.
- 'The Two Diamonds: Comparative Study of the State of Civil in Armenia and Turkey', Counterpart International/Armenia and Third Sector Foundation/Turkey, 2010.

Ask CRRC | Sample Size

2011-03-02T12:56:00.002+04:00

Q: In the last posting you said that in order for the sample to be representative of the entire population, every member of the population had to have some chance of being selected for the sample. However, you didn’t say anything about sample size. Doesn’t sample size matter?

A: As long as the sample size is not tiny, then the sample can be representative of the population – having 200 respondents or 2,000 respondents does not make a difference in whether you can call the sample representative of the population. Where sample size does make a difference is in how accurate your conclusions about the population of interest will be. Let’s explain what that means with an example:

Suppose we are interested in the population of voters in Rustavi and that we are interested in the proportion of residents who find the availability of gas to be an important local issue. We take a list of the 98,492 registered voters in Rustavi and randomly select a sample for interview. Now, let’s imagine two different scenarios: In the first, we randomly select 200 respondents and interview them. In the second, we randomly select 2,000 respondents and interview them. Now, imagine that in the first scenario, 64 respondents mentioned the availability of gas as an important local issue and 138 did not. Imagine that in the second scenario 640 respondents mentioned it and 1,380 did not. Because 64/200=0.32 and 640/2,000=0.32, in both scenarios exactly 32% of the respondents said that the availability of gas is an important local issue.

Both of these samples are representative of the population of Rustavi because every resident had a chance to be in the sample. In both cases, our best estimate of the proportion of Rustavi residents who consider the availability of gas to be a major issue is the same. This is the proportion that we encountered in each sample: 32%.

However, the two different sample sizes allow us to say two different things about the greater population of Rustavi. This is because in general the larger the sample size, the smaller the margin of error. The margin of error tells us how wide the range is within which we are sure that the true value for the entire population lies. For example, in the first scenario, using statistical formulas we can calculate that there is a 95% chance that the proportion of the entire population of 98,492 registered voters that considers the availability of gas to be an important issue is between 25.5% and 38.5%. However, in the second scenario, our calculations will tell us that we can be 95% confident that the proportion is between 30% and 34%.

That is, in the first scenario, we were 95% confident that the proportion was between 32% - 6.5% and 32% + 6.5%. In the second scenario, we were 95% confident that the proportion was between 32% - 2% and 32% + 2%. In other words, in the first scenario, the margin of error is 6.5% and in second scenario the margin of error is 2%. To conclude, different sample sizes can still be representative of a population. However, the margin of error varies with respect to the sample size and can tell us how accurate conclusions are about the population of interest.

Sex, Lies and EU Red Tape

2011-02-24T15:08:00.012+04:00

The internal workings of the European Union (EU) are notoriously yawnsome matters. However, in a survey from 2008, CRRC aimed to give an overview of Georgians’ understanding of and attitudes to the EU - including some hot topics concerning orientations towards such activities as sex before marriage, infidelity, dishonesty, and tax-paying.

Respondents were asked whether a range of these controversial activities were either ‘never justified’, ‘sometimes justified’ or ‘always justified’. Breaking down responses according to respondents from households that reported having a member who had lived in the EU for three months or more since 1993, against those from households that had no such members uncovered an interesting trend.

For example, respondents were asked whether it was ever justified for a woman to have a sexual relationship before marriage. A full 80% of respondents who had no family member who had lived in the EU reported that this was ‘never justified’, whereas only 54% of those with a family member who had lived in the EU felt the same. In terms of whether this was ‘sometimes justified’ the figures stood at 13% and 28% respectively (see table below).

A similar trend was found for attitudes to childbirth outside wedlock, as well as extra-marital affairs for both women and men. Meanwhile, though hardly anyone felt homosexuality was ‘always justified’, 10% of those with a household member who had lived in the EU felt it was ‘sometimes justified’ against only 3% of those who had no such member (see table below).

Interestingly, the same trend in attitudes held concerning such negative phenomena as lying, tax-avoidance, using criminal authorities for dispute resolution, and purchasing stolen goods. For example, while 69% of those respondents from households with no family connection to the EU feel lying for personal benefit is ‘never justified,’ only 57% of those with EU-experienced household members think the same (see table below).

If it is true that people-to-people contact creates shifts in attitudes, then a family member who has lived in the EU might ‘import’ certain value orientations into some households creating the differences manifested in the survey.

Given this, the question remains: why should having contact with someone who has lived in the EU affect individual liberalism in attitudes towards sexual matters, yet apparently negatively affect responsible social attitudes towards honesty, tax-paying, and rule of law? Is the EU a force for moral disorientation?

In answer to this, we should note that the survey does not ask if the practices in question are morally good or bad. Instead, it asks whether there might be some situations where such practices are justified. Plausibly then, those with exposure to predominantly tolerant, liberal and more relativistic values in Europe might be expected to produce flexible responses in which controversial practices are not categorically rejected on the basis of absolute moral beliefs.

So finally, perhaps we might suppose that as Georgia increases people-to-people contact through educational programs, political cooperation and trade, Georgians could slowly move towards a philosophy of ‘live and let live’.

Liberal Education Lecture: How Can It Help Us?

2011-02-17T00:58:00.012+04:00

Dr. John Schoeberlein, Project Director on Islam in Eurasia at Harvard University, gave a lecture at the Free University in Tbilisi on February 15th on the usefulness of a liberal education, specifically anthropology, for life, society, and the individual. He elaborated on his personal experiences as a former student and current professor of anthropology and presented some fascinating ideas on the importance of a liberal education.

“Everything is becoming more integrated. A larger toolbox is required,” Dr. Schoeberlein explained, referring to the promise of a liberal education to equip students with the critical abilities to think analytically, problem-solve, and understand larger aspects of culture and societal behavior. Additionally, he outlined fundamental characteristics and concepts that describe liberal education, such as an emphasis on general knowledge, rather than instruction on specific tasks. He also discussed the importance of the concept of choice for students to help formulate their own course of study and the notion that students must actively engage themselves and participate in class discussions. While he explained these notions, he made clear that he did not wish to impose this system on Georgians, but rather discuss it and make it available. As he stated, “...being a missionary is not what I want to be.”

He drew on some examples when describing how anthropology fits within the framework of a liberal education and imparts knowledge, which facilitates an understanding of certain phenomena. For example, he explained that corruption exists in various different contexts that cannot be explained aptly by current economic models; however, anthropology provides a useful approach to understand corruption by turning to the different and specific cultural contexts in which it exists and invoking ideas of authority, family relations, and honor. While a payment may be deemed an act of corruption by one culture, it may be accepted as social norms by another. In this way, an anthropological study draws on specific cases and allows one to understand social systems and elements of culture, which is an approach that is not only theoretical but also applicable.

Dr. Schoeberlein highlighted the applicability of anthropology with an example in which a factory manager needs to lead a team of employees with different cultural backgrounds. In this scenario, training in anthropological ideas could endow the manager with the skill to understand why each employee acts a certain way, how to motivate him or her, and what each one values.

These are just a few snippets of some of the ideas Dr. Schoeberlein presented. It would also be an interesting follow-up to try to evaluate what Georgians think about liberal education, in contrast to a vocation-based education system. We welcome your thoughts and comments on these topics!

Access to Justice in Central Asia | Coming Up

2011-02-14T17:50:00.000+04:00

We are in the process of completing a major research project in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) on Access to Justice. It concentrated in particular on vulnerable groups, and how they could get access to justice. Sponsored by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the project involved a nationwide survey in each of the countries, over 70 in-depth interviews, plus focus groups and an extensive literature review.

We looked at what respondents thought were some of the biggest legal problems that individuals in their country faced. Divorce figured prominently among those, making women's access to justice particularly relevant.

We also asked who inviduals would turn to on various issues, when there were problems. You see sharp differences between the countries.

We asked about trust in institutions, and among the list these are the least trusted. (Yes, that's not yet comprehensive information for you, but hopefully will whet your appetite for more.)

And we dug deeper, within the countries, to understand how people looked at the courts. Again, here a preview. It suggests that according to Kazakh citizens, competence is not the main problem in the courts.

The first presentation of results will happen on February 15 in Almaty (sorry for the short notice, but if you were likely attendee you probably received a separate invitation), and a more detailed report is out soon. Drop us a line in case you're interested in a preview, in exchange for giving us some feedback on it.

Ask CRRC | Representative Sample

2011-02-12T15:21:00.012+04:00

Q: When conducting a survey, how do you select a sample that is representative of an entire population?

A: In order for a sample to be representative of an entire population, every member of the population must have some chance of being randomly selected. In reality, there are segments of a population that can and cannot be interviewed. Therefore, we need to understand the nature of the population for which each survey is representative.

Take the Caucasus Barometer (CB) as an example. First, we randomly select voting precincts from a list of all voting precincts that contain members of the population. Thus, every precinct has a chance of being selected.

The beginning of a long list of voting precincts from which precincts are randomly selected for sampling.

Second, CRRC randomly selects households within each of the selected voting precincts. Then, interviewers conduct a “random walk” in order to randomly select households. This random walk gives each household a chance of being selected for an interview.

This CRRC interviewer has a map of households in a selected voting precinct to assist her in her “random walk” household selection. Photo by Paul Stephens.

Third, an adult household member is randomly selected for an interview within each randomly selected household. Interviewers make a list of all adult (18 years and older) household members and randomly select one of those members for an interview. The interviewer uses a kind of random number table called a “Kish table” to randomly select one of those household members to interview. Using these three steps above, each member of the population has a chance of being selected for an interview.

This household consists of a 25 year old man, a 61 year old woman and a 24 year old woman. The 25 year old man has been randomly selected for interview.

As in any country, logistical realities mean that some segments of the country’s adult population do not have a chance of being sampled. For example, some voting precincts could not be sampled even if they were randomly selected (e.g., special voting precincts for military personnel). Also, some people might not be able to be surveyed even if they were randomly selected. This includes people who do not speak the language in which the survey is conducted or those who are not physically able to be interviewed. Other excluded groups of the population include people in prisons or hospitals. The impact of losing some of these groups is relatively little since such groups are usually so small that they are within the margin of error.

By understanding which groups of the population can and cannot be included in the sample, CRRC takes all of the steps above to ensure that samples are representative of the entire population. In addition, CRRC prints questionnaires in minority languages and recruits interviewers who speak those languages so that the CB can be described as representative of the adult population of the Republic of Georgia.

Access to justice in Central Asia | Presentation of research findings in Kazakhstan

2011-02-12T14:46:00.009+04:00

CRRC has conducted a research project on access to justice in Central Asia. The project includes nationwide surveys in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, focus groups and in-depth interviews. We will be presenting the results in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on February 15, 2010, in case any of our readers are in the region. For the rest of you, we will be making the data and reports available in March. Keep your eyes open for posts here on the blog and at the CRRC webpage. For now, here’s a snapshot of the data from the surveys:

Third Stage of the Junior Research Fellowship Program at CRRC-Azerbaijan Launched!

2011-02-09T18:07:00.006+04:00

In February 11, 2011, the CRRC-Azerbaijan office launched the third stage of its Junior Research Fellowship Program, funded by the Open Society Institute Think-Tank Fund. Fifteen selected participants will attend the next round of extensive trainings that will prepare them for writing public policy papers.

The major focus of the trainings this semester will be qualitative research methods. The participants will learn how to conduct in-depth interviews, focus groups and how to perform content analysis. They will also learn tips and tricks on how to transfer data from technical charts in SPSS to attractive and understandable graphs in PowerPoint. The semester will conclude with academic writing classes in which they will exercise making citations (footnotes and endnotes) as well as writing annotated bibliographies and literature reviews.

Throughout the third stage, new, interesting and challenging competitions will be organized. By the end of the course, the fellows will be armed with new skills and knowledge, as well as the inspiration to learn more about policy analysis and to become real professionals in the field.

Observations while Traveling through Samegrelo | Agriculture and Petty Crime

2011-02-02T15:32:00.003+04:00

Much has been written about agriculture in Georgia, and the need to develop it extensively. Our upcoming reports on social capital (currently still under review with the donor) have some material on that. The typical concerns are well established: although fertile, Georgia is actually importing food. More than 50% of the employed work in agriculture, but it only contributes around 10% to GDP. And more than 50% of Georgia's arable land lies fallow.

The reasons are also familiar: privatization separated the land into small parcels that were not viable for modern farming. The people left in the countryside often are conservative and skeptical, and not quick to adopt more productive methods. They do not cooperate, and thus cannot mobilize sufficient resources to develop their land.

Traveling through Samegrelo recently highlighted another challenge. The structure of landholdings makes them particularly vulnerable to petty crime. Often the holdings are away from people's houses, so that they cannot guard them. During planting season seeds, seedlings and little plants can be stolen from the field at night, so that investing into better plants is not very attractive. Moreover, shepherds don't always respect fields that have just been fenced off anew, and let their cows trott into enclosures; or cut the fence to let a stray cow out, without repairing it.

During harvest season, the problem is even more pronounced. Unless you harvest early, your crop is at threat. And if you harvest early, you may be doing damage to the fruit. For some of the crop, the harvest season is quite long, so that the fields remain vulnerable over several weeks.

If you have a small holding, it is hard to address this problem. Sleeping outdoors on your field will only get you so far, and is not sustainable over time. With average landholdings being around less than two hectares (one hectare being a bit bigger than a soccer field), the plots are too small to pay for a security guard. Typically you will need two guards, so that they can support each other. Professional security firms would charge up to $1,000 per month. This makes it particularly difficult to experiment with higher value crops (say, avocado) since you may need a security guard to protect a handful of plants. Easier to fall back on what you have always done.

Planting in Samegrelo. This effort has fences, two security guards constantly, night vision goggles, and is about to add a trained guard dog.

We are curious whether other people have heard about this problem. If it indeed appears to be a challenge, it would be worth researching this in more detail. The government could help address this issue by providing more security through increased policing and curbing road access, together with introducing stiff sentences to signal that stopping agricultural theft is important for Georgia's economic development. Comments and ideas?

Human rights in the South Caucasus | Similarities and differences

2011-01-31T14:02:00.003+04:00

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has released its 2011 World Report of human rights conditions in the world. The report is based on investigations carried out by HRW staff in partnership with domestic human rights activists. Their findings show that several of the main human rights issues in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are similar for all three countries.

Freedom of assembly remains a problem in the South Caucasus. In Georgia, HRW points out several incidents where peaceful demonstrations were disrupted by the police. The November 2007 demonstrations are also mentioned and the government’s refusal to launch an investigation of the events. In Armenia, the report focuses on the authorities’ failure to investigate the excessive use of police force during the March 2008 demonstrations. Police officers convicted of excessive use of force were amnestied, opposition activists remain imprisoned and relatives of those killed in the demonstrations unsuccessfully appealed to the court for an investigation into the deaths. In Azerbaijan, the authorities continue to restrict the freedom of assembly by denying requests to hold demonstrations. Unauthorized demonstrations were dispersed and protestors detained.

In all three countries, there are several examples of ill-treatment in policy custody and the police has in many cases failed to conclusively investigate these incidents.

Georgia and Azerbaijan both held elections in 2010. The local elections in Georgia are mentioned as a positive development, despite some shortcomings, but the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan did not meet international standards. Only one opposition candidate gained a seat in the parliament and political parties could not express their views due to restrictions in the freedom of expression, assembly and association.

Additionally, Georgia is criticized for the authorities’ handling of the eviction of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from collective centers. According to HRW, the authorities do not engage in a dialogue with the IDPs, do not provide notice in advance of the evictions, and do not offer adequate alternatives to the collective centers. In Armenia, violations of the freedom of expression are brought up as an issue. It is, however,the lack of accountability and excessive use of force related to the March 2008 events that is the main point of criticism in HRW’s country summary for Armenia. In Azerbaijan, the focus is on journalists, political activists and bloggers who were faced with criminal charges for criticizing the authorities. Several of them also suffered physical attacks by the police. The government has failed to thoroughly investigate these incidents and continues to hold political prisoners.

HRW does not seek to rate or to compare the human rights conditions between countries. Nevertheless, the annual report provides a landmark summary of the current situation of human rights across the three countries.

You can access the full HRW report here.