Respondents were asked whether a range of these controversial activities were either ‘never justified’, ‘sometimes justified’ or ‘always justified’. Breaking down responses according to respondents from households that reported having a member who had lived in the EU for three months or more since 1993, against those from households that had no such members uncovered an interesting trend.
For example, respondents were asked whether it was ever justified for a woman to have a sexual relationship before marriage. A full 80% of respondents who had no family member who had lived in the EU reported that this was ‘never justified’, whereas only 54% of those with a family member who had lived in the EU felt the same. In terms of whether this was ‘sometimes justified’ the figures stood at 13% and 28% respectively (see table below).
A similar trend was found for attitudes to childbirth outside wedlock, as well as extra-marital affairs for both women and men. Meanwhile, though hardly anyone felt homosexuality was ‘always justified’, 10% of those with a household member who had lived in the EU felt it was ‘sometimes justified’ against only 3% of those who had no such member (see table below).
Interestingly, the same trend in attitudes held concerning such negative phenomena as lying, tax-avoidance, using criminal authorities for dispute resolution, and purchasing stolen goods. For example, while 69% of those respondents from households with no family connection to the EU feel lying for personal benefit is ‘never justified,’ only 57% of those with EU-experienced household members think the same (see table below).
If it is true that people-to-people contact creates shifts in attitudes, then a family member who has lived in the EU might ‘import’ certain value orientations into some households creating the differences manifested in the survey.
Given this, the question remains: why should having contact with someone who has lived in the EU affect individual liberalism in attitudes towards sexual matters, yet apparently negatively affect responsible social attitudes towards honesty, tax-paying, and rule of law? Is the EU a force for moral disorientation?
In answer to this, we should note that the survey does not ask if the practices in question are morally good or bad. Instead, it asks whether there might be some situations where such practices are justified. Plausibly then, those with exposure to predominantly tolerant, liberal and more relativistic values in Europe might be expected to produce flexible responses in which controversial practices are not categorically rejected on the basis of absolute moral beliefs.
So finally, perhaps we might suppose that as Georgia increases people-to-people contact through educational programs, political cooperation and trade, Georgians could slowly move towards a philosophy of ‘live and let live’.